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MONARCHIANISM AND ORIGEN’S EARLY TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY 
Stephen E. Waers, B.A., M.Div. 
 
Marquette University, 2016 
This dissertation unfolds in two parts. In the first, I offer a reconstruction of the 
core of monarchian theology using four main primary texts: Hippolytus’ Contra Noetum, 
Tertullian’s Adversus Praxean, the Refutatio omnium haeresium (often attributed to 
Hippolytus), and Novatian’s De Trinitate. The monarchian controversy enters the 
historical record at the beginning of the third century, but we know little of its origins or 
motivations. The first part begins with a hypothesis about what might have prompted the 
rise of monarchianism. Following that, I give an account of the core of monarchian 
teaching using the sources listed above. My account gives specific attention to both major 
theological themes and exegetical trends in monarchian theology. Not only is such an 
account lacking in English-language scholarship, but I also use a different method than 
the methods used in those few non-English accounts that exist. The result of part one of 
the dissertation is a portrait of the monarchians who sought to preserve the unity and 
uniqueness of God by claiming things such as “the Father and the Son are one and the 
same.” Such an overtly anti-Trinitarian theology, I argue, catalyzed the development of 
Trinitarian theology by creating a need to better articulate the unity and distinction of the 
Father and Son. 
 
In part two of the dissertation, I offer a limited rereading of Origen’s early 
Trinitarian theology in light of the monarchian controversy. I focus on books 1-2 of his 
Commentary on John. Against the trend of many contemporary scholars who use 
anachronistic categories to interpret Origen’s Trinitarian theology, I seek to read him 
within his own context in the early third century. I argue that Origen’s anti-monarchian 
polemics caused him to develop and utilize a rich Wisdom Christology. Finally, I 
approach the question of whether Origen was a “subordinationist” by reframing the 
question within the horizon of anti-monarchian polemics in the early third century. I 
conclude that Origen can be considered a “subordinationist” and that subordinationism 
was a commonly employed anti-monarchian polemical strategy. Origen used 
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together. My conversations with Kellen Plaxco on Origen, monarchianism, and Middle 
Platonism have been enriching and enlightening. Such friends have interrupted the 
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The opening books of Origen’s Commentary on John (ComJn) are some of the 
most important for the study of his early theology.1 Origen’s commentary on the 
“spiritual Gospel” in these books is preserved in Greek that Rufinus has not emended. 
Within these two books that focus on the prologue to the Gospel of John, one particular 
passage stands out for the vivid way in which it discusses the relationship between the 
Father, Son, and the created order: ComJn 2.13-33. As I argue in the last two chapters of 
the dissertation, the first two books of ComJn and especially this passage are an 
important touchstone for reconstructing Origen’s early Trinitarian theology.2 
Near the beginning of ComJn 2.13ff, Origen informs his readers that he is 
attempting to resolve the problem of some God-loving, but misguided Christians.3 There 
are some Christians, Origen observes, who are afraid that they could be understood to be 
proclaiming two gods. To avoid this misunderstanding, some of these Christians affirmed 
that the Son is divine but denied that he is distinct from the Father; others affirmed that 
                                                 
1 I discuss the reasons for the importance of ComJn 1-2 in much greater detail at the beginning of 
chapter four. Briefly stated, however, it is important for the following reasons: (1) it survives in Greek; (2) 
the vast majority of Origen’s theological writing occurs in biblical commentaries; (3) Origen thinks the 
Gospel of John has pride of place among the Gospels; (4) the Gospel of John was important for a number 
of divergent theological streams in the early-third century, like Valentinianism. See Ronald Heine’s 
discussion of ComJn’s importance: Ronald E. Heine, Origen: Scholarship in the Service of the Church, 
Christian Theology in Context (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 86–103. 
2 My judgment about the importance of this passage is shared by other notable scholars. Jean 
Daniélou notes that “this passage expresses the very heart of Origen’s vision of the Godhead.” See his 
Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture, trans. John Austin Baker, History of Early Christian Doctrine 
before the Council of Nicaea 2 (London: Longman & Todd, 1973), 382. Henri Crouzel also observes the 
importance of this passage and notes that it has caused a good deal of controversy. See Henri Crouzel, 
Origen, trans. A. S. Worrall (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1989), 181. 





the Son is distinct from the Father but denied the Son’s divinity.4 Origen does not identify 
the proponents of this theology by name or tell us much about their background. A survey 
of Christian writings roughly contemporary with the beginning of Origen’s ComJn 
reveals that the theology Origen was attempting to correct was not an isolated 
phenomenon. In these writings, we encounter Christians who were so concerned to 
protect the uniqueness of God that they accused their opponents of proclaiming two gods 
or being ditheists.5 In order to avoid what they viewed as ditheism, these theologians 
often professed that the Father and the Son are “one and the same,” thus denying any 
distinction between them.6 These theologians, attested outside of Origen’s ComJn, 
propounded a theology that seems very similar to what Origen is dealing with in ComJn 
2.16. Scholars refer to this theological position as monarchianism, among other titles.7 
If in ComJn 2.13ff Origen was addressing monarchian theology, then a proper 
historical understanding of Origen’s argument requires knowledge of the state of 
monarchian theology at the beginning of the third century. Many scholarly accounts of 
                                                 
4 The two attempts to avoid proclaiming two gods here roughly line up with what I label 
“monarchianism” and “psilanthropism.” The former dealt with the problem of proclaiming both that there 
is only one God and that the Son is divine by arguing that the Son is the same as the Father. The latter dealt 
with the problem by denying that the Son was divine. Although they answered the question differently, 
each position was concerned to protect the claim that there is only one God. As I make clear in my later 
discussion of monarchianism, it is often linked to psilanthropism—probably because they shared the 
concern to protect the uniqueness of God. 
5 For the concern to avoid proclaiming two gods, see: Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 11.1, 14.2-3; 
Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 3.1; and Refutatio omnium haeresium 9.12.16. As I discuss in much detail 
later, questions about the authorship of the Refutatio are so debated that I treat it as an anonymous text. 
6 For the explicit claim that the Father and Son are “one and the same,” see: Tertullian, Adversus 
Praxean 2.3; Refutatio 9.10.11-2. Again, I examine these texts very closely in the following chapters. 
7 As I discuss below, there is no consensus among scholars about what to call this theological 
position. Other names used to denote the position are “patripassianism,” “modalism,” and “Sabellianism.” 
Beyond the issue of what to call this theology, there is no universally agreed upon definition of what made 
up the core of this theology. Therefore, I continue to use the title “monarchian;” but I define it clearly so as 





Origen’s Trinitarian theology are inadequate because they are deficient in two respects. 
First, scholars frequently fail to read Origen as engaging with monarchianism.8 Second, 
when scholars do include attention to Origen’s engagement with monarchianism, they 
typically work with an anemic understanding of monarchianism as some vague, generic 
form of modalism, which itself functions as an ill-defined buzzword.9 These two specific 
deficiencies are the result of a broader trend in scholarship on Origen’s Trinitarian 
theology. A number of scholars are more concerned with the role of Origen’s theology in 
the development of later Nicene and post-Nicene Trinitarian theologies than they are with 
how it functioned in its contemporary context. The unfortunate byproduct of this way of 
reading Origen is that scholars give his contemporary context—especially his 
engagement with monarchianism—too little attention. 
The work of this dissertation is to remedy both of the deficiencies in scholarly 
readings of Origen’s Trinitarian theology. First, it argues that Origen’s engagement with 
monarchianism as he wrote the opening books of his ComJn shaped the way he 
articulated his Trinitarian theology. Second, it provides a clear and detailed 
reconstruction of monarchianism as it had developed by the beginning of the third 
century. The first part of the dissertation reconstructs the main contours of monarchian 
theology using primary sources written in the first half of the third century. The 
dissertation then rereads key passages from ComJn 1-2 where Origen engages with 
                                                 
8 As I note later, some scholars note that Origen’s polemic against modalism shaped his theology; 
but they do not elaborate on how it did. There are also a few notable exceptions to this trend, which I 
discuss later. 
9 Such is the case with the recent work of Christoph Bruns. For him, monarchianism or modalism 
is the bugaboo Origen is attempting to avoid and refute, but Bruns provides no detail or texture about the 
position Origen is opposing. See Christoph Bruns, Trinität und Kosmos: Zur Gotteslehre des Origenes, 





monarchian theology. Not only does the dissertation focus on the fact that Origen was 
engaged with monarchians early in his career, but it also offers a clearer picture of what 
the monarchians taught than is common in scholarship. The result is a deep, contextual 
rereading of Origen’s early Trinitarian theology as expressed in one small part of his 
expansive corpus.10 It is not an attempt at a grand pan-oeuvre reconstruction of Origen’s 
Trinitarian theology and, thus, does not attempt to address the question of development 
within Origen’s thought.11 
Monarchianism 
 Questions about monotheism and the position of Jesus in relation to the one God 
remained active and disputed well into the third century of the Common Era.12 These 
questions were raised with exceptional intensity in the so-called monarchian controversy, 
which erupted in Rome at the beginning of the third century. Despite and because of the 
                                                 
10 This dissertation is a long-form version of what Michel R. Barnes calls a “dense reading.” 
Barnes has laid out the criteria that are needed to judge the credibility of a reading of any given historical 
text. See Michel R. Barnes, “Rereading Augustine’s Theology of the Trinity,” in The Trinity: An 
Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Trinity, ed. Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, and Gerald O’Collins 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 150–4. I will summarize the main points he makes instead of 
reproducing his seven criteria here. A “Barnesian dense reading” requires that a text be read with careful 
attention to its contemporary context. Attention to both the immediate context in which a text was produced 
and the antecedent tradition that shaped that context is necessary for a credible reading of the text. Barnes 
gives more detail about this methodology in the essay cited above, but the main point is that we best 
understand a text by reading it in its original context and with attention to the forces that shaped that 
context. In the case of my dissertation, my reading of Origen required that I first reconstruct 
monarchianism. Had I not reconstructed this primary context for the key passage from ComJn 2.13ff, my 
reading of Origen would have lacked credibility. 
11 Such an ambitious project will be able to build on of the work I do here. My hope is that dense 
and textured accounts such as the one I give will enable more nuanced portraits of Origen’s Trinitarian 
theology as a whole and over the whole course of his career.. 
12 See, among others, the work of Larry Hurtado, who has traced the question of the divinity of 
Jesus and monotheism well into the second century. Larry W. Hurtado, One God, One Lord: Early 
Christian Devotion and Ancient Jewish Monotheism, 2nd ed (London: T&T Clark, 1998); idem, Lord Jesus 





strident opposition to monarchianism that arose in the early third century, it is difficult to 
develop a clear account of monarchian theology. The reconstruction of the main contours 
of monarchian theology is the focus of the first part of this dissertation. 
 Monarchian theology is difficult to reconstruct for two main reasons. The first is 
that we possess no texts from the monarchians themselves. Whereas the study of the 
varieties of Gnosticism has been aided by the discovery of the Nag Hammadi texts, 
scholars have not been so fortunate as to discover a cache of monarchian primary 
sources. The second difficulty arises from the fact that any portrait of monarchian 
theology at the beginning of the third century must be built upon four main texts, all of 
which are hostile witnesses to monarchianism.13 Their hostility to monarchianism means 
that their accounts can be tendentious and offer polemical caricatures.14 
The four main texts that attest to monarchianism are Hippolytus’ Contra Noetum, 
Tertullian’s Adversus Praxean, the Refutatio omnium haeresium (often attributed to 
Hippolytus), and Novatian’s De Trinitate. There is general agreement among scholars 
about the authorship and dating of Adversus Praxean and De Trinitate, but the same 
cannot be said of Contra Noetum and the Refutatio.15 These texts were produced during 
                                                 
13 By hostile witnesses, I mean that each of these texts seeks to refute monarchian positions. 
Because of their anti-monarchian orientation, these texts are often prone to distort the positions of those 
whom they oppose. As I discuss later, Eusebius’ Ecclesiastical History can be of some use for 
reconstructing the situation of the church at Rome during the time the monarchian controversy broke out; 
but he is oddly silent on the details of the controversy itself. 
14 This is especially the case with the Refutatio, whose well-known polemical distortions I discuss 
in more length in a later chapter. 
15 I discuss the many issues surrounding these texts and questions about the identity of Hippolytus 
in the later chapters. For the time being, suffice it to say that there is little scholarly agreement about the 
authorship, dating, and geographical provenance of these texts. Most scholars think the Refutatio was 
produced in Rome or the surrounding regions, but they are divided about the geographical provenance of 





the first half of the third century, and they offer different views of monarchianism.16 The 
first part of my dissertation uses these four texts to build a picture of monarchian 
theology. My primary interest in these texts is not what they can tell us about the 
theology of their authors; it is what they can tell us about the theology of their opponents, 
the monarchians. Specifically, I am interested in establishing the monarchians’ core 
theological commitments and the theological themes to which they give the most 
attention. Furthermore, my account of monarchianism focuses on which biblical texts 
they used and how they exegeted scripture; for in the minds of the disputants, the debate 
was fundamentally about the proper interpretation of scripture.17 
Major Scholarship on Monarchianism 
Such a detailed account of monarchian theology is necessary because it has been 
neglected in much recent scholarship. Furthermore, most of the serious treatments of 
monarchianism have focused on something other than a reconstruction of the core of 
monarchian theology and exegesis. A brief survey of the major accounts of 
                                                 
16 By suggesting that these texts were produced in the first half of the third century, I am rejecting 
the claims of Josef Frickel’s later work, where he argues that Contra Noetum, at least in its final form, is a 
product of the fourth century at the earliest. See Josef Frickel, “Hippolyts Schrift Contra Noetum: ein 
Pseudo-Hippolyt,” in Logos: Festschrift für Luise Abramowski, ed. Hans Christof Brennecke, Ernst Ludwig 
Grasmück, and Christoph Markschies, Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und 
die Kunde der älteren Kirche 67 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1993), 87–123. In addition, as I note in later chapters, 
most scholars think there is some sort of dependence between Contra Noetum and Adversus Praxean. 
17 Note especially Hippolytus’ repeated remarks about Monarchian misuse of scripture in Contra 
Noetum. He accuses the Noetians of interpreting individual verses outside of the context of whole passages 
(3.1). He complains that they “hack the scriptures to pieces” (περικόπτουσι τὰς γραφάς) (4.2). Later in the 
work, he implies that the Noetian exegesis is the result of a misuse of προαίρεσις (9.3). See also Mark 
DelCogliano’s article on anti-Monarchian exegetical strategies: Mark DelCogliano, “The Interpretation of 
John 10:30 in the Third Century: Antimonarchian Polemics and the Rise of Grammatical Reading 





monarchianism will help demonstrate the need for my work.18 Following Hagemann’s 
seminal study of the church in Rome, 19 Harnack produced a number of accounts of 
monarchianism that shaped discourse for much of the twentieth century.20 Harnack’s 
division of monarchianism into two main streams, modalistic and dynamistic, has 
become a scholarly commonplace.21 Harnack’s account is colored by his overarching 
assumption that the speculative theology of the learned Logos theologians was at odds 
with the simple faith of the uneducated masses.22 He proposed that it was this opposition 
between the learned theologians and the simple laity that gave rise to the monarchian 
controversy and that monarchianism was an attempt to protect the pure faith against the 
intrusion of speculation which derived from Hellenistic philosophy.23 
                                                 
18 My account here is highly selective. I am only discussing the most substantial and influential 
treatments of monarchianism, especially those that address monarchianism as their main topic. 
19 Hermann Hagemann, Die römische Kirche und ihr Einfluss auf Disciplin und Dogma in den 
drei ersten Jahrhunderten (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1864). Note also La Piana’s oft-cited article on the 
Church in Rome in the late second century: George La Piana, “The Roman Church at the End of the 
Second Century: The Episcopate of Victor, the Latinization of the Roman Church, the Easter Controversy, 
Consolidation of Power and Doctrinal Development, the Catacomb of Callistus,” Harvard Theological 
Review 18, no. 3 (1925): 201–77. 
20 Harnack’s most comprehensive treatment is found in Adolf von Harnack, Lehrbuch der 
dogmengeschichte, vol. 1 (Freiburg: Mohr, 1886), 556–662. I will quote from and cite the following 
English translation: Adolf von Harnack, History of Dogma, trans. Neil Buchanan, vol. 3 (Boston: Little, 
Brown, and Company, 1907), 1–118.  Note also Harnack’s influential encyclopedia entry: 
“Monarchianismus,” in Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche, ed. J. J. Herzog and 
Albert Hauck, 3rd ed., vol. 13, 24 vols. (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1903), 303–36.  An abridged English 
translation of this article can be found in “Monarchianism,” in The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of 
Religious Knowledge, ed. Samuel Macauley Jackson and George William Gilmore, 13 vols. (Grand Rapids, 
Mich.: Baker, 1963), 7:453–61. 
21 See, for example, Harnack, History of Dogma, 3:13; Harnack, “Monarchianism,” 454. Although 
the referents of Harnack’s terms are fairly clear, I later propose a more restrictive definition of 
monarchianism that aims to highlight their central concern. I will discuss the difficulties that accompany 
naming the controversy shortly. 
22 He gives this position at length at the beginning of the third volume of his History of Dogma. 
23 There are a whole host of factors that influenced his thinking in this regard, but they are beyond 
the scope of this current dissertation. For an exploration of some of the motivations behind Harnack’s 





Harnack’s theory about the divide between the scholars and the laity quickly 
found a proponent in the work of Jules Lebreton, who produced a series of essays that 
were influential for years to come.24 His essays in turn influenced the authors of major 
encyclopedia entries on monarchianism during the first half of the twentieth century.25 In 
the middle of the twentieth century, Ernest Evans gave a condensed account of the 
monarchian controversy in the introduction to his translation of Adversus Praxean.26 His 
is a good general overview, although its brevity still leaves a need for a fuller account. 
 In the 1980s, Michael Decker completed a dissertation on monarchianism.27 One 
of the chief goals of the dissertation was a source-critical study of monarchianism. From 
this source-critical study, he concludes that nearly all of the biblical exegesis attributed to 
the Noetians in Contra Noetum is the polemical invention of Hippolytus; he does not 
                                                 
Culture: Essays in Honor of Philip Rousseau, ed. Blake Leyerle and Robin Darling Young (Notre Dame, 
Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2013), 295–314. 
24 Jules Lebreton, “Le désaccord de la foi populaire et de la théologie savante dans l’Église 
chrétienne du IIIe siècle (à suivre),” Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique 19, no. 4 (1923): 481–506; “Le 
désaccord de la foi populaire et de la théologie savante dans l’Église chrétienne du IIIe siècle (suite et fin),” 
Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique 20, no. 1 (1924): 5–37. These essays have since been criticized. See 
Marguerite Harl, Origène et la fonction révélatrice du verbe incarné, Patristica Sorbonensia 2 (Paris: 
Éditions du Seuil, 1958), 46. She writes, “Ces deux articles sont typiques d'une conception encore fort 
répandue dans les dictionnaires et encyclopédies, mais qui semble dépassée.” See also a similar thesis to 
that of Lebreton advanced in the 1960s: Harry James Carpenter, “Popular Christianity and the Theologians 
in the Early Centuries,” Journal of Theological Studies 14, no. 2 (1963): 294–310. 
25 Gustave Bardy, “Monarchianisme,” in Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, contenant l’exposé 
des doctrines de la théologie catholique, leurs preuves et leur histoire, ed. Alfred Vacant, E. Mangenot, 
and Emile Amann, 15 vols. (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1929), 10.2:2193–2209; Henri Leclercq, 
“Monarchianisme,” in Dictionnaire d’archéologie chrétienne et de liturgie, ed. Fernand Cabrol and Henri 
Leclercq, 15 vols. (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1934), 11.2:1947–64. The structure, content, and wording of 
these two articles is strikingly similar. Leclercq seems to have been almost solely reliant on the prior work 
of Bardy, to the point that his own work lacks much original material. 
26 Tertullian, Tertullian’s Treatise against Praxeas, ed. Ernest Evans (London: S.P.C.K., 1948), 6–
18. 
27 Michael Decker, “Die Monarchianer: Frühchristliche Theologie im Spannungsfeld zwischen 
Rom und Kleinasien” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Hamburg, 1987). This dissertation is rarely cited in 





think that Noetian theology relied heavily on biblical exegesis.28 Throughout the course 
of his dissertation, Decker casts the monarchian controversy as a clash between different 
theological systems developed in Asia Minor and Rome.29 Despite its novel approach to 
the monarchian controversy, Decker’s work still does not leave us with a coherent picture 
of the core of monarchian thought.30 
Shortly after Decker’s work, two scholars produced major studies of 
monarchianism. Starting in the late 1980s, Reinhard Hübner developed a series of 
arguments that radically reinterpreted a number of the primary texts related to 
monarchianism.31 One of Hübner’s main contentions is that monarchiansim arose as a 
reaction against Gnosticism and that it appeared early in the second century.32 Perhaps 
the most idiosyncratic feature of Hübner’s arguments is that he reasons that Noetus was 
                                                 
28 See, for example, Ibid., 156–7. As I note in my chapter on Contra Noetum and my conclusions 
about Monarchianism, I find Decker’s conclusion problematic. Biblical exegesis was deeply interwoven 
into the thought of the Noetians and all of the other monarchians. If Hippolytus invented this Noetian 
exegesis, he is a skillful literary craftsman indeed. 
29 He articulates this point very strongly on pp. 200-5. I also have some serious objections to his 
presentation of the monarchian controversy as a conflict between Eastern and Western theologies, but I 
deal with that at more length later. 
30 By “core of monarchian theology” I mean those theological elements that recur in the four 
major texts that I study. As I note numerous times throughout the dissertation, I think the core of 
monarchianism entailed two commitments and one accompanying conclusion: (1) There is one God (the 
Father); (2) Jesus is God; therefore, Jesus and the Father are one and the same. The beginning of Contra 
Noetum presents a very condensed account of monarchian teaching and its exegetical underpinnings.  
31 Hübner’s essays, which were published in various venues, were gathered into a collected 
volume in 1999. For the sake of ease, I will cite them as they appear in that volume. See Reinhard M 
Hübner, Der Paradox Eine: Antignostischer Monarchianismus im zweiten Jahrhundert (Leiden; Boston: 
Brill, 1999). Note also Mark Edwards’ somewhat critical review of the volume: M. J. Edwards, “Review of 
Der Paradox Eine: Antignostischer Monarchianismus im zweiten Jahrhundert,” Journal of Theological 
Studies 52, no. 1 (2001): 354–56. 
32 See in particular two of his essays within the collected volume: “Die antignostische 
Glaubensregel des Noët von Smyrna,” (39-94); and “Der antivalentinianische Charakter der Theologie des 
Noët von Smyrna,” (95-129). As I have argued in an essay tentatively forthcoming in Studia Patristica, I 
think Hübner’s broad thesis is correct. Anti-Gnostic polemics probably played some role in the formation 
of monarchian theology. However, I disagree on many of the particular details of his argument, especially 





active early in the second century and that figures like Ignatius and Melito were reliant on 
his theology.33 His argument calls for a highly revisionist chronology that is not justified 
by the evidence. Like the treatments of monarchianism before him, Hübner’s fails to 
produce a clear account of the core of monarchian teaching. 
The latest major treatment of monarchianism is Gabino Uríbarri Bilbao’s tome 
written in the mid-1990s.34 Bilbao’s main concern is to trace the use of the term μοναρχία 
in order to determine how it relates to Trinity. Specifically, he wants to know whether the 
term μοναρχία necessarily excludes a Trinitarian understanding of God. To answer this 
question, he begins by tracing the early philosophical roots of the term and follows its 
usage well into third-century Christian texts. At the end, Bilbao concludes that μοναρχία 
is not necessarily opposed to a Trinitarian understanding of God. Because of this 
conclusion, he judges Praxeas’ alleged anti-Trinitarian use of the term to be a 
bastardization of its normal use.35 Although Bilbao’s book is a careful and nuanced study 
of the use and history of the term μοναρχία, he does not seek to offer a comprehensive 
account of monarchian theology. Indeed, as Bilbao reminds his readers on multiple 
occasions, the term μοναρχία itself was not at the heart of the monarchian position. His 
                                                 
33 Most think Ignatius wrote somewhere between 105 and 115 C.E. Melito probably wrote during 
the 160s. From the scarce data available, scholars typically place Noetus at the end of the second century. 
34 Gabino Uríbarri Bilbao, Monarquía y Trinidad: El concepto teológico “monarchia” en la 
controversia “monarquiana,” Publicaciones de la Universidad Pontificia Comillas Madrid, Serie 1: 
Estudios 62 (Madrid: UPCO, 1996). See also his earlier exploration of the question: “Monarquía : Apuntes 
sobre el estado de la cuestión,” Estudios eclesiásticos 69, no. 270 (1994): 343–66. 
35 See Uríbarri Bilbao, Monarquía y Trinidad, 226. There, he writes, “Praxeas' way of 
understanding the monarchy is an isolated and exceptional case within the Christian literature that has been 
handed down to us” (La manera de entender la monarquía de Praxeas es un caso aislado y excepcional 





compelling argument that the term μοναρχία was not at odds with Trinitarian theology 
still leaves need for the careful reconstruction I undertake. 
None of the major works on monarchianism provides a nuanced reconstruction of 
their core theological positions by using the full array of extant sources.36 This is 
precisely the gap in scholarship that I aim to fill in part one of this dissertation. 
Monarchianism did not arise out of nowhere. Although the extant witnesses we have for 
it are laconic with regard to its theological origins, I first offer a hypothesis about what 
theological developments in the second century might have prompted its rise. After 
giving a hypothesis about the theological origins of monarchianism, I seek to establish a 
stable core of monarchian theology through a careful examination of the four primary 
sources I listed above. I describe their theology by focusing on major themes that recur 
throughout the different texts, such as the visibility of God, the explicit identification of 
the Father and Son, and the suffering of the Father, among others. By focusing on these 
major themes, I am able to identify both a stable core of monarchian theology (the things 
that remain constant over the time period of the texts that I study) and the elements of 
monarchian theology that underwent development, perhaps in response to the growing 
criticism from anti-monarchian writers. In addition, I highlight their exegetical tendencies 
and popular biblical texts that might have belonged to some sort of monarchian dossier of 
proof texts. 
There is one more problem I must attend to in this introduction: what to call the 
monarchian controversy. Scholars have long noted that settling on a name for the 
                                                 
36 There are, however, some excellent and nuanced studies of Monarchianism that focus on a 
smaller issue. See, for example, Ronald Heine’s excellent study, “The Christology of Callistus,” Journal of 





phenomenon often referred to as the monarchian controversy is difficult. In antiquity, the 
proponents of this theology were variously called “monarchians,” “Sabellians,” and 
“patripassians.”37 Each of these names for the theological position is objectionable for 
different reasons. In the first place, not all of the so-called “monarchians” gave the term 
μοναρχία a central place in their theology.38 The use of the title “Sabellian” for the 
theology I am considering is also problematic. One of the primary reasons such a title is 
problematic is that we know almost nothing about the theology of Sabellius. As I note in 
an excursus in my discussion of Novatian, we have almost no specific details about 
Sabellius’ theology from contemporary sources; and the later heresiologists mistakenly 
attribute later teaching to him. Calling this theology “Sabellianism” obscures the fact that 
these theological positions antedated Sabellius, about whom we know very little.39 
Finally, to call this theology “patripassianism” veils the central concern of these 
theologians. As Ronald Heine notes, the claim that the Father suffered was built on the 
                                                 
37 Contemporary scholars also call them “modalists;” and while this term can be helpful, it does 
not easily map onto any of the key terms used in the primary texts. I avoid using it for this reason, although 
I do not find it completely unhelpful. 
38 This is one of the central contentions of Bilbao. See Uríbarri Bilbao, Monarquía y Trinidad, 
226, 279. Instead of “monarchians,” Bilbao prefers to call them “patripassians” or “Sabellians.” But these 
designations have their own sets of problems. See especially his discussion of the naming: Ibid., 497–500. 
Note also Simonetti’s critical response to some of Bilbao’s conclusions about the use of the term μοναρχία: 
Manlio Simonetti, “Monarchia e Trinità: Alcune osservazioni su un libro recente,” Rivista di storia e 
letteratura religiosa 33, no. 3 (1997): 627–8. 
39 For discussions of the difficulties surrounding Sabellius, see Reinhard M Hübner, “Die 
Hauptquelle des Epiphanius (Panarion, haer 65) über Paulus von Samosata: Ps-Athanasius, Contra 
Sabellianos,” Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte 90, no. 2–3 (1979): 201–20; Joseph T. Lienhard, “Basil of 
Caesarea, Marcellus of Ancyra, and ‘Sabellius,’” Church History 58, no. 2 (1989): 157–67; M. Simonetti, 
“Sulla recente fortuna del ‘Contra Sabellianos’ ps. atanasiano,” Rivista di storia e letteratura religiosa 26, 
no. 1 (1990): 117–32; Wolfgang A. Bienert, “Sabellius und Sabellianismus als historisches Problem,” in 
Logos: Festschrift für Luise Abramowski (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1993), 124–39; idem, “Wer war 





more fundamental, exegetically-based claims that the Father and Son were identical.40 
Even more, as becomes evident in my later discussions, although the commitment to the 
identity of Father and Son remained unwavering, judgments about the patripassian 
implications of this fundamental stance varied as the theology developed.41 
Although there are problems with each of the main terms used to describe the 
theology I am studying, I have chosen to refer to it as “monarchianism” in this 
dissertation.42 As is clear at the end of my examination of the primary texts in the first 
part of the dissertation, the monarchians had two core commitments: (1) God is one 
alone; (2) Jesus is God. These two core commitments led them to conclude that the 
Father and the Son are “one and the same” (ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ).43 This is the heart of the 
theological position I am calling monarchianism. Thus, those whom I call monarchians 
are the same as those called “modalistic monarchians” in Harnack’s popular 
phraseology.44 By confining my definition of “monarchianism” to those who hold (1) and 
(2) above, as well as the concomitant identification of Father and Son, I am able to 
                                                 
40 He writes, “The monarchian thesis, in which the Noetians included Christ, is derived from their 
reading of Scripture, but the patripassianist thesis is supported solely by logic based on the monarchian 
thesis.”  Heine, “The Christology of Callistus,” 83. 
41 Of note here are the sections in Adversus Praxean and the Refutatio where monarchian 
theologians seem to shy away from affirming that the Father suffered. I discuss these passages in later 
sections on the suffering of the Father in the chapters on Adversus Praxean and the Refutatio. 
42 I do this fully conscious of Bilbao’s valid critique and observation that the term itself is not 
necessarily opposed to Trinitarian understandings of God. I think the problems with the other terms, such 
as “Sabellianism” and “patripassianism” outweigh Bilbao’s point about the use of μοναρχία. 
43 See Refutatio 9.10.11-12 for this claim. See also the same claim in Adversus Praxean 2.3. 
44 In the later chapters, I discuss the differences and similarities between Harnack’s “dynamistic 
Monarchians,” whom I prefer to call “psilanthropists,” and his “modalistic monarchians.” Although they 






identify the core of the theology while still allowing for more precise descriptions of the 
diversity and development within it. 
My research into monarchianism constitutes part one of the dissertation and 
presents a clearer picture of the monarchian theological commitments than has yet been 
produced. The spate of anti-monarchian works produced at the beginning of the third 
century shows that some prominent theologians viewed it as a major threat. With my 
reconstruction of monarchian theology in place, we will be better able to understand why 
some viewed it as such a threat.45 Furthermore, this reconstruction of their theology 
allows us to understand the role they played in the development of Trinitarian theology in 
the early third century. Part two of this dissertation is a modest attempt to begin revisiting 
the development of Trinitarian theology at the beginning of the third century with fuller 
attention given to the anti-monarchian context.  
Origen 
Origen is a battlefield on which scholars anachronistically fight about pro- and 
anti-Nicene trajectories, all laying claim to his “true” thought.46 The vast impact of his 
                                                 
45 A fulsome reconstruction of monarchian theology will allow us to move beyond such outdate 
assumptions as those that underwrote the work of Harnack and Lebreton, for example. 
46 The legacy of Origen was already controverted less than one hundred years after his death. His 
theology was appropriated and adapted to support varied, and sometimes opposed, theologies. See, for 
example, two clear treatments of the appropriation of Origen in the fourth-century doctrinal conflicts: 
Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), 20–30; Rowan Williams, Arius: Heresy and Tradition, rev. ed (Grand 
Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2002), 117–57. Consider also R. P. C. Hanson’s deliberation about the 
relationship between Origen’s theology and Arius: The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God: The 
Arian Controversy, 318-381 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1988), 60–70. For a more recent account in which 
Origen plays a foundational role, see Christopher A. Beeley, The Unity of Christ: Continuity and Conflict 
in Patristic Tradition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012). Beeley is more concerned with 
Christological issues than with Nicaea, but his whole project hinges on his reading of Origen, “the great 





thought in the fourth century and beyond is undeniable, but the preoccupation with 
determining who got Origen “right” often distorts our vision of his thought.47 Origen is 
more than the Nachleben of his theology in the fourth century. Instead of reading Origen 
in situ, scholars often read Origen with one eye toward Nicaea, looking for anticipation, 
development, and consonance in every phrase.48 They depict an Origen always coursing 
through time toward Nicaea and its aftermath.49 Origen, it seems, is always on a train 
barreling forward in time that scholars often fail to examine before it leaves the station of 
his own context, his own time in the first half of the third century. 
                                                 
Writing in the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas could echo the sentiment of earlier heresiologists that 
Origen was the source of Arius’ heresy: Super Boetium de Trinitate, II, Q. 3, A. 4.   
47 Our readings of Origen are shaped as much by later appropriations of him as they are by his 
contemporary context. 
48 A prime example is the continuous debate about whether Origen used the term homoousios. The 
most important attestation of the term in Origen’s corpus comes from a fragment of Origen’s Commentary 
on Hebrews in Rufinus’ Latin translation of Pamphilius’ Apology for Origen. Despite such scant evidence 
that Origen actually used this term, scholars devote substantial attention to the question of whether Origen 
could have used it. This focus, I contend, is the product of reading Nicaea back onto Origen. The reasoning 
runs something like this: 1) Origen’s theology was important in the Nicene debates; 2) homoousios was a 
key term in the Nicene debates; 3) therefore, we must determine how (or if) Origen used this important 
term. Scholars pursue the question even though the preponderance of evidence suggests that Origen did not 
use the term, or that if he did, it was not a major part of this theology. With the caveat that I think the 
question itself is anachronistic, I am inclined to agree with Hanson, Williams, and Ayres that Origen 
probably did not use the term. See R. P. C. Hanson, “Did Origen Apply the Word Homoousios to the 
Son?,” in Épektasis: Mélanges patristiques offerts au cardinal Jean Daniélou, ed. Jacques Fontaine and 
Charles Kannengiesser (Paris: Beauchesne, 1972), 293–303; Williams, Arius, 131–7; Ayres, Nicaea and Its 
Legacy, 24. For a scholar who argues in the affirmative, see M. J. Edwards, “Did Origen Apply the Word 
Homoousios to the Son,” Journal of Theological Studies 49 (1998): 658–70. See also Ramelli’s more 
recent claims that Origen used homoousios: Ilaria Ramelli, “Origen’s Anti-Subordinationism and Its 
Heritage in the Nicene and Cappadocian Line,” Vigiliae Christianae 65, no. 1 (2011): 31–2. Note also 
Henri Crouzel, Théologie de l’image de Dieu chez Origène, Théologie, Études publiées sous la direction de 
la facultéde théologie S.J. de Lyon-Fourvière 34 (Paris: Aubier, 1956), 99–100. 
49 Geoffrey Dunn observes this tendency in scholarship, even if he cannot completely extricate 
himself from it: “The hermeneutical principle that texts and theological history are to be understood in their 
own contexts and not in the light of later developments is an important one to repeat. Words like orthodoxy 
and heresy are often not helpful when considering the development of doctrine because they condition us to 
project backwards thoughts, expressions, positions, and outcomes which were not in place at the time.” 
Geoffrey D. Dunn, “The Diversity and Unity of God in Novatian’s De Trinitate,” Ephemerides theologicae 





This tendency to project Origen toward Nicaea is easily recognizable in some 
major contemporary narratives about Nicene and post-Nicene Trinitarian theology and 
Christology.50 This debate has, for some time, revolved around the question of whether 
Origen was a “subordinationist.”51 The bulk of scholars in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries have had no doubt that Origen’s Trinitarian theology was a prime example of 
subordinationism.52 Some of these scholars, like Lebreton,53 lack nuance in their 
                                                 
50 See especially in this regard Beeley, The Unity of Christ. Beeley’s reading of Origen forms the 
substrate on which the rest of his argument is built. This trend is even evident in the title of one of 
Ramelli’s essays on Origen: Ramelli, “Origen’s Anti-Subordinationism and Its Heritage in the Nicene and 
Cappadocian Line.” My point here is that the trend for reading Origen is “Origen and X Nicene or post-
Nicene figure or concept” rather than “Origen and X antecedent or contemporary problem.” 
51 Lewis Ayres discusses the difficulty that accompanies the use of the term “subordinationism.” 
He notes that its application to pre-Nicene figures often “directs our attention away from the concern to 
emphasize continuity of being between the [Father and Son].” Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy, 21. Ayres 
himself prefers to use the term to describe theologies “whose clear intent is to subordinate the Son to the 
Father in opposition to the gradual emergence of Nicene and pro-Nicene theologies” (Ibid.). Ayres’ 
corrective here is useful, but I will continue to use the term in my description of pre-Nicene theologians. 
My continued usage is partially motivated by the fact that the term is so embedded in debates about pre-
Nicene theology that it is difficult to proceed without using it. The primary reason for my continued usage, 
however, is that I intend to recontextualize the term when it is applied to pre-Nicene theologians. As I 
argue in my last chapter, the subordination of the Son to the Father was a common strategy for 
distinguishing the Father and Son. Far from being a rejection of emerging fourth-century orthodoxy, it was 
an intentionally employed polemical strategy in the anti-Monarchian milieu. With these caveats in place, I 
will no longer use quotation marks around subordination language.  
52 Good examples of this position include the following: Harnack, History of Dogma; Eugène de 
Faye, Origen and His Work (Folcroft, Pa.: Folcroft Library Editions, 1978); Jules Lebreton, The History of 
the Primitive Church (New York: Macmillan Co, 1949). Jean Daniélou, Origen, trans. Walter Mitchell 
(New York: Sheed and Ward, 1955); T. E. Pollard, “Logos and Son in Origen, Arius and Athanasius,” 
Studia Patristica 2 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1957), 282–87;  Williamina M. Macaulay, “Nature of Christ 
in Origen’s Commentary on John,” Scottish Journal of Theology 19, no. 2 (1966): 176–87; J. Nigel Rowe, 
“Origen’s Subordinationism as Illustrated in His Commentary on St John’s Gospel,” Studia Patristica 11.2 
(Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1972), 222–28; J. Nigel Rowe, Origen’s Doctrine of Subordination: A Study in 
Origen’s Christology, vol. 272, European University Studies. Series XXIII (Berne; New York: P. Lang, 
1987); A. H. B. Logan, “Origen and Alexandrian Wisdom Christology,” in Origeniana Tertia: The Third 
International Colloquium for Origen Studies, University of Manchester, September 7th-11th, 1981, ed. 
Richard Hanson and Henri Crouzel (Roma: Edizioni dell’Ateneo, 1985), 123–29. 
53 Lebreton, The History of the Primitive Church, 940–1.  Note especially his uncritical insertion 
of the notion of consubstantiality. He states, “The vital truth that the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit 
transcend all other beings was always affirmed by Origen, and we find it already in the treatise De 
Principiis. But we must allow that there is in this treatise a hierarchical conception of the divine persons 
which endangers their equality and their consubstantiality. This idea appears in the treatise De Principiis, in 





discussion of Origen’s so-called subordination, while others, like Jean Daniélou, have 
very detailed accounts that nonetheless employ the language of subordination with its 
negative connotations.54 Within the past 20 years, however, a handful of scholars have 
argued that Origen was actually an anti-subordinationist and that the old scholarly 
consensus was misguided. There were a few scholars in the twentieth century, notably 
Crouzel and Kannengiesser, who championed this position prior to its recent 
resurgence.55 The scholars who have recently argued against Origen’s alleged 
subordinationism have insisted that he taught the equality of the Father and the Son.56 
Christoph Bruns’ recent consideration of Origen’s Trinitarian theology is 
preoccupied with the question of subordination in Origen’s Trinitarian theology.57 Bruns 
sets out to determine if Origen was, in fact, a subordinationist. If the question is answered 
                                                 
dominate the whole theological work of Origen, and he will even regard it as the rule governing Christian 
worship.” 
54 See especially his discussion of Origen’s Christology: Daniélou, Origen, 251–75. There, he 
gives a very nuanced account of Origen’s Christology before noting that “it is obviously tainted with 
subordinationism” (255). 
55 Crouzel, Origen, 181–91; Charles Kannengiesser, “Christology,” in The Westminster Handbook 
to Origen, ed. John Anthony McGuckin, 1st ed, The Westminster Handbooks to Christian Theology 
(Louisville, Ky: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004), 73–78. 
56 Christopher Beeley writes, “Although he has been accused for centuries of subordinationism (or 
making Christ to be less divine than God the Father), Origen asserted the divinity of Christ in stronger 
terms than any Christian theologian to date…. Origen argues that Christ is equal to God the Father in both 
divinity and eternity” (Beeley, The Unity of Christ, 17–8). See also Ilaria Ramelli, “Origen, Greek 
Philosophy, and the Birth of the Trinitarian Meaning of Hypostasis,” Harvard Theological Review 105, no. 
3 (2012): 302–50; Ramelli, “Origen’s Anti-Subordinationism and Its Heritage in the Nicene and 
Cappadocian Line.” As is clear throughout my discussion of Origen, I disagree with the claims of both 
Beeley and Ramelli. The last chapter demonstrates the grounds from which I reject Beeley’s assertion that 
“Origen argues that Christ is equal to God the Father in both divinity and eternity.” My disagreement is not 
with Beeley’s claim about the eternity of Christ; it is with his claims about the equal divinity. 
57 Bruns, Trinität und Kosmos. Bruns notes that his book, which is a revised version of his 
dissertation, fills a lacuna in Origen scholarship—namely, the lack of a protracted study of his Trinitarian 
theology (14). Bruns is right to note that the lack of protracted treatment of Origen’s Trinitarian theology is 
a major lacuna in scholarship. Edwards suggested in his review, however, that Bruns’ book might not have 
completely succeeded in filling the lacuna. See M. J. Edwards, “Review of Trinität und Kosmos,” The 





in the affirmative, Bruns wishes further to determine if Origen’s subordinationism was 
ontological or relational/functional (which is to say, “economic”).58 Bruns’ treatment 
spans Origen’s entire corpus, although it is heavily weighted toward the Commentary on 
John and De principiis. Bruns acknowledges that adoptianism and modalism are two of 
the primary opposing positions against which Origen’s Trinitarian theology was 
formed.59 Beyond this assertion at the beginning of the book, however, neither 
adoptianism nor modalism plays a significant role, even as Bruns asserts repeatedly that 
Origen’s Hypostasenkonzeption was largely formed in his anti-modalist polemic.60 He 
mentions modalism repeatedly, but it remains a vague bugaboo in the background of his 
reconstruction of Origen’s thought. 
                                                 
58 See especially his discussions of the distinction in types of subordination (22-3). Bruns’ 
distinction between these two types of subordinationism is strained—especially in his discussion of the 
ontological status of Holy Spirit in chapter three. In this chapter, the majority of the passages do not map 
cleanly onto his distinction. Origen addresses the question of the relationship of the Spirit to the Son and 
Father in the context of the Spirit’s work of sanctification among humans. Thus, it is clear that ontology 
and economy are often of a piece for Origen. It seems as though Bruns introduces this distinction in order 
to affirm that passages in Origen are subordinationist while protecting him from what he considers the 
more damning charge of ontological subordination. Bruns himself acknowledges that his construct is not 
necessarily found in Origen’s work itself (39). 
59 Bruns, Trinität und Kosmos, 21. 
60 See, for example, Ibid., 138. Bruns also notes that “Origen is clearly anxious to delineate the 
independence of the three hypostases against contemporary modalism” (87). Bruns scarcely treats the 
origins of modalism or the contemporary forms of its expression. In his narrative, it seems to be little more 
than a vague overemphasis on the unity of the Father, Son, and Spirit. He does, however, offer one 
interpretation of modalism: “[modalism], according to which the unity of God is guaranteed by the 
existence of a single divine hypostasis and Father and Son are only two different aspects or forms of 
expression of this one and only hypostasis” (102). Bruns’ laconic definition is made without reference to 
any of the attestations to modalism (or monarchianism) at the beginning of the third century. For example, 
one could easily press Bruns to identify what form of modalism used hypostasis, a somewhat technical term 
that does not seem to have been used in the earliest stages of monarchianism. Heine also observes that 
Bruns has scarcely defined modalism or considered its full significance: Ronald E. Heine, “Review: 





From the outset of the work, it is clear that Bruns is considering Origen within the 
horizon of the development of Nicene-Constantinopolitan Trinitarian theology.61 Bruns 
pauses at regular intervals throughout the book to consider if Origen’s thought can align 
with pro-Nicene Trinitarian theology.62 He often asserts that elements of Origen’s 
thought align cleanly with later Nicene thought.63 More frequently, however, Bruns 
argues that there is an unavoidable ambiguity in Origen’s Trinitarian theology, that at 
times it appears to be subordinationist (whether ontological or economic, in his 
construct).64 Such judgments about the ambiguity of Origen’s theology express as much 
about Bruns’ reticence to label Origen an outright subordinationist as they do about 
Origen’s theology itself.65 In the end, Bruns gives us a picture of an Origen whose 
Trinitarian theology was ambiguous but was, nevertheless, the seedbed from which grew 
multiple streams of fourth-century Trinitarian theology. While such a view conveys some 
truth, however, his focus on Origen’s relationship to later Nicene and post-Nicene 
theology often precludes a robust reconstruction of Origen’s contemporary context, 
specifically his interaction with monarchianism. This tendency is especially evident when 
Bruns considers Origen’s interpretation of John 14:28 (“the Father is greater than I”) with 
                                                 
61 Bruns signals this horizon in the introduction, when he writes, “So with good reason is Origen 
referred to as the progenitor of the Nicene faith… which has been strongly reaffirmed by Illaria Ramelli” 
(Bruns, Trinität und Kosmos, 19). 
62 See, for example, Ibid., 76–8, 88, 104–5, 304. 
63 Thus he can write, “In the Trinitarian theology of Origen the Trinitarian faith of the church first 
assumed clear contours, with it as the breeding ground from which Trinitarian dogma could grow” (Bruns, 
Trinität und Kosmos, 20). 
64 See, especially, Ibid., 21-3, 25, 51, 75, 88, 108–9, 112-3. 
65 I am not here suggesting that there is no ambiguity in Origen’s thought; there is plenty. A good 
bit of it, perhaps, stems from the difficulties in determining what parts of Origen’s Trinitarian theology 





reference to the exegesis of Athanasius, Hilary, Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, and John 
Chrysostom instead of giving due weight to Origen’s contemporaries or predecessors.66 
Bruns’ project is ambitious; but unfortunately, it does not situate Origen adequately 
within his contemporary and antecedent theological and polemical contexts. 
Subordinationism 
Although terms denoting subordination have frequently driven the narrations of 
Origen’s Trinitarian theology, scholars seldom take the time to actually define what they 
mean by subordination.67 R. P. C. Hanson affirms that virtually every theologian, 
excepting Athanasius, held some form of subordinationism before the dénouement of the 
Arian controversy sometime after 355.68 He suggests that some type of subordination 
would have been accepted as orthodox Trinitarian theology in the pre-Nicene era; but, 
                                                 
66 Bruns, Trinität und Kosmos, 76. Bruns only briefly mentions Tatian, Theophilus of Antioch, and 
Clement of Alexandria in a footnote. 
67 Beeley is one of the few who defines the term.  His two definitions of subordinationism or 
subordinationists are (1) “making Christ to be less divine than God the Father,” and (2) “those who deny 
the full divinity of Christ” (Beeley, The Unity of Christ, 10, 17–8). Another notable exception to this ill-
defined use of the term is the work of Wolfgang Marcus, which has received less attention than it is due: 
Wolfgang Marcus, Der Subordinatianismus als historiologisches Phänomen: Ein Beitrag zu unserer 
Kenntnis von der Entstehung der altchristlichen “Theologie” und Kultur unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung der Begriffe Oikonomia und Theologia (München: M. Hueber, 1963). Marcus surveys 
what he deems “liberal” and “conservative” scholarly explanations of subordinationism and notes that both 
view it as erroneous and locate the source of the error in the influence of Hellenism (27). Marcus views the 
focus on the role of subordinationism as overplayed. Instead, he looks for the scriptural warrant for 
subordinationism and any precedents in Judaism (48). One of Marcus’ main goals is to normalize pre-
Nicene subordinationism, to argue that it was not deviant. He thinks subordinationism is better understood 
as an intermediate position between Marcionite theology and monarchianism (93). He labels this sort of 
subordinationism “orthodox” and later argues that the theology of Arius cannot be seen as a logical 
development of this orthodox subordinationism (93-5). Marcus’ reassessment of subordinationism has the 
merit of considering the phenomenon within its own historical context instead of projecting anachronistic 
categories onto it. His is one of the few accounts that does so. Nevertheless, it is still interesting that his 
study is driven by determining whether the subordinationists were legitimately the forebears of Arius. He 
offers a contextual reading of subordination, but he never quite escapes the orbit of the Nicene conflicts. 





like many others, he does not produce a clear definition of what constitutes 
subordinationism. 
Given the current scholarly context, it is difficult to write about Origen’s 
Trinitarian theology without addressing whether he was a subordinationist. As was the 
case for most of the twentieth century, such is still the question du jour when it comes to 
Origen’s Trinitarian theology. In my final chapter, I explore what it means to speak of 
subordinationist theologies in the third century. I must develop a definition of 
subordinationism that is based on specific theological statements in their third-century 
contexts. This definition contains no implicit evaluative judgment about whether 
something aligns with later theological standards. By defining subordinationism without 
reference to Nicene and post-Nicene theology, we can make more meaningful claims 
about what Origen sought to accomplish in his own theological context. In addition, I 
formulate my definition of subordination with reference to my reconstruction of 
monarchianism in part one of the dissertation, for the argument against monarchianism 
was one of the main places in which our third-century authors deployed their 
subordinationist theologies. 
In order to avoid over-generalizing, I work with a definition of subordinationism 
created from examples in the three main texts I consider in the final chapter: Tertullian’s 
Adversus Praxean, Novatian’s De Trinitate, and Origen’s ComJn.69 As I observe when 
reading these three texts, the subordination of the Son to the Father is not a uniform 
phenomenon in the early third century. Thus, perhaps my definition will add nuance to 
                                                 
69 In the final chapter, I consider the texts in this order, which is not the chronological order in 
which they were written. I place Origen at the end of the chapter because he is the focus of my argument, 





the ways we speak of subordination. In the texts I survey, subordination often occurs 
when the authors speak of the relationship between a cause/source and its effect (in our 
case, the Father and Son). When authors are dealing with a cause and effect, the effect 
either lacks something present in the cause or possesses it less fully. For example, 
Tertullian claims that the Father is invisible because of the greatness of his majesty, but 
the Son is visible because his majesty is derived from the Father.70 The Son has 
something derivatively from the Father (majesty), and because of this, has less of it than 
the Father. Because the Son has less majesty, he is able to be seen. Elsewhere, Tertullian 
speaks of the Father possessing the wholeness of substance while the Son only possesses 
a portion of it.71 
Novatian exhibits a similar manner of speaking about cause/source and effect. He 
argues that the Holy Spirit is less than the Son because the Spirit receives what it 
announces from the Son.72 Novatian here does not even broach the question of whether 
the Spirit fully possesses what it receives from the Son; the mere act of reception implies 
that the Spirit is less (minor) than the Son. Novatian applies this same logic to the 
Father/Son relationship, arguing that the Son is less (minor) than the Father because the 
Son receives sanctification from the Father.73 Later, Novatian uses an inverted form of 
the same logic. The Father is unoriginate; but the Son has an origin and is, therefore, less 
                                                 
70 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 14.3. 
71 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 9.1-4. There is a tension in Tertullian’s thought with regard to the 
visibility of the Son. In Adversus Praxean 9, he suggests that the Son is visible because his majesty is 
derivative. In Adversus Praxean 14, however, Tertullian argues that the Son is invisible as Word and Spirit 
because of the condition of his substance. 
72 Novatian, De Trinitate 16.3. 





than (minor) the Father.74 In this case, the Father’s lack of something (an origin) is 
desirable. The Son is less than the Father and distinguished from him because he has an 
origin.75 For both Tertullian and Novatian, the reception or derivation of something from 
a source necessarily implies that the recipient is less than the source. Novatian is explicit 
about this and states multiple times that the Son is less than (minor) the Father.76 This is 
what I mean by subordination. Notice also that this definition does not require particular 
attention to the effect caused or the thing received.77 
A similar scheme can be seen in Origen, but there are some notable variations 
with him. As I lay out in more detail in the final chapter, Origen has a hierarchical 
understanding of the universe, with the Father at the top. In my discussion of passages 
where Origen discusses the goodness of the Father and Son, Origen employs this 
hierarchy. He also speaks of the Father as the source of goodness and the Son as having 
his goodness from the Father (or being an image of that goodness).78 In these passages, 
he speaks of the Father as being superior to the Son or superseding the Son (using 
ὑπερέχω and similar terms). 
                                                 
74 Novatian, De Trinitate 31.3. 
75 Despite the inversion of his logic, Novatian’s position is consistent. In each case, the Son’s 
existence or qualities are more tightly circumscribed than the Father who is unoriginate and possesses all 
good things in their fullness. 
76 See, for example, De Trinitate 27.12, 31.3. 
77 Later understandings of subordination will focus specifically on divinity and substance, but such 
was not necessarily the focus of the third century authors I consider. At various points, the anti-monarchian 
writers focus on the Son’s reception of divinity, substance, goodness, and sanctification, among other 
things. 





In the main passage from Origen that I survey (ComJn 2.13ff), Origen draws 
together a number of these concepts. He speaks about the Father as cause and source.79 
He speaks about the Son receiving divinity from the Father or drawing it into himself.80 
At the end of this passage, Origen employs the same hierarchical framework as he does 
elsewhere and speaks of the Son being transcended by the Father.81 It is clear that for 
Origen, the Father transcends the Son because he is cause and source (of goodness or 
divinity). What is interesting, however, is that in these passages Origen never explicitly 
says that the Son is less than the Father. It is an obvious implication of his affirmation of 
the transcendence of the Father, but the absence of explicit claims that the Son is inferior 
differentiates his subordination from that of Novatian and Tertullian. Thus, at the 
beginning of the third century, subordinationism was not some monolithic theological 
movement. Different authors accented their theologies differently so that we may speak 
of variation under the umbrella term “subordinationism.” 
In these texts, we see a relatively stable subordinationist framework. In this 
framework, the cause or source is greater than its effects or recipients. This is the 
common ground shared by all three authors I study in the last chapter. There is variation 
with how explicitly our authors draw out the consequences of this subordinationist logic. 
                                                 
79 At ComJn 2.14, he refers to the Father as the uncreated cause of the universe (τοῦ ἀγενήτου τῶν 
ὅλων αἰτίου). Note again the alpha-privative descriptor. Later, Origen refers to both the Father and the Son 
as sources but sources of different things. At ComJn 2.20, he writes, “For both hold the place of a source; 
the Father, that of divinity, the Son, that of reason” (ἀμφότερα γὰρ πηγῆς ἔχει χώραν, ὁ μὲν πατὴρ 
θεότητος, ὁ δὲ υἱὸς λόγου) (Origen, Commentary on the Gospel according to John, trans. Ronald E. Heine, 
Fathers of the Church 80 [Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1989], 100; Greek 
from SC 120:226). 
80 In ComJn 2.17, he uses two verbs, σπάω and ἀρύω to speak of the Son “drawing” divinity into 
himself. 
81 Origen, ComJn 2.32. Origen again uses ὑπερέχω to describe the transcendence of the Father 





Some clearly claim that the Son is less than the Father, but Origen is content to say that 
the Father is superior to the Son. This implies the inferiority of the Son; but in the limited 
passages I have studied, Origen nowhere argues for the inferiority of the Son in explicit 
terms.82 
My discussion of third-century subordinationism here, as with the fuller study in 
the final chapter, is an attempt to read Origen alongside his contemporaries and with 
reference to one of the primary polemical contexts of his day. I adopt the focus of 
scholarship on whether Origen was a subordinationist, but I reorient the discussion to the 
early third century instead of the late fourth. My account does not attempt to be as 
comprehensive as Bruns’ more recent study. It is an exercise in a disciplined reading of 
important parts of Origen’s oeuvre that considers his theology in its own context and a 
suggestion for how the rest of his corpus might profitably be reread. 
Plan of the Dissertation 
 This dissertation is divided into two parts. The first part, which is roughly two-
thirds of the whole, focuses on reconstructing monarchian theology. The second part 
offers a rereading of key passages from ComJn 1-2 with a focus on Origen’s engagement 
with monarchian theology. In the first chapter, I attempt to provide a plausible 
background for the rise of monarchianism in the late second and early third centuries. In 
order to do this, I survey models of articulating the Father-Son relationship in the second 
                                                 
82 This is a notable variation. A full exploration behind Origen’s motivations for this variation is 
beyond the scope of my current project. As I broaden my further study of Origen beyond his early works, it 
will be worth tracking whether he ever explicitly speaks of the Son as inferior to the Father or is merely 





century. Specifically, I am concerned with how second-century theologians express the 
unity and distinction between the Father and Son. Rather than a diachronic survey, I 
organize the theologians along a spectrum that runs from what I term “soft distinction” to 
“hard distinction” between the Father and Son. At the end of the chapter, I suggest that a 
theology like that of Justin Martyr, which stressed the alterity of the Son from the Father, 
was probably the sort of theology against which the monarchians reacted.83 
 After my exploration of what might have prompted monarchianism, I undertake a 
reconstruction of monarchian theology in chapters two and three. I begin by examining 
the relevant sections of Eusebius’ Ecclesiastical History, which does not offer much 
direct testimony about monarchianism but does give us valuable background information 
about the church in Rome at the beginning of the third century. I then offer a close 
reading of the four main sources that attest to monarchianism. This reading occurs in 
what I deem to be the chronological order of the texts: Hippolytus’ Contra Noetum, 
Tertullian’s Adversus Praxean, the Refutatio omnium haeresium, and Novatian’s De 
Trinitate.84 
 In order to fill what I consider to be a lacuna in scholarship, my reconstruction of 
monarchian theology focuses on their major theological emphases and exegetical 
practices. To that end, I pay particular attention to their discussions of the unity of God, 
the divinity of Jesus, the visibility of God, and the suffering of God. With regard to 
                                                 
83 Although not included in the dissertation, I have an article forthcoming in Vigiliae Christianae 
that rejects the claims of Daniel Boyarin that monarchianism was Judaism being “cast out” of Christianity. 
The article is entitled “Monarchianism and Two Powers: Jewish and Christian Monotheism at the 
Beginning of the Third Century.” 
84 As becomes clear in those chapters, however, there is little consensus about the dating and 
authorship of Contra Noetum and the Refutatio. One group of scholars reverses the order and considers the 





exegesis, I draw particular attention to their focus on Old Testament theophanies and key 
passages from the Gospel of John. The result of these two chapters is a picture of 
monarchianism whose core teaching was that the Father and the Son were “one and the 
same.” The monarchians actively denied that there was any real distinction between the 
Father and Son by emphasizing their sameness. My reading of these four sources also 
shows that while monarchianism maintained a stable core, there was development or 
disagreement with regard to some of the implications of the core teaching. Specifically, 
monarchians began to differ over whether their claim that the Father and Son were “one 
and the same” necessarily meant that the Father suffered.85 
In part two of the dissertation, I focus on rereading books 1-2 of Origen’s ComJn 
in light of my reconstruction of the monarchian controversy. In chapter four, I begin by 
giving a detailed account of the date and context for the first two books of ComJn. There, 
I argue that Origen most likely wrote them in the midst of the monarchian controversy 
and most likely after his return from Rome, which was the epicenter of the monarchian 
controversy. Thus, I situate Origen firmly within the context of an early third-century 
debate. In the remainder of chapter four, I consider how the Wisdom Christology Origen 
develops in book one of ComJn has anti-monarchian polemical utility.86 
In the final chapter of the dissertation, I undertake a dense reading of ComJn 
2.13ff, which I consider to be an important passage for understanding Origen’s early 
Trinitarian theology. I contextualize this passage by reading it alongside passages from 
                                                 
85 As I make clear in the relevant chapters, it is unclear if this diversity was synchronic or 
diachronic.  
86 The core of this argument about Origen’s Wisdom Christology has been accepted for 
publication in the Greek Orthodox Theological Review. The forthcoming article is entitled, “Wisdom 





Tertullian and Novatian which fit my definition of subordinationism above. In order to 
justify my focus on this passage instead of De principiis, which many scholars privilege 
in accounts of Origen’s Trinitarian theology, I include an excursus on the reliability of 
Rufinus’ translations of Trinitarian passages in Origen.87 At the end of my reading of this 
passage, I argue that Origen’s theology can be properly labelled “subordinationist” when 
using my specific definition. Furthermore, I argue that Origen’s subordinationism is 
helpfully elucidated when read alongside that of his rough contemporaries, Tertullian and 
Novatian. All three of these authors intentionally deployed subordinationist theologies in 
order to combat the monarchian assertion that the Father and Son were “one and the 
same.” Novatian is perhaps the bluntest about how subordinationism functions as 
effective anti-monarchian polemic when he argues that what is less than the Father (that 
is, the Son) cannot be the same as the Father. Here, I argue, is the primary horizon within 
which we must consider Origen’s subordinationism.88 
  
                                                 
87 There, I argue that at least with regard to Trinitarian passages, Rufinus’ translations cannot be 
trusted. My position in this regard goes against the views of some major contemporary scholars. For 
example, in a review of a new translation of De principiis for a popular magazine, Christopher Beeley 
writes, “But the tide has finally turned. In recent decades, scholars have concluded that Rufinus’s 
translation is generally reliable, and certainly more faithful than Koetschau’s reconstruction.” Christopher 
A. Beeley, “Rescuing Origen from Neglect,” The Living Church (February 2016): 10. 
88 Thus, we must offer a dense contextual reading of Origen’s theology before we try to untangle 





CHAPTER ONE: MODELS OF FATHER/SON RELATIONSHIP IN THE 
SECOND CENTURY 
Introduction 
 Scholars frequently refer to figures from the second century as “modalists” or 
“monarchians” without first defining what either of those terms means. For example, 
Campbell Bonner called Melito of Sardis’ theology “naïve modalism.”1 More recently, 
Reinhard Hübner has argued that Ignatius of Antioch was a monarchian.2 As I noted in 
the introduction and develop in the later chapters on the monarchian controversy, I prefer 
a restrictive and specific definition of monarchianism. Using my definition, 
monarchianism is restricted to those who explicitly claim that the Father and the Son are 
“one and the same” in an effort to maintain that there is only one God.3 This definition 
allows for a distinction between monarchianism and psilanthropism or adoptianism. 
Although they are related, I distinguish monarchianism from psilanthropism because the 
                                                 
1 Campbell Bonner, The Homily on the Passion (London; Philadelphia: Christophers; University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1940), 27–8. As I note later, I think calling any sort of modalism “naïve” betrays an 
insufficient definition of modalism. 
2 Hübner’s claims about Ignatius (and also Melito) rest on his problematic assertion that Noetus 
antedated them and that they were drawing on his monarchian theology. In order to make his case, he 
argues that Ignatius wrote in the second half of the second century. As I discuss in more detail later, I find 
his chronology untenable. See the essays on Ignatius and Melito in Reinhard M Hübner, Der Paradox Eine: 
antignostischer Monarchianismus im zweiten Jahrhundert (Leiden: Brill, 1999). 
3 For two of the major places where we see monarchians claiming that the Father and Son are one 
and the same, see Refutatio omnium haeresium 9.10.11-2; Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 2.3: “maxime haec 
quae se existimat meram veritatem possidere dum unicum deum non alias putat credendum quam si ipsum 
eundemque et patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum dicat.” Latin from Tertullian, Tertulliani Opera: Pars 
II, ed. A Kroymann and Ernest Evans, Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina 2 (Turnholt: Brepols, 1954), 
1161. Not everyone whom I consider a monarchian explicitly claimed that the Father and Son are “one and 
the same.” However, all of the theologies I am labeling monarchian actively seek to deny any real 
distinction between the Father and Son. By real distinction, I mean some sort of distinction of being, i.e., of 






latter appears to have been far less bothersome to figures like Hippolytus, Tertullian, and 
Origen.4 More importantly, this definition makes it clear that monarchianism or 
modalism was an actively chosen position. It was not the failure to distinguish the Father 
and Son; it was an active and intentional identification of the two. Therefore, one could 
not hold this sort of position accidentally.5 
 One of the difficulties with monarchianism is that its theological origins are 
difficult to trace.6 We know that the two earliest named monarchian leaders, Noetus and 
Praxeas, were both from Asia Minor; but we know little about their theological 
background or motivation.7 The explosion of their theology at the beginning of the third 
century begs for an explanation that the surviving texts from the period do not furnish. 
This chapter explores the possible theological motivations of monarchianism. Because 
we lack direct evidence, the best we can do is to offer a plausible explanation. Rather 
than focusing on the use and development of the term μοναρχία, I begin with the 
assumption that the claim that the Father and Son were “one and the same” and other 
                                                 
4 As will become clear in later analysis, the hard distinction between the two threatens to break 
down at certain points. However, I still think it is a helpful distinction to make. 
5 Regarding the phrase “naïve modalism,” it does seem that there were many unlearned people in 
the early church who adopted this position. In that way, one might be able to speak of a “naïve modalism.” 
The figures depicted in the anti-monarchian treatises, however, were not naïve. They knowingly rejected 
any real distinction between the Father and Son. 
6 A few scholars have traced the use of the term μοναρχία in early Christian literature, but this is 
not sufficient to establish the theological motivations of monarchianism. The term μοναρχία was flexible 
enough to be claimed by both monarchians and their opponents. For this reason, the monarchian use of the 
term cannot be assumed to encapsulate all of their theology. For the examination of the term monarchia, 
see Ernest Evans, “Introduction,” in Tertullian’s Treatise against Praxeas (London: S.P.C.K., 1948), 6–18; 
Gabino Uríbarri Bilbao, Monarquía y Trinidad: El concepto teológico “monarchia” en la controversia 
“monarquiana,” Publicaciones de la Universidad pontificia Comillas Madrid, Serie 1: Estudios 62 
(Madrid: UPCO, 1996). 
7 For the claim that Noetus is from Smyrna, see, Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 1.1; for Praxeas’ 





explicit denials of distinction between the two were the most distinguishing 
characteristics of early monarchianism. As will be clear in the surviving texts of the 
period, the monarchian identification of Father and Son was a reaction against certain 
ways of articulating distinction between the Father and Son that they thought were 
tantamount to ditheism.8 
 In order to determine what the monarchians might have reacted against at the end 
of the second century, I offer a broad survey of the ways second-century authors spoke 
about the relationship between the Father and Son. In this survey, I pay special attention 
to means of expressing both unity and distinction between the Father and Son, as well as 
expressions of monotheistic commitment. By establishing models of the Father/Son 
relationship in the second century, I will provide the background necessary to establish 
continuity and discontinuity between earlier models and monarchianism. This 
consideration of monarchianism against second-century models will clarify its 
motivations and distinctive features.9 
 In order to aid in this analysis of second-century models of the Father/Son 
relationship, I employ the following heuristic. In the course of my discussion, I will 
attempt to locate models of Father-Son relationship along a continuum between “soft 
                                                 
8 I avoid saying that monarchianism was a reaction against Logos theology. I avoid this common 
assertion because I do not think the monarchians were reacting against Logos theology qua Logos 
theology; they were reacting against the strong distinction drawn between the Father and Son by some 
Logos theologians like Justin Martyr. As will become clear in my later analysis of Callistus’ positions in 
the Refutatio, some monarchians developed a form of Logos theology that they deemed acceptable. 
9 Although I read second-century texts here with an interest in how they might elicudate the 
genesis of monarchianism, I hope to avoid an anachronistic imposition of later categories on them. The 
interest in the relationship between the Father and Son was already current in second-century texts and, 
thus, is not a projection of the concerns of the monarchian controversy into the second-century. For 
example, consider how acutely Justin feels the need to articulate the distinction between the Father and Son 





distinction” and “hard distinction.” By “soft distinction,” I mean primarily the distinction 
of Father and Son by the use of names or titles. On this end of the continuum, theologians 
exhibit little desire to articulate the manner of distinction between the Father and Son, 
perhaps because they were not aware of any need to do this. By “hard distinction,” I 
mean an explicit explanation of how the Father and Son are distinct. Justin’s claim that 
the Father and Son are ἕτερος ἐν ἀριθμῷ is a prime example of this “hard distinction.” As 
will become clear in the course of my analysis, I think all of the second-century authors 
that I survey fall somewhere on this continuum. The early third-century monarchians, on 
the other hand, do not fit anywhere on this continuum. Their explicit denial of distinction 
between the Father and Son makes their theology a novel development in comparison 
with that of the second century.10 
As I remarked above, I consider Justin a turning point in second-century theology. 
In order to demonstrate how things shifted in his work, it is first necessary to summarize 
the salient points of Christology in the first half of the second century. Instead of 
surveying the texts diachronically, I have chosen to divide them into groups depending on 
how they describe the relationship between the Father and Son. These groupings, or 
models, of Father/Son relationship are a helpful heuristic because theology did not 
develop in a clean, linear manner in the second century. One prime example of this fact is 
the comparison of the theology of Justin and Melito, discussed below. Justin, writing in 
the 150s C.E., articulated the distinction between the Father and Son that was stronger 
                                                 
10 Some monarchians admitted a sort of superficial distinction by the use of names, but they 
denied that this nominal distinction represented any underlying reality. The second-century authors who 
distinguished the Father and Son by the use of names were unconcerned with whether the names 





than any Christian theologian before him. Melito of Sardis’ Peri Pascha, probably 
written between 160 and 170 C.E., shows almost no concern to distinguish the Father and 
the Son. If I were approaching the second century with a model of linear development 
and the presupposition that a stronger articulation of distinction is “more orthodox,” I 
would have to judge Melito’s theology to be a regression of sorts. 
The development of theology in the second century C.E. appears to have been 
episodic and geographically driven, likely because of the limitations of textual 
transmission and of the spread of ideas.11 What this means is that the geographic 
provenance of texts is important to consider in the time-period we are studying. The 
geographical provenance of theologies may help establish some theological context for 
the genesis of the monarchian controversy.12 Noetus, perhaps the earliest to espouse a so-
called monarchian position, was from Smyrna, in Asia Minor. Tertullian also claims that 
Praxeas brought his theology to Rome from Asia. Both Noetus and Praxeas denied that 
there was any real distinction between the Father and Son. Melito’s Peri Pascha, 
probably written in Sardis, also exhibits little concern to distinguish the Father and Son. 
Thus, the textual evidence suggests that at the end of the second century and beginning of 
                                                 
11 What I mean by this is that we cannot assume, without clear textual evidence, that one author in 
the second century has read another second-century author. Although this occasionally happened, as in the 
case of Irenaeus reading and utilizing Theophilus’ Ad Autolycum, we cannot take it for granted in the 
absence of any evidence. Furthermore, the surviving textual evidence from this period is so sparse that it is 
difficult to construct a coherent narrative. 
12 If the earliest forms of monarchianism were an Asian phenomenon, a comparison with the 
works of Melito will elucidate some of their theological tendencies. As I make clear later in the chapter, I 
do not think that Melito was “guilty” of monarchianism because he was from Asia Minor. In his 
dissertation, Decker casts the monarchian controversy as a disagreement between East and West. There is 
something to be said for this approach, but I think Decker’s statement pushes beyond what the evidence 
allows. See especially his conclusions: Michael Decker, “Die Monarchianer: Frühchristliche Theologie im 





the third, at least one group of theologians in Asia Minor seldom used any technical 
means to distinguish the Father from the Son.13 
Because I group authors based on the characteristics of their theology rather than 
the chronology of their texts, such labels as “Apostolic Fathers” or “Apologists” are 
mostly unhelpful. These labels and divisions of the texts are largely the constructs of later 
interpreters of the texts. For example, the collection of texts known as the “Apostolic 
Fathers” was not gathered together until the end of the 17th century, and there is still 
debate about which texts should be included in the collection.14 The label “Apologists” is 
also a later construct. As I argue in what follows, Justin’s articulation of the distinction 
between the Father and the Son differs substantially from that of Athenagoras or 
Theophilus, thus making the common label “Apologists” unhelpful for my purposes.15 
 The following account is not a detailed examination of every aspect of each of the 
primary texts, but rather an overview of the major writings of the second century. This 
overview focuses on two key themes: (1) statements about monotheism; (2) articulations 
of the relationship between the Father and the Son. The findings in this chapter will serve 
as the backdrop against which I assess the rise of monarchianism at the beginning of the 
                                                 
13 As I noted earlier, I think the central characteristic of monarchianism is the claim that the Father 
and Son are one and the same. While Melito does not carefully distinguish the Father from the Son, he 
nowhere claims that they are one and the same. Therefore, I do not classify him as a monarchian. 
14 For a succinct summary of this history, see Bart D. Ehrman, ed., The Apostolic Fathers, Loeb 
Classical Library 24-25 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2003), 24:1–14; Michael W. Holmes, 
The Apostolic Fathers: Greek Texts and English Translations, 3rd ed (Grand Rapids, Mich: Baker 
Academic, 2007), 5–6. For a recent discussion on the name “Apostolic Fathers,” see David Lincicum, “The 
Paratextual Invention of the Term ‘Apostolic Fathers,’” Journal of Theological Studies 66, no. 1 (2015): 
139–48. 
15 This is not to say that there are not common features that merit the grouping of theologians 
together. My point is that when it comes to articulating the distinction of the Father and Son, there is not a 





third century. By focusing on these key themes in writers of the second century, I hope to 
isolate the parts of their theology that are most relevant for explaining what might have 
motivated monarchian theology. 
Soft Distinction 
1 Clement 
Whereas the Epistles of Ignatius unambiguously call Christ “God,” 1 Clement 
does not contain such evocative language.16 The author of 1 Clement preserves a form of 
distinction between the Father and Son.17 One of the chief ways he accomplishes this 
distinction is through the use of titles.18 He uses a few phrases to refer to the God: “Father 
and Maker (πατέρα καὶ κτίστην)”19 and “Creator and Master (ὁ δημιουργὸς καὶ 
δεσπότης).”20 The author of 1 Clement consistently uses δεσπότης to refer to God and 
κύριος to refer to the Jesus. This usage is striking because the LXX uses κύριος in place 
of the Tetragrammaton. Because of this usage in the LXX, one would expect the title 
                                                 
16 Outside of the New Testament, 1 Clement is one of the earliest Christian writings we possess. It 
was probably written in Rome during the mid-90s of the first century. For a concise introduction to its 
dating, provenance, and theology, see Ehrman, The Apostolic Fathers, 24:18–30. 
17 My use of “Father and Son” in this chapter is, at times, artificial. These are often not focal terms 
for the authors I am studying, and I use them in order to avoid confusion. For example, when second-
century authors speak of “God” without any qualification, they are almost always referring to the Father. 
Thus, in 1 Clement, the terms Father and Son do not play a central role. 
18 I do not mean to imply here that the author of 1 Clement was self-consciously developing a 
means of distinguishing the Father and Son. I am only drawing attention to patterns that are present in the 
text. 
19 1 Clement 19.2. In my discussion of 1 Clement, I am using Ehrman’s text and translation in the 
Loeb edition: Bart D. Ehrman, ed., The Apostolic Fathers, 2 vols., Loeb Classical Library 24-25 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2003). 1 Clement is in vol. 24. 





κύριος to be applied to the Father.21 1 Clement also contains strong monotheistic 
statements. Moses is described as acting “in order that the name of the true and only God 
might be glorified.”22 Later, the author asks, “Do we not have one God and one Christ 
and one Spirit of grace that was poured out upon us, and one calling in Christ?”23 1 
Clement preserves the distinction between the Father and Son much more cleanly than do 
the Ignatian Epistles.24 This distinction is done primarily by means of roles (for example, 
the Father, not the Son, is creator) and titles. Perhaps one reason why the distinction 
between Father and Son is more evident in 1 Clement is that this text does not contain 
blunt descriptions of Christ as “God” like we see in the Ignatian Epistles.25 Nevertheless, 
1 Clement does not exhibit any inclination to specify the manner of distinction between 
the Father and Son. Its use of titles and roles is a rather soft way of articulating distinction 
between the Father and Son. 
2 Clement 
Scholars have not reached any consensus on the relationship between 1 Clement 
and 2 Clement. Nearly all agree that 2 Clement was not written by the same author as 1 
                                                 
21 Perhaps this usage of κύριος for Christ is an example of how thoroughly the worship of Christ 
had permeated early Christianity.  
22 1 Clement 43.6. 
23 1 Clement 46.6. 
24 Again, my use of “Father and Son” here is artificial. As noted above, 1 Clement’s use of κύριος 
and δεσπότης does far more distinguishing work than do the titles Father and Son. 
25 Apropos to this discussion is Vogt’s contention that 1 Clement teaches the pre-existence of 
Christ and does not show signs of patripassianism. See Hermann Josef Vogt, “Monarchianismus Im 2. 





Clement and that 2 Clement is the later of the two.26 2 Clement contains a stronger 
statement of Christ’s divinity than 1 Clement. The author writes, “it is necessary for us to 
think concerning Jesus Christ just as [we think] concerning God.”27 Even this statement, 
however, is not as strong as Ignatius’ reference to “Jesus Christ our God.”28 2 Clement 
concludes with a doxology that uses familiar monotheistic language: “To the only God, 
invisible, the Father of truth, who sent to us the Savior and Founder of immortality, 
through whom he also revealed to us the truth and the heavenly life, to him be the glory 
forever and ever. Amen.”29 None of these expressions in 2 Clement has the sort of 
polemical edge that we see in the monarchian controversy. There are no signs that the 
author of 2 Clement is concerned with the same questions.30 Neither is he concerned with 
mapping out the manner of unity and distinction between the Father and Son, leaving him 
in the category of “soft distinction.” 
                                                 
26 See Tuckett’s thorough introduction to 2 Clement and its critical issues: C. M. Tuckett, ed., 2 
Clement: Introduction, Text, and Commentary, Oxford Apostolic Fathers (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012). Tuckett argues that the best we can do for dating the work is to place it somewhere in the 
second century. There is not enough evidence to be more precise than this. Nearly all scholars agree that it 
is not a letter. Tuckett argues that the best description for it is some sort of paraenetic homily. Ibid., 19–26. 
On the whole, the author of 2 Clement is much more concerned with the ethical behavior of his readers than 
he is with technical theological formulations. 
27 2 Clement 1.1. “οὕτως δεὶ ἡμᾶς φρονεῖν περὶ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, ὡς περὶ Θεοῦ.”  
28 See the preface in Ignatius, Ephesians for this statement. 
29 2 Clement 20.5 (trans. Holmes, 165). “Τῷ μόνῳ θεῷ ἀοράτῳ, πατρὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, τῷ 
ἐξαποστείλαντι ἡμῖν τὸν σωτῆρα καὶ ἀρχηγὸν τῆς ἀφθαρσίας, δι’ οὗ καὶ ἐφανέρωσεν ἡμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν 
καὶ τὴν ἐπουράνιον ζωήν, αὐτῷ ἡ δόξα εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων. ἀμήν.” This doxology immediately 
follows a section of the text that many authors view as an interpolation (19.1 – 20.4), but Tuckett argues 
that it shares enough features with 2 Clement 1-18 that it is probably by the same author. See Tuckett, 2 
Clement, 301–3. 
30 Tuckett notes that some scholars have argued that 2 Clement is writing against incipient forms 
of Valentinian theology. If it is present at all, Tuckett suggests that such polemic is very muted in 2 





Ignatius of Antioch  
The letters of Ignatius contain some striking passages about Jesus.31 Ignatius 
seems concerned to emphasize both the divinity and humanity of Jesus Christ.32 In two 
places, Ignatius uses what appears to be a stock phrase, “Jesus Christ our God.”33 
Elsewhere, Ignatius writes of God becoming manifest as a human (ἀνθρωπίνως).34 For 
Ignatius, Jesus Christ is God; and he states this multiple times without qualification.35 In 
addition to referring to Christ as God, Ignatius uses other images to affirm a close 
relationship between Christ and the Father.36 He calls Christ the γνώμη of the Father and 
                                                 
31 I follow Schoedel’s dating of Ignatius’ Letters to the first twenty years of the second century: 
William R. Schoedel, Ignatius of Antioch: A Commentary on the Letters of Ignatius of Antioch, 
Hermeneia—a Critical and Historical Commentary on the Bible (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), 5. 
This means that I reject the dating schema of Joly, upon which Hübner bases many of his conclusions about 
Noetus and Ignatius. See Robert Joly, Le dossier d’Ignace d’Antioche, [Travaux] - Université libre de 
Bruxelles, Faculté de philosophie et lettres 69 (Bruxelles: Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1979); 
Reinhard M Hübner, “Die Ignatianen und Noët von Smyrna,” in Der Paradox Eine: Antignostischer 
Monarchianismus im zweiten Jahrhundert (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 1999), 131–206. In my discussion of the 
Ignatian Epistles, I use Holmes’ text and translation: Michael W. Holmes, The Apostolic Fathers: Greek 
Texts and English Translations, 3rd ed (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2007). 
32 I discuss his emphasis on Jesus’ divinity in what follows. He emphasizes Jesus’ humanity in 
response to those who say that Jesus “suffered in appearance only” (Trallians 10.1; Smyrnaeans 2.1). For 
discussion of this dual emphasis, see Larry W. Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ: Devotion to Jesus in Earliest 
Christianity (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2003), 636–40. 
33 Ignatius, Ephesians preface; Ignatius, Romans preface. See also Ignatius, Smyrnaeans 1.1, 
where Ignatius writes, “I glorify Jesus Christ, the God who made you so wise” (trans. Holmes, 249).  
34 Ignatius, Ephesians 19.3. 
35 In addition to the references above, see Ephesians 15.3, 18.2; Romans 3.3, 6.3; Polycarp 8.3. 
Schoedel notes that some have argued that Ignatius did not view “Christ as God in an absolute sense.” He is 
unconvinced by these arguments and notes that Christ is called God because he is so closely related to the 
Father. Schoedel, Ignatius of Antioch, 39.  
36 As noted above, Ignatius uses the phrase “Jesus Christ our God” in two places. In other cases, as 
in Ephesians 18.2, Ignatius seems to use Christ as a title. There he writes, “ὁ γὰρ θεὸς ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦς ὁ 
Χριστός.” Ignatius does not appear to make the distinction between Jesus (the human) and Christ (the 





the knowledge (γνῶσιν) of God.37 Christians are those who have taken on new life “in the 
blood of God” (ἐν αἵματι θεοῦ).38 Ignatius writes that he wants to imitate the “suffering 
of my God” (τοῦ πάθους τοῦ θεοῦ μου), again closely associating the suffering of Christ 
with God.39 In one of his stronger statements, Ignatius urges his readers to “wait 
expectantly for the one who is above time: the Eternal, the Invisible, who for our sake 
became visible; the Intangible, the Unsuffering, who for our sake suffered, who for our 
sake endured in every way.”40 Ignatius did not shy away from paradoxical statements like 
“the Unsuffering, who for our sake suffered.” Elsewhere, he refers to Christ using two of 
these paradoxical pairings, stating that Christ is “γεννητὸς καὶ ἀγέννητος” and “πρῶτον 
παθητὸς καὶ τότε ἀπαθής.”41 As these statements make clear, Ignatius had no problem 
closely associating the God and Jesus, or even attributing the sufferings of Jesus to 
“God.” How exactly Ignatius understands these attributions of suffering to “God” is 
another question. As his usage above seems to indicate, Ignatius does not necessarily 
                                                 
37 Ignatius, Ephesians 3.2, 17.2. 
38 Ignatius, Ephesians 1.1. 
39 Ignatius, Romans 6.3. 
40 Ignatius, Polycarp 3.2 (trans. and Greek from Holmes, 264-5): “τὸν ὑπὲρ καιρὸν προσδόκα, τὸν 
ἄχρονον, τὸν ἀόρατον, τὸν δι’ ἡμᾶς ὁρατόν, τὸν ἀψηλάφητον, τὸν ἀπαθῆ, τὸν δι’ ἡμᾶς παθητόν, τὸν κατὰ 
πάντα τρόπον δι’ ἡμᾶς ὑπομείναντα.”   
41 Ignatius, Ephesians 7.2. These sorts of pairings bear a striking resemblance to some of the 
formulations that appear later in the monarchian controversy. For instance, the monarchians often spoke of 
God as both invisible and visible. This is precisely the sort of language that Hübner picks up on in his 
arguments about Noetus and Ignatius. Because he sees similar paradoxical expressions about God in 
Ignatius and Noetus, and because he accepts Joly’s dating of the middle recension of the Ignatian texts, 
Hübner posits that Noetus predated Ignatius and was one of Ignatius’ sources. For Hübner, Ignatius was a 
monarchian. Although his argument is spread across a number of different essays, see especially: Hübner, 
“Die Ignatianen und Noët von Smyrna.” Given the lack of any attestation to Noetus prior to the beginning 
of the third century, I find it problematic to offer such a broad revisionist narrative on the basis of such 
tenuous evidence as these paradoxical statements about God. Furthermore, if we use my narrow definition 






mean “Father” when he says “God.” Because he explicitly states that Christ is God, he 
might mean nothing more than that Christ suffered or bled when he writes about the 
suffering and blood of God. Ignatius’ wording certainly does not reflect the sensitivity to 
patripassianism that arose only 100 years later in response to some of the conclusions 
drawn by early monarchians. Ignatius unequivocally expresses the divinity of Jesus 
Christ, but the characterization of that divinity is left ambiguous in his theology.42 
 This is not to say, however, that Ignatius confuses the Father and the Son or that 
he never distinguishes between them. He has several means of acknowledging the 
distinction between the Father and the Son. Jesus is the one through whom Christians will 
reach God.43 Jesus was alongside the Father before the ages, and appeared at the 
consummation.44 Ignatius describes Jesus as the mouth in whom the Father has spoken, 
making Jesus the agent of the Father.45 Ignatius writes that the Father raised Christ from 
the dead.46 Thus, while some of Ignatius’ statements about God are ambiguous, the way 
he uses Father and Son suggests that he understands some sort of distinction between 
                                                 
42 This ambiguity militates against calling Ignatius a monarchian. Neither party in the monarchian 
controversy produced such ambiguous statements because they were concerned with a different set of 
questions. The monarchians unambiguously taught that the Father and the Son were one and the same. 
Some of the early monarchians elaborated on this teaching and plainly stated that the Father suffered. This 
theology was unambiguous. The ambiguity in Ignatius’ theology here is what earns him the title of a “naïve 
modalist.” Again, see  Hübner, “Die Ignatianen und Noët von Smyrna," 152. My definition of 
monarchianism (and modalism, by extension) excludes Ignatius because he did not explicitly deny 
distinction between the Father and Son. 
43 Ignatius, Magnesians 1.2. 
44 Ignatius, Magnesians 6.1. 
45 Ignatius, Romans 8.2. 





them, if only the distinction of different actors or agents.47 The ambiguity present in the 
way he speaks about God shows that the questions about the unity and distinction of the 
Father and Son at the heart of the monarchian controversy were not yet pressing when he 
wrote. Ignatius does not explicitly address how Father and Son are distinct. He 
unequivocally states that Jesus is God, but the reader must infer from the titles he uses 
that Ignatius considers the Son to be somehow distinguished from the Father. Thus, 
Ignatius’ theology is an example of what I am calling “soft distinction.” He nowhere 
seems concerned with defining how they are distinct, but neither does he claim that they 
are the same. 
Polycarp 
 Polycarp’s Epistle to the Philippians48 and the Martyrdom of Polycarp49 do not 
offer extended reflection on the relationship between the Father and the Son. The Epistle 
to the Philippians uses what appear to be stock phrases when speaking of the Father and 
Son. At multiple points, he speaks of “God and Christ” or “God and our Lord.”50 In 
                                                 
47 Ignatius uses “Father and Son” far more frequently and consistently than the author of 1 
Clement. Thus, we have in Ignatius much more of a Father-Son distinction than 1 Clement. 
48 Polycarp’s Epistle seems to have functioned as a cover letter attached to the collection of 
Ignatius’ letters that he was sending to the Philippians. Ehrman, The Apostolic Fathers, 24:324–5. There is 
a chance that it is actually two letters of Polycarp that were combined at a later date. See Ehrman’s 
discussion of the critical issues surrounding the letter. Ibid., 24:326–9. For the text and translation in this 
section on Polycarp, I rely on Ehrman’s text. 
49 The Martyrdom of Polycarp was written by someone named Marcion (not the infamous 
Marcion). Most scholars think that the Martyrdom was composed sometime around 155 – 156 C.E. See 
Ehrman’s survey: The Apostolic Fathers, 24:361–2. 





addition, actions are addressed to God through Jesus Christ (διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ).51 
Likewise, the Martyrdom of Polycarp speaks of glorifying God through Jesus Christ the 
eternal and heavenly high priest (διὰ τοῦ αἰωνίου καὶ ἐπουρανίου ἀρχιερέως).52 The 
Martyrdom does assert that Christians worship (προσκυνοῦμεν) the Son of God, which 
supports the arguments of Bauckham and Hurtado regarding the worship of Christ as a 
means of expressing his divinity.53 Neither of these texts is concerned with the issues that 
are at the center of the later monarchian controversy, and they exhibit no concern with 
defining the distinction between the Father and Son. 
Didache, Epistle of Barnabas, and Shepherd of Hermas 
 Neither the Didache54 nor the Epistle of Barnabas55 is terribly concerned with the 
specifics of the relationship between the Father and the Son. The Didache is 
                                                 
51 Polycarp, Epistle to the Philippians 1.3. 
52 Martyrdom of Polycarp 14.3. 
53 Martyrdom of Polycarp 17.3. See, Richard Bauckham, “The Worship of Jesus in Apocalytic 
Christianity,” New Testament Studies 27, no. 3 (1981): 322–41; idem, “The Throne of God and the 
Worship of Jesus,” in Jewish Roots of Christological Monotheism (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 43–69; idem, “The 
Worship of Jesus in Early Christianity,” in Jesus and the God of Israel: God Crucified and Other Studies 
on the New Testament’s Christology of Divine Identity (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2008), 127–51; 
idem, “The Divinity of Jesus Christ in the Epistle to the Hebrews,” in Epistle to the Hebrews and Christian 
Theology (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2009), 15–36; Larry W. Hurtado, “New Testament 
Christology: A Critique of Bousset’s Influence,” Theological Studies 40, no. 2 (1979): 306–17; idem, One 
God, One Lord: Early Christian Devotion and Ancient Jewish Monotheism (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1988); idem, Lord Jesus Christ. 
54 The Didache was probably compiled sometime around 110 – 120 C.E., although Niederwimmer 
argues that the source material used probably dates from the end of the first century. Kurt Niederwimmer, 
The Didache: A Commentary, Hermeneia: A Critical and Historical Commentary on the Bible 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998), 52–53. He also argues that the compiler of the document “is no 
‘theologian.’ It would be foolish to attempt to derive the complete teaching or views of the Didachist from 
the Didache.” Ibid., 2. 
55 We know virtually nothing about the author of this letter, which is more of a treatise fit into the 
epistolary form. Barnard argues that it was written “very early in the reign of Hadrian.” L. W. Barnard, 
“The Date of the Epistle of Barnabas: A Document of Early Egyptian Christianity,” The Journal of 





overwhelmingly concerned with Christian praxis and gives almost no information about 
the relationship between the Father and the Son. At one point, however, the Didache does 
refer to God as δεσπότης; but there is not enough of a pattern to discern if the author of 
the Didache was using it in a manner similar to 1 Clement.56 The Didache also uses the 
term Father, but it does this without correlating it to Son.57 Even more interesting is the 
fact that when the Didachist uses “Father” in the Eucharistic section in Didache 9, he 
refers to Jesus as the child (παῖς) of the Father.58 In addition to this the Didache twice 
states that baptism is to be “in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.”59 
These baptismal formulae are not explicated, and the author of the Didache does not 
address the relationship between Father, Son, and Spirit.  
The Epistle of Barnabas is mostly concerned with the relationship between 
Christianity and Judaism and contains a “virulently anti-Jewish” message.60 The Epistle 
of Barnabas does identify the Lord [Jesus] or the Son as the one to whom God spoke at 
the creation of humans, when he said, “Let us make humans according to our image and 
likeness.”61 The Epistle of Barnabas also speaks of the Son returning to earth.62 Even 
                                                 
specificity and places it sometime in the broad period between 70 – 135 C.E., though probably at the later 
end of this spectrum. Ehrman, The Apostolic Fathers, 25:6–8. 
56 Didache 10.3. 
57 Didache 1.5. 
58 The Didachist continues to call Jesus the child in Didache 10. 
59 Didache 7.1, 7.3. The formulas are almost exactly the same. In Eharman’s edition of the text, 
7.1 reads, εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ ἁγίου πνεύματος. 
60 Ehrman, The Apostolic Fathers, 25:3. 
61 Epistle of Barnabas 5.5, 6.12. At 5.5, God is said to have spoken to the Lord, while at 6.12, he is 
said to have spoken to the Son. Given the putative Alexandrian provenance of the Epistle of Barnabas, this 
comment could show an early Christian Alexandrian focus on this verse in the creation narrative. 





more striking, however, is the Epistle of Barnabas’ strong correlation between Father and 
Jesus as Son of God.63 The Epistle of Barnabas addresses the question of the visibility of 
the Son of God and seems to suggest that prior to the incarnation, the Son was invisible.64 
 Like the Didache and the Epistle of Barnabas, the Shepherd of Hermas is 
predominantly concerned with praxis and holiness.65 It yields very little data about the 
relationship between the Father and the Son because it scarcely mentions the Son at all.66 
Although it is not concerned with propounding a developed doctrine of God and Christ, it 
does bear the marks of monotheistic piety in at least one place. The first Mandate exhorts 
the readers as follows: 
First of all, believe that God is one, who created all things and set them in order, 
and made out of what did not exist everything that is, and who contains all things 
but is himself alone uncontained. Believe in him, therefore, and fear him, and 
fearing him, exercise self-control. Observe these things, and you will cast off all 
evil from yourself and will put on every virtue of righteousness and will live to 
God, if you observe this commandment.67 
 
                                                 
63 Epistle of Barnabas 12.8-10. The author does not clarify the implications of this Father-Son 
correlation, but he makes it very strongly here. See also 7.2 and 7.9 where the Epistle speaks of the 
suffering of the Son of God.  
64 Epistle of Barnabas 5.8-12. This is a marked contrast to the (probably later) theology of Justin, 
who claimed that it was the Son who was visible in all of the Old Testament theophanies. 
65 The dating of the Shepherd of Hermas is quite difficult. Carolyn Osiek writes, “Though there is 
no consensus on dating, the majority of scholars would situate the writing in the first half of the second 
century.” Carolyn Osiek, Shepherd of Hermas: A Commentary, Hermeneia: A Critical and Historical 
Commentary on the Bible (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1999), 19. Despite the uncertainty about the 
dating of the text, most scholars are confident that it was written in Rome. 
66 Hauck argues that Hermas is not a Christological or theological treatise and that the best way to 
understand the Christology of Hermas is through a soteriological lens. Robert J Hauck, “The Great Fast: 
Christology in the Shepherd of Hermas,” Anglican Theological Review 75, no. 2 (1993): 187–98. 





The passage begins with a classic exhortation to monotheism, πίστευσον ὅτι εἷς ἐστὶν ὁ 
θεός.68 Later, the Shepherd of Hermas includes a lengthy parable that touches on the 
relationship between the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.69 The Father creates and hands 
over control of the creation to the Son, indicating if nothing else that the Shepherd views 
them as distinct actors in the drama of creation. While the treatise is relatively 
unconcerned with the relationship between the Father and the Son, it clearly asserts a 
monotheistic stance in its limited theological material. Osiek highlights the background in 
Hellenistic Judaism of the assertion that God created all things out of nothing.70 On the 
whole, the Didache, the Epistle of Barnabas, and the Shepherd of Hermas are not 
concerned with developing a technical doctrine of God or the Father’s relationship to the 
Son. The hints of distinction between Father and Son are faint, especially when compared 
to their emphases on praxis and ethical living. 
Epistle to Diognetus 
 Although the Epistle to Diognetus was probably written at the end of the second 
century or the beginning of the third, it has some interesting continuities with the earlier 
second-century texts and is useful for this overview.71 The author of the Epistle writes 
concerning the place of Christians in the world, 
                                                 
68 Osiek notes that this strong affirmation of monotheism made this passage appealing for later 
heresiologists. Osiek, Shepherd of Hermas, 103. 
69 Shepherd of Hermas Parable 5.1-6. 
70 Osiek, Shepherd of Hermas, 103. 
71 Ehrman suggests that because of the style and content, a date in the middle of the second 





On the contrary, the omnipotent Creator of all, the invisible God himself, 
established among humans the truth and the holy, incomprehensible word from 
heaven and fixed it firmly in their hearts, not, as one might imagine, by sending 
them some subordinate, or angel or ruler or one of those who manage earthly 
matters, or one of those entrusted with the administration of things in heaven, but 
the Designer and Creator of the universe himself, by whom he created the 
heavens… this one he sent to them.72 
 
This passage refers to the truth and Word as Designer (τεχνίτην) and Creator 
(δημιουργόν), language that 1 Clement used to describe the Father.73 The author later 
uses almost the same language to refer to God, calling him Master (δεσπότης) and 
Creator of the universe (δημιουργὸς τῶν ὅλων).74 It is clear from these two closely 
related passages that the author views both God and the Word as sharing in the work of 
creation. The author also writes that the Son was sent as God (ὡς θεόν).75 Despite using 
such language for the Word, the author of the Epistle still preserves some distinction 
between God and the Word. God is distinguished as invisible (ἀόρατος) and the Creator 
of all (παντοκτίστης or δημιουργὸς τῶν ὅλων), a different term for creator than that used 
for the Word. The Epistle to Diognetus does identify the Word and Son and state that the 
Father sent the Word to whom he entrusted his mystery.76 In the Epistle to Diognetus, 
then, we see some means of distinguishing the Father from the Son; but there is nothing 
like a developed, technical means of distinguishing them. This is still soft distinction. 
                                                 
The Apostolic Fathers, 25:127. We know very little about the author of this letter or even about whether the 
named recipient, Diognetus, was real or fictional. 
72 Epistle to Diognetus 7.2 (trans. Holmes, 705-7). 
73 In this section, the author does not use the terms Father or Son; and I use them here only for the 
sake of clarity and continuity with my other discussions. 
74 Epistle to Diognetus 8.7. 
75 Epistle to Diognetus 7.4. 






 Since its discovery in the early twentieth century, the majority of scholars have 
held that the Peri Pascha was the work of Melito of Sardis. This is still the predominant 
view, although at least one scholar opposes it.77 The traditional date for the text is 
sometime between 160 and 170 C.E.78 Some scholars have borrowed Harnack’s phrase, 
“naïve modalism,” to describe the theology of Peri Pascha.79 As with Ignatius, my 
judgment against the use of the phrase “naïve modalism” still stands. Properly 
understood, modalism (or monarchianism) is an intentional identification of the Father 
and Son, not a position one accidentally adopts. What we see in the Peri Pascha is not 
modalism per se but a lack of concern to distinguish the Father and Son. 
 The following passages illustrate the aspects of the Peri Pascha that lead scholars 
to classify it as “naively” modalist. Speaking of the Son, Melito writes, 
For he is all things: inasmuch as he judges, Law; inasmuch as he teaches, Word; 
inasmuch as he saves, Grace; inasmuch as he begets, Father; inasmuch as he is 
begotten, Son; inasmuch as he suffers, Sheep; inasmuch as he is buried, Man; 
                                                 
77 For an alternative theory, see the work of Lynn Cohick. Cohick notes that none of the text given 
in Eusebius’ Ecclesiastical History is present in the Peri Pascha. Cohick addresses other information, such 
as the dating of the archaeological finds of the synagogue in Sardis, in order to challenge the mainstream 
views of the intent of the Peri Pascha. Cohick argues that Melito’s construction of “Israel” in Peri Pascha 
“does not reflect any second- or third-century rivalry between Jews and Christians but rather highlights the 
developing theological arguments concerning identity among Christians.” Lynn H. Cohick, “Melito of 
Sardis’s Peri Pascha and Its ‘Israel,’” Harvard Theological Review 91, no. 4 (1998): 371. Cohick’s 
arguments are strong enough to prove that traditional interpretations of the document are not quite airtight, 
but I do not think they are compelling enough to shift the scholarly majority. See also Lynn H. Cohick, The 
Peri Pascha Attributed to Melito of Sardis: Setting, Purpose, and Sources, Brown Judaic Studies 327 
(Providence: Brown Judaic Studies, 2000). Despite her alternate arguments about setting and authorship, 
Cohick still dates the text to the mid- to late second century. Ibid., 6–7. 
78 Stuart George Hall, “Introduction,” in On Pascha and Fragments, ed. Stuart George Hall, 
Oxford Early Christian Texts (Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1979), xxii. 
79 Stuart G. Hall calls attention to the fact that Bonner borrowed the phrase from Harnack: Ibid., 
xliii. See also Bonner, The Homily on the Passion, 27–8. Also note that Peri Pascha was not discovered 
until after the death of Harnack, so he was not applying the phrase to this work. There are indeed some 





inasmuch as he is raised, God. This is Jesus the Christ, to whom be glory for ever 
and ever. Amen.80 
 
Immediately preceding these lines, Melito had referred to Jesus as God three times.81The 
most striking detail of this passage is that Melito calls Christ Father, “inasmuch as he 
begets” (καθ’ ὃ γεννᾷ πατήρ). Part of the difficulty with this passage is that Melito does 
not clarify what exactly the Son begets. The later monarchian writings claim that the 
Father became his own Son; but nothing that specific is being said here.82 Nevertheless, it 
is jarring that Melito calls Christ “Father.” 
 When Melito speaks of the crucifixion, he plainly asserts that “the Sovereign has 
been insulted; the God has been murdered” (ὁ δεσπότης ὕβρισται· ὁ θεὸς πεφόνευται).83 
Melito’s use of δεσπότης here does not follow the pattern of earlier authors like Clement 
of Rome, who consistently used δεσπότης to refer to God. Melito’s use of δεσπότης 
shows no such consistency. He writes, “This is the cry, Israel, which you should have 
made to God: ‘Sovereign, if indeed your Son had to suffer, and this is your will, then let 
him suffer, but not by me” (Ὦ Δέσποτα, εἰ καὶ ἔδει σου τὸν υἱὸν παθεῖν καὶ τοῦτό σου τὸ 
θέλημα, πασχέτω δή, ἀλλὰ ὑπ΄ ἐμοῦ μή).84 In this passage, Melito clearly uses δέσποτα to 
refer to the Father. Shortly following this passage, Melito writes, “O lawless Israel, what 
is this unprecedented crime you committed, thrusting your Lord among unprecedented 
                                                 
80 Melito, Peri Pascha 9-10 (trans. and Greek from Melito, On Pascha and Fragments, ed. and 
trans. Stuart George Hall, Oxford Early Christian Texts [Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press; Oxford 
University Press, 1979], 6–7). 
81 Melito, Peri Pascha 7-8. 
82 See, for example, Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 10.1. 
83 Melito, Peri Pascha 96 (trans. and Greek from Hall, 54-5). 





sufferings, your Sovereign, who formed you, who made you, who honoured you, who 
called you ‘Israel’” (καινοῖς ἐμβαλών σου τὸν κύριον πάθεσιν, τὸν δεσπότην σου…)?85 
Here Melito uses both δεσπότης and κύριος to refer to the one being crucified. 
Presumably Melito is referring to Jesus, but even his usage here is not entirely clear. For 
Melito, these titles do not serve to distinguish the Father and Son. In fact, Melito is 
attempting to depict a relationship as close as possible between the Father and Son. In 
Melito’s argument against Israel, it is advantageous for him to depict Israel as inflicting 
“unprecedented sufferings” on the very God who called them Israel.86 Melito’s polemical 
point is that the Jews perpetrated this perfidy on their own God. It is unclear if Melito 
even felt that there was a need to distinguish the Father and Son; but if the need for 
distinction was on his radar, such a need was passed over in favor of his more immediate 
polemical purpose. 
 Raniero Cantalamessa has drawn attention to two passages in Peri Pascha that are 
relevant for our further discussion of monarchianism. First, in Melito’s discussion of 
what the Pascha is, he writes, “Learn therefore who is the suffering one, and who shares 
the suffering of the suffering one, and why the Lord is present on the earth to clothe 
                                                 
85 Melito, Peri Pascha 81 (trans. and Greek from Hall, 44-5). 
86 Cohick has argued that Melito’s “Israel” is a rhetorical construction to help form the identity of 
Christians. Cohick, “Melito of Sardis’s Peri Pascha and Its ‘Israel’”;  Lynn H. Cohick, “Melito’s Peri 
Pascha: Its Relationship to Judaism and Sardis in Recent Scholarly Discussion,” in Evolution of the 
Synagogue: Problems and Progress, ed. Howard Clark Kee and Lynn H. Cohick (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity 
Press International, 1999), 123–40. Other scholars have highlighted the possibility of real interaction 
between Jews and Christians on the ground in Sardis. See, for example, Robert L. Wilken, “Melito, the 
Jewish Community at Sardis, and the Sacrifice of Isaac,” Theological Studies 37, no. 1 (1976): 53–69. Still 
others warn that we do not possess enough data to draw grand conclusions about Melito or his relationship 
to Jews in Sardis. See David Satran, “Anti-Jewish Polemic in the Peri Pascha of Melito of Sardis: The 
Problem of Social Context,” in Contra Iudaeos, ed. Ora Limor and Guy G. Stroumsa, Texts and Studies in 





himself with the suffering one and carry him off to the heights of heaven.”87 Second, in a 
passage referring to Christ, Melito writes,  
It is he who, coming from heaven to the earth because of the suffering one, and 
clothing himself in that same one through a virgin’s womb, and coming forth a 
man, accepted the passions of the suffering one through the body which was able 
to suffer, and dissolved the passions of the flesh; and by the Spirit which could 
not die he killed death the killer of men.88 
 
Cantalamessa argues that Melito is correcting a Valentinian understanding of sympatheia 
here.89 More interesting for the current study, however, is that Melito’s position in these 
passages resembles psilanthropism—at least superficially—and that Melito uses the 
language of compassion that shows up a few decades later in Adversus Praxean. The 
passage from Peri Pascha 66 clarifies Melito’s statements in 46. Christ is the one who 
comes from heaven and clothes himself in the suffering one. He is the one who shares in 
suffering—not the Father, as Tertullian’s opponents would later argue. Furthermore, 
Melito’s position is not the same as that of the psilanthropists, who argued that Jesus was 
a mere man upon whom Christ descended at some point in his life (often at his baptism in 
the Jordan).90 Melito argues that Christ clothed himself in the suffering one in the virgin’s 
                                                 
87 Melito, Peri Pascha 46 (trans. and Greek from Hall, 22-5): “μάθετε οὖν τίς ὁ πάσχων, καὶ τίς ὁ 
τῷ πάσχοντι συμπαθῶν, καὶ διὰ τί πάρεστιν ὁ κύριος ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἵνα τὸν πάσχοντα ἀμφιασάμενος ἅρπάσῃ 
εἰς τὰ ὕψηλα τῶν οὐρανῶν.” 
88 Melito, Peri Pascha 66 (trans. and Greek from Hall, 34-5): “οὗτος ἀφικόμενος ἐξ οὐρανῶν ἐπὶ 
τὴν γῆν διὰ τὸν πάσχοντα, αὐτὸν δὲ ἐκεῖνον ἐνδυσάμενος διὰ παρθένου μήτρας καὶ προελθὼν ἄνθρωπος, 
ἀπεδέξατο τὰ τοῦ πάσχοντος πάθη διὰ τοῦ παθεῖν δυναμένου σώματος, καὶ κατέλυσεν τὰ τῆς σαρκὸς πάθη· 
τῷ δὲ θανεῖν μὴ δυναμένῳ πνεύματι ἀπέκτεινεν τὸν ἀνθρωποκτόνον θάνατον.” 
89 Raniero Cantalamessa, “Les homélies pascales de Méliton de Sardes et du Pseudo-Hippolyte et 
les extraits de Theódote,” in Épektasis: Mélanges patristiques offerts au cardinal Jean Daniélou, ed. 
Jacques Fontaine and Charles Kannengiesser (Paris: Beauchesne, 1972), 263–71. 






womb, such that the human Jesus was never without Christ.91 So, when Melito speaks of 
compassion, he is speaking of the Christ suffering with the flesh, not the Father suffering 
with the Son. 
 In a final passage relevant for this study, Melito uses sweeping language to 
describe the Son: 
It is he that made heaven and earth and fashioned man in the beginning, who is 
proclaimed through the law and prophets, who was enfleshed upon a virgin, who 
was hung up on a tree, who was buried in the earth, who was raised from the dead 
and went up to the heights of heaven, who sits at the Father's right hand, who has 
power to save every man, through whom the Father did his works from beginning 
to eternity. He is the Alpha and the Omega; he is beginning and end, beginning 
inexpressible and end incomprehensible; he is the Christ; he is the king; he is 
Jesus; he is the captain; he is the Lord; he is the one who rose from the dead; he is 
the one who sits at the Father's right hand; he carries the Father and is carried by 
the Father. To him be glory and power for ever. Amen.92 
 
Melito begins this passage by ascribing the works of creation to the Son, works that in 
many earlier writers were attributed only to the Father. The rest of the section, however, 
offers a reasonable degree of distinction between the Father and Son. The Son is twice 
said to sit at the Father’s right hand. The Father is said to work through the Son. Thus, 
understanding Melito as a “modalist”—naïve or otherwise—seems premature. The later 
monarchians (or modalists) were actively concerned to preserve belief in only one God, 
and they identified the Father and Son to safeguard monotheism. Melito, on the other 
hand, does not signal anywhere in the Peri Pascha that he thinks monotheism is being 
endangered. In the sections that scholars often identify as modalist, Melito’s theology is 
driven by his polemic against Israel—not some proto-modalist concern to protect 
                                                 
91 Cantalamessa argues that Melito’s position here appears to be an early version of a “two 
natures” understanding of the incarnation. Ibid., 265. 





monotheism. Furthermore, such claims as the Son sitting at the Father’s right hand would 
have been unpalatable for monarchians. What we see in Melito might be naïve, but it is 
not modalism proper, for it lacks many of the major characteristics which form the core 
of later monarchianism. Melito’s anti-Jewish polemic causes him to articulate a strong 
and close connection between the Father and Son, and he exhibits little inclination to 
outline the specifics of their distinction. 
The Ambiguous Middle 
Theophilus of Antioch 
 Scholars have offered widely divergent assessments of Theophilus’ three books to 
a certain Autolycus (Ad Autolycum).93 On the one hand, Robert M. Grant finds Ad 
Autolycum to be dilettantish, having a firm grasp of neither the Greco-Roman sources he 
so frequently cites nor the Christian tradition to which he is heir.94 On the other hand, 
Stuart Parsons argues that Ad Autolycum is a skillfully constructed rhetorical argument in 
which Theophilus discredits his opponents’ sources and shows his own to be reliable.95 
Whatever estimation one has of the quality of the work, it is clear that Theophilus is 
concerned, like Athenagoras, with providing a strong account of monotheism. This 
                                                 
93 Stuart Parsons argues that these three books are to be read as three separate, self-contained 
letters to Autolycus rather than one premeditated whole in three parts. Stuart Parsons, “Coherence, 
Rhetoric, and Scripture in Theophilus of Antioch’s Ad Autolycum,” The Greek Orthodox Theological 
Review 53 (2008): 163. 
94 Robert M. Grant, “Theophilus of Antioch to Autolycus,” Harvard Theological Review 40, no. 4 
(1947): 242, 256. 





emphasis on monotheism, when coupled with the fact that he does not directly mention 
Jesus, has caused some to argue that his theology is more Jewish than Christian.96 Despite 
his his omission of any mention of Jesus by name, three aspects of this theology are of 
interest for my current work: his articulation of monotheism, his Logos theology, and his 
Sophia theology. 
 Throughout Ad Autolycum Theophilus repeats his claim that the prophets 
proclaim that there is only one God. Although he argues that the pagan philosophers are 
often misguided, Theophilus thinks they are sometimes in agreement with the prophets. 
He writes, “Sometimes some poets, becoming sober in soul and departing from the 
demons, made statements in agreement with those of the prophets in order to bear witness 
to themselves and to all men concerning the sole rule of God (περί τε θεοῦ μοναρχίας) 
and the judgment and the other matters they discussed.”97 For Theophilus, when the 
                                                 
96 Robert Grant notes of Theophilus, “The author was evidently a Christian, but as we shall show, 
he was more a Jew than a Christian…. And we shall see that he was very close to what later fathers called 
the school of Ebion” (“The Problem of Theophilus,” Harvard Theological Review 43, no. 3 (1950): 180). 
See also the work of Bentivegna, which highlights the absence of Christ from Theophilus’ theology: J 
Bentivegna, “A Christianity without Christ by Theophilus of Antioch,” Studia Patristica 13 (Berlin: 
Akademie Verlag, 1975), 107–30. Grant later goes on to employ Harnack’s terminology to argue that 
Theophilus was a “dynamistic monarchian” and Judaizer (“The Problem of Theophilus,” 196). As evidence 
for this claim, Grant offers a shaky reading of 2.24, where Adam is described as being created in a sort of 
neutral state with the inclination for progress (ἀφορμὴν προκοπῆς). Grant comments on this passage, 
“Moreover, his description in II 24 of what Adam might have accomplished is clearly modeled on what he 
thinks Jesus did accomplish. God gave Adam a ‘principle of progress’ (ἀφορμὴ προκοπῆς) so that he could 
‘grow’ and ‘become perfect’, and be declared God, and thus ascend into heaven, possessing immortality. 
The word προκοπή was used by Ebionites to describe the ethical achievement of the human Jesus” (ibid., 
195). The perhaps insuperable difficulty with Grant’s assertion is that Theophilus does not once mention 
Jesus. Therefore, we have nothing to compare with other “dynamistic monarchians” or the Ebionites Grant 
mentions. Grant’s judgment is premature at best, for we scarcely catch a glimpse of the human Jesus in 
Theophilus’ work, let alone anything as explicit as the sort of “mere man (psilanthropist)” Christologies 
that Harnack associated with his term “dynamistic monarchianism.” Although Uríbarri Bilbao does not use 
a restricted definition of monarchianism like the one I suggest, he likewise disagrees with those who judge 
Theophilus’ theology to be monarchian. See Uríbarri Bilbao, Monarquía y Trinidad, 122–7. He does 
highlight the fact that Theophilus’ use of μοναρχία is not anti-Trinitarian, and this observation accords well 
with the thesis that I am advancing about the core of monarchian theology. 
97 Theophilus, Ad Autolycum 2.8 (trans. and Greek from Theophilus, Ad Autolycum, ed. Robert 





philosophers get something right, they are merely imitating the inspired prophets, who 
antedated them. In his discussions of monotheism, Theophilus frequently employs the 
term μοναρχία.98 Unlike the later Praxeans, however, Theophilus appears to be using it 
only to denote the rule of one God. There are no signs of its use as a polemical tool to 
deny distinction between the Father and Son. Like Athenagoras, his emphasis on 
monotheism serves as a bridge-concept between Greek philosophy and biblical faith. 
 Although developing a fulsome Logos theology is not Theophilus’ primary 
concern in Ad Autolycum, there are a few notable passages where he discusses the role of 
the Logos. His employment of Logos is often closely linked to his use of Sophia, so I will 
treat the two themes in tandem. Perhaps the most important passage for these concepts in 
Ad Autolycum comes near the beginning of book two. He writes, 
Therefore God, having his own Logos innate (ἐνδιάθετον) in his own bowels, 
generated him together with his own Sophia, vomiting him forth before everything 
else. He used this Logos as his servant in the things created by him, and through 
him he made all things. He is called Beginning because he leads and dominates 
everything fashioned through him. It was he, Spirit of God and Beginning and 
Sophia and Power of the Most High, who came down into the prophets and spoke 
through them about the creation of the world and all the rest. For the prophets did 
not exist when the world came into existence; there were the Sophia of God which 
is in him and his holy Logos who is always present with him. For this reason he 
speaks thus through Solomon the prophet: 'When he prepared the heaven I was 
with him, and when he made strong the foundations of the earth I was with him, 
binding them fast'. And Moses, who lived many years before Solomon,—or 
rather, the Logos of God, speaking through him as an instrument—says: 'In the 
Beginning God made heaven and earth'. First he mentioned beginning and 
creation, and only then did he introduce God, for it is not right to mention God 
idly and in vain. For the divine Sophia knew in advance that some persons were 
going to speak nonsense and make mention of a multitude of non-existent gods.99  
                                                 
98 Theophilus’ use of μοναρχία is confined to books two and three. See Ad Autolycum 2.4, 2.8, 
2.28, 2.35, 2.38, 3.7. Uríbarri Bilbao notes that Theophilus uses the term μοναρχία more frequently than 
any of the other apologists (Monarquía y Trinidad, 105). He argues that μοναρχία is something of a 
“missionary concept” for Theophilus, allowing him to build a bridge from pagan thought to Judaism and 
Christianity (ibid., 108). 
99 Theophilus, Ad Autolycum 2.10 (trans. and Greek from Grant, 38-41): “Ἔχων οὖν ὁ θεὸς τὸν 






There are a number of notable features in this passage. The first is the apparent 
inconsistency in Theophilus’ use of the title Sophia. First, Theophilus claims that the 
Logos was generated “together with his own Sophia (μετὰ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ σοφίας),” which 
implies that they are distinct entities. Immediately following that description of their 
generation, however, Theophilus uses Sophia as a title for the Logos, not to refer to a 
separate being or entity.100 While Theophilus is not consistent with his use of Sophia, 
other passages make it clear that he thinks Sophia is a being distinct from the Logos. In 
his reading of Genesis 1:26, Theophilus interprets God saying “Let us” as God speaking 
to Sophia and Logos, who were God’s partners in creation.101 Here, God’s hands appear 
to be some sort of external actors to whom God speaks, although he still does not make 
clear the manner of their distinction or connection. In the clearest of the passages where 
he distinguishes Logos and Sophia, Theophilus writes regarding the creation account in 
                                                 
ἐξερευξάμενος πρὸ τῶν ὅλων. τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἔσχεν ὑπουργὸν τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ γεγενημένων, καὶ δι’ 
αὐτοῦ τὰ πάντα πεποίηκεν. οὗτος λέγεται ἀρχή, ὅτι ἄρχει καὶ κυριεύει πάντων τῶν δι’ αὐτοῦ 
δεδημιουργημένων. οὗτος οὖν, ὢν πνεῦμα θεοῦ καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ σοφία καὶ δύναμις ὑψίστου, κατήρχετο εἰς 
τοὺς προφήτας καὶ δι’ αὐτῶν ἐλάλει τὰ περὶ τῆς ποιήσεως τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἁπάντων. οὐ γὰρ 
ἦσαν οἱ προφῆται ὅτε ὁ κόσμος ἐγίνετο, ἀλλ’ ἡ σοφία ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἡ ἐν αὐτῷ οὖσα καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ ἅγιος 
αὐτοῦ ὁ ἀεὶ συμπαρὼν αὐτῷ. διὸ δὴ καὶ διὰ Σολομῶνος προφήτου οὕτως λέγει· “Ἡνίκα δ’ ἡτοίμασεν τὸν 
οὐρανόν, συμπαρήμην αὐτῷ, καὶ ὡς ἰσχυρὰ ἐποίει τὰ θεμέλια τῆς γῆς, ἤμην παρ’ αὐτῷ ἁρμόζουσα.” 
Μωσῆς δὲ ὁ καὶ Σολομῶνος πρὸ πολλῶν ἐτῶν γενόμενος, μᾶλλον δὲ ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ ὡς δι’ ὀργάνου δι’ 
αὐτοῦ φησιν· “Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν.” πρῶτον ἀρχὴν καὶ ποίησιν ὠνόμασεν, 
εἶθ’ οὕτως τὸν θεὸν συνέστησεν· οὐ γὰρ ἀργῶς χρὴ καὶ ἐπὶ κενῷ θεὸν ὀνομάζειν. προῄδει γὰρ ἡ θεία σοφία 
μέλλειν φλυαρεῖν τινας καὶ πληθὺν θεῶν ὀνομάζειν τῶν οὐκ ὄντων.” 
100 Multiple scholars have noted this inconsistency on the part of Theophilus. See, for example, 
Anthony Briggman, Irenaeus of Lyons and the Theology of the Holy Spirit, Oxford Early Christian Studies 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 126–8; Jackson Lashier, Irenaeus on the Trinity, Supplements to 
Vigiliae Christianae 127 (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 160–2. Perhaps one reason for Theophilus’ inconsistency is 
that Paul uses Sophia as a title of Christ in 1 Corinthians 1:24, “Christ the Power of God and Wisdom of 
God.” Thus, Sophia appears in scripture as someone alongside God in creation (Proverbs 8:22) and as a 
title for Christ (1 Cor. 1:24). It was not until the end of the second century that these two uses were merged 
into one and Sophia became a title for Christ. Even Irenaeus, writing near the end of the second century, 
used Sophia as a title for the Holy Spirit. 





Genesis, “Similarly the three days prior to the luminaries are the types of the triad of God 
and his Logos and his Sophia.”102 He does not use precise terminology, but it is clear that 
Theophilus thinks that God, the Logos, and Sophia constitute three somethings.103  
 The next notable aspect of Ad Autolycum 2.10 is Theophilus’ use of the Stoic 
linguistic categories of λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and λόγος προφορικός. He develops this 
concept later, when he writes that the Logos “was always innate (ἐνδιάθετον) in the heart 
of God,” but that “when God wished to make what he had planned to make, he generated 
this Logos, making him external (τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐγέννησεν προφορικόν), as the 
firstborn of all creation.”104 It is difficult to tell what Theophilus thinks the status of the 
Logos is when it is interior to God (ἐνδιάθετος)—whether it is identical with God or 
maintains any degree of distinction. When the Logos is made external (προφορικός), 
however, it is evident that there is a distinction between the two. Again, though, 
Theophilus offers few clues regarding the manner of the distinction between God and the 
externalized Logos.105 
 In his discussion of God walking in paradise, Theophilus focuses on the fact that 
God, the Father of the universe, is not confined to any place.106 This ἀχώρητος God and 
                                                 
102 Theophilus, Ad Autolycum 2.15 (trans. Grant, 53). See also Ad Autolycum 1.7 and 2.18. 
103 Despite his use of “triad,” Theophilus does not here present something like a developed 
doctrine of the Trinity. Immediately after his use of triad, Theophilus claims that a human can be added to 
the triad to make a tetrad. See Grant’s discussion of this matter at, “The Problem of Theophilus,” 188. 
104 Theophilus, Ad Autolycum 2.22 (trans. and Greek from Grant, 62-3). Note the variability in the 
ways Theophilus describes the interiority of the Logos. In 2.10, he describes the Logos as in God’s own 
bowels (ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις σπλάγχνοις), while in 2.22, he describes him as in the heart of God (ἐν καρδίᾳ θεοῦ). 
105 Note also that Curry thinks that Theophilus might allow “for the Logos endiathetos and the 
Logos prophorikos to exist in different places simultaneously.” This possibility, of course, would increase 
the complexity here. See Carl Curry, “The Theogony of Theophilus,” Vigiliae Christianae 42, no. 4 (1988): 
321. 





Father of the universe is not present in any place, including paradise. Instead, the Logos is 
present in paradise in the role of the Father and Lord of all. Theophilus then discusses the 
voice that Adam heard in the garden, writing, “what is the ‘voice’ but the Logos of God, 
who is also his Son?”107 Theophilus’ equation of Logos and Son here is noteworthy, for 
this is the only place it occurs in Ad Autolycum. Furthermore, even when he refers to the 
Son, he does not correlate the term with Father. The Father is Father of the universe (τῶν 
ὅλων), but he is nowhere said to be Father of the Son. Thus, in Theophilus’ theology, the 
Fatherhood of God denotes his role as creator and is not connected to the title Son, which 
occurs only once. 
 In Theophilus’ three books Ad Autolycum, there are some signs that he views the 
Logos as somehow distinct from God. He can speak of Logos and Sophia as members of 
a triad, and he can speak of the Logos as external to God, at least for the work of creation. 
At the same time, however, it is clear that carefully articulating the manners of unity and 
distinction between God and the Logos is not something that concerns Theophilus. He is 
far more concerned to present a strong picture of monotheism by employing texts from 
both the Old Testament and pagan philosophical writers. This collection of characteristics 
leaves Theophilus’ Ad Autolycum somewhere in the ambiguous middle when it comes to 
articulating the distinction between the Father and Son. 
                                                 
107 Theophilus, Ad Autolycum 2.22 (Greek and trans., Grant, 62-63): φωνὴ δὲ τί ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἀλλ’ ἢ 






 John Behr asserts that disputants on both sides of the monarchian controversy 
were developing the theology of Irenaeus. Regarding the Refutatio omnium haeresium, he 
writes, “Despite the fact that this book is our primary source for determining their 
theology, enough is indicated to suggest that Zephyrinus and Callistus were maintaining 
the style of theology developed by Irenaeus…. The final protagonist in this series of 
debates was Hippolytus who, in his Contra Noetum and other undisputed works, 
developed a more Irenaean theology.”108 Behr does not specify how each of the parties 
develops Irenaeus’ theology, perhaps because there is no clear evidence that either the 
monarchians or their proto-orthodox opponents were drawing on Irenaeus in their conflict 
with each other.109 
 Scholars have noted the development of Irenaeus’ Trinitarian theology over the 
course of his career, both within Adversus haereses, his sprawling anti-Gnostic polemical 
work, and in his later and more positive theological work, the Demonstratio.110 A 
discussion of the development of Irenaeus’ Trinitarian theology is beyond the scope of 
this work, and I focus here on a few key passages in Irenaeus that typify his articulation 
                                                 
108 John Behr, The Way to Nicaea, The Formation of Christian Theology 1 (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. 
Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2001), 141–2. 
109 The lack of any clear textual evidence has not kept others from speculating about Irenaeus’ 
legacy in the monarchian controversy. In fact, Stuart Hall has argued, rather fancifully, that Tertullian’s 
Praxeas is actually a pseudonym for Irenaeus. Stuart George Hall, “Praxeas and Irenaeus,” Studia Patristica 
14.3 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1976), 145–47. 
110 Particularly of note here are the following more recent works: Michel R. Barnes, “Irenaeus’s 
Trinitarian Theology,” Nova et Vetera 7, no. 1 (2009): 67–106; Briggman, Irenaeus of Lyons and the 
Theology of the Holy Spirit; Lashier, Irenaeus on the Trinity. Briggman has argued that Irenaeus’ theology 
of the Holy Spirit underwent a notable change after Irenaeus’ interaction with the theology of Theophilus 
of Antioch, i.e., in AH, 3. Not all scholars agree that the Demonstratio is the later work. See, for example, 





of the relationship between the Father and the Son. It is important to remember that much 
of Irenaeus’ theology was developed in counterpoint to his Gnostic opponents and that 
this polemical context shaped some of his emphases.111 
 Irenaeus accused his Gnostic opponents of introducing spatio-temporal distance 
between the highest God and the less-divine members of the Pleroma and describing God 
by means of analogies from human life that were not fit for such a task. He responds to 
both of these trends and states regarding the Father of all,  
He is a simple, uncompounded Being, without diverse members, and altogether 
like, and equal to himself, since he is wholly understanding, and wholly spirit and 
wholly thought, and wholly intelligence, and wholly reason, and wholly hearing, 
and wholly seeing, and wholly light, and the whole source of all that is good—
even as the religious and pious are wont to speak concerning God.112 
 
Irenaeus stresses the simplicity of God to counter what he perceives as the divisions and 
distance within the Gnostic Pleroma.113 Another way Irenaeus seeks to combat the notion 
of any spatial distance within God is by highlighting that God is spirit. Michel Barnes 
writes, “The polemical purpose of Irenaeus’s emphasis on God as Spirit is to deny spatial 
language of God and His generation(s).”114 The denial of any spatial language when 
referring to God and the refusal to use causative language when describing the relations 
among the Father, Son, or Holy Spirit means that Irenaeus’ picture of God emphasizes 
                                                 
111 Lashier argues that the different historical and polemical circumstances in which the works of 
Irenaeus and the Apologists were composed help to explain Irenaeus’ divergence from and development of 
the theology of the Apologists. Lashier, Irenaeus on the Trinity, 15.  
112 Irenaeus, Adversus haereses 2.13.3 (trans. ANF 1:374). 
113 In his forthcoming book, God and Christ in Irenaeus, Anthony Briggman argues that simplicity 
and infinity are central to Irenaeus’ understanding of God. 





the unity of God.115 His resistance to the fracturing of the divine he perceived within the 
Valentinian Pleroma explains why Irenaeus emphasized the unity of God. 
 When Irenaeus is able to take a step back from his fierce argument against the 
Gnostics later in his career, he gives an account of God that emphasizes that God is never 
without the Son and Spirit. Scholars have noted that Irenaeus’ overarching concern to 
protect the unity of God against the Gnostics seems to have prevented him from 
developing a “separate category approximating ‘person.’”116 Although Irenaeus does not 
have any technical term to denote the distinct identities of the Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit, the Trinitarian nature of this thought is evident. In a passage near the beginning of 
the Demonstratio, Irenaeus describes the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in a way that 
makes it clear that are all divine and have distinct, yet intertwined, roles in the economy. 
He writes, 
Thus then there is shown forth One God, the Father, not made, invisible, creator 
of all things; above whom there is no other God, and from whom there is no other 
God. And, since God is rational, therefore by (the) Word He created the things 
that were made; and God is Spirit, and by (the) Spirit He adorned all things: as 
also the prophet says: By the word of the Lord were the heavens established, and 
by his spirit all their power. Since then the Word establishes, that is to say, gives 
body and grants the reality of being, and the Spirit gives order and form to the 
diversity of the powers; rightly and fittingly is the Word called the Son, and the 
Spirit the Wisdom of God. Well also does Paul His apostle say: One God, the 
Father, who is over all and through all and in us all. For over all is the Father; 
and through all is the Son, for through Him all things were made by the Father; 
and in us all is the Spirit, who cries Abba Father, and fashions man into the 
likeness of God. Now the Spirit shows forth the Word, and therefore the prophets 
                                                 
115 Irenaeus does speak about the generation of the Son at Adversus haereses 2.28.6, but there he is 
critiquing his opponents for thinking that they can describe the generation of the Son using human 
analogies. The Son’s generation, argues Irenaeus, is indescribable and ought not be fit into the mold of 
human analogies. 
116 Lashier, Irenaeus on the Trinity, 209. Michel Barnes writes, “Here it may be useful to make an 
apparently minor point about Irenaeus’s Trinitarian theology: it has no word to answer ‘two (or three) 





announced the Son of God; and the Word utters the Spirit, and therefore is 
Himself the announcer of the prophets, and leads and draws man to the Father.117 
 
Irenaeus offers a rendition of the regula fidei immediately following this passage which 
further clarifies that he views the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as having distinct 
identities, even if he does not develop the technical terminology needed to give a strong 
account of this distinction.118 Irenaeus’ statements of the equal divinity of the Father, 
Son, and Holy Spirit are stronger and more definite than most of his predecessors and 
contemporaries. The exigencies of his opposition to the Gnostics did not require him to 
develop a clear means of distinguishing the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Within his 
specific polemical context, Irenaeus developed a theology that was strong on articulating 
the unity of God and but did not focus on articulating the distinction among Father, Son, 
and Holy Spirit.119 Although he occasionally offers means for distinguishing Father, Son, 
and Spirit, they are never particularly clear or precise.  
Clement of Alexandria 
 Clement of Alexandria exhibits a desire to show both that the Father and Son are 
one and that they are also distinguished from each other. As I have demonstrated in this 
                                                 
117 Irenaeus, Demonstratio 5 (trans. Irenaeus, St. Irenaeus: The Demonstration of the Apostolic 
Preaching, trans. J. Armitage Robinson [London: S.P.C.K., 1920], 73–4). 
118 Irenaeus, Demonstratio 6. As is to be expected, Irenaeus structures the regula around the three 
Trinitarian “persons” and lists the distinct activities of each. For example, the Son or Word was manifested 
in the theophanies. He is the one through whom all things were made, the one who became visible and 
tangible in the incarnation, etc. 
119 In an email conversation, both Briggman and Lashier noted that Irenaeus does not develop 
strong categories for distinguishing Father, Son, and Spirit and that he focuses on their unity and equality. 
They do, however, note that Irenaeus has something of a functional hierarchy among the three in the 





chapter, the former impulse was shared by nearly every Christian writer of the second 
century, whereas the latter was given considerable attention only by a few. Clement’s 
exposition of the unity and distinction of the Father and Son, though original and novel at 
times, is ambiguous. He holds both in tension, but he is never able to reconcile them with 
sufficient clarity. 
 A number of scholarly treatments of Clement’s understanding of the Father/Son 
relationship have focused on Clement’s Logos theology and on a fragment from 
Photius.120 Because of the questionable authenticity of this fragment and the evocative 
nature of other passages that are almost certainly authentic, I have chosen to bracket 
questions related to Photius’ fragment.121 Instead, I focus my attention on passages from 
the Excerpta ex Theodoto (Excerpta) wherein Clement discusses questions of unity and 
distinction between the Father and Son.122 I will supplement these core passages with 
relevant texts from his other works. 
 Before assessing Clement’s description of the relationship between the Father and 
Son, we must first consider the ways in which Clement speaks about the Father. One of 
the most important aspects of Clement’s understanding of the Father is the Father’s 
                                                 
120 On this, see Edwards’ disagreement with Casey about whether Clement held that there were 
two distinct Logoi. R. P. Casey, “Clement and the Two Divine Logoi,” Journal of Theological Studies 25 
(1924): 43–56; M. J. Edwards, “Clement of Alexandria and His Doctrine of the Logos,” Vigiliae 
Christianae 54, no. 2 (2000): 159–77. 
121 Such considerations would, of course, be necessary in a fuller treatment of Clement’s 
Trinitarian theology. The goal of the present section is not to give an exhaustive account of Clement’s 
Trinitarian theology. Instead, I intend to outline the contours of his understanding of the relationship 
between the Father and Son. 
122 In the Excerpta, Clement both reproduces Valentinian thought and gives his own. As will 
become clear in my later analysis, not all scholars agree on which sections belong to Valentinians and 
which belong to Clement. For a discussion of these matters, see the introductions in the editions of both 
Casey and Sagnard: Clement, The Excerpta ex Theodoto of Clement of Alexandria, ed. Robert Pierce Casey 
(London: Christophers, 1934); Clement, Extraits de Théodote, ed. François Louis Marie Matthiew Sagnard, 





absolute transcendence.123 In the first book of the Paedagogus (Paed.), Clement says, 
“God is one, and He is more than one, beyond unity.”124 John 1:18 is a very important 
verse for Clement’s understanding of both the Father’s transcendence and the Son’s 
relation to the Father. In book five of the Stromata (Strom.) Clement reflects on this verse 
and the difficulty of speaking about God. He writes:  
No one can rightly express Him wholly. For on account of His greatness He is 
ranked as the All, and is the Father of the universe. Nor are any parts to be 
predicated of Him. For the One is indivisible; wherefore also it is infinite, not 
considered with reference to inscrutability, but with reference to its being without 
dimensions, and not having a limit. And therefore it is without form and name. 
And if we name it, we do not do so properly, terming it either the One, or the 
Good, or Mind, or Absolute Being, or Father, or God, or Creator, or Lord. We 
speak not as supplying His name; but for want, we use good names, in order that 
the mind may have these as points of support, so as not to err in other respects. 
For each one by itself does not express God; but all together are indicative of the 
power of the Omnipotent. For predicates are expressed either from what belongs 
to things themselves, or from their mutual relation. But none of these are 
admissible in reference to God. Nor any more is He apprehended by the science 
of demonstration. For it depends on primary and better known principles. But 
there is nothing antecedent to the Unbegotten.125 
                                                 
123 For a discussion of the philosophical and Philonic background of Clement’s understanding of 
the transcendence of God, see chapters one and two of Raoul Mortley, Connaissance religieuse et 
herméneutique chez Clément d’Alexandrie (Leiden: Brill, 1973). Eric Osborn also deals with Clement’s 
understanding of God’s transcendence. See especially his Clement of Alexandria (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 122–6. Daniélou’s treatment of the transcendence of God in the 
broader milieu surrounding Clement is also useful: Jean Daniélou, Gospel Message and Hellenistic 
Culture, trans. John Austin Baker, History of Early Christian Doctrine before the Council of Nicaea 2 
(London: Longman & Todd, 1973), 323–43. 
124 Clement, Paed. 1.8.71 (trans. FC 23:63): “ἓν δὲ ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτὴν 
μονάδα.” Greek from Clement, Le Pédagogue, ed. Henri-Irénée Marrou and Marguerite Harl, vol. 1, 
Sources chrétiennes 70 (Paris: Cerf, 1960), 236. Just before this quotation, Clement quotes Jesus’ words in 
John 17:21-23, thus, making it clear that Clement is referring to the Father when he here says “God.” 
125 Clement, Strom. 5.12.81.5 – 5.12.82.3 (trans. ANF 2:464): οὐκ ἂν δὲ ὅλον εἴποι τις αὐτὸν 
ὀρθῶς· ἐπὶ μεγέθει γὰρ τάττεται τὸ ὅλον καὶ ἔστι τῶν ὅλων πατήρ. οὐδὲ μὴν μέρη τινὰ αὐτοῦ λεκτέον· 
ἀδιαίρετον γὰρ τὸ ἕν, διὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ἄπειρον, οὐ κατὰ τὸ ἀδιεξίτητον νοούμενον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ 
ἀδιάστατον καὶ μὴ ἔχον πέρας, καὶ τοίνυν ἀσχημάτιστον καὶ ἀνωνόμαστον. κἂν ὀνομάζωμεν αὐτό ποτε, οὐ 
κυρίως καλοῦντες ἤτοι ἓν ἢ τἀγαθὸν ἢ νοῦν ἢ αὐτὸ τὸ ὂν ἢ πατέρα ἢ θεὸν ἢ δημιουργὸν ἢ κύριον, οὐχ ὡς 
ὄνομα αὐτοῦ προφερόμενοι λέγομεν, ὑπὸ δὲ ἀπορίας ὀνόμασι καλοῖς προσχρώμεθα, ἵν’ ἔχῃ ἡ διάνοια, μὴ 
περὶ ἄλλα πλανωμένη, ἐπερείδεσθαι τούτοις. οὐ γὰρ τὸ καθ’ ἕκαστον μηνυτικὸν τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ ἀθρόως 
ἅπαντα ἐνδεικτικὰ τῆς τοῦ παντοκράτορος δυνάμεως· τὰ γὰρ λεγόμενα ἢ ἐκ τῶν προσόντων αὐτοῖς ῥητά 
ἐστιν ἢ ἐκ τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα σχέσεως, οὐδὲν δὲ τούτων λαβεῖν οἷόν τε περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ἐπιστήμῃ 
λαμβάνεται τῇ ἀποδεικτικῇ· αὕτη γὰρ ἐκ προτέρων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων συνίσταται, τοῦ δὲ ἀγεννήτου οὐδὲν 






In this passage, Clement uses a number of apophatic terms before conceding that some 
positive ascriptions can be made of God, but only as something of a crutch for human 
minds. For Clement, God is beyond our attempts at description. 
For the purposes of this study, one more aspect of Clement’s description of God is 
illuminating. Echoing Philo in multiple places, Clement describes God as unable to be 
circumscribed (ἀπερίγραφος); and this is important for one of the primary ways he 
describes the distinction between God and his Son in the Excerpta.126 In the first place, 
Clement writes:  
Since the gnostic Moses does not circumscribe within space Him that cannot be 
circumscribed, he set up no image in the temple to be worshipped; showing that 
God was invisible, and incapable of being circumscribed; and somehow leading 
the Hebrews to the conception of God by the honour for his name in the temple.127 
 
In this passage, Clement uses multiple terms with the alpha-privative to denote the same 
basic concept, the illimitability of God. Daniélou notes, “It will be apparent… that the 
epithet ἀπερίληπτος is virtually synonymous with ἀπερίγραφος.”128 Clement employs the 
same concept later in Strom., writing, “For is it not the case that rightly and truly we do 
not circumscribe in any place that which cannot be circumscribed; nor do we shut up in 
                                                 
Ludwig Früchtel, vol. 2, Griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte 15 (Berlin: 
Akademie-Verlag, 1960), 380–1. 
126 For Philo’s prior use of the term, see De sacrificiis Abelis et Caini 59, 124. At 59, Philo writes, 
ἀπερίγραφος γὰρ ὁ θεός, ἀπερίγραφοι δὲ καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐτοῦ. In 124, Philo states that God has 
uncircumscribed wealth (ἀπερίγραφον πλοῦτον). 
127 Clement, Strom. 5.11.74 (trans. ANF 2:462): καὶ ὅτι οὐ περιλαμβάνει τόπῳ τὸ ἀπερίληπτον ὁ 
γνωστικὸς Μωυσῆς, ἀφίδρυμα οὐδὲν ἀνέθηκεν εἰς τὸν νεὼν σεβάσμιον, ἀόρατον καὶ ἀπερίγραφον δηλῶν 
εἶναι τὸν θεόν, προσάγων δὲ ἁμῇ γέ πῃ εἰς ἔννοιαν τοῦ θεοῦ τοὺς Ἑβραίους διὰ τῆς τιμῆς τοῦ κατὰ τὸν 
νεὼν ὀνόματος. Greek from GCS 15:376. 





temples made with hands that which contains all things?”129 For Clement, God cannot be 
limited or circumscribed. This assertion accords well with his apophatic approach to 
speaking about God. Clement held that God was one (and even beyond unity) and that 
God was beyond any human description or limitation. 
 For Clement, this one illimitable and indescribable God was both united to and 
distinguished from the Son, who was also God. His description of this unity and 
distinction is where the ambiguity manifests itself most fully. Before considering how 
Clement distinguishes the Father and Son, let us examine some of the ways he speaks of 
their unity. One of the primary ways Clement refers to the Son is through the use of the 
title Logos, and it is precisely this term that makes Clement’s thought so ambiguous. As I 
noted above, there is disagreement among scholars about the reliability of Photius’ report 
that Clement taught “two Logoi.” I will bracket the questions attached to the Photian 
fragment by focusing on Excerpta 8, 10-15, and 19.130 
                                                 
129 Clement, Strom. 7.5.28 (trans. ANF 2:530): Ἢ γὰρ οὐ καλῶς καὶ ἀληθῶς οὐκ ἐν τόπῳ τινὶ 
περιγράφομεν τὸν ἀπερίληπτον οὐδ’ ἐν ἱεροῖς καθείργνυμεν «χειροποιήτοις» τὸ πάντων περιεκτικόν; 
Greek from Clement, Clemens Alexandrinus: Stromata Buch VII-VIII, ed. Otto Stählin and Ludwig 
Früchtel, vol. 3, Griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte 17 (Berlin: Akademie-
Verlag, 1970), 20. Clement’s usage of the term here supports Daniélou’s contention that Clement is using 
them as synonyms. 
130 As I noted above, it can be difficult to parse out whether a particular passage in the Excerpta 
should be attributed to Clement or to his Valentinian opponents. Sagnard clearly lays out the criteria he 
uses to determine whose thought is being expressed in any given passage. See Clement, Extraits de 
Théodote, 9. He has also presented the text using different indentation and font size to denote whose 
position is being represented. One of the surest means to determine the Clementine provenance of a passage 
is a direct statement by him in the text. He does this in one of the most important passages for my current 
study, Exc. 8. After summarizing the Valentinian position, Clement counters, “But we say” (Ἡμεῖς δὲ... 
φαμεν)… Both Sagnard and Casey, who have created editions of the text, agree that the sections I am 
considering represent the thought of Clement. In his more recent article, however, Mark Edwards argues 
that Exc. 19 cannot represent the thought of Clement. He writes regarding the content of Exc. 19, “This can 
scarcely be Clement’s own opinion, as it affirms the identity of Christ on earth with the Creator at the cost 
of divorcing both from God the Logos, who is not credited with any distinct hypostasis.” Edwards, 
“Clement of Alexandria and His Doctrine of the Logos,” 174. Earlier in the article, Edwards lamented the 
fact that “facile skepticism… is too readily adopted when a text proves inconvenient to scholarship,” but 
such noble resistance to facile skepticism does not seem to prevent him from dismissing Exc. 19 as 
unreliable because it does not fit his narration of Clement’s doctrine of the Logos (ibid., 171). Even more, 





 One of Clement’s strongest statements of the unity between the Father and Son, 
or, in this case, Logos, comes in Exc. 8. In this section, Clement is directly responding to 
a Valentinian Logos theology based on a reading of John 1:1. In order to better 
understand Clement’s rejoinder, a brief appraisal of the position of his Valentinian 
opponents is in order. In Exc. 6, Clement records the key terms that the Valentinians 
focused on in their exegesis: beginning (ἀρχή), Only-Begotten (Μονογενής), and Logos 
(λόγος). In Exc. 7, Clement elaborates their position and writes:   
Therefore, the Father, being unknown, wished to be known to the Aeons, and 
through his own thought, as if he had known himself, he put forth (προέβαλε) the 
Only-Begotten, the spirit of Knowledge which is in Knowledge. So he too who 
came forth (προελθὼν) from Knowledge, that is, from the Father’s Thought, 
became Knowledge, that is, the Son, because ‘through the Son the Father was 
known.’131 
 
In this passage, Clement’s Valentinian opponents use two verbs that denote the 
exteriorizing of something from the Father (προβάλλω, προέρχομαι). This exteriorizing 
of the Only-Begotten, who becomes Knowledge, is important because it reveals the 
unknown (ἄγνωστος) Father.132 Later in the same passage, however, Clement speaks of 
the one “who remained ‘Only-Begotten Son in the bosom of the Father’ explaining 
                                                 
claims that it is authentically and reliably Clementine. Furthermore, Edwards must surely search in vain for 
any claim in Clement that the Logos is a “distinct hypostasis,” for Clement never uses the term hypostasis 
to describe the distinction betweenthe Father and the Logos or Son. Such a specialized meaning for 
hypostasis, as Daniélou notes, does not begin to develop until the next century. Daniélou, Gospel Message 
and Hellenistic Culture, 367. I agree with Sagnard and Casey that Exc. 19 does represent Clement’s 
thought, and I think it is a particularly important passage. 
131 Clement, Exc. 7 (trans. Casey, 45): Ἄγνωστος οὖν ὁ Πατὴρ ὤν, ἠθέλησεν γνωσθῆναι τοῖς 
Αἰῶσι· καὶ διὰ τῆς Ἐνθυμήσεως τῆς ἑαυτοῦ, ὡς ἂν ἑαυτὸν ἐγνωκώς, Πνεῦμα γνώσεως οὔσης ἐν γνώσει, 
προέβαλε τὸν Μονογενῆ. Γέγονεν οὖν καὶ ὁ ἀπὸ γνώσεως (τουτέστι τῆς πατρικῆς Ἐνθυμήσεως) προελθὼν 
Γνῶσις, τουτέστιν ὁ Υἱός, ὅτι «δι’ Υἱοῦ ὁ Πατὴρ ἐγνώσθη.» Greek from SC 23:66-8. 
132 Clement also holds that the Father is unknown because of his transcendence. Furthermore, the 
Son, as an intermediary, plays a crucial role in the revelation of the invisible and unknown God in 





Thought to the Aeons through Knowledge, just as if he had also been put forth 
(προβληθείς) from his bosom.”133 In this one passage in Exc. 7, it is unclear whether the 
Only-Begotten remains in the bosom of the Father or is exteriorized. Regardless of the 
answer to that question, it is clear that it is necessary for something to go out from the 
Father in order for him to be known to the Aeons—whether it be the Only-Begotten or 
Knowledge. 
 At the end of the Valentinian excerpt, the focus shifts to the incarnation and the 
relationship between the one who appeared on earth and the one who remained in heaven. 
Here, the Valentinian author is commenting on John 1:14, which describes the glory of 
the incarnate. Clement writes:  
Him who appeared here, the Apostle no longer calls ‘Only-Begotten,’ but ‘as 
Only-Begotten’ ‘Glory as of an Only-Begotten.’ This is because being one and 
the same, Jesus is the ‘First-Born’ in creation, but in the Pleroma is ‘Only-
Begotten.’ But he is the same, being to each place such as can be contained [in it]. 
And he who descended is never divided from him who remained.134 
 
Casey notes that the identification of the Only-Begotten with Jesus is the most striking 
part of this teaching and the thing that causes Clement to be somewhat sympathetic to 
it.135 Almost immediately following this statement of unity between the Only-Begotten 
                                                 
133 Clement, Exc., 7 (trans. Casey, 45 with my modifications): καὶ ὁ μὲν μείνας «Μονογενὴς Υἱὸς 
εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ Πατρός», τὴν Ἐνθύμησιν διὰ τῆς γνώσεως ἐξηγεῖται τοῖς Αἰῶσιν, ὡς ἂν καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ 
κόλπου αὐτοῦ προβληθείς· Greek from SC 23:68. 
134 Clement, Exc. 7 (trans. Casey, 45): ὁ δὲ ἐνταῦθα ὀφθεὶς οὐκέτι «Μονογενής», ἀλλ’ «ὡς 
Μονογενὴς» πρὸς τοῦ Ἀποστόλου προσαγορεύεται, «δόξαν ὡς Μονογενοῦς»·—ὅτι εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ὤν, ἐν 
μὲν τῇ κτίσει «Πρωτότοκός» ἐστιν Ἰησοῦς, ἐν δὲ Πληρώματι «Μονογενής». Ὁ δὲ αὐτός ἐστι, τοιοῦτος ὢν 
ἑκάστῳ τόπῳ οἷος κεχωρῆσθαι δύναται. Καὶ οὐδέποτε τοῦ μείναντος ὁ καταβὰς μερίζεται. Greek from SC 
23:68-70. 
135 Clement, The Excerpta ex Theodoto of Clement of Alexandria, 103. The use of εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς 
is particularly interesting for me because it will show up again in the monarchian controversy. There, 
however, it will be used to argue for the absolute identity of the Father and the Son, not the earthly Jesus 





and Jesus, the Valentinian author draws a sharp distinction between the Only-Begotten 
and the Demiurge. Clement reports, “They call the Creator the image of the Only-
Begotten.”136 Thus, while they could affirm the unity of Jesus and the Only-Begotten, the 
Demiurge is only an image of the Only-Begotten. Because he is not identified with the 
Only-Begotten, the Demiurge is another step removed from the Father. 
 Following his report of the Valentinian interpretation of John 1, Clement 
emphatically offers his own position. He writes, “But we maintain that the Logos in its 
constant identity is God in God, who is also said to be ‘in the bosom of the Father,’ 
continuous, undivided, one God.”137 That Clement holds the unity of the Logos with the 
Father here is unquestionable, but it is unclear exactly what Clement means when he 
speaks of the Logos. Regardless of what Clement means by Logos, he immediately 
affirms the Johannine claim that all things were made by [the Word] (Jn. 1:3). This 
affirmation directly contradicts the Valentinian assertion that there was some sort of 
disjunction between the Logos (or Only-Begotten) and the Demiurge. Later in the same 
passage, Clement seamlessly shifts to speaking of the “Only-Begotten in his constant 
identity” (ὁ δὲ ἐν ταὐτότητι μονογενής); so it seems that Clement identifies the two titles. 
                                                 
136 Clement, Exc., 7 (trans. Casey, 47): Εἰκόνα δὲ τοῦ Μονογενοῦς τὸν Δημιουργὸν λέγουσιν· 
Greek from SC 23:70 
137 Clement, Exc. 8 (trans. Casey, 47 with modifications): Ἡμεῖς δὲ τὸν ἐν ταὐτότητι Λόγον Θεὸν 
ἐν Θεῷ φαμεν, ὃς καὶ «εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ Πατρὸς» εἶναι λέγεται, ἀδιάστατος, ἀμέριστος, εἷς Θεός. Greek 
from SC 23:72. Casey translates τὸν ἐν ταὐτότητι λόγον as “the essential Logos,” but this translation is 
misleading because Clement does not use any “essence” language here. In his introduction, Casey notes 
that Clement uses a novel formulation here: Clement, The Excerpta ex Theodoto of Clement of Alexandria, 
28. I think Sagnard’s translation of the phrase is truer to the original sense, so I have adopted it here. 
Sagnard translates the phrase as follows, “LOGOS «dans sa constante identité…»” This translation 
highlights the consistency of the identity of the Logos. It has the further advantage of not muddying the 





 For Clement, the Logos in its constant identity is “God in God” (θεὸν ἐν θεῷ). 
Since Clement also describes the Only-Begotten using “ἐν ταὐτότητι,” it seems that 
Clement would also consider the Only-Begotten as “God in God.” Shortly following this 
in Exc. 8, Clement speaks of the Savior who works according to the “continuous power” 
(κατὰ δύναμιν ἀδιάστατον) of the Only-Begotten.138 In the Exc., Clement often uses 
“Savior” to speak about the earthly Jesus.139 In Exc. 8, then, we see Clement develop a 
scheme wherein the Logos has a “constant identity” as “God in God.” The earthly Jesus, 
or Savior, works according to the power of this Logos or Only-Begotten, who remains 
God in God. 
 Regarding the novel phrase ὁ ἐν ταὐτότητι λόγος, Casey suggests that Clement 
means something like the Stoic λόγος ἐνδιάθετος.140 In Exc. 8, however, we see neither 
that specific terminology nor a scheme that would indicate that Clement was using the 
λόγος ἐνδιάθετος / λόγος προφορικός distinction. That according to which the Savior 
works is not some exteriorized word, but rather the “power of the Only-Begotten in his 
constant identity.” As far as Clement is concerned in Exc. 8, the Logos does not cease to 
be God in God. 
 At Exc. 19, Clement again speaks about the ὁ ἐν ταὐτότητι λόγος, but this time in 
the context of the incarnation. He writes: 
“And the Logos became flesh” not only by becoming man at his Advent, but also 
“at the beginning” the Logos in its constant identity became Son by 
circumscription and not according to essence. And again he became flesh when he 
acted through the prophets. And the Savior is called a child of the Logos in its 
                                                 
138 Clement, Exc. 8 (Greek from SC 23:74). 
139 See, e.g., Exc. 4, where Clement uses both κύριος and σωτήρ to refer to the earthly Jesus. 
140 Clement, The Excerpta ex Theodoto of Clement of Alexandria, 28. See also his article which 





constant identity; therefore, “in the beginning was the Logos and the Logos was 
with God” and “that which came into existence in him was life” and life is the 
Lord.141 
 
This passage is evocative, for Clement elsewhere refers to God as the one who is unable 
to be circumscribed (ἀπερίγραφος). In Exc. 8, Clement describes the Logos ἐν ταὐτότητι 
as God in God; but here he ascribes something to this Logos that he denies of God—
limitability. This seeming inconsistency appears to be prompted by Clement’s argument 
that some sort of mediator is needed for there to be a vision of the invisible God. The 
Son, according to Clement, is the “face of the Father” (πρόσωπον δὲ πατρὸς ὁ υἱός), and 
it is “through him that the Father is known” (δι’ οὗ γνωρίζεται ὁ πατήρ).142 
 For Clement, at least in the Exc., the distinction between the Father and Son 
occurs not through the exteriorization of an interior Word but, rather, by the 
circumscription of that Word in its constant identity. This Word, which should share 
illimitability with the Father, becomes limited in order that the Father might be known.143 
This begs the question about what happens to the “constant identity” of the Logos when 
the circumscription occurs. Is this constant identity changed when it becomes Savior, or 
is it able both to remain constant and reveal the Father in the form of circumscribed Son 
at the same time? It seems as though Clement wants to have it both ways. Speaking of the 
manifold appearances of Jesus, Clement writes: 
                                                 
141 Clement, Exc. 19 (trans. Casey, 55 with my modifications): «Καὶ ὁ Λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο», οὐ 
κατὰ τὴν παρουσίαν μόνον ἄνθρωπος γενόμενος, ἀλλὰ καὶ «ἐν Ἀρχῇ» ὁ ἐν ταὐτότητι Λόγος, κατὰ 
«περιγραφὴν» καὶ οὐ κατ’ οὐσίαν γενόμενος [ὁ] Υἱός. Καὶ πάλιν «σὰρξ ἐγένετο» διὰ προφητῶν ἐνεργήσας. 
Τέκνον δὲ τοῦ ἐν ταὐτότητι Λόγου ὁ Σωτὴρ εἴρηται. Διὰ τοῦτο «ἐν Ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ Λόγος, καὶ ὁ Λόγος ἦν πρὸς 
τὸν Θεόν· ὃ γέγονεν ἐν αὐτῷ, Ζωή ἐστιν»· Ζωὴ δὲ ὁ Κύριος. Greek from SC 23:92-94. 
142 Clement, Exc. 10 (Greek from SC 23:80). 
143 Mortley observes the following regarding this passage: “The incarnation, therefore, does not 
lead to a change of essence but simply to a delimitation of this essence. That which is uncircumscribed 





By reason of great humility the Lord did not appear as an angel but as a man, and 
when he appeared in glory to the apostles on the Mount he did not do it for his 
own sake when he showed himself, but for the sake of the Church which is the 
“elect race,” that it might learn his advancement after his departure from the flesh. 
For on high, too, he was Light and that which was manifest in the flesh and 
appeared here is not later than that above nor was it curtailed in that it was 
translated hither from on high, changing from one place to another, so that this 
was gain here and loss there. But he was the Omnipresent, and is with the Father, 
even when here, for he was the Father’s Power.144 
 
Clement argues that the Lord is both omnipresent and with the Father simultaneously, 
that the incarnation does not entail some sort of separation of the Son from the Father. If 
Clement’s logic holds, this would allow for the Logos to maintain a constant identity 
while at the same time becoming circumscribed as Son. 
 This logic also helps to clear up a difficult passage at the end of Exc. 19, which 
has drawn the attention of a number of scholars. Casey’s edition produces the passage 
thus: ‘ἀοράτου’ μὲν γὰρ ‘θεοῦ εἰκόνα’ τὸν λόγον τοῦ λόγου τοῦ ἐν ταὐτότητι, 
‘προτότωκον δὲ πάσης κτίσεως·’145 Casey’s edition includes the idiosyncratic feature of 
noting both “accepted” and “rejected” emendations of the text. He indicates that he has 
rejected the reading of Bunsen and Stählin. Stählin’s edition of the text in the GCS reads, 
τὸν <υἱὸν> λέγει τοῦ Λόγου τοῦ ἐν ταὐτότητι…146 Shortly after Casey’s edition of the 
Exc. came out, Stählin reviewed it very negatively, taking issue with a number of Casey’s 
                                                 
144 Clement, Exc. 4 (trans. Casey): Ὁ Κύριος, διὰ πολλὴν ταπεινοφροσύνην, οὐχ ὡς ἄγγελος 
ὤφθη, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἄνθρωπος. Καὶ ὅτε ἐν δόξῃ ὤφθη τοῖς Ἀποστόλοις ἐπὶ τοῦ Ὄρους, οὐ δι’ ἑαυτὸν ἐποίησεν, 
δεικνὺς ἑαυτόν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν Ἐκκλησίαν, ἥτις ἐστὶ «τὸ γένος τὸ ἐκλεκτόν», ἵνα μάθῃ τὴν προκοπὴν αὐτοῦ 
μετὰ τὴν ἐκ τῆς σαρκὸς ἔξοδον. Αὐτὸς γὰρ καὶ ἄνω Φῶς ἦν, καὶ ἐστὶ τὸ «ἐπιφανὲν ἐν σαρκὶ» καὶ τὸ 
ἐνταῦθα ὀφθὲν οὐχ ὕστερον τοῦ ἄνω· οὐδὲ διεκέκοπτο ᾗ ἄνωθεν μετέστη δεῦρο, τόπον ἐκ τόπου ἀμεῖβον, 
ὡς τὸν μὲν ἐπιλαβεῖν, τὸν δὲ ἀπολιπεῖν· ἀλλ’ ἦν τὸ πάντῃ Ὂν καὶ παρὰ τῷ Πατρὶ κἀνταῦθα· δύναμις γὰρ 
ἦν τοῦ Πατρός. Greek from SC 23:58-60. 
145 Clement, Exc. 19 (Casey, 54). 





“accepted” emendations.147 In his 1948 edition of the text in SC, Sagnard largely 
reproduces Stählin’s critical text, including Stählin’s reading of 19.148 Casey’s choice to 
produce the Greek text as he does is perhaps influenced by his decision in his earlier 
article that Clement teaches “two logoi”—the same conclusion which leads him to posit 
that ὁ ἐν ταὐτότητι λόγος in the Exc. 8 and 19 is synonymous with ὁ λόγος ἐνδιάθετος.149 
 The reading of Stählin and Sagnard, however, makes better sense of the passage 
in its immediate context.150 Just above the phrase in question, Clement speaks of the 
Savior as a “child of the Logos in its constant state (τέκνον δὲ τοῦ ἐν ταὐτότητι λόγου ὁ 
σωτὴρ εἴρηται).”151 It seems only natural, then, that Clement would speak of the “First-
Born of all creation” here as “Son of the Logos” instead of introducing the puzzling 
phrase “the Logos of the Logos in its constant state.” The Son, Savior, or Lord is, for 
Clement, the limited and knowable manifestation of ὁ ἐν ταὐτότητι λόγος, which always 
remains with the Father, God in God.152 
                                                 
147 Otto Stählin, “[Rezension] Clemens Alexandrinus, The Excerpta ex Theodoto of Clement of 
Alexandria 1935,” Theologische Literaturzeitung 60 (1935): 414–16. 
148 Like Stählin, he thinks there are substantial issues with Casey’s text. He writes, “On peut y 
noter un certain nombre d’erreurs de détail, parfois même sérieuses…” Clement, Extraits de Théodote, 50. 
149 Casey, “Clement and the Two Divine Logoi.” 
150 In his dismissal of Exc. 19 as authentically Clementine, Edwards makes no mention of the 
discussion of the Greek text by the editors of the critical editions. Edwards, “Clement of Alexandria and 
His Doctrine of the Logos,” 174. 
151 Clement, Exc. 19 (Greek from SC 23:92). 
152 Note the similarity of this scheme in Exc. to that Bogdan Bucur describes in Strom. 4.25.156, 
which “speaks of the utterly transcendent God and the Logos as his agent. The difference between Father 
and Son is very similar to Numenius' distinction between the first and the second god: God cannot be the 
object of any epistemology (ἀναπόδεικτος; οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστημονικός), while the exact opposite is true of the 
Son (σοφία τέ ἐστι καὶ ἐπιστήμη; ἀπόδειξιν ἔχει). This difference on the epistemological level corresponds 
to a different relation to the cosmos, where it is the Son who founds multiplicity: The Son is neither simply 
one thing as one thing (ἓν ὡς ἓν), nor many things as parts (πολλὰ ὡς μέρη), but one thing as all things (ὡς 
πάντα ἕν).” Bogdan G. Bucur, “Revisiting Christian Oeyen: ‘The Other Clement’ on Father, Son, and the 





 There is tension and ambiguity in Clement’s thought about the relationship 
between the Father and Son as it is presented in the Exc. On the one hand, he states very 
clearly that the Logos in its constant state is God in God. This would entail the host of 
aphophatic epithets used of the Father, such as ἀπερίγραφος, being applied to the Logos 
as well. On the other hand, the Logos in its constant state becomes Son κατὰ περιγραφήν, 
seemingly interrupting the constancy for the sake of revealing the unknown and invisible 
Father. Even more, Clement never clarifies the duration of this circumscription of the 
Son. Is this a temporary circumscription that applies only to the incarnation, or does it 
extend eternally? Scholars look for Clement to use some sort of language to signal that 
the Son or Logos is a “hypostasis distinct from God the Father.”153 In the Exc. we are left 
with the pregnant tension between the claim that the Logos is both God in God and limits 
himself to become Son. Clement wants to affirm both the unity and distinction of the 
Father and Son, but he never quite smooths out the wrinkles in his theory. Thus, 
regarding the distinction of the Father and the Son, he too finds himself in the ambiguous 
middle of authors in the second century. 
Athenagoras 
 Athenagoras’ Legatio is unique among the works surveyed in this chapter. His 
apologetic purpose and intended audience result in a treatise that is dense with references 
from Greco-Roman literature and light on references from Jewish and Christian 
                                                 





scripture.154 He does use scripture, but it is mostly to bolster the arguments he is making 
on philosophical grounds. As David Rankin notes, Athenagoras probably did not cite 
scripture more often because it would have had no authority for his intended audience.155 
Athenagoras’ Legatio was probably composed between 176 and 180 C.E.156 The majority 
of the treatise is devoted to rebutting the charge of atheism that was often directed at 
Christians. 
 Athenagoras spends chapters four through eight addressing the charge of atheism 
from Greco-Roman philosophical sources. Once he has proven that the philosophical 
sources support the monotheistic belief of Christians, Athenagoras uses scripture to prove 
that Christian beliefs are not merely of human origin (ἀνθρωπικόν): 
Now if we were satisfied with considerations of this kind, one could regard our 
doctrine as man-made. But since the voices of the prophets affirm our 
arguments—and I expect that you who are so eager for knowledge and so learned 
are not without understanding of the teachings either of Moses or of Isaiah and 
Jeremiah and the rest of the prophets who in the ecstasy of their thoughts, as the 
divine Spirit moved them, uttered what they had been inspired to say, the Spirit 
making use of them as a flautist might blow into a flute—what, then, do they say? 
'The Lord is our God; no other shall be reckoned in addition to him.' [Baruch 
3:36] And again: 'I am God, first and last; and except for me there is no God.' [Isa. 
44:6] Similarly: 'There was no other God before me and there will be none after 
me; I am God and there is none beside me.' [Isa. 43:10-11] And concerning his 
greatness: 'Heaven is my throne and the earth my footstool. What house will you 
build for me, or what place for me to rest?' [Isa. 66:1] I leave it to you to apply 
yourselves to these very books and to examine more carefully these men's 
prophecies, that you may with fitting discernment bring to an end the abuse with 
which we are treated.157 
                                                 
154 Consider as a contrast, for example, how central the interpretation of biblical passages (like 
Gen. 1-3) is in Theophilius’ Ad Autolycum. 
155 David Rankin, Athenagoras: Philosopher and Theologian (Farnham, England; Burlington, 
VT.: Ashgate, 2009), 156–7. 
156 William R. Schoedel, “Introduction,” in Athenagoras: Legatio and De Resurrectione, ed. and 
trans. William R. Schoedel, Oxford Early Christian Texts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), xi. See also 
Rankin’s survey of the scholarship on the dating of the Legatio: Rankin, Athenagoras, 23–5. 






Athenagoras here lays out a web of texts that later shows up in the monarchian 
controversy. Both Baruch 3:36-38 and Isaiah 44:6 would become favorite prooftexts of 
the monarchians—or at least the Noetians with whom Hippolytus was in conflict.158 
Athenagoras’ sustained argument demonstrates that he considered monotheism to be the 
foundation of Christian belief in God, and these passages from the Old Testament were 
his main scriptural proofs for this belief. 
 It is within this philosophical and scriptural framework of monotheism that 
Athenagoras fits his understanding of the relationship between the Father and the Son:  
We have brought before you a God who is uncreated, eternal, invisible, 
impassible, incomprehensible, and infinite, who can be apprehended by mind and 
reason alone, who is encompassed by light, beauty, spirit, and indescribable 
power, and who created, adorned, and now rules the universe through the Word 
that issues from him. I have given sufficient evidence that we are not atheists on 
the basis of arguments presenting this God as one. For we think there is also a Son 
of God. Now let no one think that this talk of God having a Son is ridiculous. For 
we have not come to our views on either God the Father or his Son as do the 
poets, who create myths in which they present the gods as no better than men. On 
the contrary, the Son of God is the Word of the Father in Ideal Form and 
Energizing Power; for in his likeness and through him all things came into 
existence, which presupposes that the Father and the Son are one. Now since the 
Son is in the Father and the Father in the Son [John 10:38, 14:10?] by a powerful 
unity of spirit, the Son of God is the mind and reason of the Father.159 
 
                                                 
158 See Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 2.2-5 for the use of both of these passages in conjunction. 
Tertullian’s Adversus Praxean notes that the Isaiah passage was a favorite of the monarchians, but he does 
not include any reference to Baruch 3. 
159 Athenagoras, Legatio 10.1-2 (trans. and Greek from Schoedel, 20-3): Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἄθεοι μὴ 
εἶναι, ἕνα τὸν ἀγένητον καὶ ἀίδιον καὶ ἀόρατον καὶ ἀπαθῆ καὶ ἀκατάληπτον καὶ ἀχώρητον, νῷ μόνῳ καὶ 
λόγῳ καταλαμβανόμενον, φωτὶ καὶ κάλλει καὶ πνεύματι καὶ δυνάμει ἀνεκδιηγήτῳ περιεχόμενον, ὑφ’ οὗ 
γεγένηται τὸ πᾶν διὰ <τοῦ παρ’> αὐτοῦ λόγου καὶ διακεκόσμηται καὶ συγκρατεῖται, θεὸν ἄγοντες, ἱκανῶς 
μοι δέδεικται. νοοῦμεν γὰρ καὶ υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ. καὶ μή μοι γελοῖόν τις νομίσῃ τὸ υἱὸν εἶναι τῷ θεῷ. οὐ γὰρ 
ὡς ποιηταὶ μυθοποιοῦσιν οὐδὲν βελτίους τῶν ἀνθρώπων δεικνύντες τοὺς θεούς, ἢ περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ πατρὸς 
ἢ περὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ πεφρονήκαμεν, ἀλλ’ ἐστὶν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος τοῦ πατρὸς ἐν ἰδέᾳ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ· πρὸς 
αὐτοῦ γὰρ καὶ δι’ αὐτοῦ πάντα ἐγένετο, ἑνὸς ὄντος τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ. ὄντος δὲ τοῦ υἱοῦ ἐν πατρὶ καὶ 





Athenagoras pointedly asserts that the Father and Son are one in this passage, which is in 
accord with his earlier articulation of Christian monotheism. He also admits that there is 
an apparent tension between the claim that God is one and the claim that God has a Son: 
“Let no one think that this talk of God having a Son is ridiculous.” In addition to the use 
of philosophical categories, he demonstrates that the Son is one with the Father because 
the Son was also involved in creation. He then explains that the Son is the first begotten 
of the Father (πρῶτον γέννημα), which does not imply that he began to exist at some 
point.160 The Son existed with the Father from the beginning (ἐξ ἀρχῆς) but came forth 
(προελθῶν) for the purpose of creation. Athenagoras then quotes Proverbs 8:22 to 
support his claims about the Son.161 
 Athenagoras’ presentation of the relationship between the Father and the Son, 
however, is not one of unqualified unity. He writes, “Who then would not be amazed if 
he heard of men called atheists who bring forward God the Father, God the Son, and the 
Holy Spirit and who proclaim both their power in their unity and their diversity in 
rank?”162 Thus, while Athenagoras does not equivocate about the fact that God is one, he 
does recognize that there is diversity within the one God.163 Later, he repeats this 
                                                 
160 Athenagoras, Legatio 10.3. 
161 Athenagoras, Legatio 10.4. Athenagoras’ use of Proverbs 8:22 in support of his arguments 
about the begetting of the Son is suggestive of his knowledge of Justin. Compare this section in 
Athenagoras with Justin, Dialogue, 61. Even more interesting is that Athenagoras introduces the quotation 
from Proverbs by attributing it to the prophetic Spirit (τὸ προφητικὸν πνεῦμα), one of Justin’s favorite titles 
for the Spirit. 
162 Athenagoras, Legatio 10.5 (trans. and Greek from Schoedel, 22-3): τίς οὖν οὐκ ἂν ἀπορήσαι 
<τοὺς> ἄγοντας θεὸν πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν θεὸν καὶ πνεῦμα ἅγιον, δεικνύντας αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ ἑνώσει 
δύναμιν καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ τάξει διαίρεσιν, ἀκούσας ἀθέους καλουμένους; 
163 Regarding Athenagoras’ dual emphasis on unity and diversity in God, Schoedel writes, “We 
shall try to show that an important reason for the phenomenon is the apologist's concern not only to stress 
the oneness of God but also to set forth the pluralistic strain in Christian theism as an answer to traditional 
polytheism” (“A Neglected Motive for Second-Century Trinitarianism,” The Journal of Theological 





assertion that there is both unity and diversity in God: “We are attended only by the 
knowledge of him who is truly God and of the Word that issues from him—a knowledge 
as to what is the unity of the Son with the Father, what is the communion of the Father 
with the Son, what is the Spirit, what is the unity of these powers—the Spirit, the Son, 
and the Father—and their diversity when thus united.”164 Athenagoras has not yet made 
clear the manner of this unity and diversity between God, his Son, and the Spirit; and he 
has certainly claimed nothing so strong as Justin’s assertion that the Father and Son are 
numerically different.165 Athenagoras uses language of origination in multiple places, and 
this clarifies the distinction or diversity between God, Son, and Spirit some.166 
 Athenagoras once more asserts the unity and diversity among God, his Son, and 
the Spirit, and he seems to employ an image that Justin uses in the Dialogue. He argues, 
“We say that there is God and the Son, his Word, and the Holy Spirit, united in power yet 
distinguished in rank (ἑνούμενα μὲν κατὰ δύναμιν <διαιρούμενα δὲ κατὰ τάξιν>) as the 
Father, the Son, and the Spirit, since the Son is mind, reason [word], and wisdom of the 
Father and the Spirit an effluence like light from fire.”167 Justin addresses light/source 
                                                 
Athenagoras’ argument were: “that is, our pure monotheism is proof enough of our piety, but our 
Trinitarianism makes it still clearer that we are not atheists even if measured by the pluralistic conception 
of paganism” (358).  
164 Athenagoras, Legatio 12.3 (trans. Schoedel, Athenagoras: Legatio and De Resurrectione, 27.). 
“ὑπὸ μόνου δὲ παραπεμπόμενοι τοῦ τὸν ὄντως θεὸν καὶ τὸν παρ’ αὐτοῦ λόγον εἰδέναι, τίς ἡ τοῦ παιδὸς 
πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ἑνότης, τίς ἡ τοῦ πατρὸς πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν κοινωνία, τί τὸ πνεῦμα, τίς ἡ τῶν τοσούτων ἕνωσις 
καὶ διαίρεσις ἑνουμένων.” 
165 Athenagoras’ use of τάξις is, to a certain extent, a clarification of how they are distinguished; 
but it leaves the exact relationship among the three unclear. 
166 For example, at Legatio 10.3-4, he speaks of the Son as first-begotten of the Father and states 
that the Son “came forth” (προελθῶν) from the Father. Furthermore, in both 10.4 and 24.2, Athenagoras 
states that the Spirit is an ἀπόρροια from God. 
167 Athenagoras, Legatio 24.2 (trans. and Greek from Schoedel, 58-9). Schoedel has accepted 
Schwartz’s reconstruction of the text here, and he notes that the reconstruction fits well with what 





imagery to explain the generation of the Son, but he rejects it because some were using it 
to claim that when the sun sets, the light disappears.168 Justin rejects this image because 
those using it claimed that the Son and angels who proceed from God as light from the 
sun could be returned to God and cease to have a distinct existence. Athenagoras, on the 
other hand, does not seem to be dealing with the same controversy; and he uses the 
light/source imagery only to argue for distinction without a destruction of unity.  
 In his discussions of the relationship between the Father and the Son in the 
Legatio, Athenagoras holds unity and diversity in tension. As the beginning of the treatise 
makes clear, the oneness of God is foundational for him. Whereas Justin could write that 
the Son was numerically different from the Father, Athenagoras always juxtaposes an 
assertion of the diversity of the Father and Son with an equally strong assertion of their 
unity. Athenagoras takes some steps to define the diversity between Father, Son, and 
Spirit, such as using τάξις and language of origination. However he thinks the three are 
distinct or diverse, he is clear that it does not destroy the unity of God. Athenagoras 
seems aware of the tension between unity and diversity in the Godhead, but he does not 
seem intent on resolving it. Like Clement, then, he remains in the ambiguous middle; 
however, his introduction of τάξις into God, coupled with his use of origination language, 
makes him closer to clearly defining the distinction between the Father and Son. 
                                                 
oratio de resurrectione cadaverum, vol. 2, Texte und Untersuchungen 4 (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1891). Note 
also that Athenagoras here identifies Wisdom with the Son, not the Spirit as Theophilus and Irenaeus did. 





Hard Distinction: Justin Martyr 
 Many of the scholarly works that treat the questions of monotheism and 
Christology at the beginning of the Common Era are heavily weighted to texts in the New 
Testament and the apostolic fathers. When Justin is addressed in these works, he is often 
considered as an end-point or transitional figure.169 Hurtado writes,  
I propose that the writings of Justin Martyr give us the earliest extant example of 
a proto-orthodox Christian seriously attempting to articulate an understanding of 
Jesus as divine in terms he hoped to make comprehensible and even persuasive 
both to Jewish interlocutors and the wider culture.170 
 
Hurtado is right: Justin does seem to represent something of a new approach to the 
persistent questions raised by the tension between claims about monotheism and the 
divinity of Christ. Justin’s new approach to the problem does not mean, however, that 
what he is doing is somehow fundamentally discontinuous with what had come before. 
As Hurtado, Bauckham, and others have demonstrated, Christians had long held their 
affirmations of monotheism and the divinity of Christ in tension. Justin’s work accepts 
the premises underlying the tension that the earlier writers had tolerated, but Justin 
appears to have less of a tolerance for ambiguity than his predecessors.171 
 Thus, Justin begins to address how the Father and Son are one and how the Father 
and Son are distinct. Justin is important for my reconstruction of the background of the 
                                                 
169 Hurtado, for example, views Justin as a transitional figure between “earliest Christianity and 
what comes thereafter.” Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ, 642. 
170 Ibid., 641. 
171 For the sake of brevity, I will not here push the question of what Hurtado means by the “proto-
orthodox” and how one would go about distinguishing them from those who are not “proto-orthodox.” A 
good place to start with these discussions is Rowan Williams’ excellent essay: “Does It Make Sense to 
Speak of Pre-Nicene Orthodoxy?,” in The Making of Orthodoxy: Essays in Honour of Henry Chadwick, ed. 





monarchian controversy because he is overtly concerned with how the Father and Son are 
distinct. While many of the other Christian authors from the second century do not give 
much attention to the distinction of the Father and Son, the articulation of this distinction 
comes sharply into relief in Justin’s Dialogue.172 Many of the other authors in the second 
century do not even signal that they think it is a problem. Justin faces something that 
makes the clear differentiation of the Father and Son important.  
He employs philosophical language to clarify problems left unresolved by the 
ambiguity of the language of his predecessors. The polyvalent concept of Logos plays an 
important role for Justin as he seeks to articulate unity and distinction more clearly. 
Scholars rightly note that Justin readily employs concepts from Hellenistic philosophy, 
and this observation is often accompanied by the accusation that he thus perpetrates some 
sort of pollution of pure Christianity with the foreign ideas of Hellenism.173 These 
Hellenistic “fall narratives,” however, fail to account for the fact that despite the 
supposed shift or evolution of the conceptual framework (from a “Jewish” to a 
“Hellenistic” conceptual framework), there is still a fundamental continuity.174 Justin is 
                                                 
172 Justin’s works can be dated with a fair degree of precision. From internal evidence in the 
Apologies, they can be dated sometime between 147 and 154 C.E. See Justin, Justin, Philosopher and 
Martyr: Apologies, ed. Denis Minns and P. M. Parvis, Oxford Early Christian Texts (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 44; Robert McQueen Grant, Greek Apologists of the Second Century 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1988), 52–4. At Dialogue 120.6, Justin mentions the 1 Apology, thus 
placing the composition of the Dialogue after that of 1 Apology. Marcovich suggests that this results in a 
date range of 155-160 C.E. for the Dialogue: Justin, Dialogus cum Tryphone, ed. Miroslav Marcovich, 
Patristische Texte und Studien 47 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997), 1. 
173 For example, Bousset argued that Justin’s Dialogue “shows how foreign Old Testament 
monotheism was to the deification of the Son….” For Bousset, Justin’s thought represents an inevitable 
decline from the pure faith of the Palestinian Primitive Community. Wilhelm Bousset, Kyrios Christos: A 
History of the Belief in Christ from the Beginnings of Christianity to Irenaeus, trans. John E Steely (Waco, 
TX.: Baylor University Press, 2013), 332. 
174 R. M. Price has addressed the issue of Justin’s use of Logos and judgments about Hellenization. 
Although his argument lacks precision at times, his main point is well taken: at the turn of the Common 
Era, it is very difficult to speak of something like the pure Judaism Bousset’s argument presupposes. By the 





addressing the very problem that was bequeathed to him by his forebears, the problem 
that was at the heart of Christian theology and devotion during the first centuries of the 
church: the relation between monotheism and the divinity of Christ. Given that Justin was 
a Gentile who came to Christianity after a philosophical education, it is no surprise that 
he uses different conceptual tools for addressing the same problems as Jewish Christians 
had before him.175 The following analysis of Justin highlights both the fact that Justin is 
addressing an old problem and the fact that he brings new tools and concepts to bear in an 
attempt to clarify the question. 
Among the many topics of debate between Justin and Trypho in the Dialogue, 
perhaps the most prominent is how monotheism fits with the position of Christ in relation 
to the Father.176 The centrality of this question is evident in the repeatedly expressed 
concerns of both Justin and Trypho. Justin deploys his full arsenal of scriptural 
argumentation to prove to Trypho that Christ is also God. Trypho remains unconvinced 
by Justin’s proofs and will not admit that there is another called God alongside the 
                                                 
further argues that while Justin’s use of Logos was clearly influenced by Hellenistic philosophy, he was 
probably also drawing some of it from the Old Testament occurrences of “word of God.” R M. Price, 
“‘Hellenization’ and Logos Doctrine in Justin Martyr,” Vigiliae Christianae 42, no. 1 (1988): 18–23. 
175 Remember here that my organizational scheme in this chapter is not strictly chronological. 
Writing in the 150s, Justin was one of the first to heavily utilize philosophical concepts. While I treated 
Athenagoras before Justin in this chapter, I am well aware that Justin antedated Athenagoras. 
176 A number of different theories have been advanced about Justin’s intended audience for the 
Dialogue. See the following, among others: Jon Nilson, “To Whom Is Justin’s Dialogue with Trypho 
Addressed,” Theological Studies 38, no. 3 (1977): 538–46; Michael Mach, “Justin Martyr’s Dialogus cum 
Tryphone Iudaeo and the Development of Christian Anti-Judaism,” in Contra Iudaeos, ed. Ora Limor and 
Guy G. Stroumsa, Texts and Studies in Medieval and Early Modern Judaism 10 (Tubingen: Mohr, 1996), 
27–47; David Rokeah, Justin Martyr and the Jews, Jewish and Christian Perspectives Series 5 (Leiden ; 
Boston: Brill, 2002), 12–9. Also of note here are Daniel Boyarin’s somewhat speculative claims that Justin 
was engaged in constructing boundaries between what had theretofore been a basically indistinguishable 
mass of “Judeo-Christianity.” Specifically, see Daniel Boyarin, “Justin Martyr Invents Judaism,” Church 
History 70, no. 3 (2001): 427–61. For a broader picture of Boyarin’s project, see his lengthier treatment: 
Border Lines: The Partition of Judaeo-Christianity, Divinations (Philadelphia, Pa.: University of 





Creator of all. Because the questions about monotheism and the divinity of Jesus are 
central in the Dialogue, my analysis is weighted toward that work. Where there is 
relevant data in the Apologies, I draw that in as well. 
One God 
 As Justin and Trypho meet in the Dialogue, we see that they are both interested in 
philosophy because it considers important questions about God. To Justin’s question 
about why he would be interested in philosophy, Trypho retorts, “Why not, for do not the 
philosophers speak always about God? Do they not constantly propose questions about 
his monarchy and providence (καὶ περὶ μοναρχίας αὐτοῖς καὶ προνοίας)? Is this not the 
task of philosophy, to inquire about the divine?”177 It is notable here that Trypho uses the 
term monarchy, but it is not entirely clear how he is using it. Justin responds and says that 
similar questions draw him to the study of philosophy, but he then complains that many 
philosophers have failed to inquire about “whether there is one or even several gods.”178 
 After his account of his journey through the philosophical schools, Justin 
describes a conversation with the “old man” who introduced him to Christianity. In the 
course of this conversation, Justin gives his own definition of God. He writes, “God is the 
Being who always has the same nature in the same manner, and is the cause of existence 
to all else.”179 The old man approves of this definition of God and then states that there is 
                                                 
177 Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho 1.3 (trans. Justin, Dialogue with Trypho, ed. Thomas P. 
Halton and Michael Slusser, trans. Thomas B. Falls, Selections from the Fathers of the Church 3 
(Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America Press, 2003), 4 with modifications; Greek from 
Marcovich, 70). Unless otherwise noted, all Greek for the Dialogue is taken from Marcovich’s edition. 
178 Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho 1.4 (trans. Falls, 4). 





only “one Unbegotten.”180 He also commends to Justin the writings of the prophets: 
“They also are worthy of belief because of the miracles which they performed, for they 
exalted God, the Father and Creator of all things, and made known Christ, his Son, who 
was sent by him.”181 Already in this statement we see one of the ways that Justin will 
distinguish between the Father and Son. For Justin, the Father, the unbegotten one, is 
frequently referred to as the Creator of all. Later in the Dialogue, Justin will include 
Christ in the prerogative of creation; but he never applies to Christ the title “Creator of 
all.” It seems as though this descriptor is reserved for the Father alone in Justin’s thought. 
 In neither the Dialogue nor the Apologies do we see Justin dwelling on the fact 
that Christians believe in only one God. The only such strong affirmation that Justin 
makes in the Dialogue occurs near the beginning:  
Trypho, there never will be, nor has there ever been from eternity, any other God 
except him who created and formed this universe. Furthermore, we do not claim 
that our God is different from yours, for he is the God who, with a strong hand 
and outstretched arm, led your forefathers out of the land of Egypt. Nor have we 
placed our trust in any other (for, indeed, there is no other), but only in him whom 
you also have trusted, the God of Abraham and of Isaac and of Jacob. But our 
hope is not through Moses or through the Law, otherwise our customs would be 
the same as yours.182 
  
In this statement, Justin is highlighting the fact that they are discussing the same God, but 
the debate quickly turns to how Jews and Christians relate to this God vis-à-vis the law. 
Trypho’s responses in this section of the dialogue show that the real disagreement was 
over observance of the law, not whether they worshipped the same God. Other than this 
passage , blunt professions of monotheism like “We Christians believe in only one God” 
                                                 
180 Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho 5.6. 
181 Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho 7.3 (trans. Falls, 14). 





are absent from Justin’s extant works. Justin does acknowledge multiple times that there 
is only one “unbegotten,” but this does not appear to be motivated by his polemic with 
Judaism.183 It seems that even in the Dialogue, monotheism is a taken-for-granted 
bedrock assumption for both parties. 
Theophanies: Visible Son 
What Justin is concerned with, however, is proving that Christ is also God. This 
comes sharply into focus around chapter fifty of the Dialogue, where Justin offers 
Christological interpretations of the Old Testament theophanies. The interpretation of Old 
Testament theophanies was a central point of contention in the later monarchian 
controversy, so a thorough analysis of Justin on this point will help to provide 
background for my later discussions.184 Justin belabors his point that the one who 
appeared in the theophanies was not the Father. Regarding Genesis 18:1-3, he writes, 
Moses, then, that faithful and blessed servant of God, tells us that he who 
appeared to Abraham under the oak tree of Mamre was God, sent, with two 
accompanying angels, to judge Sodom by another, who forever abides in the 
super-celestial regions, who has never been seen by any man, and with whom no 
man has ever conversed, and whom we call Creator of all and Father.185 
 
                                                 
183 See 1 Apol. 14; 2 Apol. 13; Dialogue with Trypho 5.6.  
184 Furthermore, as Bogdan Bucur has demonstrated, the interpretation of theophanies was one of 
the primary means by which Jews and Christians distinguished themselves from each other. Bogdan G. 
Bucur, “Justin Martyr’s Exegesis of Biblical Theophanies and the Parting of the Ways between Christianity 
and Judaism,” Theological Studies 75, no. 1 (2014): 34–91. 
185 Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho 56.1 (trans. Falls, 83). Note also André Méhat’s 
discussion of Justin’s reference to the “super-celestial regions” here, in André Méhat, “Le «lieu 
supracéleste» de Saint Justin à Origène,” in Forma futuri: Studi in onore del cardinale Michele Pellegrino 





In this passage, the first notable thing is that Justin unequivocally refers to Christ as God. 
Secondly, to avoid any confusion, Justin reiterates that the one seen (ὁ ὀφθεὶς) was sent 
by another (ὑπὸ ἄλλου).186 Furthermore, the one who sent Christ “has never been seen by 
any man.” Here, Justin has introduced his hard rule for interpreting the theophanies: the 
“Creator of all and Father” (ποιητῆν τῶν ὅλων καὶ πατέρα) is never seen, never descends 
to earth from the heavens. 
 Justin’s dialogue partners responded to his interpretation of Gen. 18:1-3 by stating 
that his reading of the passage had not convinced them that there was any other (ἄλλος) 
God or Lord mentioned in scripture.187 Undeterred by their response, Justin replied,  
I shall attempt to prove my assertion, namely that there exists and is mentioned in 
Scripture another God and Lord alongside the Creator of all things (ὅτι ἐστὶ... 
θεὸς καὶ κύριος ἕτερος παρὰ τὸν ποιητὴν τῶν ὅλων), who is also called an Angel, 
because he proclaims to man whatever the Creator of the world—above whom 
there is no other God (ὑπὲρ ὃν ἄλλος θεὸς οὐκ ἔστι)—wishes to reveal to them.188 
 
Justin unabashedly asserts that there is another God alongside the Creator God whom his 
dialogue partners acknowledge. Trypho and his coreligionists were pleased that Justin 
had clearly stated that there was no God above the Creator of all, but they remained 
unconvinced by Justin’s argument that there was another God alongside the Creator.189 
This exchange between Justin and Trypho signals one of the chief points of disagreement 
that frequently recurs as the dialogue progresses. Justin again and again claims that the 
Son is another God alongside the Father. Other second-century authors spoke of Christ as 
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187 Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho 56.3. 
188 Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho 56.4 (trans. Falls, 84 with my modifications; Greek from 
Marcovich, 161-2). 





God, but they did not clarify that he was another God. Justin carries on the tradition of 
maintaining the Son’s divinity, but he couples it with an equally strong affirmation that 
the Son is a God distinct from, and even different than, the Father. 
 Justin continues to outline the details of his position despite Trypho’s incredulity 
and writes: 
I shall now show from the Scriptures that God has begotten of himself a certain 
rational power as a beginning before all creatures (ὅτι ἀρχὴν πρὸ πάντων τῶν 
κτισμάτων ὁ Θεὸς γεγέννηκε δύναμίν τινα ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ λογικήν). The Holy Spirit 
indicates this power by various titles, sometimes the Glory of the Lord, at other 
times Son, or Wisdom, or Angel, or God, or Lord, or Word…. Indeed, he can 
justly lay claim to all these titles from the fact both that he performs the Father's 
will and that he was begotten by an act of the Father's will (ἔχει γὰρ πάντα 
<ταῦτα> προσονομάζεσθαι ἔκ τε τοῦ ὑπηρετεῖν τῷ πατρικῷ βουλήματι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ 
πατρὸς θελήσει γεγεννῆσθαι).190 
 
Justin had earlier simply asserted that the one who appeared in the theophanies was 
another God alongside the Creator; but here, he further addresses the relationship 
between the Creator and the Son. Here and elsewhere Justin argues that the Son is both 
angel and God. Justin appears to be using angel functionally: Christ is angel because he is 
the messenger of the Creator.191 Justin does not seem to think that the Son is 
ontologically an angel. Justin also argues that the Son was begotten by an act of the 
Father’s will, although he does not elaborate on the significance or manner of this 
begetting.  
                                                 
190 Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho 61.1 (trans. Falls, 93-4; Greek from Marcovich, 174-5). 
Italics in original. 
191 Anthony Briggman has shown that the ways Justin speaks about the functions of the Son and 
Spirit betray that he had a Binitarian orientation despite some of the Trinitarian formulas he used in 
liturgical settings. Anthony Briggman, “Measuring Justin’s Approach to the Spirit: Trinitarian Conviction 





 Justin has consistently argued that the Son is another God alongside the Father. 
He repeatedly calls him God and posits that he was begotten by the Father. None of these 
descriptors, however, is terribly precise. It is clear that Justin wants to place the Son with 
the Father, but it is not clear what this means. Justin seems aware of the ambiguity of the 
way he has described the Son and the Father, so he clarifies himself. He writes, “I wish 
again to quote Moses to prove beyond all doubt that he spoke with one endowed with 
reason and numerically different (ἀριθμῷ ὄντα ἕτερον) from himself.”192 In this passage, 
Justin is trying to refute Trypho’s assertion that God was talking to himself when he said 
“let us…” in Gen. 1:26. For Justin, the plural in those verses clearly signals that God was 
talking to someone else who was present at the creation of the world. Elsewhere Justin 
makes his case for the distinction between the Father and Son: “Let us return to the 
Scriptures and I shall try to convince you that he who is said to have appeared to 
Abraham, Jacob, and Moses, and is called God, is distinct from God, the Creator; distinct, 
that is, in number, but not in mind” (θεὸς ἕτερός ἐστι τοῦ τὰ πάντα ποιήσαντος θεοῦ· 
ἀριθμῷ <δὲ> λέγω, ἀλλὰ οὐ γνώμῃ).193 Note again in this passage that Justin uses both 
ἕτερος and ἀριθμός to articulate the distinction between the Father and the Son. Both of 
these are very strong ways of distinguishing the Father and Son.194  
Justin restates the distinction between the Father and Son in the strongest terms at 
the close of the discourse: “It has also been shown at length that this power which the 
                                                 
192 Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho 62.2 (trans. Falls, 95; Greek from Marcovich, 177). 
193 Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho 56.11 (trans. Falls, 85; Greek from Marcovich, 163). 
194 These terms do not feature very prominently in the later monarchian controversy. Because the 
monarchians often accused their opponents of being ditheists, I suspect that these terms fell out of use. 
After all, calling the Son “another God” and claiming that he was numerically distinct would easily attract 





prophetic Word also calls God and Angel not only is numbered as different by its name… 
but is something distinct in real number… but not by abscission, as if the substance of the 
Father were divided.”195 Again, Justin is clear that the Son is God; but he is equally clear 
that the Son is other than the Father. Unlike Ignatius or Melito, scholars never accuse 
Justin of being a “naïve modalist.” 
 To further strengthen his case, Justin turns to the interpretation of Pr. 8:22, 
writing, “But this offspring, who was really begotten of the Father, was with the Father 
and talked with him before all creation as the Word clearly showed us through Solomon, 
saying that this Son, who is called Wisdom by Solomon, was begotten both as a 
beginning before all his works, and as his offspring.”196 By his Christological use of this 
passage at this point in the debate, Justin attempts to prove that the Son was with the 
Father before and during creation.197 Justin continues this line of thought later in the 
Dialogue and suggests that all living beings were created by the Word.198 Not only has 
Justin argued that the Son was present with the Father in creation, but he has also given 
                                                 
195 Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho 128.4 (trans. Falls, 194; Greek from Marcovich, 293): 
ἀλλ’ ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν ἄγγελοι, καὶ ἀεὶ μένοντες καὶ μὴ ἀναλυόμενοι εἰς ἐκεῖνο ἐξ οὗπερ γεγόνασιν, 
ἀποδέδεικται· καὶ ὅτι δύναμις αὕτη, ἣν καὶ θεὸν καλεῖ ὁ προφητικὸς λόγος, διὰ πολλῶν ὡσαύτως 
ἀποδέδεικται, καὶ ἄγγελον, οὐχ ὡς τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς ὀνόματι μόνον ἀριθμεῖται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀριθμῷ ἕτερόν τί 
ἐστι, καὶ ἐν τοῖς προειρημένοις διὰ βραχέων τὸν λόγον ἐξήτασα, εἰπὼν τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην γεγεννῆσθαι 
ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρός, δυνάμει καὶ βουλῇ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ’ οὐ κατὰ ἀποτομήν, ὡς ἀπομεριζομένης τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς 
οὐσίας, ὁποῖα τὰ ἄλλα πάντα μεριζόμενα καὶ τεμνόμενα οὐ τὰ αὐτά ἐστιν ἃ καὶ πρὶν τμηθῆναι· καὶ 
παραδείγματος χάριν παρειλήφειν ὡς τὰ ἀπὸ πυρὸς ἀναπτόμενα πυρὰ ἕτερα ὁρῶμεν, οὐδὲν ἐλαττουμένου 
ἐκείνου, ἐξ οὗ ἀναφθῆναι πολλὰ δύνανται, ἀλλὰ ταὐτοῦ μένοντος. 
196 Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho 62.4 (trans. Falls, 96 with my modifications). Italics in 
original. 
197 Justin’s use of Proverbs 8:22 as a Christological passage here is also noteworthy because some 
other second-century authors interpreted the passage as referring to the Spirit. See Theophilius, Ad 
Autolycum 2.10 and Ireaneus, Adversus Haereses 4.20.1. Such Pneumatological readings of Proverbs 8:22 
did not continue past the end of the second century, however. 





the Son (or Word) a role in the act of creation itself. One of the reasons this is so 
significant is that Justin consistently refers to the Father as the Creator of all. When he 
attributes the creation of living beings to the Son, he is arguing that the Son is involved in 
carrying out the divine prerogative of creation. One interesting thing to note is that Justin 
modifies the passage from Pr. 8:22. In the LXX, the text reads “κύριος ἔκτισέν με ἀρχὴν 
ὁδῶν αὐτοῦ εἰς ἔργα αὐτοῦ…” Justin replaces “ἔκτισέν” with “γεγέννηκε” when he is 
speaking about Wisdom.199 Justin often quotes passages in the dialogue and offers little 
interpretation. His laconic streak continues here, and he does not offer an explanation for 
changing the verb in Pr. 8:22.200 Perhaps Justin changes this verb for the same reason he 
stresses the pre-existence of the Son—to make the Son prior to and above the created 
order. Justin could have also changed the verb here because γεννάω is also used in Pr. 
8:25, where Wisdom speaks of being begotten before the mountains were settled.201 
 Justin repeats his claim that the Son existed prior to the incarnation. Trypho is 
aware that Justin claims that the Son “already existed as God (καὶ θεὸν αὐτὸν 
προϋπάρχοντα λέγεις καὶ κατὰ τὴν βουλὴν τοῦ θεοῦ σαρκοποιηθέντα αὐτόν)” before the 
incarnation.202 The issue of the Son’s pre-existence continues to be an important issue for 
                                                 
199 See, for example, Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho 61.1, 62.4. 
200 See James Ernest’s discussion of this section in the Dialogue: “Patristic Exegesis and the 
Arithmetic of the Divine,” in God in Early Christian Thought: Essays in Memory of Lloyd G. Patterson, ed. 
Andrew Brian McGowan, Brian Daley, and Timothy J. Gaden, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 94 
(Leiden: Brill, 2009), 133–5. 
201 See also Maurice Wiles’ discussion of the importance of Proverbs 8 in the development of the 
doctrine of eternal generation: “Eternal Generation,” Journal of Theological Studies 12, no. 2 (1961): 285. 
Regarding the different verb, there is always the chance that Justin’s Vorlage had a different reading. 





Justin.203 Speaking of Christ, Justin writes, “This is he who was before all things, and the 
eternal priest of God, and the King and Christ.”204 Throughout the Dialogue, Justin 
repeats a sort of standard formula when referring to Christ. The following is a prime 
example: “We know him as the first-begotten of God before all creatures, and as the Son 
of the patriarchs since he became incarnate by a virgin of their race, and condescended to 
become a man without comeliness or honor and subject to suffering.”205 In Justin’s 
understanding, the pre-existence of the Son serves an important function, for it is one of 
the things that proves that the Son is divine. Justin makes this connection explicit on 
multiple occasions: “[Christ] is God, because he is the first-begotten of all creatures.”206 
 Even with all of Justin’s exegetical proofs, Trypho is not swayed; and he urges 
that “Christians should… acknowledge this Jesus to be a man of mere human origin (καὶ 
μᾶλλον ἄνθρωπον ἐξ ἄνθρώπων γενόμενον λέγειν τὸν Ἰησοῦν).”207 Trypho’s response 
shows that Justin is faced with a difficult task in the Dialogue. He must convince his 
Jewish interlocutor of three things: 1) that he, like Trypho believes in only one God; 2) 
that Christ is God alongside the Father; 3) that the second claim does not negate the first. 
Because Trypho resists affirming that there is another God alongside the Father, Justin 
spends the bulk of his time arguing in favor of the divinity of Christ. At the same time, 
                                                 
203  On this point, see Demetrios Trakatellis, The Pre-Existence of Christ in the Writings of Justin 
Martyr, Harvard Dissertations in Religion 6 (Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1976). 
204 Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho 96.1 (trans. Falls, 147). 
205 Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho 100.2 (trans. Falls, 151). See also the similar clear 
expressions in 48.1-2. 
206 Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho 125.3 (trans. Falls, 188). 
207 Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho 66.2 (trans. Falls, 103; Greek from Marcovich, 185). As 
the Greek shows, this is not the same as the ψιλὸς ἄνθρωπος terminology that recurs in the accounts in 





however, he must prove that Christ is not the same as the Father—that what we are 
dealing with in Christ is another God. The introduction of this language of alterity 
implies that Justin is suggesting that there are two Gods, something Trypho would 
certainly never admit. 
 As Hurtado and others suggest, I think Justin marks a turning point in second-
century theology. In his dialogue (real or fictional) with Judaism, he demonstrates a new 
concern to distinguish the Son from the Father. Like earlier theologians, he held that the 
Son was God; and he expressed this belief unequivocally. His development, however, 
came when he claimed that the Son was another God alongside the Father. In response to 
his Jewish interlocutors, Justin articulated the alterity of the Father and the Son more 
strongly than any other Christian theologian of the second century. The Father and Son 
were ἕτερος ἐν ἀριθμῷ. Even more, Justin is so concerned to discuss the distinction 
between the Father and Son that he does not give equal stress to their unity.208 Justin’s 
was a hard distinction between the Father and Son which was unparalleled in the second 
century. As will become clear in my later discussion of monarchianism, I think such 
strong articulations of the distinction of the Father and Son were what prompted the 
monarchians to stress that the Father and Son were “one and the same.” Furthermore, it 
might be no coincidence that Rome, where Justin taught, became the epicenter of 
monarchianism at the beginning of the third century.209 
                                                 
208 This is not to say that he rejected the unity of the Father and Son. It was not, however, one of 
his chief concerns in the Dialogue with Trypho. Recall, for example, Dialogue with Trypho 56.11, where 
Justin argues that Father and Son are not distinct in γνώμη. 
209 In the texts attesting to monarchianism, we are not told why the monarchians ventured to Rome 
from Asia Minor. What I am suggesting is that, among other things, Justin’s strong articulation of 







 Hurtado, Bauckham, and the so-called New Religionsgeschichtliche Schule have 
argued that Jesus was considered divine very early in the history of Christianity. 
Furthermore, they have demonstrated that the earliest Christians articulated Jesus’ 
divinity through the use of Jewish concepts and categories. Hurtado argues that Jesus was 
fit into the Jewish divine agent paradigm but that devotion to Jesus also developed 
beyond this paradigm. Indeed, no other divine agents were given such formalized cultic 
worship in Judaism prior to the time of Jesus. This devotion to Jesus, argues Hurtado, 
was a mutation of Jewish monotheism in the first century. Richard Bauckham argued that 
the divinity of Jesus was expressed by including him in the divine identity of the God of 
Israel. This move entailed ascribing to him things that were reserved for God alone: 
creation and sole rule of the universe. Both note that the divinity of Jesus was not 
expressed using ontological terminology. The earliest Christians, then, established the 
divinity of Jesus through the use of Jewish categories and concepts.210 
 The so-called Apostolic Fathers took up where the earliest Christians left off. 
They still maintained the divinity of Jesus and often used stronger language than the New 
Testament—even using phrases like “Jesus Christ our God.”211 The divinity of Jesus 
never seems to be in question in any of the writings of the Apostolic Fathers, but they are 
                                                 
210 A full consideration of the arguments of Hurtado and Bauckham is beyond the scope of the 
current chapter. Their main arguments can be found in the following: Hurtado, One God, One Lord; 
Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ; Richard Bauckham, Jesus and the God of Israel: God Crucified and Other 
Studies on the New Testament’s Christology of Divine Identity (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2008). 
Both have numerous articles that address the same themes, but I have chosen to list monographs and 
collections of essays here for brevity. 





not terribly concerned to work out exactly how Jesus is divine or how he relates to the 
Father. They distinguish between the Father and Son almost exclusively by means of 
titles and functions, and they are not always consistent about such distinctions. They did 
not explicitly address how the Father and Son were distinguished. 
 Melito’s Peri Pascha, written in the second half of the second century, bears 
much in common with earlier Christian writings. Like his forebears, Melito considered 
Jesus to be divine. Also like those before them, he was relatively unconcerned with 
precisely distinguishing between the Father and Son. He also continued to use Jewish 
concepts and categories as the primary means of distinguishing the Father and Son. As I 
noted above, his lack of concern to distinguish the Father and Son caused scholars to call 
his theology naively modalistic. His language was often ambiguous and seemed to risk 
collapsing any distinction between Father and Son. 
 Of all of the writings surveyed in this chapter, Justin’s Dialogue with Trypho 
stands out because of its strong concern to show that the Father and Son are distinct, even 
different. He argues that the Son is another God and that he is distinct from the Father in 
number. Justin’s descriptions of the difference between the Father and the Son offer a 
sharp contrast to the other second-century theologies that did not take care to distinguish 
them so strongly. Even more, while Justin uses an abundance of scripture from the Old 
Testament to support his positions, he does not shy away from using Greek philosophical 
concepts in a way that we do not see in the Apostolic Fathers. Athenagoras likewise uses 
Greek philosophical categories to discuss monotheism and the divinity of the Son. Unlike 
Justin, Athenagoras always holds the unity of God and the divinity of the Son in tension. 





accord with the systems of Greco-Roman philosophers. In short, Athenagoras does not 
articulate the distinction between the Father and Son as strongly as Justin. 
 Justin and Athenagoras represent the demographic shift in early Christianity that 
Hurtado has discussed. Their theology bears the marks of the shift from a primarily 
Jewish conceptual matrix to one that was indebted to both Judaism and Greco-Roman 
philosophy. Justin employed more precise and technical language to define the 
relationship between the Father and the Son than almost all of the other second-century 
theologians. Justin’s argument that the Son was another God, I argue, is one of the 
contexts which best illuminates the motivation of the monarchian controversy. Before 
Justin, Christian theology did not carefully distinguish the Father and Son by means of 
precise technical terminology. Justin’s developments, however, did away with much 
ambiguity regarding the relationship between the Father and the Son: they were distinct, 
even different. In his conversation with Trypho the Jew, Justin left no doubt that the Son 
was another God alongside the Father. This would have problematized theologies like 
that of Melito, theologies that did not carefully distinguish the Father and Son. Justin’s 
theory of the alterity of the Father and Son would have also militated against any 
theologies that wanted to deny any distinction between the Father and the Son. The 
monarchianism that arose at the beginning of the third century was just such a theology, 






CHAPTER TWO: EUSEBIUS, CONTRA NOETUM, AND ADVERSUS 
PRAXEAN 
Introduction: The Beginnings of Monarchianism 
 The monarchian controversy erupted in Rome at the beginning of the third 
century, but it does appear in any of the second-century theologies I surveyed in the last 
chapter. While second-century theologians exhibited varying levels of concern to 
articulate the distinction between the Father and Son, none explicitly denied their 
distinction and claimed that they were the same. Nor did they seem to be defending this 
distinction against those who denied it. This denial, however, is precisely what was at the 
heart of monarchian theology: a denial of any distinction between the Father and the Son 
in order to protect a commitment to the oneness of God. 
 As I have already noted, we lack any account of the origins of monarchianism. 
One of the most probable explanations for its origins is that this strong affirmation of the 
oneness of God and the denial of distinction between the Father and Son was a reaction 
against theological developments that the monarchians perceived as endangering the 
oneness of God. Of the models of relationship between the Father and Son surveyed in 
the last chapter, Justin’s is the sort that could have easily provoked a monarchian 
reaction. The monarchian insistence on the sameness of the Father and Son would make 
sense as a reaction against Justin’s claims that the Son is another God. 
 Despite our lack of knowledge about the background of monarchianism, we can 
imagine what sorts of theology would have troubled them, namely, those that stressed the 





motivations of monarchianism, I turn to a detailed analysis of the main texts of the period 
that bear witness to monarchian theology. Unfortunately, we do not possess any texts 
from the monarchians themselves.1 We are thus left with the difficult task of 
reconstructing monarchian theology using only the fragmentary evidence we can extract 
from hostile witnesses. 
 Although it is the latest of the texts I survey, I begin with an overview of passages 
relevant to monarchianism in Eusebius’ Ecclesiastical History.  He has little to say about 
monarchianism itself, but his work does elucidate the state of the church in Rome at the 
time when monarchianism made its appearance. Next, I discuss Hippolytus’ Contra 
Noetum, which I take to be the earliest of the sources attesting to monarchiansim.2 Then, I 
examine Tertullian’s Adversus Praxean, which I consider to be dependent on Contra 
Noetum. These two sources are the earliest attestation to monarchianism, and they show 
that there was a stable core to monarchian theology. At the same time, there was also 
variation and development within monarchian theology, early signs of which can be seen 
in Adversus Praxean. In chapter three, I undertake a similar analysis of the Refutatio 
omnium haeresium and Novatian’s De Trinitate, which give us later portraits of 
monarchianism. At the close of that chapter, I summarize my conclusions about 
monarchianism and reevaluate some of the major scholarly theories about it. 
                                                 
1 We thus have no primary sources for monarchianism. The best we can do is reconstruct their 
position from secondary sources written by their contemporaries. 
2 I offer a full argument regarding the date and authorship of Contra Noetum and the other third-






 Although Eusebius of Caesarea’s Ecclesiastical History (EH) dwells at some 
length on the life of the church in the late second and early third centuries, it offers 
relatively little information on the varieties of monarchianism that were prevalent at the 
beginning of the third century.3 His omission of details about monarchianism does not 
seem to be motivated by a lack of concern for Trinitarian or Christological issues since he 
lays out what he considers to be a proper view of Christ at the beginning of EH.4 Despite 
the absence of any in-depth treatment of monarchianism itself, Eusebius does provide 
chronology and lists of succession for the bishops of major sees during the period that 
can be useful for determining the chronology of the monarchian controversy and some of 
its possible antecedents. 
 In his discussion of the Ebionites, Eusebius states that they held a low view of 
Christ and denied his miraculous birth.5 Specifically, according to Eusebius, they taught 
that Christ was a simple (λιτόν) and common (κοινόν) man. Others of the same name, 
recounts Eusebius, did not deny the virgin birth but nevertheless denied the pre-existence 
of the Son.6 In a later discussion of the Ebionites, Eusebius states that they held Christ to 
                                                 
3 Reinhard Hübner argues that Eusebius’ silence regarding monarchianism is confirmation of his 
contention that it was the dominant position well into the third century. See his, Der Paradox Eine: 
Antignostischer Monarchianismus im zweiten Jahrhundert (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 31. Many of Hübner’s 
assertions, however, are built on dubious assumptions and chronology. 
4 Eusebius, EH 1.2. 
5 Eusebius, EH 3.27. 
6 Robert M. Grant helpfully notes that this twofold categorization of the Ebionites comes from 
Origen, and that Eusebius probably mentioned the second class so that he could distance himself from their 





be a mere man (ψιλὸν ἄνθρωπον).7 Variations on these themes will show up in later anti-
monarchian polemic, although Eusebius’ laconic treatment of them gives us little 
information about what motivated the positions. 
 Eusebius uses the word μοναρχία twice in EH, and both of his uses are in 
reference to works of other authors. In the first reference, Eusebius attributes to Justin a 
work entitled περὶ θεοῦ μοναρχίας.8 Next, Eusebius tells us that Irenaeus composed a 
number of letters to address conflicts in the Roman church. One of these letters was 
addressed to Florinus and was entitled περὶ μοναρχίας.9 Eusebius reproduces a quotation 
from this letter wherein Irenaeus emphasizes his connection to Polycarp, who, in turn, 
was connected to the apostles. Irenaeus then repeats that Polycarp would have taken great 
offense at the things Florinus was teaching. Eusebius states that Florinus was defending 
the position that God was the author of evil. In addition to this letter, Eusebius writes that 
Irenaeus composed a treatise On the Ogdoad because Florinus seems to have been 
attracted to Valentinianism.10 
                                                 
7 Eusebius, EH 6.17. 
8 Eusebius, EH 4.18. We now know that this treatise which Eusebius attributes to Justin was not 
written by Justin. The treatise is a collection of excerpts from Greek literature arguing against polytheism 
and idolatry. There is little in this treatise that makes it distinctively Christian, although many scholars 
assume that it is. For a good introduction and critical edition, see Miroslav Marcovich, ed., Cohortatio ad 
Graecos; De monarchia; Oratio ad Graecos, Patristische Texte und Studien 32 (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 
1990). Given that we do not know the author of the text, dating it can be rather difficult. The two major 
pieces of information that inform dating the text are (1) the fact that it is cited by Eusebius, and (2) some 
phraseology that seems to mimic Clement of Alexandria. Therefore, the latest it was composed was 311-2. 
Given the apparent knowledge of Clement, the earliest date of the text would have been the last few years 
of the second century. Marcovich splits the difference and argues that it was probably written in the middle 
of the third century. Ibid., 82. 
9 Eusebius, EH 5.20. Unfortunately, this letter is no longer extant. 





 It is striking that Irenaeus would write a letter On Monarchy to someone who was 
inclined to Valentinianism. An emphasis on the monarchy or sole rule of God could serve 
as a sharp rebuff of Valentinian pleromatology which included a multiplication of divine 
figures who often rebelled against those above them in the hierarchy of the Pleroma. 
Unfortunately, there is very little in the quotation that would alert us to the specifics of 
Florinus’ teaching or Irenaeus’ response. We are, however, left with the fact that Irenaeus 
wrote a letter On Monarchy to someone who was inclined towards Valentinianism, and 
this is not insignificant in our reconstruction of the monarchian position.11 If the title is 
indicative of anything, it appears that Irenaeus employed the concept of monarchy to 
counter the Valentinian leanings of Florinus. It is also important to remember here that 
Irenaeus gives no indication that the monarchian controversy had begun at the time of his 
writing. Furthermore, Irenaeus was certainly not a monarchian. That he could use the 
term monarchy to rebuff Gnosticism, however, demonstrates that such a use might have 
been appealing a few decades later for those who wished to defend the uniqueness of 
God. 
 Eusebius mentions a certain Apelles a few times in book five, following his 
source Rhodo, and lumps Apelles with Marcion despite variance in their teaching.12 
Eusebius repeatedly states that Apelles taught that there is only one principle (μίαν 
ἀρχήν). He contrasts this position to that of Marcion, who taught that there were two 
                                                 
11 Ernest Evans was unconvinced that anti-Gnostic sentiment was an impetus for the rise of 
Monarchianism. See his “Introduction,” in Tertullian’s Treatise against Praxeas (London: S.P.C.K., 1948), 
6.  
12 Eusebius, EH 5.13: “He said that he did not know how the unbegotten God is one but that he 
believed it” (trans. Eusebius of Caesarea, Ecclesiastical History: Books 1-5, trans. Kirsopp Lake, Loeb 





principles (δύο ἀρχάς), and still others who taught that there were three natures (τρεῖς 
φύσεις). When pressed on this teaching that there was only one principle, Apelles was 
unable to defend it, but he held it nonetheless.13 Before the outbreak of the monarchian 
controversy proper, theologians used the word μοναρχία to refute both pagan polytheism 
and other positions that imperiled the unity of God.14   
 At the end of book five of EH, Eusebius provides us with the work’s most useful 
information for our reconstruction of the monarchian controversy. It is contained within 
another writing that Eusebius quotes three times, which he refers to as a treatise “against 
the heresy of Artemon.”15 Some scholars argue that the sources Eusebius quotes in the 
EH are often of more value than Eusebius’ own history or theology because his thought is 
often driven by polemical concerns.16 Even in his introduction of these quotations, 
Eusebius’ concern with Paul of Samosata is signaled when he accuses Paul of trying to 
renew the heresy of Artemon. His animosity towards Paul of Samosata shapes how he 
writes and what information he includes.  
                                                 
13 The problem with the teaching of Apelles seems to have been his views regarding seemingly 
contradictory material in the Old Testament. 
14 The work of Gabino Uríbarri Bilbao on the uses of monarchia prior to the outbreak of the 
controversy at the beginning of the second century is very informative here. See his Monarquía y Trinidad: 
El concepto teológico “monarchia” en la controversia “monarquiana,” Publicaciones de la Universidad 
Pontificia Comillas Madrid, Serie 1: Estudios 62 (Madrid: UPCO, 1996). Note also the discussion of the 
uses of monarchia at Evans, “Introduction,” 6–9. 
15 Eusebius, EH 5.28. 
16 See, for example, the rather harsh appraisal of Robert Grant: “Eusebius' accounts of the early 
heresies thus possess no value apart from that of the documents he quoted or paraphrased” (Eusebius as 
Church Historian, 86). See also John T. Fitzgerald, “Eusebius and the Little Labyrinth,” in The Early 






Scholars have pointed out that although Eusebius mentions a treatise against 
Artemon, the quotations that Eusebius has preserved do not mention Artemon by name.17 
There have, therefore, been numerous attempts to determine the title of the treatise and its 
author. Many scholars are confident that the title of this treatise from which Eusebius 
quotes is The Little Labyrinth. The main piece of evidence supporting this conclusion 
comes from Theodoret’s Haereticarum fabularum compendium.18 Near the beginning of 
part two of his compendium, Theodoret offers brief accounts of the heresy of Artemon 
and Theodotus, both of whom Eusebius mentions. Then Theodoret states that “The Little 
Labyrinth was written against the heresy of these [two].”19 Scholars have preferred the 
title The Little Labyrinth because they are relatively certain that Theodoret has in mind 
the same text Eusebius quotes. Although we have here no definitive proof of the actual 
title of the treatise, we can be confident that it was known by this name at the time of 
Theodoret’s writing.20 
Although scholars have settled upon the title The Little Labyrinth for this treatise, 
there is much less certainty regarding the authorship and date of the work. The most 
frequently suggested authors are Origen, Gaius, and Hippolytus. Theodoret notes that 
“some assume it is the work of Origen but the style [of the writing] refutes those saying 
                                                 
17 Fitzgerald, “Eusebius and the Little Labyrinth,” 124; Grant, Eusebius as Church Historian, 91–
2. 
18 For a full discussion of the evidence, see Fitzgerald, “Eusebius and the Little Labyrinth,” 124-
126. 
19 Theodoret, Haereticarum fabularum compendium 2.4-5 (PG 83.389-92). Translation mine. 
Κατὰ τῆς τούτων αἱρέσεως ὁ σμικρὸς συνεγράφη Λαβύρινθος. 





[so].”21 The association of Gaius with the treatise is rather limited. The suggestion for 
authorship that has received the most support is that of Hippolytus.22 Fitzgerald argues 
that there are insurmountable objections to the Hippolytan authorship of this text and 
suggests that viewing it as anonymous is the safest way to proceed.23 After his thorough 
discussion of the problems of authorship associated with The Little Labyrinth, Fitzgerald 
offers a proposal for the dating of the work. He argues that because Hippolytus seems to 
be unaware of Artemon, the career of Artemon in Rome must have post-dated the work 
of Hippolytus. He suggests that the work was probably written sometime between 240 
and 255 CE.24 Although it appears to post-date many of the other works that attest to the 
monarchian controversy, it is still of value because it gives us an alternative glimpse into 
Rome during the period when the controversy was just beginning.  
Between his quotations of The Little Labyrinth, Eusebius provides us with an 
account of the succession of Roman bishops following Victor.25 In the Refutatio, both 
Zephyrinus and Callistus are cast in a negative light and as major personalities in the 
controversy. Eusebius states that Zephyrinus succeeded Victor during the ninth year of 
                                                 
21 Theodoret, Haereticarum fabularum compendium 2.5 (PG 83.392). Translation mine. ὅν τινες 
Ὠριγένους ὑπολαμβάνουσι ποίημα, ἀλλ’ ὁ χαρακτὴρ ἐλέγχει τοὺς λέγοντας. 
22 Fitzgerald, “Eusebius and the Little Labyrinth,” 133; Grant, Eusebius as Church Historian, 91–
2. 
23 Fitzgerald, “Eusebius and the Little Labyrinth,” 133–6. “In view of these and other problems in 
attributing the document to Hippolytus, it is not surprising that the majority of contemporary scholars 
appear to reject Hippolytus's putative authorship and treat the work as strictly anonymous. Until a cogent 
case can be made on behalf of some other early Christian author, The Little Labyrinth is best viewed as a 
truly anonymous document” (136). 
24 Ibid., 136–44. 





the reign of Severus.26 The majority of Eusebius’ references to Zephyrinus are passing 
mentions in lists of succession and do not imply anything about what his role in the 
monarchian controversy might have been. In Eusebius’ first quotation from The Little 
Labyrinth, we learn a bit more about Zephyrinus,even though the account is more 
suggestive than explicit. This quotation from The Little Labyrinth merits being 
reproduced in full: 
For they say that all who went before and the apostles themselves received and 
taught what they now say, and that the truth of the teaching was preserved until 
the times of Victor, who was the thirteenth bishop in Rome after Peter, but that 
the truth had been corrupted from the time of his successor, Zephyrinus. What 
they said might perhaps be plausible if in the first place the divine Scriptures were 
not opposed to them, and there are also writings of certain Christians, older than 
the time of Victor, which they wrote to the Gentiles on behalf of the truth and 
against the heresies of their own time. I mean the works of Justin and Miltiades 
and Tatian and Clement and many others in all of which Christ is treated as God. 
For who is ignorant of the books of Irenaeus and Melito and the others who 
announced Christ as God and man? And all the Psalms and hymns which were 
written by faithful Christians from the beginning of the Christ as the Logos of 
God and treat him as God. How then is it possible that after the mind of the 
church had been announced for so many years that the generation before Victor 
can have preached as these say? Why are they not ashamed of so calumniating 
Victor when they know quite well that Victor excommunicated Theodotus the 
cobbler, the founder and father of this insurrection which denies God, when he 
first said that Christ was a mere man (ψιλὸν ἄνθρωπον)? For if Victor was so 
minded towards them as their blasphemy teaches, how could he have thrown out 
Theodotus who invented this heresy?27 
 
Although all of Eusebius’ other references to Zephyrinus in EH were neutral or positive, 
this reference in The Little Labyrinth suggests that things started to go awry during the 
episcopate of Zephyrinus.28 
                                                 
26 Eusebius, EH 5.28. 
27 Eusebius, EH 5.28 (trans. LCL 153:517-9). 
28 For a classic discussion of the episcopate of Victor and the state of the Roman church at the end 
of the second century, see George La Piana, “The Roman Church at the End of the Second Century: The 
Episcopate of Victor, the Latinization of the Roman Church, the Easter Controversy, Consolidation of 





 This section of The Little Labyrinth has a specific heresy in mind: that which 
claimed that Christ was a “mere man” (ψιλὸν ἄνθρωπον). Eusebius at first attributes this 
heresy to a certain Artemon, but this quotation from The Little Labyrinth connects the 
beginnings of this heresy to Theodotus, the cobbler.29 Regardless of who was actually 
responsible for this heresy that called Christ ψιλὸν ἄνθρωπον, The Little Labyrinth is 
clear that Victor unequivocally rejected it and that he even excommunicated Theodotus 
because of it.30 The Little Labyrinth’s statement about the corruption of the truth in the 
time of Zephyrinus lacks any sort of specificity; but given the context surrounding this 
statement, there is a good chance that this “corruption of the truth” had something to do 
with teaching about Christ. 
 In the next quotation of The Little Labyrinth, we learn about a certain Natalius 
who was persuaded by disciples of Theodotus the cobbler (who taught that Christ was 
ψιλὸν ἄνθρωπον) to become their bishop for a certain sum of money.31 Eventually his 
guilt for accepting this illegitimate position got the better of him, and he repented before 
Zephyrinus. Despite his change of heart and penance, however, The Little Labyrinth tells 
us that he was either not readmitted to communion with the church or just barely taken 
back into communion.32 This account of Zephyrinus from The Little Labyrinth contrasts 
                                                 
(1925): 201–77. La Piana’s discussion is concerned primarily with ecclesiological questions and the 
growing authority of the Roman see. As a result, he does not focus on many of the doctrinal problems that 
are of interest here. 
29 Theodoret does connect the teaching that Christ was ψιλὸν ἄνθρωπον with Artemon. See his 
Haereticarum fabularum compendium 2.4 (PG 83.392). 
30 Note again that Eusebius also accused the Ebionites of teaching that Christ was ψιλὸν 
ἄνθρωπον. Whether anything actually connects Artemon, Theodotus, and the Ebionites with each other is 
an open question, but Eusebius paints them as teaching the same thing about Christ. 






sharply with what we learn of him in the Refutatio. The Refutatio portrays Zephyrinus as 
a weak and servile man who is easily moved by the machinations of Callistus, but The 
Little Labyrinth presents him as someone who was very concerned with proper discipline 
in the church.33 If nothing else, the testimony of The Little Labyrinth regarding 
Zephyrinus should make us even warier of the distorting tendencies of the Refutatio.34 
 Another episode in the EH merits our attention. Eusebius writes about Beryllus, 
who was bishop of Bostra in the time of Origen. He states that Beryllus “attempted to 
introduce things foreign to the faith, daring to say that our Saviour and Lord did not pre-
exist in an individual existence of his own before his coming to reside among men, nor 
had he a divinity of his own, but only the Father's dwelling in him.”35 Concerned bishops 
then invited Origen to intervene in order to correct Berrylus. As Eusebius recounts it, 
Origen reasoned Beryllus back to “orthodoxy.”36 It is interesting to note that Eusebius 
here accuses Beryllus of something similar to his earlier charge against the Ebionites, 
namely, that he denied the pre-existence of the Son.37 
                                                 
33 See, for example, Refutatio 9.7. 
34 It is also interesting that The Little Labyrinth can speak of the truth being corrupted during the 
time of Zephyrinus while also showing him to be a firm disciplinarian. 
35 Eusebius, EH 6.33 (trans. and Greek from Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History: Books 6-10, trans. J. 
E. L. Oulton, Loeb Classical Library 265 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1932), 86–7): ... 
ξένα τινὰ τῆς πίστεως παρεισφέρειν ἐπειρᾶτο, τὸν σωτῆρα καὶ κύριον ἡμῶν λέγειν τολμῶν μὴ 
προϋφεστάναι κατ’ ἰδίαν οὐσίας περιγραφὴν πρὸ τῆς εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἐπιδημίας μηδὲ μὴν θεότητα ἰδίαν 
ἔχειν, ἀλλ’ ἐμπολιτευομένην αὐτῷ μόνην τὴν πατρικήν. 
36 Eusebius’ account here has many similarities with Origen’s Dialogue with Heraclides. In both, 
Origen appears to have been summoned by bishops, and he functioned as something of a theological 
trouble-shooter. In both accounts, Origen also wins over the errant person with whom he is in dialogue. 
Eusebius himself introduces the vocabulary of “orthodoxy” here even though it was often difficult to 
sharply delineate what was orthodox and what was heterodox at the beginning of the third century. 





 Finally, and even though he post-dates Origen, Eusebius’ treatment of Paul of 
Samosata in the EH is worth consideration because it illuminates some of the common 
threads that run through Eusebius’ different accounts of errant views of Christ. Eusebius 
states that Paul “espoused low and mean views as to Christ, contrary to the Church's 
teaching, namely, that he was in his nature an ordinary man.”38 Eusebius earlier used the 
same word, ταπεινός, to describe the Ebionite views of Christ.39 Furthermore, Eusebius 
describes both the Ebionites and Paul of Samosata of teaching that Christ was a common 
(κοινόν) man. In Eusebius’ descriptions of those who hold errant views of Christ, several 
terms recur: ψιλὸν ἄνθρωπον, κοινὸν ἄνθρωπον, ταπεινός. Eusebius says that both the 
Ebionites and Artemon claimed that Christ was ψιλὸν ἄνθρωπον. Eusebius also accuses 
Paul of Samosata of trying to resurrect the heresy of Artemon. Eusebius clearly has Paul 
of Samosata in his sights during the composition of the EH, and there is little doubt that 
he intended to create some sort of heretical genealogy with the similarities we see in his 
account. The tendentious nature of Eusebius’ account calls for caution when determining 
the value of his reports on the heresies that antedated Paul.  
Neither Eusebius nor The Little Labyrinth gives us any details about the sort of 
monarchianism we see in Contra Noetum, Tertullian’s Adversus Praxean, the Refutatio, 
or Novatian’s De Trinitate. As I argue in what follows, the same impulse to preserve the 
uniqueness of God probably prompted both monarchianism and psilanthropism. Thus, 
although they do not mention monarchianism directly, Eusebius and The Little Labyrinth 
                                                 
38 Eusebius, EH 7.27 (trans. and Greek from LCL 265:209-11): τούτου δὲ ταπεινὰ καὶ χαμαιπετῆ 
περὶ τοῦ Χριστοῦ παρὰ τὴν ἐκκλησιαστικὴν διδασκαλίαν φρονήσαντος ὡς κοινοῦ τὴν φύσιν ἀνθρώπου 
γενομένου. 





are helpful. As we see it in Eusebius and The Little Labyrinth, psilanthropism can be 
interpreted as an attempt to safeguard the uniqueness of God that travelled to Rome 
during the second century. Calling Christ a “mere man” and saying that he was filled by 
the power of God would certainly be ways of safeguarding this understanding of 
monotheism. Novatian’s fixation on both psilanthropism and the later “modalistic” 
monarchianism shows that these were closely related. If nothing else, Eusebius’ EH and 
The Little Labyrinth demonstrate that strong views of the uniqueness of God and of 
Christ’s mere humanity were already a pressing issue in Rome by the time of Victor. 
The Hippolytan Question 
Before addressing either the Refutatio omnium haeresium or the Contra Noetum, 
two works often attributed to Hippolytus, it is necessary to outline the contours of the 
scholarly discussion about Hippolytus. The nature of the questions about Hippolytus and 
the texts attributed to him is such that it has a great bearing on how the works are treated. 
For example, very few scholars still argue that the Refutatio and Contra Noetum are by 
the same author. If different authors wrote these two works, we should expect to see 
differences in style and theology. Questions of authorship regarding these two texts will 
in turn affect determinations we make about the relationship between Tertullian’s 
Adversus Praxean and Contra Noetum. In short, a thorough grasp of the debate about 





or Contra Noetum. Accordingly, I here highlight the key pieces of the scholarly debate 
and draw preliminary conclusions about the Refutatio and Contra Noetum.40 
The debate about Hippolytus extends far beyond the Refutatio and Contra 
Noetum; but because they feature so prominently in the scholarly debate and represent its 
major contours, I will mostly limit my summary of the debate to pieces that deal with 
these works. Prior to the twentieth century, scholars commonly accepted that the 
Refutatio and Contra Noetum were both written by Hippolytus.41 Since the beginning of 
the twentieth century, such a claim for common authorship has become problematic. 
There is a cloud of uncertainty surrounding both Hippolytus and many of the works 
ascribed to him. Scholars lack precise details about who Hippolytus was, which writings 
can be attributed to him with any degree of confidence, and the dating of both his life and 
the works attributed to him. Scholars have presented numerous theories attempting to 
make sense of the disparate pieces of data, but these theories are not plausible enough to 
gain widespread acceptance. Uncertainty is regnant regarding most questions related to 
Hippolytus.42  
Eusebius first mentions Hippolytus as he is discussing church leaders who left 
written works to posterity. He refers to Hippolytus in passing as someone “who also 
                                                 
40 Because questions about these two works are so intertwined, I have chosen to address them 
together rather than with an introduction to each of the specific works. 
41 Harnack is a good example of this position. See Adolf von Harnack, History of Dogma, trans. 
Neil Buchanan, vol. 3 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1907), 52–4, 62–3. 
42 For a concise summary of the major trends and problems in Hippolytus research, see Ronald E. 
Heine, “Hippolytus, Ps.-Hippolytus and the Early Canons,” in The Cambridge History of Early Christian 
Literature, ed. Frances M. Young, Lewis Ayres, and Andrew Louth (Cambridge: Cambridge University 





presided over another church somewhere.”43 Even here, our uncertainty about Hippolytus 
is evident because Eusebius gives him no geographical epithet. A short while later, 
Eusebius provides us with a list of Hippolytus’ works to which he has access. Among 
these, he includes the Refutatio or Πρὸς ἁπάσας τὰς αἱρέσεις.44 Although Eusebius does 
not mention the Contra Noetum in this list, he does say that there are many other works 
of Hippolytus that have been preserved by other people.45 Eusebius’ final reference to 
Hippolytus in the EH comes during his discussion of Dionysius of Alexandria, where he 
says that Dionysius sent a letter to “those in Rome” and that the letter was delivered 
through Hippolytus (διὰ Ἱππολύτου).46 This last reference, despite the earlier absence of a 
geographical epithet, does lend some credence to the common association of Hippolytus 
with the church in Rome. 
Furthermore, a statue was discovered in Rome in 1551 near the tomb of a martyr 
named Hippolytus.47 This statue contained both a calculation of dates for the Passover 
                                                 
43 Eusebius, EH 6.20 (trans. LCL 265:65). 
44 Eusebius, EH 6.22. 
45 Scholars debate whether Contra Noetum should be viewed as an independent work or as a part 
of a larger whole. Those who argue that it is a fragment of a larger work usually assume that it was part of 
the Syntagma mentioned by Photius in Bibliotheca, codex 121. Pierre Nautin represents the scholarly 
trajectory that thinks Contra Noetum was the conclusion of the Syntagma. See his Hippolyte et Josipe: 
Contribution à l’histoire de la littérature chrétienne du troisième siècle, Études et textes pour l’histoire du 
dogme de la Trinité 1 (Paris: Cerf, 1947), 100. Harnack also considered Contra Noetum to be the 
conclusion of the Syntagma (History of Dogma, 3:51–2, n. 1). Butterworth argues at length that Contra 
Noetum is an independent work and should not be considered a fragment dislocated from a larger whole. 
He argues that it is structured as an adaptation of profane diatribe and that this helps explain the structure, 
style, and content of the work. See Hippolytus, Contra Noetum, ed. Robert Butterworth, Heythrop 
Monographs 2 (London: Heythrop College [University of London], 1977), 118ff. Manlio Simonetti accepts 
the conclusions of Butterworth and argues that Contra Noetum is an independent work (“Una nuova 
proposta su Ippolito,” Augustinianum 36, no. 1 (1996): 40). 
46 Eusebius, EH 6.46. Eusebius does not specify those to whom Dionysius sent the letter. He 
merely tells us that it was sent to “those in Rome” (τοῖς ἐν Ῥώμῃ). 
47 See Nautin, Hippolyte et Josipe, 17ff; Josef Frickel, Das Dunkel um Hippolyt von Rom: Ein 
Lösungsversuch; Die Schriften Elenchos und Contra Noëtum, Grazer theologische Studien 13 (Graz: 





and a list of written works.48 The similarity of the titles of the works on the statue with 
other lists of Hippolytus’ writings, coupled with its location near the tomb of Hippolytus 
the martyr, led scholars to conclude that this statue depicted Hippolytus. Varying 
interpretations of the statue have been weighted heavily in the accounts of many scholars 
on the works of Hippolytus.49  
As noted above, the authorship and provenance of the Refutatio and Contra 
Noetum have been hotly contested for most of the twentieth century.50 The common view 
                                                 
Allen Brent, Hippolytus and the Roman Church in the Third Century: Communities in Tension before the 
Emergence of a Monarch-Bishop, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 31 (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 3–50; 
Heine, “Hippolytus, Ps.-Hippolytus and the Early Canons,” 144. 
48 For a good summary of the list of works on the statue, see Miroslav Marcovich, “Introduction,” 
in Refutatio Omnium Haeresium, Patristische Texte und Studien 25 (New York; Berlin: W. De Gruyter, 
1986), 12–3. 
49 For a number of reasons, Nautin doubted that Hippolytus was the author of numerous works 
attributed to him, especially the Elenchos or Refutatio omnium haeresium. Nautin, therefore, denied that the 
statue depicted Hippolytus. Nautin argued that the statue actually depcited a certain Josipe (or Josephus) 
and that this Josipe was the author of the Elenchos. See Nautin, Hippolyte et Josipe, 79ff. One of the chief 
means Nautin used to posit two authors, Hippolytus and Josipe, was that there were differences between 
chronological sections in works attributed to Hippolytus and the paschal calculations on the statue. Nautin 
thought it improbable that a single author would produce conflicting chronologies, and thus argued that 
there were two authors. More recently, John Behr, following Brent’s conclusion argues that Hippolytus was 
not the author of the Refutatio and that it antedated the Contra Noetum, which was written by Hippolytus. 
John Behr, The Way to Nicaea, The Formation of Christian Theology 1 (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir’s 
Seminary Press, 2001), 141–2. 
50 Nautin thinks the Refutatio is the product of "Josipe", and he places it earlier than Contra 
Noetum, which he deems to be genuinely Hippolytan (Hippolyte et Josipe, 85–6). Marcel Richard notes 
that serious questions arise when we consider whether the Refutatio and Contra Noetum are by the same 
author. See his “Sainte Hippolyte, ‘Hippolyte et Josipe’: Bulletin de Patrologie,” Mélanges de science 
religieuse 5 (1948): 297–8.  Marcovich (1986) argues that the Refutatio is actually by Hippolytus and dates 
it between 222 and 235 (“Introduction,” 16–17). Roberth Butterworth sees no reason to doubt that 
Hippolytus of Rome was the author of Contra Noetum (“Introduction,” in Contra Noetum, Heythrop 
Monographs 2 [London: Heythrop College (University of London), 1977], i).  In his 1988 monograph, 
Frickel argued that the Refutatio is legitimately by Hippolytus, as is Contra Noetum.  His argument 
proceeds by comparing the demonstrations of truth at the end of Contra Noetum and Refutatio, 10.  He 
builds on the work of Richard and argues strongly against Nautin. See Frickel, Das Dunkel um Hippolyt 
von Rom, 299. Caroline P. Bammel says of Frickel’s monograph: "Frickel writes as an advocate rather than 
as an impartial umpire" (“The State of Play with Regard to Hippolytus and the Contra Noetum,” Heythrop 
Journal 31, no. 2 [1990]: 195). Later, however, Frickel changed his position and suggested that Contra 
Noetum was not written by Hippolytus but was actually responding to fourth- and fifth- century problems. 
See Josef Frickel, “Hippolyts Schrift Contra Noetum: Ein Pseudo-Hippolyt,” in Logos: Festschrift für Luise 
Abramowski, ed. Hans Christof Brennecke, Ernst Ludwig Grasmück, and Christoph Markschies, Beihefte 





that Hippolytus was the author of both the Refutatio and Contra Noetum was forcefully 
challenged with the publication of Pierre Nautin’s Hippolyte et Josipe in 1947.51 At the 
beginning of the work, Nautin signaled his intention to critically reevaluate the prevailing 
paradigm with the following statement about the Refutatio: “Modern criticism attributes 
this work to Hippolytus, but it presents such very profound divergences with a certainly 
authentic text of Hippolytus, the fragment Contra Noetum, that it was not possible to 
avoid posing anew the question of its origin.”52 In this statement, Nautin shows two of his 
central propositions: (1) that there are substantial differences between the Refutatio and 
the Contra Noetum, and (2) that the Contra Noetum is a genuine and reliable work of 
Hippolytus.53 
                                                 
Gruyter, 1993), 87–123. Reinhard M. Hübner adopts a similar position and argues that Contra Noetum is a 
product of the fourth century and is unreliable for establishing the theology of Noetus (“Melito von Sardes 
und Noët von Smyrna,” in Der Paradox Eine: antignostischer Monarchianismus im zweiten Jahrhundert 
[Leiden; Boston: Brill, 1999], 4–9).  Brent thinks the Refutatio was written by someone other than 
Hippolytus, but that Hippolytus touched it up and used it as a source for composing Contra Noetum, which 
was an attempt at rapprochement with the semi-monarchianism of Callistus. (Hippolytus and the Roman 
Church in the Third Century, 206, 211, 256–8). Nautin also argues that Trinitarian formulae in Tertullian’s 
Adversus Praxean are not treated as skeptically as those in Contra Noetum. Therefore, he sees no reason 
that the seemingly advanced Trinitarian theology in Contra Noetum would have to be considered a later 
interpolation. While his observation about the lack of skepticism regarding the pneumatological passages in 
Adversus Praxean is true, Nautin fails to consider whether Tertullian’s Montanism influenced him to 
emphasize pneumatology. See, Nautin, 46-7. 
51 Nautin clearly and somewhat polemically outlines the rise of the scholarly consensus regarding 
the Hippolytan authorship of both works. He pays particular attention to its rise in German scholarship 
before stating that “A. d'Alès vulgarisait définitivement en France la thèse allemande” (34). For this 
narration, see Ibid., 17–35. 
52 Nautin, Hippolyte et Josipe, 7. Translation mine. “La critique moderne attribue cet ouvrage à 
Hippolyte; mais il présente des divergences si profondes avec un texte certainement authentique 
d'Hippolyte, le fragment contre Noët, que l'on ne pouvait éviter de poser à nouveau la question de son 
origine.” Note that Nautin and other scholars prefer to call the Refutatio the Elenchos. Still others refer to it 
as the Philosophoumena. While any of these titles is appropriate, I will use Refutatio for the sake of 
consistency. 
53 Nautin states that one of the reasons he considers Contra Noetum to be genuinely Hippolytan is 
that it is attributed to him by the fifth-century authors Gelasius and Theodoret (ibid., 35). As I will note 
later, several scholars have questioned the Hippolytan authorship of Contra Noetum. Nautin notes that 
some earlier scholars had viewed the seemingly well-developed pnematological passages in Contra Noetum 
as later interpolations, but Nautin dismisses these critiques. He claims that these pnematological sections 





Nautin attempts to compare the works attributed to Hippolytus in four major areas 
to determine if they are genuinely Hippolytan: (1) doctrine, (2) genre, (3) formation of 
general spirit, (4) style.54 After a detailed analysis, Nautin concludes that the Refutatio 
and Contra Noetum are not by the same author. Since he had pre-determined that Contra 
Noetum was a genuinely Hippolytan work, he needed to posit a different author for the 
Refutatio. Eventually, he settled on a certain “Josipe” as the author of the Refutatio.55 
Nautin further suggests that the Refutatio was the earlier of the two works and that 
Hippolytus drew on it when he composed Contra Noetum.56 Despite some of the highly 
speculative or tendentious conclusions Nautin came to, his work catapulted questions 
about Hippolytus back into the scholarly consciousness.57 His work was a substantial 
challenge to the prevailing views at the time. 
                                                 
Furthermore, Nautin accepts Photius’ assertion that Hippolytus was a student of Irenaeus and claims that 
such pneumatology as we see in Contra Noetum was already present in the earlier works of Irenaeus (ibid., 
37–42). One of the similarities Nautin claims to see between Irenaeus and Hippolytus is that they both 
identify the Holy Spirit as Wisdom. Nautin is correct to note that Irenaeus identifies the Holy Spirit and 
Wisdom, but he is quite mistaken with regard to the Contra Noetum. The passage from Contra Noetum 10 
that Nautin cites to support his position is not about the Holy Spirit, but rather the Son. See ibid., 44. What 
we see in Contra Noetum 10, then, is nothing more than the standard early-third century connection of the 
creative functions of the Son with those of Wisdom. Brent also notes this erroneous assertion of Nautin 
(Hippolytus and the Roman Church in the Third Century, 533 n. 126). 
54 Nautin, Hippolyte et Josipe, 48. By “formation of general spirit” (formation d’esprit générale) 
Nautin seems to mean something like the intellectual horizon of each author. For example, he thinks that 
the divergence in usage of scripture between the Refutatio and Contra Noetum “révèle déjà deux esprits de 
formations très différentes” (ibid., 51). 
55 Nautin, Hippolyte et Josipe, 88. 
56 Ibid., 56–8. One of the chief reasons Nautin gives for believing that the Refutatio is earlier is 
that it has no mention of the condemnation of Noetus. Contra Noetum, on the other hand, does have an 
account of Noetus’ condemnation. Since Nautin assumes that there is some dependence between the works, 
he finds it very implausible that the “Josipe” would not have included details about the condemnation of 
Noetus if he had been aware of them. Thus, for Nautin, it makes sense that Contra Noetum was later. This 
whole argument about which of the works was earlier, however, begs the question about dependence. Was 
there actually direct dependence between the works? If there was, is Nautin’s dating scheme the only way 
to explain the absence of Noetus’ condemnation in the Refutatio? 
57 Nautin’s work is tendentious in that he exhibits a marked preference for Hippolytus. He views 
“Josipe” as a pretentious dilettante, while he claims that Hippolytus was a pious man of the church. The 





The publication of Nautin’s monograph touched off a controversy among French 
scholars that lasted for nearly a decade.58 Gustave Bardy quickly responded to Nautin’s 
thesis with acerbic criticism and argued for common Hippolytan authorship.59 Shortly 
following Bardy’s harsh critique of Nautin’s thesis, Marcel Richard began a series of 
articles in which he disputed the conclusions Nautin drew from the chronological 
inconsistencies. Richard argued that such inconsistencies do not necessarily lead one to 
conclude that there were two different authors. Indeed, Richard argued that Hippolytus 
was the author of the works Nautin divided between Hippolytus and Josipe, although he 
was willing to admit that there were interpolations in the extant texts.60 
An Italian school of scholars devoted substantial attention to the Hippolytan 
question beginning in the 1970s and held two coferences devoted to Hippolytus. They 
generally accepted Nautin’s fundamental thesis that the Refutatio and Contra Noetum 
                                                 
d'esprit très différents, et l'on ne peut s'empêcher de comparer l'impression qu'ils nous laissent après bientôt 
deux millénaires. L'oeuvre de Josipe nous apparaît bien vieille, à cause de l'érudition périmée qui 
l'encombre. Quand nous lisons aujourd'hui ses développements copieux sur la physique de la création ou 
sur la description de l'Hadès, nous trouvons que l'"amour de la science", dont il se vantait, l’a entraîné à 
beaucoup de puérilité. La sobriété d'Hippolyte dans les mêmes matières relève d'une intelligence religieuse 
plus pénétrante et incontestablement plus proche de l'esprit moderne. C'est à son esprit ecclésiastique, qu'il 
nous faut accepter d'en savoir gré. Parce qu'Hippolyte n'a pas voulu d'autre science que celle des 'saintes 
Écritures', son oeuvre reste vivante pour nous” (Hippolyte et Josipe, 103). 
58 Butterworth gives a competent summary of the whole controversy, although it precedes the 
substantial contributions made by the Italian school in the late 1970s. See Robert Butterworth, “The 
Growth of the Problem,” in Contra Noetum, Heythrop Monographs 2 (London: Heythrop College 
(University of London), 1977), 1–33. 
59 Gustave Bardy, “L’énigme d’Hippolyte,” Mélanges de science religieuse 5, no. 1 (1948): 63–
88. 
60 For Richard’s response to Nautin, see Richard, “Sainte Hippolyte, ‘Hippolyte et Josipe’: 
Bulletin de Patrologie”; idem, “Comput et chronographie chez Saint Hippolyte,” Mélanges de science 
religieuse 7 (1950): 237–68; idem, “Comput et chronographie chez Saint Hippolyte,” Mélanges de science 
religieuse 8 (1951): 19–51; idem, “Encore le problème d’Hippolyte,” Mélanges de science religieuse 10 
(1953): 13–52; idem, “Dernières remarques sur s. Hippolyte et le soi-disant Josipe,” Recherches de science 





were not composed by the same author.61 Josef Frickel, who participated in both of the 
Italian conferences, maintained the common Hippolytan authorship of the Refutatio and 
Contra Noetum.62 In 1993, however, Frickel revised his position and argued that Contra 
Noetum was actually not by Hippolytus.63 
Since Frickel’s change of position in 1993, the majority of scholars have rejected 
the older view that both texts were composed by Hippolytus of Rome.64 Brent’s more 
recent proposal accepts that Hippolytus was not the author of both the Refutatio and 
Contra Noetum, but he innovatively, if not convincingly, argues that there was a 
Hippolytan school operative in Rome.65 These scholarly arguments about Hippolytus 
have ranged widely, drawing upon both archaeological evidence and the written works 
attributed to Hippolytus. Scholars have clearly shown that there are substantial 
theological differences between the extant works, especially between the theological 
positions favored by one or another work.66 
                                                 
61 See the two volumes of conference proceedings, and especially the essays of Simonetti and Loi. 
Ricerche su Ippolito, Studia ephemeridis Augustinianum 13 (Rome: Institutum patristicum Augustinianum, 
1977); Nuove ricerche su Ippolito, Studia ephemeridis Augustinianum 30 (Rome: Institutum patristicum 
Augustinianum, 1989). 
62 Josef Frickel, “Contraddizioni nelle opere e nella persona di Ippolito di Roma,” in Ricerche su 
Ippolito, Studia ephemeridis Augustinianum 13 (Rome: Institutum patristicum Augustinianum, 1977), 137–
49; idem, Das Dunkel um Hippolyt von Rom; idem, “Ippolito di Roma, scrittore e martire,” in Nuove 
ricerche su Ippolito, Studia ephemeridis Augustinianum 30 (Roma: Institutum patristicum Augustinianum, 
1989), 23–41. 
63 Frickel, “Hippolyts Schrift Contra Noetum: ein Pseudo-Hippolyt.” 
64 Hübner thinks that Contra Noetum was written in the fourth century and is fundamentally 
unreliable for the reconstruction of Noetus’ teaching (“Melito und Noët,” 1999, 4–9). 
65 Brent, Hippolytus and the Roman Church in the Third Century. 
66 I am referring to places where the authors go beyond refuting their opponents and lay out their 
own positions. For example, Frickel’s earlier argument examines the positions endorsed in the 
“demonstrations of truth” in Refutatio X and Contra Noetum (Das Dunkel um Hippolyt von Rom). On the 
basis of this study, though, Frickel argues that the two works were written by the same author. His 





One of the most recent detailed treatments of the Hippolytan question is that of J. 
A. Cerrato.67 Cerrato notes at the outset of his work that he is critical of the traditional 
Roman hypothesis, namely, that all the works commonly ascribed to Hippolytus were 
penned by a Roman bishop named Hippolytus. Cerrato notes that the majority of studies 
from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries focused on the relationship between the 
controversial works: the Refutatio and Contra Noetum. His study breaks new ground 
because he concentrates his analysis on the biblical commentaries ascribed to 
Hippolytus.68 He argues that the overwhelming majority of biblical commentaries of the 
same style as those ascribed to Hippolytus were produced in the East; there is little 
literary evidence for this commentary tradition in Rome. Furthermore, Cerrato sees 
enough similarities between these (most likely) eastern commentaries and Contra Noetum 
to argue that they were by the same author. The same cannot be said of the Refutatio. 
Although Cerrato does not spend much time discussing the dating of Contra Noetum, the 
fact that he lumps it with the eastern biblical commentaries suggests a date at the 
beginning of the third century. 
The scholarly opinion that the Refutatio and Contra Noetum are not both the 
product of Hippolytus’ pen has grown increasingly strong since the publication of 
Nautin’s monograph in the 1940s. Indeed, nearly all scholars have abandoned attempts to 
                                                 
67 J. A. Cerrato, Hippolytus between East and West: The Commentaries and the Provenance of the 
Corpus, Oxford Theological Monographs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
68 Ibid., 82: “Throughout the literary controversy between Nautin and his critics the emphasis 
remained on the anti-heretical works, especially the Contra Noetum and the Refutatio. This had been the 
focus of the nineteenth century. It was the original point of attack against the Roman hypothesis and, 
therefore, the centre of defence by advocates of the western provenance view. The evidences for the eastern 
character of the commentaries, perhaps the most positive and persuasive data in the debate were not 





show that Hippolytus wrote both texts.69 Accordingly, my treatment of these two works 
begins with the well-founded assumption that they were not written by the same author. 
Although traditional claims about Hippolytan authorship have fallen out of favor, these 
texts still prove to be worthwhile sources for the reconstruction of the monarchian 
controversy. Both the Refutatio and Contra Noetum were concerned with refuting 
monarchian teaching; and if Heine’s thesis is correct, these two texts provide a lens into 
how monarchianism developed over a period of about thirty years (from ca. 200 to ca. 
230).70 Even though they are probably by different authors and there are stylistic 
differences between the two, the texts can still be used to create a more substantial 
coherent picture of the monarchian teachings. Regarding stylistic differences, I am 
thinking specifically of the way the accounts of monarchian teaching are organized. In 
the Refutatio, few scriptural references are used when laying out the positions of Callistus 
et al. In Contra Noetum, however, the work is structured around biblical quotations, 
monarchian interpretation of those verses, and then a rebuttal of their interpretation. 
                                                 
69 Mansfeld notes, however, that he finds Frickel’s argument that they are by the same author 
mostly convincing. See Jaap Mansfeld, Heresiography in Context: Hippolytus’ Elenchos as a Source for 
Greek Philosophy, Philosophia Antiqua 56 (Leiden: Brill, 1992), 317. 
70 Ronald E. Heine, “The Christology of Callistus,” Journal of Theological Studies 49 (1998): 78. 
Heine argues that Contra Noetum bears witness to an earlier form of Monarchianism wherein patripassian 
assertions were not viewed as problematic. The Refutatio, on the other hand, shows a more developed form 
of Monarchianism that sought to distance itself from the difficult patripassian claims of earlier forms of 
Monarchianism. If Mouraviev is correct, the development of Monarchian teaching is even visible in the 
different reports on Noetian teaching in the Refutatio. See Serge N. Mouraviev, “Hippolyte, Héraclite et 
Noët (Commentaire d’Hippolyte, Refut. omn. haer. IX 8 - 10),” in Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen 





Hippolytus: Contra Noetum 
Introduction 
 As the summary of disparate positions regarding the works of Hippolytus above 
demonstrates, scholars are divided regarding the date of Contra Noetum. Despite the 
difficulties of dating the work, determinations about its date remain quite important. 
Nearly all scholars agree that there is a relationship of dependence between Contra 
Noetum and Tertullian’s Adversus Praxean.71 Narrowing the date of Contra Noetum 
helps us determine the directionality of that dependence. Furthermore, an accurate dating 
of the work allows us to make determinations about any developments within monarchian 
theology. Even with the uncertainty about dating, Contra Noetum contains snippets of 
simple and early monarchian teachings that help lay bare some of the core monarchian 
commitments. 
 Nautin and Brent both take Contra Noetum to be a genuine work of Hippolytus, 
and both place its composition after the Refutatio. In Brent’s scheme, the date of the work 
is sometime after 225 C.E.72 Frickel disagreed with the conclusions of Nautin and 
                                                 
71 One of the main reasons scholars think that there is some sort of dependence between the two 
works is that they both deploy a similar understanding of “economy” against the monarchians. I detail the 
theories about dependence in the following discussion. One notable exception to this is Michael Decker, 
who thinks that the two works were composed independently. See his “Die Monarchianer: Frühchristliche 
Theologie im Spannungsfeld zwischen Rom und Kleinasien” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Hamburg, 
1987), 49. 
72 See Nautin, Hippolyte et Josipe, 85–6; Brent, Hippolytus and the Roman Church in the Third 
Century, 529. Brent is fully aware that his proposal contradicts the positions of the Italian school. He 
directly engages Simonetti in this section, stating, “We shall argue therefore that though Tertullian is 
dependent upon the theology of El., C.N. is in fact dependent upon Tertullian. We shall show that where 
Simonetti claims Tertullian develops, it is in fact C.N. which shortens and omits in order to depersonalize 
the pre-existent λόγος and thus forge a rapprochement with Monarchianism, which would have regarded a 





proposed that Contra Noetum preceded the Refutatio.73 Specifically, he dated Contra 
Noetum before 217 and the Refutatio around 235.74 Later, he changed his position and 
argued that Contra Noetum had undergone substantial redaction.75 Simonetti has 
forcefully and repeatedly rejected the claims of Nautin and Brent that Contra Noetum is 
later than the Refutatio.76 He contends that Contra Noetum was written in the late second 
century or early third and that it antedates Tertullian’s Adversus Praxean.77 On the whole, 
I find Simonetti’s arguments regarding the early dating of Contra Noetum to be more 
compelling than those that argue it was composed after the Refutatio.78 The argument for 
                                                 
73 Frickel, Das Dunkel um Hippolyt von Rom, 204–10. For an explicit rejection of Nautin’s 
proposal, see 208, n. 628. 
74 Ibid., 299. 
75 Frickel, “Hippolyts Schrift Contra Noetum: Ein Pseudo-Hippolyt.” 
76 See especially Simonetti, “Una nuova proposta su Ippolito,” 29–31. Here Simonetti explicitly 
engages with Brent’s work and rejects his conclusions. Although Simonetti rejects many of the details of 
Brent’s argument, he is not fundamentally opposed to Brent’s core thesis that there was a Hippolytan 
school. For a protracted discussion of the relationship between Contra Noetum and Adversus Praxean, see 
Manlio Simonetti, “Due note su Ippolito: Ippolito interprete di Genesi 49; Ippolito e Tertulliano,” in 
Ricerche su Ippolito, Studia ephemeridis Augustinianum 13 (Rome: Institutum patristicum Augustinianum, 
1977), 121–36. 
77 Simonetti, “Due note su Ippolito,” 136. 
78 Although the subject is beyond the scope of this current section, many scholars have observed 
that the Pneumatology in Contra Noetum seems to be rather developed if the document is from the early 
third century. Despite the rigorous debate, no consensus has been reached. Nautin thinks the Pneumatology 
is intelligible coming from Hippolytus and does not see the need to posit later interpolations (Hippolyte et 
Josipe, 36–47). Richard disagreed with Nautin and thought that the Holy Spirit passages were perhaps an 
indication that the entire work was later. See, for example, Richard, “Sainte Hippolyte, ‘Hippolyte et 
Josipe’: Bulletin de Patrologie,” 298. Reinhard Hübner accepted Richard’s theory and viewed Contra 
Noetum as a product of the fourth century and as completely unreliable for the reconstruction of Noetus’ 
thought. See two of his discussions: Der Paradox Eine, viii; “Die antignostische Glaubensregel des Noët 
von Smyrna,” in Der Paradox Eine, 39. Although Hübner thinks that Contra Noetum is a late work, he 
repeatedly claims that Noetus himself was an early figure and that Ignatius, Irenaeus, Melito, and others 
drew on this theology. I will discuss his theory in more detail in my section on the Refutatio, but suffice it 
to say that I find it unconvincing. Note also Mark Edwards’ negative appraisal of Hübner’s main thesis: M. 
J. Edwards, “Review of Der Paradox Eine: Antignostischer Monarchianismus im Zweiten Jahrhundert,” 
Journal of Theological Studies 52, no. 1 (2001): 354–56. In his earlier works, Frickel did not think that 
these pneumatological passages were later interpolations and noted that such Trinitarian formulations can 





an early dating of Contra Noetum is further strengthened by Heine’s contention that the 
straightforward patripassianism of Contra Noetum represents an earlier strain of Asian 
monarchianism.79 Thus, I will proceed from the assumption that Contra Noetum is the 
earliest extant witness that we possess to monarchian teachings. Furthermore, this 
conclusion leads me to consider Tertullian’s Adversus Praxean to have been at least 
partially dependent upon Contra Noetum. 
Textual Analysis 
 Contra Noetum begins with a condensed representation of the most troublesome 
aspects of the Noetians’ teaching and offers some limited biographical background about 
Noetus. We learn that he was from Smyrna and that he lived not long before the author of 
Contra Noetum.80 Next we are informed that Noetus had friction with “the elders” and 
was eventually condemned.81 If we can trust Hippolytus’ account, Noetus opened his own 
                                                 
79 Heine, “The Christology of Callistus,” 89. Note also Mouraviev’s discussion of the possible 
development of Noetus’ teaching by his successors: Serge N. Mouraviev, “Hippolyte, Héraclite et Noët 
(Commentaire d’Hippolyte, Refut. omn. haer. IX 8 - 10),” in Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt, 
vol. 2.36.6, 1992, 4375–4402. Especially helpful are his two charts that map out the main areas of 
development within Noetian theology on pp. 4385-6. 
80 Contra Noetum 1.1. Unless otherwise noted, the Greek for Contra Noetum is taken from 
Butterworth’s edition. Because the section numbers are the most specific reference, I will not include the 
page number from Butterworth. 
81 Contra Noetum 1.4; 1.6-7. It seems as though Noetus had multiple run-ins with the elders. In 
1.3, Hippolytus mentions one condemnation and in 1.6 speaks of Noetus being called in again by the elders. 
Hippolytus’ tone in this section is far from friendly, and it is possible that this account is unreliable. 
However, such actions by presbyteroi fall in line with what we see in Origen’s Dialogue with Heraclides 
and the episode with Beryllus in Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History 6.33. Scholars who argue that Contra 
Noetum post-dated the Refutatio often fixate on these details about the condemnation of Noetus. They 
claim that if the author of the Refutatio had known these details, he would have included them. The absence 
of the condemnation in the Refutatio signals to them that Contra Noetum had not yet been written. For a 





didaskaleion in response to the condemnation of the elders.82 Hippolytus gives us further 
information about Noetus’ teaching and the response of the elders to him, but Noetus 
himself does not appear to be Hippolytus’ main target.83 Hippolytus’ invective is directed 
against the disciples of Noetus.84 When he provides the details of the teaching he is 
opposing, he presents it not as the teaching of Noetus but as the teaching of his 
disciples.85 Noetus is the villainized heresiarch who quickly fades into the background as 
Hippolytus addresses the teachings of his disciples, who were most likely the 
contemporaries of Hippolytus. 
One God 
 After this introduction, Hippolytus begins his exposé of the Noetians’ teaching 
before rebutting it point-by-point. From the outset it becomes clear that the Noetian 
teaching was firmly rooted in scriptural exegesis.86 The first texts presented are all 
adduced by the Noetians in order to support their foundational claim that there is only 
                                                 
82 Contra Noetum 1.8. 
83 Hippolytus gives us a digest of his teaching in 1.2: “He said that Christ himself was the Father, 
and that the Father himself had been born and had suffered and had died.” (trans. Butterworth, 42 with my 
modifications). Both Hippolytus’ digest of Noetus’ teachings and the response of the elders to Noetus are 
important for reconstructing the positions of the Noetians. I will offer a fuller treatment of them as I 
develop the major themes of the Noetian teaching. 
84 Contra Noetum 1.1: Ἕτεροὶ τινες... τινος Νοητοῦ μαθηταί.  
85 Contra Noetum 2.1. οἳ καὶ δεῖξαι βούλονται σύστασιν τῷ δόγματι λέγοντες… The οἳ here is 
referring to the Ἕτεροὶ τινες... τινος Νοητοῦ μαθηταί with which the work opens. 
86 This will be important to note in our later discussion of the Refutatio, which expurgates almost 
all scriptural references when it reports on the teachings of key monarchians. As I observe in my later 
discussions of the Refutatio, scholars have recognized that this was a result of the polemical tendency of the 
author. Decker argues that the scriptural quotations were not actually used by the Noetians and that they 
were inserted by Hippolytus to be fodder for his exegetical rebuttal. Decker, “Die Monarchianer,” 156–7. 
Given the prominence of biblical exegesis in every account of monarchianism except the Refutatio, 





one God. As the analysis continues, it will become clear that theirs was a particularly 
rigid interpretation of the claim that there is only one God.87  
Hippolytus’ account has them combining Gen. 46:3 (or Ex. 3:6) with Ex. 20:3 to 
affirm that there is only one God: Ἐγὼ εἰμὶ ὁ Θεὸς τῶν πατέρων ὑμῶν· οὐκ ἔσονται ὑμῖν 
θεοὶ ἕτεροι πλὴν ἐμοῦ.88 These two conjoined texts precede a rough paraphrase of Isa. 
44:6: Ἐγώ, φησίν, πρῶτος καὶ ἐγὼ ἔσχατος καὶ μετ’ ἐμὲ οὔκ ἐστιν οὐδείς.89 Immediately 
following his presentation of these Noetian prooftexts, Hippolytus states that “this is the 
way they are claiming to establish a single God” (οὕτω φάσκουσιν συνιστᾶν ἕνα Θεόν).90 
Given the centrality of this claim to their teaching, the Noetians almost certainly had 
more proof texts in their dossier to prove that there is only one God. Nevertheless, 
Hippolytus reproduces enough of their argument to make it clear that their first step was 
to argue that there is only one God and that passages from the Old Testament were 
critical pieces of their exegetical argument.91 
The Noetian fixation on the claim that there is only one God is evidenced in 
numerous other places in Contra Noetum. It is clear that the Noetians accused Hippolytus 
(and probably the elders also) of being ditheists. Hippolytus twice clarifies his own 
                                                 
87 Remember that this rigid interpretation of the uniqueness of God is what I take to be the 
common denominator of the different expressions of monarchianism and some forms of psilanthropism. 
Although they diverge about the best way to protect monotheism, the impulse to preserve a strong form of 
it motivated each of their theologies. 
88 Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 2.1. These quotations are nearly verbatim from the LXX. In the 
LXX of both of the verses, the second person pronouns are singular. Butterworth identifies the first 
quotation as Ex. 3:6, but it is actually closer to Gen. 46:3. 
89 Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 2.2. Again, this is not an exact quotation of the LXX. 
90 Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 2.3. (trans. Butterworth, 44). 
91 Mouraviev also identifies the assertion that there is only one God as the first postulate of the 





claims in order to state that he does not teach that there are two Gods.92 The response of 
the elders to Noetus in the introduction is particularly telling in this regard. They state, 
“We too have knowledge of a single God – in the true way” (Καὶ ἡμεῖς ἕνα Θεὸν οἴδαμεν 
ἀληθῶς.).93 It was necessary for them to restate that they believed in one God precisely 
because Noetus and his followers accused them of being ditheists.  
The centrality of the Noetians’ concern with the oneness of God is again on 
display as Hippolytus begins his demonstration of the truth. He starts as follows, “There 
is one God, and we acquire knowledge of him from no other source, brethren, than the 
Holy Scriptures.”94 Hippolytus’ choice to start his demonstration of truth this way is 
indicative of two prominent features of his conflict with the Noetians: (1) it focused on 
the proper understanding of monotheism, and (2) the conflict was thoroughly 
exegetical.95 This emphasis on the proper understanding of monotheism is further borne 
out by the way in which Hippolytus refutes the Noetian claims before his demonstration 
of truth: “After all, would not everyone say that there is a single God? – but it is not 
everyone who would scrap the economy.”96 For Hippolytus, the question is not whether 
                                                 
92 Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 11.1, 14.2-3. That the monarchians charged their opponents with 
being ditheists is well attested in the extant literature. I will highlight occurrences of this charge in the 
discussions of the other primary sources. The charge appears twice in the Refutatio. 
93 Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 1.7 (trans. Butterworth, 44). 
94 Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 9.1 (trans. Butterworth, 66): εἷς Θεός, ὃν οὐκ ἄλλοθεν 
ἐπιγινώσκομεν, ἀδελφοί, ἢ τῶν ἁγίων γραφῶν. 
95 Again, contra Decker’s thesis, Hippolytus’ conflict with the Noetians was thoroughly 
exegetical. He complains numerous times about the bad exegetical practices of his opponents. See Contra 
Noetum 2.4, 3.1, 4.2, 9.3. 
96 Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 3.4 (trans. Butterworth, 48): τίς γὰρ οὐκ ἐρεῖ ἕνα Θεὸν εἶναι; ἀλλ’ 
οὐ τὴν οἰκονομίαν ἀναιρήσει. Hippolytus’ use of economy is quite important, and I will discuss it later. 
Note also that economy is an important term in Tertullian’s Adversus Praxean, and the role of the term in 
both Contra Noetum and Adversus Praxean is one of the primary reasons that scholars think there is a 





there is one God; everyone believes this. The question is how to interpret the statement 
that there is only one God. Hippolytus follows his commitment to monotheism by 
outlining his exegetical task against the Noetians: “So really, in view of all of this, the 
first of our two tasks must be to refute our opponents' understanding of the passages 
quoted, and to show what they mean in the light of the truth.”97 Again, the dual emphasis 
on monotheism and scriptural exegesis shows that both Hippolytus and the Noetians saw 
the question of monotheism as one best resolved through scriptural exegesis.98 
Visible 
 From this bedrock assertion that there is only one God, the Noetians moved to 
address passages wherein God is said to have been visible to humans. Oddly absent from 
the texts they marshal in support of their argument are loci classici such as the episode of 
the burning bush (Ex. 3) or the Sinai theophany (Ex. 19:16-25). It is not surprising that 
the next step of the Noetians’ argument was to address the visibility of God. By the late 
second century, it was an exegetical commonplace to identify the one manifest in the 
                                                 
97 Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 3.5 (trans. Butterworth, 48): ὄντως μὲν οὖν τὰ κεφάλαια διὰ ταῦτα 
πρότερον δεῖ ἀνατραπῆναι κατὰ τὸν ἐκείνων νοῦν· κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν δειχθῆναι. This passage 
particularly tells against Decker’s claim that the Noetian exegesis is the invention of Hippolytus. If 
Hippolytus did invent the exegesis, this passage shows how far he was willing to extend his ruse. 
98 It is very interesting to note that Hippolytus links the exegetical tendencies of the Noetians with 
those of Theodotus. He states, “And in this way they themselves, too, wish to explain these individual 
verses – using them in the way that Theodotus spoke in his attempt to establish that [Christ] was a mere 
man” (Contra Noetum 3.1 [trans. Butterworth, 48]). Therefore, it is very likely that psilanthropism and 
monarchianism were both responses to the same problem. Unfortunately, we do not have access to texts 
that preserve the exegetical proclivities of Theodotus and other second-century psilanthropists. Access to 
Theodotus’ exegesis of these passages could help us fill in details about the distinct ways these exegetes 
sought to defend monotheism. Hippolytus and Eusebius both accuse Theodotus of teaching the same thing: 





theophanies as the Logos.99 This interpretation of the theophanies was driven by an 
attempt both to affirm the invisibility of God the Father (cf. Ex. 33:20) and to maintain 
that God did appear in the theophanies. The argument that it was the divine Logos who 
was seen in these manifestations allowed interpreters to uphold both claims. Justin 
Martyr is an early and strong example of this exegetical trend.100 Because the Noetians 
had a strong reaction against anything they deemed to contradict a rigorous understanding 
of the uniqueness of God, this exegetical avenue was unpalatable. 
 Rejecting the prevailing interpretation of the OT theophanies, the Noetians argued 
that it was the one God who became visible in history. As noted earlier, Hippolytus’ 
account has the Noetians sustaining their argument without reference to the classic OT 
theophanies. Perhaps they avoided these passages because they were precisely the ones 
used by those who argued that the Logos was present in the theophanies.101 The first 
passage the Noetians use to argue about the visibility of God is Baruch 3:36-8.102 They 
appear to have chosen this passage because it begins with an affirmation of the 
incomparability of God (a statement of God’s uniqueness) before proceeding to speak of 
God becoming visible to humans. In the Noetian exegesis, we have here a clear example 
                                                 
99 See Bogdan G. Bucur’s recent article on the importance of the interpretation of theophanies in 
the second century: “Justin Martyr’s Exegesis of Biblical Theophanies and the Parting of the Ways between 
Christianity and Judaism,” Theological Studies 75, no. 1 (2014): 34–91. 
100 See especially Justin Martyr, I Apology 63. 
101 Again, see Justin, I Apology 63, where he uses Ex. 3:6 as a major example. 
102 On the use of Baruch 3:36, see Elena Cavalcanti, “Osservazioni sull’uso patristico di Baruch 3, 
36-38,” in Mémorial Dom Jean Gribomont (1920-1986), Studia ephemeridis Augustinianum 27 (Roma: 
Institutum Patristicum “Augustinianum,” 1988), 145–65; Reinhard M Hübner, “Der antivalentinianische 
Charakter der Theologie des Noët von Smyrna,” in Der Paradox Eine, 117–9; idem, “Εἷς θεὸς Ἰησοῦς 
Χριστός,” in Der Paradox Eine, 228–9. Cavalcanti is more concerned with later use of this verse but still 





of the one God becoming visible in human history. Hippolytus records Noetus as 
interpreting this passage as follows: “So you see… that this is the God who is one alone, 
and who subsequently was seen and conversed with men.”103 
 Following the exposition of Baruch 3:36-38, Hippolytus presents Noetian 
interpretation of Isa. 45:14-5. This passage seems to have been chosen by the Noetians 
for the same reasons as the passage from Baruch. Like the Baruch passage, this passage 
contains an affirmation of the oneness of God (ἐροῦσιν Οὐκ ἔστιν θεὸς πλὴν σοῦ) and the 
presence and manifestation of God among humans (ὅτι ἐν σοὶ ὁ θεός ἐστιν). Hippolytus 
again gives Noetus’ interpretation of the passage: “the scriptures proclaim one God—the 
one who is visibly revealed.”104 
 The Noetian combination of affirmations about the oneness of God with 
affirmations about the same God’s visibility is no mistake. In the late second century, OT 
theophanies were often interpreted as an example of the place of the Logos alongside the 
Father, even if the specifics of the divinity of the Logos and the relationship of the Logos 
to the Father had not yet been worked out with the precision that would come in later 
centuries. By addressing together God’s oneness and visibility, the Noetians were 
offering an alternative exegesis to the dominant one which saw the Logos in the 
theophanies. 
From these two exegetical movements, the main thrust of the Noetian argument 
becomes exceedingly clear. According to Hippolytus, their central claim is, without a 
                                                 
103 Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 2.5. (trans. Butterworth, 46): Ὁρᾷς οὖν, φησίν, ὅτι οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ 
θεὸς ὁ μόνος ὦν καὶ ὕστερον ὀφθεὶς καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις συνανεστραφείς. 
104 Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 2.6. (trans. Butterworth, 46): ἕνα θεὸν κηρύσσουσιν αἱ γραφαί, 





doubt, that there is only one God. Furthermore, their linkage of this affirmation to 
assertions about the visibility of God demonstrates that they considered exegesis that saw 
the Logos in the theophanies as a direct contradiction of the assertion of the oneness of 
God. Thus, in the Noetian exegesis presented by Hippolytus, the Noetians offer the sine 
qua non of their theology: the oneness of God. They follow this claim by offering 
exegesis of passages dealing with the visibility of God, for it is the frequent exegesis of 
these passages that they deem to be a critical threat to the oneness of God. Hippolytus 
records other passages that the Noetians used to support their arguments, but these 
passages are largely used to work out the implications of the particularly rigorous 
understanding of the oneness of God to which the Noetians adhered. I address exegesis of 
these passages in the following thematic analysis of Noetian teaching. 
Both Father and Son 
 The next salient characteristic of the Noetian system is the stark identification of 
the Father and the Son. This assertion appears repeatedly in the first few chapters of 
Contra Noetum. Hippolytus reports that the Noetians retorted to questions about 
maintaining one God as follows, “If, therefore, I confess Christ as God, then he himself is 
the Father, if in fact he is God. But Christ himself, being God, suffered. Therefore, did 
not the Father suffer? For he himself was the Father.”105 I will address the 
patripassianism of this passage later; but for now, there are several other interesting 
features to consider.  
                                                 
105 Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 2.3. Translation mine. Εἰ οὖν Χριστὸν ὁμολογῶ Θεόν, αὐτὸς ἄρα 
ἐστὶν ὁ Πατήρ, εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ὁ Θεός. ἔπαθεν δὲ Χριστὸς αὐτὸς ὢν Θεός. ἆρα οὖν ἔπαθεν Πατήρ; <Πατὴρ> 





The first notable thing about this statement is the tag on the end of the first 
sentence: “if in fact he is God at all.”106 If this statement actually comes from the 
Noetians, it lends support to the hypothesis that monarchianism and psilanthropism were 
closely related. This quip implies that one way to deal with the trouble of maintaining 
monotheism is to deny the divinity of Christ. This is not the path the Noetians chose, but 
they seem to have been aware of it as a live option. 
The psilanthropists did not need to identify the Father and the Son because they 
felt no compulsion to maintain the divinity of the Son. The Noetians, on the other hand, 
accepted the divinity of Christ as a fundamental premise (“But Christ himself, being 
God”). Their acceptance of Christ’s divinity then fed into their logic of monotheism: if 
Christ is God and the Father is God, then Christ must be the Father.107 Hippolytus then 
gives us another Noetian excerpt: “You see, brethren, how rash and reckless a doctrine 
they introduced in saying quite shamelessly, ‘The Father is himself Christ; he is himself 
the Son; he himself was born, he himself suffered, he himself raised himself up!’”108 This 
is another straightforward statement that the Father and the Son are the same. 
                                                 
106 It is difficult to tell if this is an actual quotation or if this is merely Hippolytus’ reproduction of 
their position. If this is not an actual quotation, we must be wary of any less-than-generous additions 
Hippolytus might have made. 
107 Note that this is precisely what Evans is getting at in his discussion of the logic at work in 
monarchianism (“Introduction,” 8). 
108 Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 3.2 (trans. Butterworth, 48): ὁρᾶτε, ἀδελφοί, πῶς προαλὲς καὶ 
τολμηρὸν δόγμα παρεισήνεγκαν ἀναισχύντως λέγοντες, Αὐτός ἐστι Χριστὸς ὁ Πατήρ, αὐτὸς Υἱός, αὐτὸς 
ἐγεννήθη, αὐτὸς ἔπαθεν, αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἤγειρεν. Note the importance the pronoun αὐτός has in these 
statements. This use of the pronoun features prominently in all of the extant accounts of monarchianism. 
Butterworth is not always consistent with his translations of αὐτός. Sometimes he translates it as “in 
person.” I prefer in these cases to translate it as “himself” because I think it captures the thrust of the 
monarchian doctrine a bit better. The use of αὐτός here could also be translated as “the same,” which I still 
prefer to Butterworth’s translation. Where Butterworth uses “in person” or something similar, I have tried 
to modify the translation to reflect this preference. Also worth noting is the seeming redundancy in this 
statement: “The Father is himself Christ; he is himself the Son.” While we could have here nothing more 
than repetition, it could also reflect a technical usage of the terms Christ and Son. Note here Heine and 





Although it seems as though the Noetians could have arrived at this identification 
of the Father and Son purely by means of the logic of the restrictive understanding of the 
oneness of God, they nonetheless bolstered their claim by means of scriptural exegesis, as 
we should expect by now. In order to do so, the Noetians appear to have used the two 
passages that recur in later stages of the monarchian controversy: Jn 10:30 and Jn. 14:8-
10. Hippolytus does not give us direct quotations from the Noetians regarding these 
passages, but he presents the use of them somewhat hypothetically (ἐὰν δὲ λέγῃ). 
Hippolytus writes, “And if he were to say, ‘He himself said: “I and the Father are one”’ 
(Jn 10, 30), let him apply his mind to the matter and learn that he did not say, ‘I and the 
Father am one’, but ‘are one’. ‘We are’ is not said with reference to the one, but with 
reference to the two. He revealed two persons, but a single power.”109 
The Noetians supplemented their exegesis of John 10:30 with exegesis of John 
14:8-10. Hippolytus writes,  
But supposing they were to try also to quote the fact that Philip asked about the 
Father: ‘Show us the Father and we shall be satisfied’ (Jn 14, 8); and the Lord 
answered him with the words: ‘Have I been with you so long, Philip, and yet you 
do not know me? He who has seen me has seen the Father. Do you not believe 
that I am in the Father and the Father is in me?’ (Jn 14, 9-10) – and they want to 
                                                 
“The Christology of Callistus,” 71; Friedrich Loofs, Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmengeschichte, 4th ed. 
[Halle: M. Niemeyer, 1906], 188). If this usage is in play here, we could be seeing the monarchians’ way of 
identifying the Father with the incorporeal, heavenly Son of their opponents as well as with the incarnate 
Son. The repetition of αὐτός could also be a subtle reaction against the use of ἕτερος to describe the Son, as 
in Justin. 
109 Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 7.1 (trans. Butterworth, 60): ἐὰν δὲ λέγῃ, Αὐτὸς εἶπεν, Ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ 
Πατὴρ ἐν ἐσμέν, ἐπιστανέτω τὸν νοῦν καὶ μανθανέτω ὅτι οὐκ εἶπεν ὅτι ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ Πατὴρ ἐν εἰμί, ἀλλ’ ἓν 
ἐσμέν. τὸ γὰρ ἐσμὲν οὐκ ἐφ’ ἑνὸς λέγεται, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ δύο· <δύο> πρόσωπα ἔδειξεν, δύναμιν δὲ μίαν. Note 
that Hippolytus’ distinction between “am” and “are” here is a clear example of the anti-monarchian 
exegesis of these passages that Mark DelCogliano has highlighted. See his “The Interpretation of John 
10:30 in the Third Century: Antimonarchian Polemics and the Rise of Grammatical Reading Techniques,” 





say that thereby their doctrine prevails, since [Christ] maintains that he himself is 
the Father.110 
 
Although Hippolytus does not provide us with any of the specifics of their exegesis of 
this passage, it is easy to see how it fit within their theological framework. This passage 
addresses the visibility of God; and because they used it to identify the Father and Son, it 
would have supported their contention that they believed in the one God who was visibly 
revealed.111 As the monarchian controversy developed through the third century, John 
10:30 and John 14:8-10 became centerpieces of their exegetical argument. While the 
Noetians appear to have used them before the time of Hippolytus, they seem not to have 
had yet the central role in the argument. Later authors, like Tertullian and Novatian, note 
that these two passages from the Gospel of John were fundamental for the monarchians. 
Suffered and Died 
 The Noetians moved from their identification of the Father and the Son to what 
was for them the logical consequence of that identification: the attribution of suffering to 
the Father. If Hippolytus’ fixation on this claim is an accurate indicator, this last phase of 
the Noetian system was quite irksome for him. He highlights this aspect of their teaching 
in the opening lines of the text: “[Noetus] said that Christ was the Father himself, and that 
the Father himself had been born and had suffered and died.”112  
                                                 
110 Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 7.4 (trans. Butterworth, 62): εἰ δὲ καὶ Φίλιππον ἐπερωτᾶν περὶ 
Πατρὸς βούλοιντο λέγειν—Δεῖξον ἡμῖν τὸν Πατέρα καὶ ἀρκεῖ ἡμῖν· πρὸς ὃν ἀπεκρίθη ὁ Κύριος λέγων, 
Τοσοῦτον χρόνον μεθ’ ὑμῶν εἰμι, Φίλιππε, καὶ οὐκ ἔγνωκάς με; ὁ ἑωρακὼς ἐμὲ ἑώρακε τὸν Πατέρα· οὐ 
πιστεύεις ὅτι ἐγὼ ἐν τῷ Πατρὶ καὶ ὁ Πατὴρ ἐν ἐμοί ἐστιν; —καὶ θέλουσιν λέγειν διὰ τούτου κρατύνεσθαι τὸ 
δόγμα αὐτῶν, ὁμολογοῦντος αὐτοῦ ἑαυτὸν Πατέρα. 
111 Remember that they spoke of the one God who was visibly revealed in Contra Noetum 2.6. 
112 Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 1.2 (trans. Butterworth, 42 with modifications): ἔφη τὸν Χριστὸν 





 The same theme is restated a little later, with the Noetians reasoning, “But Christ 
himself, being God, suffered. Therefore, did not the Father suffer? For he himself was the 
Father.”113 Unlike the earlier passage, the logical flow of the Noetian argument is explicit 
here. Because the Noetians held that the Father and Son were the same, they attributed to 
the Father everything that was ascribed to the Son, including suffering. The Noetians’ 
sense of the logical necessity of their patripassian claim is again highlighted a bit later. 
Hippolytus has his opponent stating the following, “‘I am bound’, says he, ‘since the 
existence of a single one is maintained to submit this very one to suffering.’”114 
 Hippolytus repeatedly focuses on the same claims of the Noetians, and his short 
digests of their teaching punctuate the sections where he details their exegesis in depth. 
He produces one more example of the Noetian claim before demonstrating how they are 
in error: “You see, brethren, how rash and reckless a doctrine they introduced in saying 
quite shamelessly, ‘The Father is himself Christ; he is himself the Son; he himself was 
born, he himself suffered, he himself raised himself up!’”115 This passage shows that the 
Noetians extended their logic beyond suffering when attributing the Son’s experiences to 
the Father. They seem to have applied their logic to all aspects of the life of Christ. 
                                                 
digest of the Noetian teaching, Hippolytus does not mention their repeated assertions that they believed in 
only one God. Perhaps he does not mention it here because the Noetian claim that they believed in only one 
God was not problematic on the surface. After all, Hippolytus himself began his demonstration of the truth 
with the same claim. 
113 Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 2.3 (trans. mine): ἔπαθεν δὲ Χριστὸς αὐτὸς ὢν Θεός. ἆρα οὖν 
ἔπαθεν Πατήρ; <Πατὴρ> γὰρ αὐτὸς ἦν. 
114 Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 2.7 (trans. Butterworth, 46): Τούτων οὕτως μαρτυρουμένων 
ἀνάγκην, φησίν, ἔχω, ἑνὸς ὁμολογουμένου, τοῦτον ὑπὸ πάθος φέρειν. 
115 Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 3.2 (trans. Butterworth, 48): ὁρᾶτε, ἀδελφοί, πῶς προαλὲς καὶ 
τολμηρὸν δόγμα παρεισήνεγκαν ἀναισχύντως λέγοντες, Αὐτός ἐστι Χριστὸς ὁ Πατήρ, αὐτὸς Υἱός, αὐτὸς 





Immediately preceding his demonstration of the truth, Hippolytus offers a final refutation 
of the Noetians’ position, saying, “There is one God, in whom we must believe; but he 
does not become, cannot suffer, cannot die.”116 
 In Hippolytus’ treatment, the Noetians never use scripture to support their claims 
that the Father suffered. Hippolytus examines and refutes the exegetical underpinnings of 
all of the other Noetian claims, so it is probable that the Noetians made their assertions 
about the Father suffering without additional scriptural exegesis. This approach would be 
in line with the logical sequence in which the Noetians argued for the suffering of the 
Father: if the Father and the Son are the same, and the Son suffered, then the Father must 
have suffered. Thus is confurmed Heine’s conclusion that the patripassian thesis of the 
Noetians was a logical conclusion to an exegetical argument.117 
Conclusion 
 Despite being a short treatise, Contra Noetum gives us a clear window into the 
teachings of the Noetians. Furthermore, this treatise might be the earliest in-depth 
attestation we have to any monarchian teaching. The following are the salient points of 
the Noetian system according to Contra Noetum. (1) The Noetian teaching, with the 
exception of the patripassian thesis, was heavily based in scriptural exegesis.118 (2) Their 
                                                 
116 Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 8.3 (trans. Butterworth, 64): εἷς γὰρ Θεός ἐστιν, ᾧ δεῖ πιστεύειν, 
ἀλλ’ ἀγένητος ἀπαθὴς ἀθάνατος. 
117 Heine, “The Christology of Callistus,” 83: “The monarchian thesis, in which the Noetians 
included Christ, is derived from their reading of Scripture, but the patripassianist thesis is supported solely 
by logic based on the monarchian thesis.” 
118 Again, Decker’s claims that the scriptural references are interpolations seem implausible. See 





strict interpretation of the claim that there is only one God underwrote the rest of their 
theological system. (3) Their repeated contention that the one God was visible seems to 
have arisen as a response to interpretations that saw the Logos in the Old Testament 
theophanies. (4) The Noetians identified the Father and the Son, and they most likely 
used key passages from the Gospel of John to sustain this identification. (5) The 
patripassian thesis of the Noetians was the one aspect of their system that was not 
supported by exegesis. It appears to have been a logical conclusion drawn from the 
earlier exegetical premises. 
Tertullian: Adversus Praxean 
Introduction 
 Tertullian’s Adversus Praxean is one of the most important extant treatises for 
reconstructing the positions of the monarchians in the early third century. Although this 
work gives us valuable information about monarchian teaching, it still leaves many 
historical and biographical questions unanswered. It addresses the teachings of Praxeas, a 
character shrouded in mystery, but it tells us little about the origins of monarchianism. 
Despite all of the questions that Adversus Praxean leaves unanswered, scholars are 
relatively confident about dating the text to ca. 213 C.E.119 Tertullian’s emphasis on the 
                                                 
119 See Evans’ discussion of external evidence for this dating (“Introduction,” 18). See also René 
Braun’s suggestion that it was written in 213 or shortly after. Braun also gives a short summary of dating 
proposals by major scholars (Deus Christianorum: Recherches sur le vocabulaire doctrinal de Tertullien, 
2nd ed., Collection des études augustiniennes 70 [Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1977], 576). Timothy 
David Barnes dates the text a bit earlier—to 210/11 (Tertullian: A Historical and Literary Study [Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1985], 55). Andrew McGowan notes that the work certainly comes from Tertullian’s 
Montanist period and places it sometime in the second decade of the third century (“Tertullian and the 





Paraclete and prophecy throughout the text lets us confidently place it during the 
beginning of his Montanist phase.120 Tertullian directs his ire against Praxeas because “he 
drove out prophecy and introduced heresy: he put to flight the Paraclete and crucified the 
Father.”121 
 Although there is relative certainty about the dating of the text to the earliest years 
of Tertullian’s Montanist phase, there are many basic questions that the text leaves 
unanswered. Chief among these is the question of the exact identity of Praxeas, for whom 
we have no further attestation beyond Adversus Praxean and works that seem to be 
dependent on it.122 Tertullian gives us two major pieces of data about Praxeas, neither of 
which does much to help us identify him with any precision. First, Tertullian recounts 
that Praxeas journeyed from Asia to Rome.123 Given the paucity of other details about 
Praxeas’ life, his Asian origin does little to help us identify him.124 Tertullian next 
                                                 
120 For the role of Tertullian’s Montanism in his articulation of the Trinity against the 
monarchians, see McGowan, “Tertullian and the ‘Heretical’ Origins of the ‘Orthodox’ Trinity.” 
121 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 1.5 (trans. Evans, 131): prophetiam expulit et haeresin intulit, 
Paracletum fugauit et Patrem crucifixit. Unless otherwise noted, all Latin of Adversus Praxean is from 
Tertullian, Tertulliani Opera: Pars II, ed. A Kroymann and Ernest Evans, Corpus Christianorum, Series 
Latina 2 (Turnholt: Brepols, 1954). 
122 Praxeas is mentioned in Ps. Tertullian, Adversus omnium haereses 8.4. We know very little 
about the author of this text, although scholars have noted that it has some interesting similarities with the 
Refutatio ascribed to Hippolytus. See William Tabbernee, Fake Prophecy and Polluted Sacraments: 
Ecclesiastical and Imperial Reactions to Montanism, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 84 (Leiden: Brill, 
2007), 78–9. The work itself does not add anything to our knowledge of Praxeas, so I will not treat it 
further. 
123 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 1.4. 
124 This geographical information, however, is useful for trying to reconstruct different streams or 
schools of monarchianism. See, for example, Heine’s discussion of Roman and Asian schools of 
monarchianism discussed above (“The Christology of Callistus,” 78-89). Decker especially focuses on the 
fact that both Noetus and Praxeas are said to have come from Asia. He concludes, unconvincingly, that 
theologians from Asia Minor focused on the action of the one God in history, while theologians from the 
West were focused about differentiation between God and creatures and differentiation within the 
Godhead. See especially his “Die Monarchianer,” 203–5. Such sweeping assertions about differences 
between East and West with regard to Trinitarian theology were accepted when Decker wrote his 





complains that Praxeas somehow gained the ear of the bishop of Rome and convinced 
him to reject Montanist teachings.125 Tertullian’s statements give the impression that 
Montanism had gained a favorable hearing in at least some sectors of the church in Rome 
and that the hierarchy of the church there had not formally rejected it.126 
 Even with the scarcity of biographical information about Praxeas, scholars have 
ventured a number of theories about his identity and activity. Hermann Hagemann argued 
that Praxeas was a pseudonym for Callistus.127 Others have argued that Praxeas was not a 
pseudonym. Bardy thought that the identification of Praxeas with Callistus faced “too 
many difficulties to be sustained.”128 Harnack noted the many “hazardous hypotheses” 
that had been advanced regarding Praxeas before arguing that Praxeas was operative in 
Rome during the episcopate of Victor. This brief sojourn in Rome, thought Harnack, was 
followed by Praxeas’ journey to Carthage.129 Like Harnack, La Piana and Bardy suggest 
that Praxeas was operative in Rome during the episcopate of Victor.130 Evans, however, 
finds plausible the suggestions that Praxeas might have been a pseudonym.131 Moingt 
                                                 
125 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 1.5. 
126 For a discussion of the question of Montanism in Rome at the beginning of the third century, 
see La Piana, “The Roman Church at the End of the Second Century,” 244-251. 
127 See Hagemann’s lengthy section “Wer war Praxeas” in his Die römische Kirche und ihr 
Einfluss auf Disciplin und Dogma in den drei ersten Jahrhunderten (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1864), 234–57. 
128 Gustave Bardy, “Monarchianisme,” in Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, contenant 
l’exposé des doctrines de la théologie catholique, leurs preuves et leur histoire, ed. Alfred Vacant, E. 
Mangenot, and Émile Amann, vol. 10.2 (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1929), 2203. 
129 Harnack, History of Dogma, 3:59–60. 
130 Bardy, “Monarchianisme,” 2197. Not surprisingly, Henri Leclercq adopts Bardy’s conclusions 
in “Monarchianisme,” in Dictionnaire d’archéologie chrétienne et de liturgie, ed. Fernand Cabrol and 
Henri Leclercq, vol. 11.2 (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1934), 1953–5. La Piana further argues that Praxeas 
convinced Victor to drive out Montanism (“The Roman Church at the End of the Second Century,” 246–7). 





rejects the suggestion in older German scholarship and the work of Evans that Praxeas 
was really a pseudonym that Tertullian used to address the views of someone such as 
Callistus.132 He sees no reason for us to doubt the separate existence of a Praxeas. Stuart 
Hall has advanced the speculative claim that Praxeas is really a pseudonym for 
Irenaeus.133 More recently, Allen Brent has taken up the old view that Praxeas is actually 
a pseudonym for Callistus.134 Ronald Heine has proposed something of a hybrid theory. 
He argues that a real Praxeas was operative in Rome, but that Tertullian was also 
addressing the views of Callistus under the name of Praxeas.135 There is scarcely enough 
data to determine with any certainty whether a Praxeas actually existed or was merely a 
pseudonym used by Tertullian. Our inability to know even this most basic fact about 
Praxeas does not, however, invalidate the usefulness of this treatise for reconstructing the 
monarchian position. 
                                                 
132 See, Joseph Moingt, Théologie trinitaire de Tertullien, vol. 1, Théologie 68 (Paris: Aubier, 
1966), 91 n. 2. 
133 Stuart George Hall, “Praxeas and Irenaeus,” Studia Patristica 14.3 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 
1976), 145–47. Hall’s suggestion is tenuous. It is based on an impressionistic reading of the texts, and he 
fails to produce strong evidence for his claims. The following quotation sums up his reasoning, which is 
quite abbreviated: “Irenaeus was a figure already revered in the whole Western Church. His great book had 
been put into Latin. Tertullian himself, in his early days, borrowed from him. But in the crucial issue of 
Tertullian's life, Irenaeus was on the wrong side. He had persuaded Rome against the new prophecy. So 
when Tertullian gets the chance, he pins theological heresy upon the honoured theologian of the Catholics. 
He had not only exiled the Paraclete; he had crucified the Father” (147). 
134 Brent, Hippolytus and the Roman Church in the Third Century, 525–9. 
135 Heine, “The Christology of Callistus,” 59–60. The identification of Praxeas with Callistus 
depends on a specific confluence of the rise of Callistus in Rome and the composition of Adversus 
Praxean. If we assume that Adversus Praxean was written in 213 and we accept the identification of 
Praxeas and Callistus, we must propose that Callistus had developed enough influence in Rome prior to 213 
to attract the attention of Tertullian. The Refutatio does suggest that Callistus was already making his 
influence felt before his elevation to the episcopacy, but the exact chronology of this whole scenario is 
murky. If, however, we push the date of composition for Adversus Praxean later by a few years, the 
probability that Callistus was wielding power in Rome is substantially higher. Even this reasoning, 
however, relies on the hostile witness of the Refutatio. In the absence of more reliable evidence, theories 






 Another question that this text leaves unanswered is how exactly the monarchian 
teaching made its way to Tertullian. Scholars have advanced numerous theories to 
account for the transmission of this teaching, and these are often drawn from scholars’ 
imaginations as much as from concrete data. Harnack suggests that Praxeas journeyed 
from Rome to Carthage, evidence for which is nowhere found in the primary literature.136 
Moingt, on the other hand, believes that Praxeas’ followers, not praxeas himself,  carried 
his teaching to Carthage.137 Again, none of these suggestions is supported by concrete 
data from the text. All we can say with certainty is that sometime prior to 213, Tertullian 
had encountered the monarchian teaching that he attributes to a certain Praxeas. 
Furthermore, this teaching seems to have been accepted by a large portion of the Roman 
population (the simplices). Any conclusions beyond these data must be provisional 
because of the lack of evidence. 
Textual Analysis 
 Although Adversus Praxean offers little in the way of historical background of the 
monarchian position, it provides a store of data that is useful for reconstructing the 
monarchian teachings during the first quarter of the third century. Hippolytus’ treatment 
                                                 
136 Harnack, History of Dogma, 3:59–61; idem, “Monarchianism,” in The New Schaff-Herzog 
Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge, ed. Samuel Macauley Jackson and George William Gilmore, vol. 7 
(Grand Rapids, Mich: Baker, 1963), 459. 
137 Moingt, Théologie trinitaire de Tertullien, 1:94. Moingt later proposes (p. 100) a chronology 
for the events in question: “Nous proposons en conséquence cette chronologie. Peu avant 200, venue et 
agitation de Praxéas à Rome; 200-202, arrivée de ses émissaires à Carthage, première crise et rétractation 
du docteur; 202-204, agnitio Paracleti (fin des écrits purement 'catholiques' de Tertullien vers 204-205, et 
apparition dès cette époque des écrits à tendances montanistes); vers 208, defensio Paracleti (ouvrages de 
propagande puis de polémique montaniste), suivie de la rupture avec l'église officielle (vraisemblablement 
antérieure aux prodromes de la persécution, soit à 211); 212-214, second crise et Adv. Praxean; 214-215 





of monarchianism in Contra Noetum is frontloaded with a summary of core monarchian 
teachings and the exegesis of certain passages used to support these positions. After 
Hippolytus summarizes the monarchian positions, he offers alternative exegesis and an 
exposition of what he considers to be true teaching. Tertullian does not lay out the 
monarchian positions and scriptural passages quite as neatly as Hippolytus.138 
Monarchian positions and exegetical tendencies are scattered throughout the treatise. 
Tertullian also spends much more time than does Hippolytus offering alternatives directly 
opposed to those of the monarchians. For example, Tertullian expends a great deal of 
energy trying to wrest the term “monarchy” from his opponents and to show that it can be 
used without destroying distinction in the Godhead.139 Simonetti argues that the treatise 
presents a more advanced version of monarchian teaching than Contra Noetum.140 
One God 
Like Hippolytus, Tertullian spends a great deal of time addressing the monarchian 
assertion of the absolute unity of God. In the first words of Adversus Praxean, Tertullain 
                                                 
138 Simonetti notes that Adversus Praxean is often rambling and is not as well-organized as Contra 
Noetum (“Due note su Ippolito,” 126). 
139 For discussions of Tertullian’s positive use of monarchia and its background, see Kevin B. 
McCruden, “Monarchy and Economy in Tertullian’s Adversus Praxeam,” Scottish Journal of Theology 55, 
no. 3 (2002): 325–37; T. Verhoeven, “Monarchia dans Tertullien, Adversus Praxean,” Vigiliae Christianae 
5, no. 1 (1951): 43–48. Verhoeven focuses on the background of the term. He argues that the major 
scholars who discuss its usage (Prestige, Lebreton, Evans) do not pay enough attention to the Hellenistic 
Jewish context in which it was used by the likes of Philo. Verhoeven argues that within Hellenistic 
Judaism, it was a defense against pagan polytheism. McCruden focuses a bit more attention on why the 
Monarchians might have been using the term.  
140 Simonetti, “Due note su Ippolito,” 128. See especially Adversus Praxean 27-29, where 






accuses the devil of making “a heresy out of the unity.”141 Shortly thereafter, Tertullian 
bemoans the fact that the Praxean profession holds that it is “impossible to believe in one 
God unless it says that both Father and Son and Holy Spirit are one and the same.”142 In 
his rendition of the regula fidei immediately preceding this complaint he, like Hippolytus, 
states explicitly that he believes in only one God.143 Tertullian’s account of the 
monarchians starts with their assertions regarding the strict unity of God because this 
seems to have been their most foundational premise, the one that drove all of their other 
teaching and exegesis.  
As I noted above, Tertullian’s presentation of the monarchian positions is not 
nearly as methodical and linear as that of Hippolytus in Contra Noetum. Accordingly, 
Tertullian does not here provide us with the core passages the Praxeans used to support 
their exclusive understanding of the unity of God. Perhaps one exception to the lack of 
exegetical underpinning in his presentation of the Praxean understanding of the unity of 
God is a brief reference to Isa. 45:5. Tertullian states, “Therefore there is one God, the 
Father, and besides him there is no other, and he himself who introduces this <statement> 
is denying, not the Son, but another god: whereas the Son is not another <god> than the 
Father.”144 Tertullian is not explicit about how his opponents are using this verse, but his 
                                                 
141 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 1.1 (trans. Evans, 130): ut et de unico haeresim faciat.  
142 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 2.3 (trans. Evans, 132): maxime haec quae se existimat meram 
ueritatem possidere, dum unicum deum non alias putat credendum quam si ipsum eundemque et Patrem et 
Filium et Spiritum dicat.  
143 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 2.1-2. Because he wishes to differentiate his articulation of the 
one God from that of the monarchians, he quickly adds that his belief in this one God is subject to a 
dispensation that includes a Son through whom all things are made, a Son who comes from the Father. 
144 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 18.3 (trans. Evans, 156): Igitur unus Deus pater et alius absque eo 





emphasis makes it probable that they were using it in a way similar to the Noetians’ use 
of Isa. 44:6.145 While Tertullian argues that the verse is combatting polytheism, the 
Praxeans seem to have suggested that it ruled out Tertullian’s understanding of the Son. 
Later in the treatise, Tertullian suggests that Isa. 45:5 was the monarchians’ favorite 
passage from the Old Testament: 
For as in the old <scriptures> they retain nothing else but, I am God and other 
beside me there is not, so in the Gospel they uphold the Lord's answer to Philip, I 
and the Father are one, and, He that hath seen me hath also seen the Father, and, 
I am in the Father and the Father in me. To these three citations they wish the 
whole appurtenance of both testaments to yield, though the smaller number ought 
to be understood in accordance with the greater.146 
 
Thus, while Tertullian is not as focused as is Hippolytus on detailing the exegesis used to 
underpin the monarchian articulation of the unity of God, he does make it clear that Isa. 
45:5 was a key passage for their argument.  
This monarchian interpretation of the oneness of God was particularly appealing 
for those whom Tertullian calls simple folks. For Tertullian, claims about the oneness of 
God must be balanced by assertions about the plurality of God in the economy, a balance 
that Tertullian’s simplices seem unable to achieve. Tertullian states, “Simple people… 
not understanding that while they must believe in one only <God> yet they must believe 
in him along with his economy, shy at the economy.”147 Tertullian, in ways that parallel 
Hippolytus closely, argues that the unity of God is administered or distributed in the 
                                                 
145 Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 2.2. 
146 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 20.1-2 (trans. Evans, 159): Nam sicut in ueteribus nihil aliud 
tenant quam Ego Deus et alius praeter me non est, ita in euangelio responsionem Domini ad Philippum 
tuentur: Ego et Pater unum sumus, et: Qui me uiderit, uidit et Patrem, et: Ego in Patre et Pater in me. His 
tribus capitulis totum instrumentum utriusque testamenti uolunt cedere cum oporteat secundum plura 
intellegi pauciora. 
147 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 3.1 (trans. Evans, 132): Simplices enim quique… non 





economy.148 The monarchian emphasis on the unity of God does not allow for the 
admission of any plurality into the Godhead. Although Tertullian’s discussion of the 
monarchian emphasis on the absolute unity of God is concentrated at the beginning of 
Adversus Praxean, he returns to the claim later in the treatise as well.149 
 It appears as though the Praxeans used the term “monarchy” to signify an 
exclusive understanding of the unity of God. Tertullian sums up their position succinctly: 
They claim that the plurality and ordinance of trinity is a division of unity—
although a unity which derives from itself a trinity is not destroyed but 
administered. And so <people> put it about that by us two or even three <gods> 
are preached, while they, they claim, are worshippers of one God—as though 
unity irrationally summed up did not make heresy and Trinity rationally counted 
out constitute truth. “We hold”, they say, “to the monarchy”: and even Latins so 
expressively frame the sound, and in so masterly a fashion, that you would think 
they understood monarchy as well as they pronounce it: but while Latins are 
intent to shout out “monarchy”, even Greeks refuse to understand the economy.150 
  
Tertullian, however, does not surrender the term “monarchy” to his opponent. In fact, he 
places his own claim on the term and demands that it be coupled with a proper 
understanding of the economy.151 The fact that Tertullian claims the term “monarchy” for 
                                                 
148 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 3. 
149 See, for example, Adversus Praxean 12.1, where Tertullian tells us that the monarchians were 
offended by the plurality of the Trinity. 
150 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean: 3.1-2 (trans. Evans, 132-3): Numerum et dispositionem trinitatis 
diuisionem praesumunt unitatis, quando unitas ex semetipsa deriuans trinitatem, non destruatur ab illa sed 
administretur. Itaque duos et tres iam iactitant a nobis praedicari, se uero unius Dei cultores praesumunt, 
quasi non et unitas irrationaliter collecta haeresin faciat et trinitas rationaliter expensa ueritatem 
constituat. “Monarchiam, inquiunt, tenemus”, et ita sonum ipsum uocaliter exprimunt etiam Latini, et tam 
opifice ut putes illos tam bene intellegere monarchiam quam enuntiant. Sed monarchiam sonare student 
Latini, oikonomiam intellegere nolunt etiam Graeci.  
151 See Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 3-4. See also Adversus Praxean 9, where Tertullian argues 





himself bears out the argument of Uríbarri, who thinks that Praxeas’ use of the term is 
aberrant.152 
 Also evident in the above quotation is the common accusation that the 
monarchians made against their opponents, the charge of ditheism. This charge is 
repeated later when Tertullian discusses how both the Father and Son were active in 
creation. Tertullian records the objection of the Praxeans, “‘Consequently’, you say, ‘if 
God spake and God made, if one God spake and another made, two gods are 
preached.’”153 Shortly thereafter, Tertullian has them repeating the accusation, “I will 
challenge you, today, also by the authority of those scriptures consistently to preach two 
gods and two lords.”154  Tertullian stridently denies that he has ever proclaimed two gods 
or two lords, but the monarchian accusation persists.155 
 Tertullian suggests that the monarchians were offended by the Trinity because “it 
is not combined in a simple unity (unitate simplici).”156 It is in the context of his 
                                                 
152 Uríbarri Bilbao, Monarquía y Trinidad, 148–50. If Uríbarri is correct, Tertullian here 
represents the traditional usage of the term. Given the absence of the term in many of the other monarchian 
works, I think Uríbarri is correct in proposing that Praxeas’ usage is a distortion of the traditional sense.  
153 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 13.1 (trans. Evans, 146): Ergo, inquis, si Deus dixit et Deus fecit, 
si alius Deus dixit et alius fecit, duo dii praedicantur. 
154 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 13.5 (trans. Evans, 147): prouocabo te ut hodie quoque ex 
auctoritate istarum scripturarum constanter duos deos et duos dominos praedices. For another iteration of 
this charge, see Adversus Praxean 23.7, where Tertullian states, “Though it were the case that we spoke of 
two divided <from each other>, as you put it about that we do, yet it were more tolerable to preach two 
divided than one chameleon god” (trans. Evans, 166): Vt sic duos diuisos diceremus, quomodo iactitatis, 
tolerabilius erat duos diuisos quam unum Deum uersipellem praedicare. Tertullian, of course, argued 
strongly that the Father and Son were not divided in his understanding; they were distinct. With the 
chameleon image, Tertullian accuses them of positng a God who masquerades using different visages for 
which there is no underlying distinction. 
155 Tertullian repeatedly claims that the Father and Son are two. He qualifies this statement in a 
number of ways: two, but inseparable; two persons, not two things, indivisibly two, etc. For a dense cluster 
of these assertions, see Adversus Praxean 22. 





discussion of this “simple unity” that Tertullian mockingly asks if God speaks in the 
plural in the Genesis 1:26 because God is “father-son-spirit” (pater filius spiritus). The 
occurrence of this pater filius spiritus language here calls to mind the teachings about the 
υἱοπάτωρ often attributed to Sabellius.157 If this pater filius spiritus language is fulfilling 
the same function as the allegedly Sabellian υἱοπάτωρ, it is quite possible that Sabellius 
himself was pulling on an earlier tradition, perhaps that of Praxeas and his followers. 
Although he gives few details about the exegetical underpinnings of the Praxean claim 
that there is only one God, Tertullian’s responses to this claim are littered throughout the 
work. Tertullian repeatedly asserts that he too believes in one God, but he always 
qualifies his assertion to make it clear that his understanding of the unity of God is 
different from that of his opponents. 
Father and Son  
 As in Hippolytus’ account of monarchianism, Tertullian bears witness to the fact 
that the bedrock claim that God is absolutely one was foundational for other core 
monarchian positions. Also like Hippolytus, Tertullian deals at length with one of the 
main conclusions the monarchians drew from this assertion: arguing for the absolute 
identity of the Father and Son. At the beginning of the treatise, Tertullian reproduces a 
classic expression of the identity, stating, “and in particular this [teaching/heresy] which 
supposes itself to possess truth unadulterated while it thinks it ought not to believe in one 
                                                 






God unless it says that Father and Son and Holy Spirit are one and the same.”158 
Although the “one and the same” formula does not occur in Contra Noetum, it seems to 
have become a standard formula for the monarchian assertion of the identity of the Father 
and Son.159 Tertullian repeats the formula often in Adversus Praxean.160 In the above 
quotation, Tertullian adds a reference to the Spirit, which does not appear to have been a 
focus for the monarchians in the other extant witnesses. The vast majority of their claims 
were about the absolute identity of the Father and Son, without any reference to the 
Spirit.161 
                                                 
158 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 2.3 (trans. Evans, 132 with my modification): maxime haec quae 
se existimat meram ueritatem possidere, dum unicum Deum non alias putat credendum quam si ipsum 
eundemque et Fatrem et Filium et Spiritum dicat. 
159 See, for example, the very formulaic use of it in the Refutatio omnium haeresium 9.10.11-12, 
where the author reports on the teaching of Noetus: “For in this manner he thinks to establish the monarchy 
of God, alleging that Father and Son, so called, are one and the same, not one individual produced from a 
different one, but himself from himself; and that he is styled by name Father and Son, according to 
vicissitude of times” (οὕτως γοῦν δοκεῖ μοναρχίαν συνιστᾶν, ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φάσκων ὑπάρχειν πατέρα καὶ 
υἱόν, γινόμενον οὐχ ἕτερον ἐξ ἑτέρου, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ· ὀνόματι μὲν πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν καλούμενον 
κατὰ χρόνων τροπήν). Translation from ANF, 5.128 with modifications  Greek from Hippolytus, Refutatio 
Omnium Haeresium, ed. Miroslav Marcovich, Patristische Texte Und Studien, Bd. 25 (New York ; Berlin: 
W. De Gruyter, 1986), 348–349. 
160 See Adversus Praxean 14, 15, 18, 27. 
161 Perhaps Tertullian has inserted the Spirit into a standard formula here. Another explanation is 
also possible. The author of the Refutatio argues that some of the Montanists were also followers of the 
doctrine of Noetus. See Refutatio 10.26. If there was actually a confluence of Montanists and Noetians, it is 
possible that it could have influenced a form of monarchianism that paid more attention, at least nominally, 
to the Spirit. For a discussion of the possible relationship between Montanists and Noetians, see Alistair 
Stewart-Sykes, “The Asian Context of the New Prophecy and of Epistula Apostolorum,” Vigiliae 
Christianae 51, no. 4 (1997): 432–3. However, nearly everywhere else that Tertullian interacts with 
monarchian charges, he is dealing with the Father and Son. He is constantly arguing that they are two while 
guarding against the charge of ditheism. While Tertullian certainly mentions the Spirit when he is 
articulating some of his own views, his engagement with the monarchians is largely binitarian, most likely 
because the monarchians framed their argument almost exclusively in terms of the Father and Son. 
Although I find his interpretation of monarchianism implausible, Daniel Boyarin also notes that the 
monarchian controversy was mainly focused on the Father and Son. See Daniel Boyarin, “Two Powers in 
Heaven: Or, the Making of a Heresy,” in The Idea of Biblical Interpretation, ed. Hindy Najman and Judith 
H. Newman (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 346; idem, Border Lines: The Partition of Judaeo-Christianity, 





Tertullian explicitly hypothesizes that the motivation behind the monarchian 
identification of the Father and Son was safeguarding the unity of God. He writes the 
following: “Therefore if their reason for thinking they must believe the identity of the 
Father and the Son has been that they may prove their case for the unity of God….”162  
Tertullian was particularly troubled by this teaching of the identity of the Father and Son, 
and it is clear in his rebuttal that he finds it completely preposterous. Employing a 
mocking tone, Tertullian pushes his opponents regarding their formulations of the 
generation of the Son from the Father. He sallies, “Further, you who identify Father and 
Son, cause the same one both to have brought forth from himself that which is God, and 
as such to have come forth.”163 Tertullian continues to challenge his opponents, saying, 
“If you will have me believe that the Father himself is also the Son, show me that it is 
stated elsewhere in this form, The Lord said to himself, I am my son, today have I 
begotten myself.”164 In this quotation, Tertullian is employing what comes to be an 
important method for refuting the monarchian claims about the identity of the Father and 
the Son: the use of grammatical exegesis.165  
 Within this grammatical exegesis, interpreters paid close attention to the persons 
(or speakers or actors) revealed in a given passage. At multiple points in Adversus 
                                                 
162 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 19.7 (trans. Evans, 158): Igitur si propterea eundem et Patrem et 
Filium credendum putauerunt ut unum Deum uindicent….  
163 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 11.1 (trans. Evans, 143): porro qui eundem Patrem dicis et 
Filium, eundem et protulisse ex semetipso facis et prodisse.  
164 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 11.3 (trans. Evans, 143): Si uelis ut credam ipsum esse Patrem et 
Filium, ostende sic pronuntiatum alibi, “Dominus dixit ad se: filius meus sum ego, ego hodie generaui 
me”.  
165 Use of this method of reading during the onarchian controversy has been ably documented by 





Praxean, Tertullian focuses his exegesis on who is speaking in a passage and to whom 
that person is speaking.166 Another good example of this approach is Tertullian’s exegesis 
of 1 Cor. 15:24-28., a passage that was also very important in later Trinitarian debates. 
Tertullian argues,  
By this one passage of the apostolic epistle we have already been able to show 
that Father and Son are two, besides <by deduction> from the names Father and 
Son, also from the fact that he who has delivered the kingdom and he to whom he 
has delivered it, as also he who has subjected it and he to whom he has subjected 
it, must of necessity be two.167 
  
In this passage, Tertullian identified two actors. If the Son delivered the kingdom to the 
Father, argued Tertullian, the Son and Father cannot be the same. As DelCogliano notes, 
this exegetical technique gained widespread usage and was a central feature in the 
refutation of monarchian positions. Tertullian and other users of this anti-monarchian 
technique had at their disposal a host of passages that spoke of action between the Father 
and Son.168 Tertullian even codified this rule for interpreting scripture:  
You however would make him a liar and a deceiver, a disappointer of this faith 
<of mine>, if being himself his own son he assigned the role of son to another, 
since all the scriptures display both the demonstration and the distinctness of the 
Trinity: and from them is derived also our standing rule, that speaker and person 
spoken of and person spoken to cannot be regarded as one and the same, for as 
much as neither wilfulness nor deception befits God as that, being himself the one 
spoken to, he should prefer to speak to another and not to himself.169 
                                                 
166 See ibid., 120. 
167 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 4.4 (trans. Evans, 134): Hoc uno capitulo epistolae apostolicae 
potuimus iam et Patrem et Filium ostendisse duos esse, praeterquam ex nominibus Patris et Filii etiam ex 
eo quod qui tradidit regnum et cui tradidit, item qui subiecit et cui subiecit duo sint necesse est. 
168 For another notable example of this argument, see Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 12.1. There 
Tertullian writes, “If you are still offended by the plurality of the Trinity, on the ground that it is not 
combined in simple unity, I ask you how it is that one only single <person> speaks in the plural, Let us 
make man after our image and likeness, when he ought to have said, Let me make man after my image and 
likeness, as being one only single <person>… Or was he speaking to the angels, as the Jews explain it, 
because they, like you, do not recognise the Son?” (trans. Evans, 145). 
169 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 11.4 (trans. Evans, 144): Tu porro eum mendacem efficias et 






For Tertullian, a responsible reading of the text could never collapse the distinct actors 
into one as the monarchians did. These grammatical reading techniques gave authors an 
arsenal of passages that became an important polemical tool against monarchianism. 
Within a few generations, this reading technique had become commonplace.170 
 In the passage I quoted in the previous section, Tertullian gave the three favorite 
passages of the Praxeans: Isa. 45:5, Jn 10:30, and Jn 14:9-11.171 Later, Tertullian further 
discusses their use of Jn 10:30 and shows that it was one of their favorite passages for 
arguing for the identity of the Father and Son:  
Here then they wish to make a stand, these fools, yea blind, who see not, first, that 
'I and the Father' is an indication of two; secondly, at the end <of the sentence>, 
that 'are' is not from the person of one, because it is spoken in the plural; and then, 
that he says 'are one <thing>', not 'are one <person>'. For if he had said 'are one 
<person>' he would have been able to assist their case: for 'one <person>' is 
apparently an indication of the singular number. Yet when he says that two, of the 
masculine gender are one <thing>, in the neuter—which is not concerned with 
singularity but with unity, with similitude, with conjunction, with the love of the 
Father who loveth the Son, and with the obedience of the Son who obeys the 
                                                 
omnes et demonstrationem et distinctionem trinitatis ostendant a quibus et praescriptio nostra deducitur 
non posse unum atque eundem uideri qui loquitur et de quo loquitur et ad quem loquitur, quia neque 
peruersitas neque fallacia deo congruat ut, cum ipse esset ad quem loquebatur, ad alium potius et non ad 
semetipsum loqueretur. 
170 Tertullian used other techniques to combat the identification of the Father and Son. One 
example can be seen in Adversus Praxean 10. There, Tertullian argues that the terms Father and Son 
necessarily imply two who are mutually distinguished from each other. He argues that the monarchians 
want one person to be both terms of the relationship, but that this is nonsensical. For an excellent 
discussion of Tertullian’s use of Stoic logic in Adversus Praxean 10, see Gerald P. Boersma, “The Logic of 
the Logos: A Note on Stoic Logic in Adversus Praxean 10,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 22, no. 4 
(2014): 485–98. Boersma argues that chapter 10 is the heart of the treatise: “The heart of the treatise is to 
be found, I believe, in section 10. Here Tertullian establishes his guiding theological hermeneutic—the 
ground that sustains the rest of the treatise. Thus, in the rest of the work Tertullian mines the Scriptures, 
especially the Gospel of John, for all the key passages in which Christ distinguishes himself from the 
Father. As such, the guiding principles of logic and language that Tertullian lays down in Adversus Praxean 
10 serve to aid in correctly understanding the scriptural distinction of Father and Son laid out in the rest of 
the work." (487) I also argue in my last chapter that surbordinationism was another common anti-
monarchian tool at the beginning of the third century. 





Father's will--when he says, One <thing> are I and the Father, he shows that 
those whom he equates and conjoins are two.172 
 
That the Praxeans focused on John 10:30 is not surprising. Remember that Hippolytus 
worked to counteract the Noetians’ apparent use of this passage in Contra Noetum.173 
There are striking similarities between the rebuttals that Hippolytus and Tertullian give of 
this passage. Both focus on the fact that the verb (sumus in this case) is plural, not 
singular. Tertullian goes further in his analysis of John 10:30 and focuses on the fact that 
“one” (unum) is in the neuter. Tertullian focuses on this fact to show that the unity of 
Father and Son is not a personal unity. Although “one” (ἕν) is also neuter in the Greek, 
Hippolytus does not cite this fact as further evidence that the Father and Son are not one 
in the sense that the monarchians would have it. If Tertullian was drawing on Contra 
Noetum, he appears to have taken the basic argument of Hippolytus and added further 
proof to it. Since John 10:30 was so important for the monarchians, it would be little 
surprise if Tertullian sought to bolster a pre-existing anti-monarchian reading of the 
verse.174 
                                                 
172 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 22.10-11 (trans. Evans, 164). Note Tertullian’s focus on the 
distinction between unus and unum: Hic ergo iam gradum uolunt figere stulti, immo caeci, qui non uideant 
primo "ego et pater" duorum esse significationem, dehinc in nouissimo "sumus" non ex unius esse personae 
quod pluraliter dictum est, tunc quod "unum sumus", non "unus sumus" <dicit>. Si enim dixisset: "unus 
sumus", potuisset adiuuare sententiam illorum, unus enim singularis numeri significatio uidetur. Adhuc 
cum duo masculini generis unum dicit neutrali uerbo (quod non pertinet ad singularitatem sed ad unitatem, 
ad similitudinem, ad coniunctionem, ad dilectionem patris qui filium diligit et ad obsequium filii qui 
uoluntati patris obsequitur): vnum sumus, dicens, ego et pater, ostendit duos esse quos aequat et iungit.  
173 See especially Contra Noetum 7.1. 
174 Just following the passage I quoted, Tertullian notes that Jesus says “I and the Father are one” 
in order to show that he is the Son of God, not “God himself (ipsum deum).” Although beyond the 
immediate scope of this chapter, it is interesting to note that when he wishes to call both the Father and Son 
“God” yet maintain their distinction, he will argue that the Father is ipsum deum. This understanding of the 
Father as ipsum deum fits well with Tertullian’s conception of divine monarchy wherein the Father is God 
most fully and the Son is God derivatively or by ordinance. This approach is also, in many ways, similar to 
Origen’s discussion of God with and without the article in ComJn 2.13-32. I discuss Origen’s treatment of 






 Tertullian expends a great deal of energy discussing questions of the visibility and 
invisibility of God. As is clear from the earlier discussion of Contra Noetum, this 
question also occupied the Noetians. Whereas the Noetians focused on Baruch 3:36-38 
and Isaiah 45:14-15, Tertullian’s discussion is primarily concerned with the proper 
interpretation of Exodus 33:20.175 Despite the difference in passages used, the same 
exegetical moves are present in both Hippolytus’ and Tertullian’s accounts of 
monarchianism. 
 Tertullian opens his section on the visibility and invisibility of God by offering an 
interpretation of Exodus 33:20 that is standard for the early third century. For Tertullian, 
this passage vindicates his claim about the duality of the Father and Son: “Once more, we 
have the support in our vindication of the duality of the Father and the Son, of that rule 
which has defined God as invisible.”176 The tension between the claim that Moses spoke 
to God face to face and lived (Ex. 33:11) and that none shall see God and live (Ex. 33:20) 
did not go unnoticed by Tertullian. He diffused this tension by repeating the already 
commonplace assertion that the God who was seen face to face by Moses was in fact the 
Son. He escapes the apparent difficulty in the following way: 
                                                 
175 One expects to see Exodus 33:20 as the centerpiece of a debate about the visibility of God. 
Indeed, this verse is perhaps the locus classicus for discussing these matters. Hippolytus’ discussion of 
visibility and invisibility, on the other hand, treats monarchian exegesis of passages that seem less directly 
related to the question at hand. The fact that Tertullian and Hippolytus do not include the same passages in 
their discussion of visibility and invisibility might suggest that there is not as strong of a relationship of 
dependence between the two as some have suggested. Alternatively, if a strong relationship is maintained, 
it could be that the specific opponents of each author used different passages to make common claims. 
176 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean: 14.1 (trans. Evans, 148): Adhuc et illa nobis regula adsistit duos 





So then it will be another who was seen, for it is impossible for the same one who 
was seen, to be characterised as invisible: and it will follow that we must 
understand the Father as invisible because of the fulness of his majesty, but must 
acknowledge the Son as visible because of the enumeration of his derivation, just 
as we may not look upon the sun in respect of the total of its substance which is in 
the sky, though we can with our eyes bear its beam because of the moderation of 
the assignment which from thence reaches out to the earth.177 
 
Like many of his forebears and contemporaries, Tertullian argued that it was in fact the 
Son who was visible in the OT theophanies. Thus, for Tertullian, the apparent tension in 
this text becomes grounds to assert the duality of the Father and Son. 
The monarchians against whom Tertullian was writing were also well aware of 
the tension presented in the biblical text. The monarchians apparently welcomed this 
tension within the text, for they attributed both visibility and invisibility to the same 
God.178 In Tertullian’s account, the first move the monarchians made was to consider the 
ways in which scripture speaks of the Son. Tertullian says that his opponents wish to 
claim that in addition to being visible in the incarnation, “the Son is also invisible as 
                                                 
177 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 14.3 (trans. Evans, 149): Iam ergo alius erit qui uidebatur, quia 
non potest idem inuisibilis definiri, qui uidebatur, et consequens erit ut inuisibilem patrem intellegamus pro 
plenitudine maiestatis, uisibilem uero filium agnoscamus pro modulo deriuationis, sicut nec solem nobis 
contemplari licet, quantum ad ipsam substantiae summam quae est in caelis, radium autem eius toleramus 
oculis pro temperatura portionis quae in terram inde porrigitur. Tertullian’s emphasis that it is the Son’s 
derivation from the Father that allows him to be seen is important for my later examination of Origen’s 
Trinitarian theology within the context of other third century theologians. Although Tertullian does not 
state it explicitly, it seems that whatever it was that prevented the Father from being visible was not 
transferred to the Son in the process of derivation. 
178 Note here that this is one of the same paired opposites that the author of the Refutatio attributes 
to his opponents in an attempt to show that they derive their teachings from the philosophy of Heraclitus. 
Not present in Tertullian’s account, however, are any of the author of the Refutatio’s tendentious assertions 
of monarchian dependence upon Heraclitus. Given the centrality of discussions about the visibility and 
invisibility of God in the monarchian system, it is highly probable that the monarchians did claim that God 
is both visible and invisible. In an attempt to discredit their teaching, however, the author of the Refutatio 
constructed a link between this teaching and the philosophy of Heraclitus that probably was not actually 
present in the monarchian system. For an in-depth discussion of these antitheses, see Mouraviev, 
“Hippolyte, Héraclite et Noët.” Note also that the antitheses feature prominently in the general argument of 
Hübner. He claims that the antitheses are early snippets from an anti-Gnostic rule of faith. These claims run 





Word and Spirit.”179 With this move, the monarchians were able to argue that there is 
precedent for attributing both visibility and invisibility to the same one. 
After claiming that the same one can be visible and invisible, the monarchians 
used their oft-repeated assertion of the identification of the Father and the Son. Tertullian 
rehearses their argument as follows: 
For they also add this to their quibbling, that if on that occasion it was the Son 
speaking to Moses, he pronounced his own face visible to no man, because of 
course he was the invisible Father himself under the name of Son. And 
consequently they wish the visible one and the invisible one to be taken as 
identical, in the same way as <they wish> Father and Son <to be taken as> 
identical, because also a little earlier, before he refused Moses <the sight of> his 
face, it is written that the Lord spake to Moses face to face as a man speaks to his 
friend, and furthermore that Jacob says, I have seen the Lord face to face: 
consequently the same one is visible and invisible: and because the same one has 
both attributes, therefore also the invisible Father is himself visible as being also 
the Son.180 
 
Later, Tertullian restates the position of his opponents: “Our adversary will argue that 
both are rightly spoken, <since he was> visible in the incarnation but invisible before the 
incarnation; and that consequently the Father, invisible before the incarnation, is the same 
<Person> as the Son, visible in the incarnation.”181 Tertullian and the monarchians 
offered competing and opposite interpretations of the same passages. When Tertullian 
                                                 
179 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 14.4 (trans. Evans, 149): Hic ex diuerso uolet aliquis etiam filium 
inuisibilem contendere, ut sermonem, ut spiritum. 
180 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 14.5 (trans. Evans, 149): Nam et illud adicient ad 
argumentationem quod, si filius tunc ad moysen loquebatur, ipse faciem suam nemini uisibilem 
pronuntiarit quia scilicet ipse inuisibilis pater fuerit in filii nomine. Ac per hoc sic eundem uolunt accipi et 
uisibilem et inuisibilem, quomodo eundem patrem et filium, quoniam et paulo supra, antequam faciem 
moysi neget, scriptum sit dominum ad moysen locutum coram uelut si quis loquatur ad amicum suum, non 
minus quam et iacob: ego uidi, inquit, deum facie ad faciem. "Ergo uisibilis et inuisibilis idem, et quia idem 
utrumque, ideo et ipse pater inuisibilis, quia et filius, uisibilis".  
181 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 15.3 (trans. Evans, 151): Ad hanc diuersitatem uisi et inuisi in 
unum conferendam qui ex diuerso nobis argumentabitur recte utrumque dictum, uisibilem quidem in carne, 





considered these passages together, he saw them as clearly demonstrating that the Father 
and Son must be two, the Father invisible and the Son visible. The monarchians, on the 
other hand, took these passages as manifesting that the same God was both visible and 
invisible, both Father and Son, one and the same. 
 Tertullian’s discussion of the visibility of God and its implications for the 
distinction of the Father and Son is concentrated in Adversus Praxean 14-17. Noticeably 
absent from this concentrated discussion of the visibility of God, however, is any mention 
of John 14:9-11. The absence of this passage here is striking because Tertullian elsewhere 
indicates that this was one of the Praxeans’ favorite passages.182 Even more, John 14:9 
(he who has seen me has seen the Father) would seem to fit their argument perfectly here. 
There is a high probability that the Praxeans did use John 14:9-11 to argue that the same 
God is both visible and invisible, but for undisclosed reasons, Tertullian has omitted it 
from his most concentrated discussion of the visibility of God. 
Became Incarnate, Suffered, and Died 
 Tertullian repeatedly attacked his opponents because of the consequences their 
views had on teaching about the incarnation. The monarchian position on the incarnation 
is straightforward: God “made himself his own Son.”183 As with some of their other 
claims, the testimony of Tertullian shows that the monarchians were aware that their 
position seemed to entail an impossibility. They responded to this difficulty as follows, 
“But”, <they say>, “to God nothing is difficult.” Who does not know it? And who 
is not aware that things impossible with the world are possible with God? Also 
                                                 
182 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 20.1-2. 





God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the things that are 
wise. We have read it all. “Consequently”, they say, “it was not difficult for God 
to make himself both Father and Son, contrary to the law traditional in human 
affairs: for it was not difficult for God, contrary to nature, to cause the barren 
woman to bear—or even the virgin.”184 
 
For the monarchians, the claim that the same God was Father and Son is of the same 
order as the claim that the same God is both visible and invisible. They did not shy away 
from teachings that ostensibly entailed contradiction.185 
 Tertullian draws out the implications of the monarchian teaching on the 
incarnation in such a manner that the connections between this teaching and the claim of 
the identity of the Father and Son are clear. Tertullian states, 
Yet these people bring [the Father] down into Mary's womb, and set him at 
Pilate's judgement seat, and shut him up in Joseph's sepulchre. Hence therefore it 
is evident that they are astray. For not knowing that from the beginning the whole 
course of the divine ordinance has come down through the Son, they believe that 
the Father himself both was seen and conversed and wrought, and suffered thirst 
and hunger, in spite of the prophet who says The eternal God shall never thirst 
nor hunger at all—and how much more shall he neither die nor be buried—and 
that thus the one God, that is, the Father, has always done those things which <in 
fact> have been performed by <the agency of> the Son.186 
 
For Tertullian, the claim that the Father became his own Son entailed a whole host of 
problems, including the attribution of every event in the life of Christ to the Father. If, as 
                                                 
184 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 10.7 (trans. Evans, 142): Sed nihil deo difficile, quis hoc nesciat? 
et: impossibilia apud saeculum possibilia apud deum, quis ignoret? et: stulta mundi elegit deus, ut 
confundat sapientia. Legimus omnia. ‘Ergo, inquiunt, difficile non fuit deo ipsum se et patrem et filium 
facere aduersus traditam formam rebus humanis. Nam et sterilem parere contra naturam difficile deo non 
fuit, sicut nec uirginem’. 
185 There is also the possibility here that Tertullian is stylizing his opponents’ position here in 
order to make them look foolish. 
186 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 16.6-7 (trans. Evans, 154-5): quem isti in uuluam mariae 
deducunt et in pilati tribunal imponunt et in monumentis ioseph reconcludunt. Hinc igitur apparet error 
illorum. Ignorantes enim a primordio omnem ordinem diuinae dispositionis per filium decucurrisse, ipsum 
credunt patrem et uisum et congressum et operatum et sitim et esuriem passum - aduersus prophetam 
dicentem: deus aeternus non sitiet nec esuriet omnino: quanto magis nec morietur nec sepelietur? - et ita 





the monarchians claimed, the Father and the Son are the same, one need not try to ascribe 
some things to the Son and some to the Father, for they could all be equally ascribed to 
Father and Son. For Tertullian, however, it is improper to attribute to the Father many of 
the things said of Christ in the gospels, as well as all the apperances of God in the Old 
Testament. 
 Tertullian argued that the attribution of suffering to the Father was improper. The 
monarchians, much to Tertullian’s dismay, claimed precisely that the Father did suffer. 
Tertullian sums up the monarchian teaching at the beginning of his treatise: “And so, 
after <all this> time, a Father who was born, a Father who suffered, God himself the Lord 
Almighty, is preached as Jesus Christ.”187 The fact that Tertullian includes this digest of 
the most troublesome aspects of monarchian teaching at the beginning of the work is a 
close parallel to Hippolytus in Contra Noetum. Later in the work, he accuses the 
monarchians of crucifying the Father.188 Tertullian again charges them with claiming that 
the Father was both crucified and died.189 
 Although that they did not have trouble attributing things proper to the Son to the 
Father, some monarchians tried to avoid the bald assertion that the Father suffered. 
Tertullian states, “Further, if the Father is impassible he is of course incompassible: or if 
he is compassible he is of course passible. So you do him no benefit by this fear of yours. 
                                                 
187 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 2.1 (trans. Evans, 131): Itaque post tempus pater natus et pater 
passus, ipse deus dominus omnipotens iesus christus praedicatur. 
188 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 10.8. 





For you fear to call passible him whom you do call compassible.”190 This distinction 
between passibility and compassibility is elucidated by Heine’s work on Callistus’ 
Christology. Heine argues that the introduction of the language of compassibility was 
meant to distance monarchians from overtly claming that God suffered.191  
By employing the techniques of grammatical exegesis, Tertullian seeks to show 
how problematic it was to claim that the Father suffered, was crucified, and died:  
You have him [the Father] crying aloud at his passion, My God, my God, why hast 
thou forsaken me? Consequently either the Son was suffering, forsaken by the 
Father, and the Father did not suffer, seeing he had forsaken the Son: or else, if it 
was the Father who was suffering, to what God was he crying aloud?192 
 
Thus, for Tertullian, the monarchian claims that the Father suffered were brought about 
by a way of reading the text that could not account for all of the main actors. These 
problems derived from the monarchian identification of the Father and the Son, which 
itself was an outflowing of their strict understanding of the assertion that there is only one 
God. 
                                                 
190 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 29.5-6 (trans. Evans, 177): porro si impassibilis pater, utique et 
incompassibilis; aut si compassibilis, utique passibilis. Nihil ei uel hoc timore tuo praestas. Times dicere 
passibilem quem dicis compassibilem. 
191 Heine notes the tension between the claims at the beginning of Adversus Praxean that the 
Father suffered and the later claims that the Father was actually compassible. Heine has convincingly 
argued that Callistus and the Roman school developed their monarchian theology away from the 
patripassian implications that were readily accepted by early monarchians. Heine suggests that it is these 
views of the later Roman school that are represented in Adversus Praxean 27-29 (“The Christology of 
Callistus,” 59–60). This is the insight that underwrites Heine’s suggestion that there was actually a 
monarchian named Praxeas but that Tertullian was also addressing the theology of Callistus under the name 
of Praxeas. Although it is hard to prove definitively, Heine’s theory has the virtue of explaining the 
seeming contradiction between the theology attributed to Praxeas at the beginning and end of Adversus 
Praxean. 
192 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 30.1 (trans. Evans, 178): habes ipsum exclamantem in passione: 
deus meus, deus meus, ut quid me dereliquisti? ergo aut filius patiebatur a patre derelictus et pater passus 






 Tertullian’s Adversus Praxean exhibits a number of similarities with Hippolytus’ 
Contra Noetum. It is clear that both Tertullian and the Praxeans were concerned with the 
unity of God. Like the Noetians, the Praxeans claimed that the Father and Son were one 
and the same (ipsum eundemque). Consequently, they claimed that the one God was seen 
in the theophanies, that this one God was both visible and invisible. Adversus Praxean 
does present some notable developments in comparison with Contra Noetum.  Tertullian 
records that there were some monarchians who, like the Noetians, had no problem 
affirming that the Father suffered. Tertullian also bears witness to the fact that some other 
monarchians began to shy away from a straightforward claim that the Father suffered. In 
order to avoid this troublesome conclusion, they began to argue that the Father suffered 
with the Son, that he was compassible but not passible. Despite this development, a solid 
core of monarchianism is evident in both works. The monarchians defended a strong 
view of the unity of God using scriptural exegesis. Similarly, they identified the Father 
and Son, often using passages from the Gospel of John to support their claim. From the 
foundation of this identification of the Father and Son, they argued that the same one God 
was both visible and invisible. Views regarding the passibility of the Father shifted within 






CHAPTER THREE: THE REFUTATIO OMNIUM HAERESIUM AND 
NOVATIAN’S DE TRINITATE 
In this chapter, I continue my analysis of contemporary texts that attest to 
monarchianism. The first of the texts I examine in this chapter, the Refutatio omnium 
haeresium, presents a host of difficulties. Not least among the difficulties is that the 
author (of whose identity we are uncertain) has distorted the positions of those whom he 
opposes. Therefore, evidence gleaned from this text must be used with caution. 
Novatian’s De Trinitate, too, presents a clear, sometimes simplistic portrait of his 
opponents. His portrait of his monarchian opponents is almost certainly less subtle than 
their theology itself. However, his simplistic portrayal of their theology has the benefit of 
highlighting the most basic aspects of monarchian theology. After treating these two 
works, I offer a synopsis of the monarchian sources, summarize my conclusions, and 
reassess some of the scholarly views about monarchianism. My reconstruction of 
monarchianism in Part One of this dissertation provides the foundation for re-examining 
Origen’s early Trinitarian theology in Part Two. 
The Refutatio 
Introduction 
 As my earlier discussions of the Hippolytan problem made clear, there is little 
scholarly consensus regarding the specifics of the Refutatio. Most scholars think it was 
written by a different author than the one who composed the Contra Noetum. Among 





it should be dated. Because I find Simonetti’s arguments convincing, I think the most 
probable date for the Refutatio falls somewhere between 225 and 235 C.E.1 My 
acceptance of this dating means that I think Refutatio postdates Contra Noetum and likely 
draws upon it.2 Because of the gaps in knowledge surrounding the work, I will speak of 
“the author of the Refutatio” instead of Hippolytus. This somewhat cumbersome 
circumlocution indicates that I consider the work to be the product of a different author 
than the Contra Noetum. 
One of the chief difficulties with the Refutatio is that it is fiercely polemical and 
often highly tendentious. In an attempt to discredit the teaching of his opponents, the 
author often resorts to ad hominem arguments. For instance, he details at length the 
alleged dishonesty and deception of Callistus.3 The reliability of these accusations is 
difficult to corroborate from external sources. Eusebius makes only a brief mention of 
Callistus in his Ecclesiastical History, noting that he succeeded Zephyrinus in the Roman 
see.4 Eusebius does not signal any major problems with the teaching or career of 
                                                 
1 Simonetti’s argument proceeds by first comparing Contra Noetum and Adversus Praxean. 
Against Allen Brent, he concludes (with the majority of earlier scholars) that Contra Noetum represents an 
early, simple form of monarchianism and that Adversus Praxean draws on it. Since most scholars agree that 
the Refutatio postdates Adversus Praxean, Simonetti concludes that it also postdates Contra Noetum. This 
reconstruction of the dating of the texts makes the most sense of the data. See Manlio Simonetti, “Una 
nuova proposta su Ippolito,” Augustinianum 36, no. 1 (1996): 13–46; idem, “Due note su Ippolito: Ippolito 
interprete di Genesi 49; Ippolito e Tertulliano,” in Ricerche su Ippolito, Studia ephemeridis Augustinianum 
13 (Rome: Institutum patristicum Augustinianum, 1977), 121–36. 
2 I have chosen here not to address in any detail the question of the hypothetical relationship 
between the Refutatio and Tertullian’s Adversus Praxean. The overlap in specific vocabulary and analogies 
between Contra Noetum and Adversus Praxean is too great to ignore. This is not the case with the 
Refutatio, which has a completely different tenor and purpose. If the Refutatio does draw upon Tertullian’s 
Adversus Praxean, the reliance is obscured by the differing tendencies of the two authors. 
3 Refutatio 9.12.1-19. In this section on the Refutatio, I use Marcovich’s edition of the text and the 
translation in the ANF unless otherwise noted. Miroslav Marcovich, ed., Refutatio omnium haeresium, 
Patristische Texte und Studien 25 (New York; Berlin: De Gruyter, 1986). 





Callistus, and this lack stands in stark contrast to our author’s overwhelmingly negative 
portrayal of him. Eusebius does not give any of Callistus’ backstory or accuse him of 
dishonest dealings. Another example of the Refutatio’s overt anti-Callistan bias is his 
philosophical genealogy of Callistus’ heresy. The author of the Refutatio is at pains to 
argue that Callistus derived his teaching from Heraclitus.5 Heine’s thorough article has 
demonstrated that in order to make the connection between Callistus and Heraclitus, the 
author substantially modified some of the distinctive features of Callistus’ teaching.6 
Heine has drawn on Mansfeld, who has shown that the author of the Refutatio doctored 
the teaching of Heraclitus as well.7 
 Despite the polemical tone of the Refutatio, and the many unanswered questions 
surrounding Hippolytus, it remains the case that the Refutatio and Contra Noetum are two 
of the most important extant sources for reconstructing the monarchian controversy. The 
importance of these polemically charged works illustrates acutely the difficult nature of 
                                                 
5 For an examination of the role of Heraclitus in the Refutatio, see Mouraviev’s discussion. 
Mouraviev focuses on the use of Heraclitus with respect to the teaching of Noetus rather than Callistus. 
Because his study was published at roughly the same time as that of Jaap Mansfeld, Mouraviev did not 
have the benefit of access to Mansfeld’s detailed argument about the distortions present in the Refutatio. 
Serge N. Mouraviev, “Hippolyte, Héraclite et Noët (Commentaire d’Hippolyte, Refut. omn. haer. IX 8 - 
10),” in Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt, vol. 2.36.6, 1992, 4375–4402; Jaap Mansfeld, 
Heresiography in Context: Hippolytus’ Elenchos as a Source for Greek Philosophy, Philosophia Antiqua 
56 (Leiden: Brill, 1992). 
6 Ronald E. Heine, “The Christology of Callistus,” Journal of Theological Studies 49 (1998): 56–
91. 
7 Jaap Mansfeld, Heresiography in Context, 231–42. Elsewhere, Mansfeld states regarding 
Hippolytus, “He is an intelligent and erudite person, an industrious Christian intellectual, but one without 
an interest in philosophy for its own sake. Philosophy is important to him insofar as, following in Irenaeus' 
footsteps, he can use it, or rather those of its ingredients which were most favoured in his own time, as 
powerful polemical tools…. Hippolytus must be considered guilty of doctoring the evidence concerned 
with the Greek philosophers” (ibid., xvi–xvii). Note the different tone of Mansfeld and Nautin. Nautin 
considered the Refutatio to be the work of Josipe, whom he viewed as a pretentious dilettante. See Pierre 
Nautin, Hippolyte et Josipe: Contribution à l’histoire de la littérature chrétienne du troisième siècle, 





reconstructing the monarchian controversy. We have no extant primary sources from 
monarchian writers, and we are forced to reconstruct their positions from opponents who 
often misrepresented their views in an attempt to discredit them. The Refutatio seems to 
be more prone to this misrepresentation than, for example, Tertullian’s Adversus 
Praxean. All of these anti-monarchian writings contain some quotations from 
monarchians, but it is difficult to judge the reliability of these quotations given the 
absence of any extant monarchian writings. 
Textual Analysis 
Genealogy of Heresy 
 Because the author of the Refutatio is so concerned with tracing the genealogy of 
the heresy of Noetus and Callistus, whom he repeatedly connects to each other, our first 
task is to reconstruct the family tree of the heresy as presented in the Refutatio.8 He 
regularly sees the heresy of Noetus and his successors as part of a complicated web, 
which can make a reconstruction difficult. His treatment of those whom he considers to 
be teaching aberrant doctrines follows a long survey of philosophers and their systems. 
These preceding philosophers provide part of the genealogy that the Refutatio is trying to 
                                                 
8 I use “heresy” here not as an evaluative tool of my own, but to represent the position of the 
author of the Refutatio, who unmistakably views monarchianism as a heresy. As I note elsewhere, drawing 
a sharp line between orthodoxy and heresy at the beginning of the third century is tricky business. See the 
clarifying essay of Rowan Williams and the extensive studies of Alain le Boulluec for more discussion of 
this matter: Rowan Williams, “Does It Make Sense to Speak of Pre-Nicene Orthodoxy?,” in The Making of 
Orthodoxy: Essays in Honour of Henry Chadwick, ed. Henry Chadwick and Rowan Williams (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 1–23; Alain le Boulluec, La notion d’hérésie dans la littérature 
grecque, IIe-IIIe siècles, 2 vols., Collection des études augustiniennes 110-111 (Paris: Etudes 
augustiniennes, 1985); idem, “L’écriture comme norme hérésiologique dans les controverses des IIe et IIIe 





trace.9 Books nine and ten of the Refutatio are the focus of my analysis, but I also 
highlight relevant sections from the earlier books.10 
 In the Contra Noetum, Hippolytus gives no information about the transmission of 
the teachings of Noetus.11 He does tell us that Noetus was a Smyrnaean and that he lived 
recently.12 The author of the Refutatio confirms that Noetus was from Smyrna.13 At the 
beginning of book nine of the Refutatio, the author traces the teaching of Noetus through 
to Callistus.14 He states that Epigonus learned the teaching of Noetus and passed it on to 
Cleomenes. He later reports that Zephyrinus learned the teaching from Cleomenes.15 
Thus, the arrival of Noetus’ teaching in Rome would have been by means of either 
Epigonus or Cleomenes.16 
                                                 
9 Again, note Heine’s article that details how the author of the Refutatio distorts the theology of 
Callistus to make it align with Heraclitus’ philosophical teaching. See notes 6-7 in this chapter. 
10 My decision to focus on book nine and ten of the Refutatio is one of necessity. A fuller 
examination of the Refutatio would make the dissertation even longer than it already is. Furthermore, the 
Refutatio focuses on Noetus and Callistus in books nine and ten, making them the most important for my 
study. Callistus seems to be the main target of the author of the Refutatio, so he waits to report on his 
teaching until the culmination of the work. 
11 Without giving a detailed account of the genealogy of Noetus’ teaching, Hippolytus signals at 
the beginning of Contra Noetum that Noetus’ disciples are troublesome. He appears to focus on Noetus in 
an attempt to get to the root of the problem. See Contra Noetum 1.1. 
12 Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 1.1. 
13 Refutatio 9.7. 
14 See especially Refutatio 9.7, 10.27. 
15 Refutatio 9.7. 
16 The translator of the Refutatio in the ANF mistranslated 10.27.1 and took it to mean that Noetus 
learned his heresy from Epigonus. This is certainly not the case; the author of the Refutatio consistently 
traces the heresy from Noetus through Epigonus and Cleomenes. The passage should be translated roughly 
as follows: “Likewise Noetus… introduced such a heresy as this, which advanced from a certain Epigonus 
unto Cleomenes and thus until now it continued through successive teachers….” (Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Νοητός, 
τῷ μὲν γένει ὢν Σμυρναῖος, ἀνὴρ <δὲ> ἀκριτόμυθος καὶ ποικίλος, εἰσηγήσατο τοιάνδε αἵρεσιν—ἐξ 





 This teaching that proved problematic for the author of the Refutatio appears to 
have been introduced to Zephyrinus through the influence of Cleomenes.17 This statement 
is interesting because it might shed light on a vague statement of Eusebius in the EH. 
Eusebius considered the teaching of the church in Rome to have been somehow corrupted 
during the time of Zephyrinus.18 Eusebius does not provide any details of how the 
teaching of the church was corrupted during this time, but he does tell us that Zephyrinus’ 
predecessor, Victor, rejected the teaching of Theodotus.19 The author of the Refutatio, in 
one of his more polemically charged moments, informs us that Zephyrinus’ successor, 
Callistus, at times subscribed to the teachings of Theodotus; but he does not disclose the 
details of how Theodotus’ teaching gained a foothold with the successors of Victor.20 
 If we take the testimony of Eusebius and the Refutatio in tandem, we can 
reasonably assume that one of the things that was probably accepted by the church during 
the episcopate of Zephyrinus was the teaching of Theodotus, which had previously been 
rejected by Zephyrinus’ predecessor, Victor. Even more, Hippolytus briefly mentions 
Theodotus in the Contra Noetum and, like Eusebius, accuses him of teaching that Christ 
was a mere human (ἄνθρωπον ψιλόν). The connection of the teachings of Noetus and 
                                                 
17 Refutatio 9.7. 
18 Eusebius, EH 5.28. Eusebius writes that Victor had repelled improper teachings but “that the 
truth had been corrupted from the time of his successor, Zephyrinus” (ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ διαδόχου αὐτοῦ 
Ζεφυρίνου παρακεχαράχθαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν). Trans. Eusebius of Caesarea, Ecclesiastical History: Books 1-5, 
trans. Kirsopp Lake, Loeb Classical Library 153 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1926), 517. 
19 Eusebius, EH 5.28. Decker devotes a good portion of his dissertation on monarchianism to 
reconstructing the theology of the Theodotians. See especially Michael Decker, “Die Monarchianer: 
Frühchristliche Theologie im Spannungsfeld zwischen Rom und Kleinasien” (Ph.D. Dissertation, 
University of Hamburg, 1987), 66–130. On my narrower definition, the Theodotians are not properly 
monarchians. 





Theodotus is a common theme in both the Refutatio and Contra Noetum.21 When the 
Refutatio is augmented by these other sources, it provides us with enough information to 
establish a rough genealogy of the teaching of Noetus, one that has it gaining a foothold 
among leaders of the church in Rome during the episcopate of Zephyrinus. With this 
established, we must move on to examine the teaching of Noetus and others whom the 
Refutatio often lumps with him. 
 Books nine and ten of the Refutatio have Callistus as their primary target; but 
before I discuss their presentation of Callistus, it will be fruitful to examine the 
Refutatio’s presentation of Callistus’ predecessors. Doing so will help both to show the 
framework within which the Refutatio presents the theology of Callistus and to elucidate 
other teaching on the doctrines of God and Christ that the Refutatio views as aberrant. 
After giving this context, I examine the Refutatio’s accounts of the teaching of 
Zephyrinus and Callistus, giving special attention to similarities with, and divergences 
from, Noetus and the others the Refutatio examines. 
 The first person of interest for us in the Refutatio is Apelles. The author of the 
Refutatio accuses him of teaching that there are four gods, thus seeming to remove him 
from the orbit of monarchian teaching, which strongly held that there is only one God.22 
Apelles is of interest here because he also shows up in Eusebius’ EH. Both the author of 
the Refutatio and Eusebius include a section on Apelles directly following a discussion of 
Marcion, and the Refutatio states that Apelles was a disciple of Marcion.23 Drawing from 
                                                 
21 See Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 3.1. 
22 For the primary discussions of Apelles, see, Refutatio 7.38 and 10.20. 





his source, Rhodo, Eusebius records that Apelles confessed that there was only one 
principle (μίαν ἀρχὴν ὁμολογεῖ).24 Eusebius is obviously contrasting this position with 
the teaching of Marcion, whom he describes as teaching that there are two principles (δύο 
ἀρχὰς).25 Eusebius goes on to say that Apelles could not explain his reasons for holding 
that there was only one principle, but that he held it nonetheless. If Rhodo’s account of 
Apelles’ teaching is correct, it lines up well with the monarchian emphasis; but Eusebius’ 
account of Apelles teaching does not agree with the Refutatio. It is possible that Apelles 
managed to both affirm that there was only one principle and that there were multiple 
gods, but this possibility seems unlikely. Presenting him as a disciple of Marcion, the 
Refutatio suggests that he took Marcion’s teaching a step further and argued for more 
than two gods. This emphasis in the Refutatio fits well with its placement shortly after 
discussions of various Gnostic figures. Given the absence of an arbitrating source, it is 
difficult to determine which source for Apelles’ teaching is more accurate. 
 The next figure of interest in the Refutatio is Cerinthus.26 It begins its discussion 
of Cerinthus by noting that he taught that the world was not made by the “first [god], but 
by a certain power (δυνάμεώς) which had been separated (κεχωρισμένης) from the power 
(ἐξουσίας) which is above all and which is ignorant of the God who is above all.”27 In 
many ways, this teaching resembles Gnostic formulations wherein the demiurge is 
                                                 
24 Eusebius, EH 5.13.2. 
25 Eusebius, EH 5.13.3. 
26 Eusebius mentions Cerinthus a few times in the Ecclesiastical History. See EH, 3.28, 4.14, 7.25. 
With regard to Cerinthus, Eusebius is not concerned with any of the same issues as the author of the 
Refutatio. Eusebius’ overriding concerns regarding Cerinthus have to do with issues of chiliasm and the 
proper conception of the Kingdom of Christ. 





ignorant of the fact that there is a higher God. However, it is interesting to note that 
Cerinthus does not appear to have argued that another god created the world; rather a 
“power” did so. Although the account is too brief to offer anything definitive, the fact 
that Cerinthus calls the creator a “power” could be the result of his impulse to protect 
monotheism.28  
The Refutatio accuses Cerinthus of denying the virgin birth and teaching that 
Jesus was born of Mary and Joseph in a way similar to all humans.29 Cerinthus held that 
the Christ descended upon Jesus in the form of a dove at the baptism. Furthermore, he 
allegedly taught that this Christ left Jesus after the passion but that the Christ did not 
suffer because he was πνευματικόν.30 This sort of teaching is what Harnack wishes to 
identify by his “dynamistic monarchian” label.31 Immediately after this treatment of 
Cerinthus, the Refutatio claims that the Ebionites held views of Jesus that were similar to 
those of Cerinthus.32 Although the Refutatio does not alert us to the motivations of his 
teaching about Christ, Cerinthus’ teaching effectively protects a strict understanding of 
the uniqueness of God. He does not use the exact wording, but Cerinthus’ teaching is 
                                                 
28 What I mean by this is that certain strands of Gnosticism had an impulse to be monotheistic, or 
at least monistic. By saying a power created, Cerinthus is able to avoid positing the existence of another 
god, if that was his intention. See John Dillon, “Monotheism in the Gnostic Tradition,” in Pagan 
Monotheism in Late Antiquity, ed. Polymnia Athanassiadi and Michael Frede (Oxford; New York: 
Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 1999), 69–79. Note also that in 10.21.1, the Refutatio reports 
that Cerinthus thinks the demiurgic power is “angelic.” 
29 Refutatio 10.21.2: Τὸν δὲ Ἰησοῦν λέγει μὴ ἐκ παρθένου γεγεν<ν>ῆσθαι, γεγονέναι δὲ αὐτὸν ἐξ 
Ἰωσὴφ καὶ Μαρίας υἱὸν, ὁμοίως τοῖς λοιποῖς <ἅπασιν> ἀνθρώποις. See also 7.33.1.  
30 Refutatio 10.21.3; 7.33.2. 
31 For Harnack’s naming schema of “modalistic” and “dynamistic” monarchianism, see History of 
Dogma, trans. Neil Buchanan (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1907), 3.13; idem, “Monarchianism,” 
in The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge, ed. Samuel Macauley Jackson and 
George William Gilmore (Grand Rapids, Mich: Baker, 1963), 7.454. 





almost identical to the “mere man” Christologies I discussed earlier. In his scheme, Jesus 
is nothing more than a human upon whom Christ descends. Jesus is certainly not 
presented as divine.33 This scheme, too, may be the result of an impulse to protect 
monotheism. 
 Immediately following its discussion of the Ebionites, the Refutatio examines the 
teachings of Theodotus, who is important for its later discussions of Zephyrinus and 
Callistus. According to the Refutatio, Theodotus taught that Jesus was similar to all 
humans, except that he was born of a virgin by the will of God. Like Cerinthus, he is 
accused of teaching that the Christ descended upon Jesus in the form of a dove at his 
baptism. The Refutatio then reports that the followers of Theodotus expanded on this 
doctrine and taught that before the descent of the Christ onto Jesus, the latter’s “powers” 
were inoperative. The Refutatio takes Theodotus’ position to be a denial of the divinity of 
Christ.34 
 After Theodotus, the Refutatio examines the teachings of the Montanists. At first 
it gives a standard account of Montanism springing from Montanus, Maximilla, and 
Priscilla; but then it states that there were other Montanists who followed the teachings of 
Noetus.35 It states that these Noetian Montanists held that the same one is both Son and 
                                                 
33 The Refutatio does not clarify whether the descending Christ is divine or what the precise 
relationship between the Christ and Jesus is. 
34 Refutatio 10.23.1-2: Θεόδοτος (δὲ) ὁ Βυζάντιος εἰσηγήσατο αἵρεσιν τοιάνδε, φάσκων τὰ μὲν 
ὅλα ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄντως θεοῦ γεγονέναι, τὸν δὲ Χριστόν, ὁμοίως τοῖς προειρημένοις γνωστικοῖς, φάσκει 
τοιούτῳ τινὶ τρόπῳ πεφηνέναι. Εἶναι μὲν τὸν Ἰησοῦν ἄνθρωπον κ(οι)νὸν πᾶσιν, ἐν δὲ τούτῳ διαφέρειν, ὅτι 
κατὰ βουλὴν θεοῦ γεγένηται ἐκ παρθένου, ἐπισκιάσαντος τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος <τ>ὸν ἐν τῇ παρθένῳ 
σαρκωθέντ(α)· ὕστερον δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ βαπτίσματος κατεληλυθέναι τὸν Χριστὸν ἐπὶ τὸν Ἰησοῦν ἐν εἴδει 
περιστερᾶς. ὅθεν φησὶ μὴ πρότερον «τὰς δυνάμεις <ἐν> αὐτῷ ἐνεργηθῆναι». θεὸν δὲ οὐκ εἶναι τὸν Χριστὸν 
θέλει. καὶ τοιαῦτα <δὴ καὶ> Θεόδοτος. See also 7.35. 





Father, seen and unseen, begotten and unbegotten, etc.36 Antithetical pairings of this sort 
recur in the Refutatio’s accounts of Heraclitus, Noetus, and Callistus. There is some 
question about the relationship of monarchianism and Montanism, but a full exploration 
of this matter is beyond the scope of the current chapter.37  
The Refutatio often mentions Zephyrinus in its accounts of the theology of Noetus 
and Callistus, but it seldom describes what Zephyrinus actually taught. In its account, 
Zephyrinus is portrayed as a dull and servile man: an “ignorant and illiterate individual, 
and one unskilled in ecclesiastical definitions.”38 The author of the Refutatio also reports 
that Zephyrinus was bent to the will of Callistus by means of bribes.39 Later, he expands 
this portrait of Zephyrinus and presents him as oblivious to the designs of Callistus.40 
According to the author of the Refutatio, Zephyrinus is merely an instrument in the 
transmission of the Noetian teaching. As the author of the Refutatio presents it, it is 
because of his weakness that Noetian teaching gained a foothold in the church in Rome.41 
                                                 
36 Hippolytus, Refutatio 10.26.1: <τὸν> αὐτὸν εἶναι υἱὸν καὶ πατέρα λέγοντες, ὁρατὸν καὶ 
ἀόρατον, γεννητὸν καὶ ἀγέννητον, θνητὸν καὶ ἀθάνατον, τούτων τὰς ἀφορμὰς ἀπὸ Νοητοῦ τινος λαβόντες. 
37 For a short discussion about similarities between Montanism and the teaching of Noetus, see 
Alistair Stewart-Sykes, “The Asian Context of the New Prophecy and of Epistula Apostolorum,” Vigiliae 
Christianae 51, no. 4 (1997): 432–3. Note also that one of Tertullian’s main complaints against Praxeas 
was that he was instrumental in getting Montanism expelled from Rome. He writes, “Thus Praxeas at Rome 
managed two pieces of the devil's business: he drove out prophecy and introduced heresy: he put to flight 
the Paraclete and crucified the Father.” See Adversus Praxean 1.5 (trans. Evans, 131). If Tertullian can be 
trusted here, monarchianism and Montanism appear to be incompatible. We should thus proceed with 
caution when assessing the Refutatio’s claims here. 
38 Refutatio 9.11.1 (trans. ANF 5:128): ἄνδρα ἰδιώτην καὶ ἀγράμματον καὶ ἄπειρον τῶν 
ἐκκλησιαστικῶν ὅρων. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Refutatio 9.12.14. 
41 The author of the Refutatio is never clear about the extent to which monarchian teaching 
pervaded the church in Rome. He does not clarify whether it was actively propounded by the leaders of the 





It is difficult to isolate monarchian teachings in the Refutatio because of the 
highly polemical and tendentious nature of the work. Furthermore, the author of the 
Refutatio has placed these portraits of monarchianism near the end of his genealogy of 
heresy. This placement of key sections on monarchianism at the end of the work enables 
the author of the Refutatio to stylize the monarchians so that they appear to be derivative 
from the philosophers and “heretics” surveyed earlier in the work. Nevertheless, there are 
a few dense sections where the Refutatio addresses monarchianism directly. The tenor of 
these passages is quite different than similar passages in Contra Noetum and Adversus 
Praxean. There are brief glimpses into monarchian teaching, but they are planted in a 
forest of ad hominem caricatures. Even this fragmentary evidence is important because it 
gives us a view into a Roman monarchianism that probably postdates Contra Noetum by 
some twenty years. 
One God 
 As in the earlier accounts, the monarchian concern to defend the unity of God is 
readily apparent in the Refutatio. The first indication of this fact is seen an episode in the 
Refutatio where Callistus urges Zephyrinus to confess, “I know that there is one God, 
Jesus Christ; nor except Him do I know any other that is begotten and amenable to 
suffering.' And on another occasion, when he would make the following statement: 'The 
Father did not die, but the Son.’”42 Whether we should trust the Refutatio regarding the 
machinations of Callistus, the statement it attributes to Zephyrinus rings true because the 
                                                 
42 Refutatio 9.11.3 (trans. ANF 5:128): «ἐγὼ οἶδα ἕνα θεὸν Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν, καὶ πλὴν αὐτοῦ 





statement so neatly encapsulates the central concern that the monarchians tried to 
address: the maintenance of a strict view of monotheism while simultaneously confessing 
that Jesus is God. 
 The second statement that the Refutatio attributes to Zephyrinus, that the Son 
died, not the Father, also seems possible, even though it appears to contradict the earlier 
claim that the one God was “amenable to suffering.” Already in Tertullian’s Adversus 
Praxean we saw variance about whether the Father suffered—a seemingly necessary 
consequence of arguing that the Father and Son are one and the same.43 In the above 
quotation, it appears as though Zephyrinus was willing to admit a certain (albeit limited) 
distinction between Father and Son in order to protect the Father from suffering. 
 Immediately following this passage, the author of the Refutatio notes that both 
Zephyrinus and Callistus accused him of being a ditheist (δίθεοί ἐστε) because he would 
not consent to their teaching.44 Despite the seeming concession to protect the Father from 
suffering, the monarchians continued to maintain that their opponents where ditheists. A 
short while later, the Refutatio gives what appears to be a direct quotation from Callistus: 
“‘I will not,’ he says, ‘say two gods, Father and Son, but one.’”45 Callistus here is 
protecting himself against the very things he accuses his opponents of. 
 The author of the Refutatio even works this strict understanding of the uniqueness 
of God into his claims about monarchian teachings being derived from the philosophy of 
Heraclitus. He has Heraclitus urging that it is proper to believe that “all things are one” 
                                                 
43 See Adversus Praxean 27-29. Note again that this equivocation could reveal different 
chronological strata of monarchianism as well as possible geographical variation. 
44 Refutatio 9.12.16. 





(ἓν πάντα εἶναι).46 According to the Refutatio, Heraclitus teaches that the oneness of all 
things includes contrary pairs such as visible and invisible: “In this manner, Heraclitus 
assigns to the visible an equality of position and honour with the invisible, as if what was 
visible and what was invisible were confessedly some one thing.”47 It is probably no 
mistake that the author of the Refutatio claims that Heraclitus taught that the invisible and 
visible were one thing, for this assertion is commonly attributed to monarchians.48 
Although the term μοναρχία does not appear in Contra Noetum, it makes a single 
perplexing appearance in the Refutatio, where the latter reports that Noetus “thinks to 
establish the monarchy, saying that the Father and Son are one and the same….”49 There 
are a few possible reasons for this appearance. First, as Gabino Uríbarri Bilbao has 
suggested, the term might not occur in Contra Noetum because it was not a key term for 
those whom we now call monarchians. It could have been a pejorative label that was 
mockingly applied to groups for whom it was not an important term.50 On the other hand, 
I think Simonetti’s hypothesis about the absence of the term in Novatian’s De Trinitate 
also gives a plausible explanation of the absence of the term in Contra Noetum. Simonetti 
argued that the term was absent from De Trinitate because Novatian knew how important 
                                                 
46 Refutatio 9.9.1.  
47 Refutatio 9.10.1 (trans. ANF 5:126): Οὕτως <οὖν> Ἡράκλειτος ἐν ἴσῃ μοίρᾳ τίθεται καὶ τιμᾷ τὰ 
ἐμφανῆ τοῖς ἀφανέσιν, ὡς ἕν τι τὸ ἐμφανὲς καὶ τὸ ἀφανὲς ὁμολογουμένως ὑπάρχον· 
48 See Mouraviev’s detailed discussion of the relationship between Heraclitus’ teaching and the 
successors of Noetus: Mouraviev, “Hippolyte, Héraclite et Noët,” 4386–4402. 
49 Refutatio 9.10.11 (trans. mine): οὕτως γοῦν δοκεῖ μοναρχίαν συνιστᾶν, ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φάσκων 
ὑπάρχειν πατέρα καὶ υἱόν…. 
50 See Gabino Uríbarri Bilbao, Monarquía y Trinidad: El concepto teológico “monarchia” en la 
controversia “monarquiana,” Publicaciones de la Universidad Pontificia Comillas Madrid, Serie I: 






them term was for his opponents and, therefore, intentionally avoided it.51 Whether the 
term enjoyed widespread (or any) use by all of those whom I label monarchians, the 
author of the Refutatio suggests that Noetus at least used it to signify a strong conception 
of the unity of God.52 
The Refutatio presents Callistus as having a concern, like Noetus and Zephyrinus, 
to maintain the unity of God. After saying that Callistus corroborated the heresy of the 
Noetians, the Refutatio claims that he “confesses that there is one God, the Father and 
creator of all.”53 This statement parallels the beginning of the Refutatio’s demonstration 
of truth and its portrayal of Jewish beliefs. Concerning the Jews, it says, “And they affirm 
that there is one God, and that He is Creator and Lord of the universe: that He has formed 
all these glorious works which had no previous existence; and this, too, not out of any 
coeval substance that lay ready at hand, but wishing to create, He did create.”54 The 
author of the Refutatio begins his own demonstration of truth similarly: “The first and 
only (one God), both Creator and Lord of all, had nothing coeval with Himself; not 
infinite chaos, nor measureless water, nor solid earth, nor dense air, not warm fire, nor 
refined spirit, nor the azure canopy of the stupendous firmament. But He was One, alone 
                                                 
51 See, for example, Manlio Simonetti, “Monarchia e Trinità: Alcune osservazioni su un libro 
recente,” Rivista di storia e letteratura religiosa 33, no. 3 (1997): 628. Simonetti articulated this theory in 
response to Uríbarri Bilbao’s thesis. Note also that if Simonetti is right about Novatian, the latter takes the 
approach opposite to that of Tertullian, who seeks to wrest his opponents’ key terms and verses from them 
and to use them to support his own position. 
52 This attribution is not nearly as striking as that in Adversus Praxean 3.1-2, where the Praxeans 
seem to use it as a battle cry: “We hold to the monarchy” (monarchiam tenemus).  
53 Refutatio 10.27.3: ἕνα εἶναι θεὸν τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν δημιουργὸν τοῦ παντός· 
54 Refutatio 9.30.1 (trans. ANF 5:138 with my modifications): καὶ τὸν μὲν θεὸν ἕνα εἶ(ν)αι 
λέγουσι, δημιουργόν τε τοῦ παντὸς καὶ κ(ύριον), ποιήσ(α)ντα πάντα οὐ πρότερον ὄντ(α), οὐδὲ ἔκ τινος 





in Himself.”55 Nothing about the above claim attributed to Callistus is necessarily 
offensive for the author of the Refutatio. The problem for the author is the way the 
monarchians parsed this claim out, as will become clear in the next section. Although it is 
not uncommon for statements of faith to start with an affirmation of belief in one God, 
the strength and repetition of our author’s claims is striking. These strong affirmations of 
the unity of God countered the frequent monarchian accusation of ditheism.  
Father and Son 
 As in the previous accounts, the identification of the Father and Son was one of 
the key byproducts of the monarchian affirmation of the unity of God. The Refutatio’s 
account of Noetus’ teaching expresses this identification poignantly and is worth quoting 
fully: 
Now, that Noetus affirms that the Son and Father are the same, no one is ignorant. 
But he makes his statement thus: "When indeed, then, the Father had not been 
born, he yet was justly styled Father; and when it pleased him to undergo 
generation, having been begotten, he himself became his own Son, not another's.” 
For in this manner he thinks to establish the monarchy, alleging that Father and 
Son,are one and the same, not one individual produced from a different one, but 
himself from himself; and that he is styled by name Father and Son, according to 
vicissitude of times. But that he is one who has appeared, both having submitted 
to generation from a virgin, and as a man having held converse among men. And, 
on account of the birth that had taken place, he confessed himself to those 
beholding him a Son, no doubt; yet he made no secret to those who could 
comprehend him of his being a Father. That this person suffered by being fastened 
to the tree, and that he commended his spirit unto himself, having died, and not 
having died. And he raised himself up on the third day, after having been interred 
in a sepulchre, and wounded with a spear, and perforated with nails. Cleomenes 
asserts, in common with his band of followers, that this person is God and Father 
                                                 
55 Refutatio 10.32.1 (trans. ANF 5:150): Θεὸς εἷς, ὁ πρῶτος καὶ μόνος καὶ ἁπάντων ποιητὴς καὶ 
κύριος, σύγχρονον ἔσχεν οὐδέν· οὐ χάος ἄπειρον, οὐχ ὕδωρ ἀμέτρητον, οὐ γῆν στερράν, οὐκ ἀέρα πυκνόν, 






of the universe, and thus introduces among many an obscurity (of thought) such 
as we find in the philosophy of Heraclitus.56 
 
In Contra Noetum and some sections of Adversus Praxean, the Father and Son were 
clearly identified; and their identification was strongly grounded in exegesis. In the 
Refutatio’s account of Noetus, however, the identification of the Father and Son is more 
complex.57 The Refutatio claims that the Noetians taught that God appeared differently 
depending on the “changing of the times” (κατὰ χρόνων τροπήν). In this schema, the 
names are merely convenient descriptors, and they all refer to the one, undivided God.58 
There is no underlying reality within the Godhead that corresponds to the different 
names. There is one God who appears in different ways at different times, and this is 
precisely the sort of teaching that prompts many scholars to use the term “modalism.” 
 Although this focus on the applicability of names being determined by the 
changing of the times adds a new dimension to the monarchian position, there are still 
vestiges of a simple identification of the Father and Son. Here, as in the preceding 
                                                 
56 Refutatio 9.10.11-12 (trans. ANF 5:127-128 with my modifications): Ὅτι δὲ καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν υἱὸν 
εἶναι λέγει καὶ πατέρα, οὐδεὶς ἀγνοεῖ· λέγει γὰρ οὕτως· ὅτε μὲν οὖν μὴ <γε>γένητο ὁ πατήρ, δικαίως πατὴρ 
προσηγόρευτο· ὅτε δὲ ηὐδόκησε γένεσιν <ἐκ παρθένου> ὑπομεῖναι, γεν<ν>(η)θεὶς ὁ <πατὴρ> υἱὸς ἐγένετο 
αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ, οὐχ ἑτέρου. οὕτως γοῦν δοκεῖ μοναρχίαν συνιστᾶν, ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φάσκων ὑπάρχειν πατέρα 
καὶ υἱόν, γινόμενον οὐχ ἕτερον ἐξ ἑτέρου, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ· ὀνόματι μὲν πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν καλούμενον 
κατὰ χρόνων τροπήν, ἕνα δὲ <ὄντα καὶ> τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν φανέντα, καὶ γένεσιν ἐκ παρθένου ὑπομείναντα, 
καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπο(ις) ἄνθρωπον ἀναστραφέντα· υἱὸν μὲν <γὰρ> ἑαυτὸν τοῖς ὁρῶσιν ὁμολογοῦντα διὰ τὴν 
γενομένην γένεσιν, πατέρα δὲ <ὄντα> [εἶναι] καὶ τοῖς χωροῦσιν (μ)ὴ ἀποκρύψαντα. <καὶ> τοῦτον <εἶναι 
τὸν> πάθει <προσελθόντα καὶ> ξύλῳ προσπαγ(έ)ντα καὶ ἑαυτῷ τὸ πνεῦμα παραδόντα· <τὸν> ἀποθανόντα 
καὶ μὴ ἀποθανόντα καὶ ἑαυτὸν τῇ τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ ἀναστήσαντα· τὸν ἐν μνημείῳ ταφέντα καὶ λόγχῃ τρωθέντα 
καὶ ἥλοις καταπαγέντα. τοῦτον <οὖν> τὸν τῶν ὅλων θεὸν καὶ πατέρα <υἱὸν> εἶναι λέγει Κλεομένης καὶ ὁ 
τούτου χορός, Ἡρακλείτειον σκότος ἐπεισάγοντες πολλοῖς. 
57 Mouraviev’s detailed analysis of the difference between the Refutatio’s presentation of the 
theology of Noetus and that of his followers is helpful here. Mouraviev, “Hippolyte, Héraclite et Noët.” 
58 The scheme that the Refutatio presents here is what is typically referred to as “modalism,” and it 
is easy to see how the term developed to describe this theology. The Greek τρόπος comes from the verb 
τρέπω, which can mean “to turn.” The Latin modus translates the Greek τρόπος. Thus, the development of 
the term Modalism by scholars is not completely without foundation. The problem with the term, however, 





accounts, we see the nearly ubiquitous monarchian phrase asserting that the Father and 
Son are “one and the same” (ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φάσκων ὑπάρχειν πατέρα καὶ υἱόν). The 
phrase continues with a further clarification that uses the same sort of language present in 
the earlier treatises. We are told that the names Father and Son, especially with regard to 
the incarnation, do not reveal two, but rather the same one: “not one coming to be from 
another, but himself from himself” (γινόμενον οὐχ ἕτερον ἐξ ἑτέρου, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸν ἐξ 
ἑαυτοῦ). 
 This explicit denial that the incarnation entails two, one and another, draws 
together strands that we have already seen in monarchian theology. First, the rejection of 
“one and another” could be an allusion to the passages from Exodus and Isa. 44-45 that 
featured prominently in the monarchian theology in Contra Noetum and Adversus 
Praxean. Contra Noetum claims that the Noetians use an amalgam of passages from 
Exodus as follows, “He said in the law, ‘I am the God of your fathers; you shall not have 
any gods other than me’” (Εἶπεν ἐν νόμῳ, Ἐγὼ εἰμὶ ὁ Θεὸς τῶν πατέρων ὑμῶν· οὐκ 
ἔσονται ὑμῖν θεοὶ ἕτεροι πλὴν ἐμοῦ).59 The strong rejection of the use of ἕτερος when 
discussing the names Father and Son echoes the biblical expressions of monotheism that 
deny the existence of θεοὶ ἕτεροι.60 Thus, while the author of the Refutatio has tried to 
expunge any trace of scripture from the theology of his opponents, this usage of ἕτερος 
might very well bear the marks of the earlier interpretive trajectory.61 
                                                 
59 Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 2.1. This quotation is a combination of Gen. 46:3 (or Ex. 3:6) with 
Ex. 20:3.  
60 Note also that this approach could be a reaction to Justin’s theology in the Dialogue with 
Trypho. Justin unabashedly referred to the Son as another God. See, for example, Justin Martyr, Dialogue 
with Trypho 56.4. 
61 Hübner has also argued that there is an allusion to Baruch 3:36-38 in Refutatio 9.10.11, where 





Second, this rejection of the assertion that Father and Son are “one thing and 
another” might be directly aimed at the sort of expression we find in the demonstration of 
truth in Contra Noetum. There, Hippolytus argues that when the Logos was made 
manifest in the creation of the world, “another stood beside the Father” (καὶ οὕτως αὐτῷ 
παρίστατο ἕτερος).62 Hippolytus quickly goes on to clarify, “but when saying ‘another,’ I 
am not saying two gods” (ἕτερον δὲ λέγων οὐ δύο θεοὺς λέγω).63 For Hippolytus, the use 
of ἕτερος was important to ensure proper distinction between the Father and Son. He did 
not use ἕτερος indiscriminately, and his immediate qualification was probably meant to 
affirm with the passages from Exodus and Isaiah that there are not ἕτεροι θεοὶ. Insofar as 
this formulaic use of ἕτερος in the Refutatio responds directly to the theology of the early 
anti-monarchian writers, it seems to be authentic. 
The Refutatio’s report on Noetus’ teaching at times seems to suggest the absurdity 
of the claims of the Noetians. It is unclear if this absurdity was in fact part of the Noetian 
teaching, or if it is the work of our author’s imagination. For example, the claim that the 
Father became his own Son in the incarnation gives the whole account a farcical feel.64 
                                                 
solid case here, as there is a strong similarity with συνανεστραφείς in the quotation of Baruch 3:36-38 in 
Contra Noetum 2.5. See Reinhard M Hübner, “Der antivalentinianische Charakter der Theologie des Noët 
von Smyrna,” in Der Paradox Eine: Antignostischer Monarchianismus im zweiten Jahrhundert (Leiden; 
Boston: Brill, 1999), 115–8. See also Elena Cavalcanti’s brief discussion of the use of Baruch 3:36-38 prior 
to the Arian controversy: “Osservazioni sull’uso patristico di Baruch 3, 36-38,” in Mémorial Dom Jean 
Gribomont (1920-1986), Studia ephemeridis Augustinianum 27 (Roma: Institutum Patristicum 
“Augustinianum,” 1988), 145–9. The fact that this seeming verbal parallel has made it into the Refutatio 
shows how difficult it would have been for the author of the Refutatio to remove any traces of the biblical 
exegesis that underwrote monarchian theology. Furthermore, the presence of this apparent allusion to 
Baruch 3:36-38 in the Refutatio is particularly damaging to Decker’s claim that the Monarchian exegesis in 
Contra Noetum is a polemical invention of Hippolytus. This apparent allusion demonstrates that it was 
woven into the fabric of their theology. See Decker, “Die Monarchianer,” 156–7. 
62 Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 11.1. 
63 Ibid. 





Perhaps this was the actual teaching of the Noetians. It seems more likely, however, that 
this sentence is the product of our author’s tendentious imagination, even if it was built 
upon actual monarchian theology.65 
Visible and Invisible 
 The issue of God’s visibility was still a prominent feature in monarchian teaching 
when the Refutatio was written, probably because, as I suggested earlier, questions about 
the visibility of God were important for those who argued that it was the Logos who was 
visible in the theophanies of the Old Testament.66 The importance of these questions for 
the Refutatio’s opponents is clear in the section where the Refutatio explicitly seeks to 
show that the Noetians derive their teaching from the philosophy of Heraclitus. It states, 
For they advance statements after this manner—that one and the same God is the 
Creator and Father of all things; and that when it pleased him, he nevertheless 
appeared, (though invisible,) to just men of old. For when He is not seen He is 
invisible; and He is incomprehensible when He does not wish to be 
comprehended, but comprehensible when he is comprehended.67 
 
The author of the Refutatio is clearly presenting the Noetian teaching in pairings of 
contraries, which he views as absurd. Althrough the author of the Refutatio is clearly 
                                                 
65 The reports about monarchian positions in the Refutatio lack the sort of subtlety such positions 
probably would have had in their original form. The author of the Refutatio seems determined to show that 
his opponents were ridiculous, even if it means distorting some of the details. 
66 In some contexts, the claim that the Logos appeared in the theophanies could be used to support 
claims that the Logos was divine and that the Logos was distinct from the Father. 
67 Refutatio 9.10.9-10 (trans. ANF 5:127): λέγουσι γὰρ οὕτως· ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν θεὸν εἶναι <τὸν> 
πάντων δημιουργὸν καὶ <τὸν> πατέρα, εὐδοκήσαντα μὲν πεφηνέναι τοῖς ἀρχῆθεν δικαίοις, ὄντα <δὲ> 
ἀόρατον. ὅτε μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ὁρᾶται, ἐστὶν ἀόρατος, <ὅτε δὲ ὁρᾶται, ὁρατός· καὶ> ἀχώρητος μὲν ὅτε μὴ 
χωρεῖσθαι θέλει, χωρητὸς δὲ ὅτε χωρεῖται· Note here that we see the use of Father without any correlation 
to a son. As in 1 Clement in the first chapter, this usage of the title Father seems tied to creation rather than 





reshaping the Noetian teaching to fit it into a Heraclitean paradigm, the core assertions 
about visibility and invisibility match up with earlier accounts of monarchianism.68 
 In the Refutatio’s later discussion of Noetus’ teaching, similar notions about the 
visibility of God are reported; but this time, they do not seem to be forced into the 
Heraclitean paradigm of paired contraries. The Refutatio states, “Noetus asserts that there 
is one Father and God of the universe, and that He made all things, and was imperceptible 
to those that exist when He might so desire. Noetus maintained that the Father then 
appeared when He wished; and He is invisible when He is not seen, but visible when He 
is seen.”69 Like the earlier discussion of the names Father and Son, whether God is 
visible seems to depend on the vicissitudes of the times or the will of the deity. There is 
no distinction between God and the Logos on the basis of visibility as there was for 
someone like Justin. 
 The author of the Refutatio records some of Callistus’ teaching regarding the 
visibility of God. In the first passage of interest, the Refutatio states,  
And he adds, that this is what has been declared by the Saviour: “Believest thou 
not that I am in the Father, and the Father in me?” For that which is seen, which is 
man, he considers to be the Son; whereas the Spirit, which was contained in the 
Son, to be the Father. “For,” says (Callistus), “I will not profess belief in two 
Gods, Father and Son, but in one. For the Father, who comes to be out of Himself, 
after He had taken unto Himself our flesh, raised it to the nature of Deity, by 
bringing it into union with Himself, and made it one; so that Father and Son must 
                                                 
68 Hübner claims that the sort of antitheses we see in this passage were part of Noetus’ early anti-
Gnostic rule of faith and that they were then adopted by Ignatius, Melito, Tertullian, and others who post-
dated Noetus. Hübner’s contention that monarchian use of antithetical statements about God might be anti-
Gnostic seems possible, but his revisionist dating of Noetus and Ignatius is untenable. See especially 
Hübner’s two essays on Melito and Ignatius in relation to Noetus: Reinhard M Hübner, “Melito von Sardes 
und Noët von Smyrna,” in Der Paradox Eine, 1–37; idem, “Die Ignatianen und Noët von Smyrna,” in Der 
Paradox Eine, 131–206. 
69 Refutatio 10.27.1-2 (trans. ANF 5:148): λέγων ἕνα <εἶναι θεὸν> τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν τῶν ὅλων 
<δημιουργόν> [τοῦτον πάντα πεποιηκότα]· ἀφανῆ μὲν <γὰρ> τοῖς ἀνθρώποις γεγονέναι ὅτε ἠβούλετο, 





be styled one God, and that this Person being one, cannot be two, and thus that the 
Father suffered with the Son.70 
 
The most interesting feature about his passage is the fact that the author of the Refutatio 
has shown that his opponent used Scripture to support his positions. Even though nearly 
all of the biblical exegesis of his opponents has been expurgated, this one key passage 
(John 14:11) manages to make an appearance. 
 In this passage, Callistus espouses a view that is more akin to psilanthropist views 
than the sort of monarchianism we see in Contra Noetum and Adversus Praxean. Instead 
of the traditional monarchian assertion that the Father is the Son, Callistus reportedly says 
that the Father was in the Son. He even qualifies and says that the Son is the human 
(ἄνθρωπος). The passage quoted above is immediately followed by an attempt to guard 
the Father from the bald assertion that he suffered and died, and it appears that the 
concern with the suffering of the Father is what drives Callistus’ position on the visibility 
of the Son and seeming invisibility of the Father. Here, the visible Son is not properly 
divine; he is, rather, an ἄνθρωπος who is deified by the Father. This passage clearly 
demonstrates the ways in which Callistus modified earlier and simpler monarchian 
teaching.71  
                                                 
70 Refutatio 9.12.17-18 (trans. ANF 5:130 with my modifications): καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ εἰρημένον· 
«οὐ πιστεύεις ὅτι ἐγὼ ἐν τῷ πατρὶ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἐν ἐμοί;» τὸ μὲν γὰρ βλεπόμενον, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, 
τοῦτο εἶναι τὸν υἱόν, τ(ὸ) δὲ ἐν τῷ υἱῷ χωρηθὲν πνεῦμα, τοῦτ<ο> εἶναι τὸν πατέρα. οὐ γάρ, φησίν, ἐρῶ δύο 
θεούς, πατέρα καὶ υἱόν, ἀλλ’ ἕνα· ὁ γὰρ ἐξ <ἑ>αυτοῦ γενόμενος πατήρ, προσλαβόμενος τὴν σάρκα 
ἐθεοποίησεν <αὐτὴν> ἑνώσας ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἐποίησεν ἕν, ὡς καλεῖσθαι πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν ἕνα θεόν. καὶ τοῦτο, 
ἓν ὂν πρόσωπον, μὴ δύνασθαι εἶν(αι) δύο, καὶ οὕτως τὸν πατέρα συμπεπονθέναι τῷ υἱῷ. 
71 The theology present here could also be motivation for the Refutatio’s depiction of Callistus as 





Despite the allegedly Noetian underpinnings of his theology, Callistus’ distinctive 
developments of monarchian theology appear in another passage. The Refutatio states 
that Callistus believes  
that He who was seen in the flesh and was arrested is Son, but that the Father is 
[the Spirit] who dwells in Him. Callistus thus at one time branches off into the 
opinion of Noetus, but at another into that of Theodotus, and holds no sure 
doctrine. These, then, are the opinions of Callistus.72 
 
This belief offers a sharp contrast to the teaching that the Refutatio earlier ascribed to 
Noetus. For Noetus, the one God was visible, sometimes revealed as Father, sometimes 
as Son. Callistus, as in the passage in the immediately preceding paragraph, seems to be 
making some sort of distinction between the Father and Son. Callistus distinguishes 
between God (the Father) and a human (the Son), so this distinction does not imperil 
Callistus’ commitment to the uniqueness of God. The fact that the visibility of God is 
again closely tied to the suffering of the Son indicates some of the potential motivations 
for the development. As Heine has argued, Callistus had a strong aversion to the 
straightforward patripassianism of the earlier monarchians.73 He suggests that Callistus 
used Stoic mixture theory in order to argue that the Father was in the (human) Son in 
such a manner that he could separate himself before the crucifixion and death of the 
(human) Son. Consequently, people see the flesh (body) of the human Jesus, not the 
Father himself. Callistus’ solution regarding the visibility of the Son allows him to say 
that the Father was invisible without having to sacrifice his strong claims about the unity 
of God. The resulting development is something of a hybrid of pure monarchianism and 
                                                 
72 Refutatio 10.27.4 (trans. ANF 5:148 with my modifications): καὶ τὸν μὲν κατὰ σάρκα ὁρώμενον 
καὶ κρατούμενον υἱὸν εἶναι θέλει, τὸ δὲ <αὐτῷ> ἐνοικοῦν <πνεῦμα> πατέρα, ποτὲ μὲν τῷ Νοητοῦ δόγματι 
προσρηγν(ύ)μενος, ποτὲ δὲ τῷ Θεοδότου, μηδέν <τε> ἀσφαλὲς κρατῶν. ταῦτα τοίνυν <καὶ> Κάλλιστος. 





psilanthropism. This development also seems to avoid the critique by the Refutatio that it 
is unintelligible to say that the one God is both visible and invisible, passible and 
impassible. Within Callistus’ teaching, at least as presented in the Refutatio, Jesus can 
only be said to be divine in a qualified sense. For Callistus, Jesus would have been divine 
only as long as the Father continued to remain with or in him. 
Suffered and Died 
 My discussion of Contra Noetum and Adversus Praxean has shown that the 
question of whether the Father suffered became increasingly acute in the development of 
monarchianism. Callistus’ teaching on the visibility of God and its linkage to issues of 
patripassianism shows that the concern with patripassianism instigated development 
away from the simpler forms of monarchian teaching. The changing attitude toward 
straightforward patripassianism is evident within the account of the Refutatio. In order to 
make the development explicit, I will reexamine the Refutatio’s account of the Noetians 
before analyzing how Callistus modifies this earlier view.74 
 The first instance where the Refutatio discusses Noetus’ view of the suffering of 
the Father is of questionable reliability because it is in a section where the Noetian 
teaching is clearly being distorted to fit into the mold of Heraclitean philosophy. The 
Refutatio accuses the Noetians of teaching that the one God is “immortal and mortal” 
(ἀθάνατος καὶ θνητός), clearly the sort of antithetical statement that the Refutatio 
                                                 






suggested was representative of Heraclitus’ philosophy.75 The teaching itself does not 
seem too far afield for the Noetians, but the distinctly Heraclitean phrasing is suspect. 
 Just after the overtly Heraclitean wording, the Refutatio elaborates on Noetus’ 
teaching without forcing it into the philosopher’s alleged paradigm. Noetus claims that 
the one God underwent generation and became his own son; the one God was then 
crucified and handed his spirit over to himself; this same one who died did not die (<τὸν> 
ἀποθανόντα καὶ μὴ ἀποθανόντα) and raised himself on the third day.76 Here, Noetus 
allegedly attributes the full range of Christ’s human experience to the one God: birth, 
suffering, death, resurrection. Although he says that God died and did not die, he does not 
try to parcel this out between the Father and the Son. Noetus does not appear to have any 
aversion to saying that the Father suffered and died. In this regard, the Refutatio’s 
account squares with that of Contra Noetum. Later, the Refutatio similarly reports that 
Noetus taught that the Father was at one time unbegotten and at another begotten, at one 
time suffered and died while at another time did not suffer and die.77 While there seems 
to be contradiction here, Noetus does not hesitate to say that the Father, at certain times, 
did suffer. 
 The Refutatio’s presentation of Callistus’ teaching about the suffering of the 
Father is more complex than that of Noetus. The Refutatio reports that Callistus was 
willing to say that the Father became incarnate from the virgin: “And he affirms that the 
Spirit, which became incarnate in the virgin, is not different from the Father, but one and 
                                                 
75 Refutatio 9.10.10. 
76 Refutatio 9.10.11-12. 
77 Refutatio 10.27.2. It is possible that these two texts share a common distortion of Noetus’ 





the same.”78 In the Noetian schema, where there is a simple identification of the Father 
and Son, subjecting the Father to birth from the virgin would seem necessarily to entail 
the suffering of the Father. Callistus, however, employs a Stoicized conception of spirit in 
attempt to guard against the suffering of the Father.79 
 The Refutatio continues to lay out Callistus’ teaching, and I include the fuller 
context in the quotation here: 
Callistus alleges that the Logos Himself is Son, and that Himself is the Father; 
and that though denominated by the names “Son” and “Father,” yet that in reality 
He is one indivisible spirit. And he maintains that the Father is not one [thing] and 
the Son another, but that they are one and the same spirit; and that all things are 
full of the Divine Spirit, both those above and those below. And he affirms that 
the Spirit, which became incarnate in the virgin is not different from the Father, 
but one and the same. And he adds that this is what has been declared: “Believest 
though not that I am in the Father and the Father in me?” [Jn 14:11] For that 
which is seen, which is man, he considers to be the son; whereas the Spirit, which 
was contained in the Son, to be Father. “For,” says (Callistus), “I will not profess 
belief in two Gods, Father and Son, but in one. For the Father, having come to be 
from himself, after He had taken flesh, he deified it, bringing it into union with 
Himself, and made it one; so that Father and Son are styled one God, and that this 
Person being one, cannot be two.” And in this way Callistus contends that the 
Father suffered along with the Son; for he does not wish to assert that the Father 
suffered, and is one Person, being careful to avoid blasphemy against the Father. 
The senseless and knavish fellow, who improvises blasphemies in every direction, 
only that he alone might seem to speak according to the truth, and is not abashed 
at being at one time betrayed into the tenet of Sabellius, whereas at another into 
the doctrine of Theodotus.80 
                                                 
78 Refutatio 9.12.17. Heine rightly suggests that Callistus’ emphasis on Spirit in this passage 
probably indicates that it was a central concept for his linkage of the Father and Son (“The Christology of 
Callistus,” 64). 
79 See Manlio Simonetti’s discussion of Callistus’ use of a Stoic understanding of spirit in order to 
avoid patripassianism: “Il problema dell’unità di Dio a Roma da Clemente a Dionigi,” Rivista di storia e 
letteratura religiosa 22, no. 3 (1986): 455–6. 
80 Refutatio 9.12.16-19 (trans. ANF 5:130 with my modifications): λέγων τὸν Λόγον αὐτὸν εἶναι 
υἱόν, αὐτὸν καὶ πατέρα, ὀνόματι μὲν <υἱὸν καὶ πατέρα> καλούμενον, ἓν δὲ ὄν<τα>, τὸ πνεῦμα ἀδιαίρετον· 
οὐ <γὰρ> ἄλ<λ>ο <μὲν> εἶναι πατέρα, ἄλλο δὲ υἱόν, ἓν δὲ καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ <πνεῦμα> ὑπάρχειν. καὶ τὰ πάντα 
γέμειν τοῦ θείου πνεύματος, τά τε ἄνω καὶ <τὰ> κάτω. καὶ εἶναι τὸ ἐν τῇ παρθένῳ σαρκωθὲν πνεῦμα οὐχ 
ἕτερον παρὰ τὸν πατέρα, ἀλλὰ ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτό. καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ εἰρημένον· «οὐ πιστεύεις ὅτι ἐγὼ ἐν τῷ 
πατρὶ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἐν ἐμοί;» τὸ μὲν γὰρ βλεπόμενον, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, τοῦτο εἶναι τὸν υἱόν, τ(ὸ) δὲ ἐν 
τῷ υἱῷ χωρηθὲν πνεῦμα, τοῦτ<ο> εἶναι τὸν πατέρα. οὐ γάρ, φησίν, ἐρῶ δύο θεούς, πατέρα καὶ υἱόν, ἀλλ’ 
ἕνα· ὁ γὰρ ἐξ <ἑ>αυτοῦ γενόμενος πατήρ, προσλαβόμενος τὴν σάρκα ἐθεοποίησεν <αὐτὴν> ἑνώσας ἑαυτῷ 






This is a dense passage and needs to be analyzed carefully. The aspect of Callistus’ 
teaching that helps bring the above quotation into focus is that Callistus thought that the 
one God was “one indivisible spirit” (ἓν δὲ ὄν<τα>, τὸ πνεῦμα ἀδιαίρετον).81 For 
Callistus, the names Father and Son were both ways of referring to this one indivisible 
spirit. The incarnation, then, was a joining of this spirit to human flesh.82 As the 
discussion continues, it appears as though Callistus did not use the name “Son” 
consistently. At one point, the names Father and Son are both used to refer to the one 
divine spirit, and the particular name used is determined by the exigencies of the 
situation. In the quotation above, however, Callistus seems to use “Son” also to refer to 
the human Jesus, the flesh. Callistus says that the Father “suffered with the Son” 
(συμπεπονθέναι τῷ υἱῷ).83 This is motivated by the fact that Callistus did not want to say 
that the Father suffered (οὐ γὰρ θέλει λέγειν τὸν πατέ(ρα) πεπονθέναι). The operative 
difference here is that Callistus appears willing to admit that τὸν πατέ(ρα) 
συμπεπονθέναι, but not that τὸν πατέ(ρα) πεπονθέναι. For Callistus, suffering and 
                                                 
δύο, καὶ οὕτως τὸν πατέρα συμπεπονθέναι τῷ υἱῷ. οὐ γὰρ θέλει λέγειν τὸν πατέ(ρα) πεπονθέναι καὶ ἓν 
εἶναι πρόσωπον, <οὕτως νομίζων> ἐκφυγεῖν τὴν εἰς τὸν πατέρα βλασφημίαν ὁ ἀνόητος καὶ ποικίλος· ὃ<ς> 
ἄνω κάτω σχεδιάζων βλασφημίας, ἵνα μόνον κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν λέγειν δοκῇ, ποτὲ μὲν εἰς τὸ Σαβελλίου 
δόγμα ἐμπίπτων, ποτὲ δὲ εἰς τὸ Θεοδότου οὐκ αἰδεῖται. This passage raises a number of questions that must 
be bracketed for later: why do we see the introduction of πρόσωπον language in this passage? Was this 
language introduced by the author of the Refutatio or by Callistus? What does Callistus mean when he 
speaks of the Father bringing flesh into union with himself and making it one? Questions like these will 
require a treatment beyond the scope of this chapter. 
81 Refutatio 9.12.16. 
82 In other contexts, such an understanding of the incarnation was not problematical. For example, 
Tertullian considered spirit to be divinity. For him, the statement that spirit was joined to flesh was nothing 
more than an affirmation that divinity was joined to flesh. 





suffering with were two different things; the former was inappropriate for God, while the 
latter did not pose as much of a problem. 
Although he does not explicitly state it, the implication is that it was the Son who 
suffered. If Callistus were using “Son” consistently to refer to τὸ πνεῦμα ἀδιαίρετον,84 
the attribution of suffering to the Son but not the Father would be self-defeating, for the 
Father and the Son would be just different names for the same spirit. The equivocation in 
Callistus’ usage of “Son” elucidates the developments that were taking place within 
monarchianism. On the one hand, he uses traditional monarchian affirmations that the 
Father and the Son are the same.85 On the other hand, he wants to argue, in the manner of 
the psilanthropists, that the Son was only human in order to guard against the charge of 
patripassianism. Thus, Callistus uses traditional language to argue that the Father and Son 
were the same while moving away from the earlier claim that this argumentmeant that the 
Father suffered. Perhaps when he refers to the suffering of the Son, he is talking about the 
human Jesus to whom the indivisible spirit was joined, and from whom this same spirit 
could be separated to avoid suffering. 
The Refutatio accuses Callistus of vacillating between the teaching of Sabellius 
and Theodotus.86 If we can trust the account of the Refutatio, there is some truth to this 
accusation. At the same time, however, this alleged vacillation throws the enduring 
concern of the monarchians into stark relief: the protection of the unity and uniqueness of 
                                                 
84 Refutatio 9.12.16. 
85 The phrase he consistently uses for this idea is some variation of “ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτό.” Note the 
repetition of this phrase in 9.12.16-18. 
86 As I note shortly, it is very difficult to know what Sabellius taught. Our main reliable reference 
to him is Novatian, but he gives us a picture of Sabellian teaching that differs little from the core of 





God. At one time, Callistus can espouse simple monarchian teachings; at another, he can 
utilize psilanthropist elements to guard against accusations of patripassianism; but the 
impulse to protect a strong understanding of the unity and uniqueness of God underlies 
both of these Callistan theological positions.  
Novatian: De Trinitate 
Introduction 
 Novatian’s De Trinitate (De Trin.) was most likely composed between 240 and 
250 C.E.87 Because it postdates the other works considered in this chapter by twenty to 
thirty years, it provides valuable testimony regarding the perdurance of monarchian 
teaching in Rome. De Trin. was most likely written as a commentary on the local regula 
fidei, but Novatian spends a substantial amount of time defending the regula against any 
teachings that jeopardize its central tenets.88 Novatian’s primary concerns are to refute 
teachings that deny either the divinity or humanity of Christ and to refute monarchianism, 
                                                 
87 Russell J. DeSimone, “Introduction,” in The Trinity, The Spectacles, Jewish Foods, In Praise of 
Purity, Letters, The Fathers of the Church 67 (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1974), 
14; idem, The Treatise of Novatian, the Roman Presbyter on the Trinity: A Study of the Text and the 
Doctrine, Studia ephemeridis Augustinianum 4 (Rome: Institutum patristicum Augustinianum, 1970), 43–
4. In an earlier work, James Leonard Papandrea dates the work to the 240s C.E.: The Trinitarian Theology 
of Novatian of Rome: A Study in Third-Century Orthodoxy (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen, 2008), 43. 
Later, he suggests that it might have been written as early as the late 230s: Novatian of Rome and the 
Culmination of Pre-Nicene Orthodoxy, Princeton Theological Monograph Series 175 (Eugene, Ore.: 
Pickwick, 2012), 57–8. 
88 De Trin. begins with a reference to the “rule of truth,” and Novatian states explicitly in chapter 
21 that his purpose is to explain the “rule of truth” concerning Christ. DeSimone notes that De Trin. was 
almost certainly not the original title of the work. See Novatian, The Trinity, The Spectacles, Jewish Foods, 
In Praise of Purity, Letters, 23, n. 1. See also Geoffrey D. Dunn’s warning against reading later Trinitarian 
concerns back into Novatian’s text: “The Diversity and Unity of God in Novatian’s De Trinitate,” 





which rejects what he regards as proper distinction between the Father and the Son.89 Of 
particular interest for my discussion are the sections that Novatian devotes to those who 
collapse distinction between the Father and the Son and confuse them. Sabellius is the 
only “heretic” mentioned by name in De Trin., but the monarchianism that Novatian is 
combatting is little developed from that which is present in Tertullian and Hippolytus.90  
On the whole, the monarchianism opposed by Novatian seems to have been built 
upon the simple propositions that we also find in Contra Noetum, Adversus Praxean, and 
the Refutatio.91 However, unlike the Refutatio, Novatian presents the positions of the 
monarchians as a product of the exegesis of the same cluster of passages that appeared in 
Adv. Prax. Even more, Novatian makes explicit some of the reasoning that funded the 
exegetical conclusions peculiar to the monarchians. Novatian reproduces the arguments 
of the monarchians in a simple and straightforward manner. He is by no means a 
sympathetic witness, but his account is less tendentious than the accounts in Refutatio 9-
10, which distort the monarchian positions to demonstrate that they derive from the 
teaching of Heraclitus. 
                                                 
89 Unlike Tertullian and Hippolytus, Novatian’s De Trin. does not use any of the language of 
monarchy to describe the positions of those who denied the distinction between the Father and the Son. 
Nevertheless, it is quite clear that he is addressing positions very similar to those with which Tertullian and 
Hippolytus concerned themselves. See Simonetti’s discussion (contra Uríbarri Bilbao) of possible reasons 
the term monarchia is not present in De Trin.: Simonetti, “Monarchia e Trinità,” 628. 
90 Sabellius is mentioned in De Trin. 12.7 and 12.9. 







 Towards the end of his work, Novatian asserts that the teachings regarding Christ 
he has been combatting all derive from mistaken attempts to understand the claim that 
there is only one God. Because this passage demonstrates the lens through which 
Novatian approaches all the arguments of his opponents, it is worth quoting at length. He 
states, 
They are scandalized by Christ because the Scriptures assert that He is also God 
and we believe this. Therefore, that all heretical calumny against our Faith may 
cease, it is right that we should discuss the fact that Christ is also God (in such a 
way that it will not interfere with the truth of Scripture or with our faith) because 
the Scriptures assert and because we maintain and believe that there is only one 
God. In fact, the heretics who say that Jesus Christ is Himself God the Father, as 
well as those who would have him to be only a man, have drawn from Scripture 
the elements and the reasons for their error and perversity. For when they 
observed that it was written that God is one, they thought that they could not hold 
such a belief unless they thought they should believe that Christ was a mere man 
or that He was really God the Father.92 
 
In Novatian’s account, his opponents are attempting to preserve the fundamental claim 
that there is only one God. They first do so by identifying the Father and Son so that there 
are not two to whom divinity is attributed. They seek to salvage the divinity of Christ by 
denying that there is any distinction between Christ and the Father. The second group of 
                                                 
92 Novatian, De Trinitate 30.2-3 (trans. FC 67.104-105). Unless otherwise noted, all English 
translations of De Trinitate are from this translation. scandalizati in christum, quod etiam deus et per 
scripturas asseratur et a nobis hoc esse credatur, merito a nobis, ut omnis a fide nostra auferri possit 
haeretica calumnia, de eo quod et deus sit christus sic est disputandum, ut non impediat scripturae 
ueritatem, sed nec nostram fidem, qua unus deus et per scripturas promittitur et a nobis tenetur et creditur. 
Tam enim illi qui iesum christum ipsum deum patrem dicunt quam etiam illi qui hominem illum 
tantummodo esse uoluerunt, erroris sui et peruersitatis origines et causas inde rapuerunt, quia cum 
animaduerterent scriptum esse quod unus sit deus, non aliter putauerunt istam tenere se posse sententiam, 
nisi aut hominem tantum christum aut certe deum patrem putarent esse credendum. Unless otherwise 
noted, all Latin for Novatian’s De Trinitate is from Novatianus, Opera, quae supersunt nunc primum in 
unum collecta ad fidem codicum, qui adhuc extant, ed. G. F. Diercks, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina 4 





Novatian’s opponents attempts to solve the problem by arguing that Christ was a mere 
man, thereby scrapping any attempts to maintain the divinity of Christ.93 
 The above quotation demonstrates that both Novatian and his opponents viewed 
the preservation of monotheism as a first-order question. Elsewhere, he summarizes his 
opponents’ positions, saying, “They express themselves in this manner: Scripture teaches 
that there is one God. But Christ is God. Therefore, say the heretics, if the Father and 
Christ are the one God, Christ will be called the Father.”94 Note again that the 
fundamental premise on which their argument is built is that there is only one God.  
Like his opponents, Novatian seeks to preserve the oneness of God. In his 
discussion of God as creator near the beginning of the work, he echoes the strong 
assertion of monotheism from Isaiah 45: “I am God, and there is none beside me.”95 
Tertullian also dwells on this passage and states that it is directed against the idolatry of 
the Gentiles and does not, therefore, deny that the Son is God with the Father.96 
                                                 
93 By the time of Novatian, the identification of the Son with the Father and the denial of the 
divinity of the Son were fairly common ways of attempting to preserve the core teaching that there is only 
one God. Both Hippolytus and Eusebius report that Theodotus taught that Christ was a mere human 
(ἄνθρωπον ψιλὸν). See Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 3.1 and Eusebius, EH 5.28. The Refutatio accuses 
Callistus of wavering between the teaching of Sabellius and Theodotus. While the Refutatio no doubt 
includes this note in order to show that his opponent is inconsistent, this alleged inconsistency is much 
more intelligible if we remember that the distinct positions of Sabellius and Theodotus were designed to 
protect the oneness of God. See Refutatio 9.12.19. Whatever other shortcomings they might have, 
Harnack’s terms “modalistic” and “dynmasitc” monarchianism at least show that the two positions are 
related. Decker, however, rejects Harnack’s label and thinks that psilanthropism and monarchianism are 
entirely distinct phenomena. He claims that Novatian distorts the evidence in order to argue that there is 
some sort of family resemblance between psilanthropism and monarchianism. See Decker, “Die 
Monarchianer,” 4–5, 53. There is enough linkage between monarchian and psilanthropist positions in other 
works to surmise that the two might have been related in some way. 
94 Novatian, De Trinitate 26.2 (trans. FC 67:90): Sic enim inquiunt: si unus esse deus promitur, 
christus autem deus, ergo, inquiunt, si pater et christus est unus deus, christus pater dicetur. 
95 Novatian, De Trinitate 3.2 (trans. FC 67:29). Rather than a direct quotation, he offers a pastiche 
of phrases from Isa. 45:5, 18-22. 





Tertullian’s opponents also utilized passages like Isa. 45 that assert that there is only one 
God in order to deny any distinction between the Father and the Son.97 Since strong 
assertions of monotheism drawn from Isa. 45 are prominent in the accounts of both 
Tertullian and Novatian, which are separated by roughly thirty years, it seems that neither 
the fundamental assertions of the monarchians nor the dossier of scriptural passages they 
used to support these assertions had substantially changed during that span of thirty years. 
Novatian, like earlier anti-monarchian writers, was apparently accused of being a 
ditheist by his monarchian opponents. He states, “First of all, then, we must refute the 
argument of those who presume to make against us the charge of saying that there are 
two gods.”98 Following a chain of passages where Christ is referred to in the same 
manner as the Father (good, Lord, etc.), Novatian rejects the accusation of his opponents 
and turns it against them: “Let them acknowledge, then, by the same line of reasoning 
that the truth that there is one God is not hindered in any way by the other truth that 
Christ is also declared to be God.”99 The fact that Novatian had to combat the charge of 
ditheism as late as the mid-third century clearly demonstrates both that monarchianism 
was persistent and that its central teachings remained fairly consistent throughout the first 
                                                 
97 Passages from Isaiah 45 feature prominently in second- and third-century theologies. Irenaeus 
places words from Isa. 45 on the lips of the Valentinian demiurge, who is ignorant of the fact that there are, 
in fact, many other gods, and others who are higher than he (Adversus haereses 1.5.4). There are other 
indications that monarchianism was, at least in part, a reaction to the tendency of Gnosticism to multiply 
divine figures in the Pleroma. Thus, passages like Isa. 45 became theological battlegrounds. Those authors 
who found the positions of Gnosticism and monarchianism unpalatable had to carefully chart a course 
between the two extremes: a heavily populated Pleroma that bordered on polytheism and a strict 
understanding of monotheism that rejected distinction in the one God.  
98 Novatian, De Trinitate 30.21 (trans. FC 67:94): Et in primis illud retorquendum in istos qui 
duorum nobis deorum controuersiam facere praesumunt. 
99 Novatian, De Trinitate 30.25 (trans. FC 67:107 with modifications): eadem ratione intellegant 





half of the third century. Attempts by Tertullian, Hippolytus, and Novatian to distinguish 
the Father and Son were consistently seen by the monarchians as a confession that there 
were two gods. 
Excursus: Sabellius Outside of De Trinitate  
As I noted in my discussion of naming the monarchian controversy in the 
introduction, one of the commonly used names for this theology is “Sabellianism.” There, 
I argued that calling this theology “Sabellianism” adds little to our understanding of it. In 
order to support that contention, I offer here a brief excursus on our knowledge of 
Sabellius. In its brief discussion of Sabellius, the Refutatio paints a murky picture. First, it 
suggests that Callistus perverted Sabellius even though Callistus had the power to set him 
straight.100 This statement seems to suggest that Callistus corrupted Sabellius (to his own 
teaching?). Later, however, the Refutatio tells us that Callistus drove Sabellius away 
(ἀπέωσεν) as someone not thinking rightly (ὡς μὴ φρονοῦντα ὀρθῶς), an odd statement 
given the Refutatio’s earlier assertion that Callistus corrupted Sabellius.101 Furthermore, 
the Refutatio suggests that Callistus distanced himself from Sabellius in order to prove 
his own orthodoxy in response to the Refutatio’s accusations against him. The Refutatio’s 
account of Sabellius grows even more complicated when it tells us that Sabellius accused 
Callistus of having passed beyond his first faith.102 Finally, after describing the mutual 
animosity between Callistus and Sabellius, it claims that Callistus waivers between the 
                                                 
100 Refutatio 9.11.1. 
101 Refutatio 9.12.15. 





dogma of Sabellius and that of Theodotus.103 Despite the repeated linkage between 
Sabellius and Callistus in the Refutatio, its account does not allow us to form a coherent 
picture. The Refutatio alternately accuses Callistus of corrupting Sabellius, falling into 
the error of Sabellius, and publicly distancing himself from Sabellius. All of these 
references to Sabellius occur in one of the Refutatio’s most venomous attacks on 
Callistus, and it seems that Sabellius appears in the scene only to besmirch the reputation 
of Callistus. The Refutatio gives us precious little about the content of Sabellius’ 
teaching. 
By the end of the third century and the beginning of the fourth, the mere 
invocation of the name of Sabellius was all that was needed to pillory an opponent. 
Following Harnack, Bienert notes that the name “Sabellianism” had become the general 
name for “modalistic monarchianism” in the East at the end of the third century.104 
Despite the widespread use of Sabellius’ name to designate monarchianism, we still have 
very little information on the distinctive features of Sabellius’ teaching. Scarcely more is 
known about the details of his biography. The author of the Refutatio places Sabellius in 
contact with Callistus in Rome, but later writers place him outside of Rome.105 Basil of 
                                                 
103 Refutatio 9.12.19. This might be an indication that even in the time the Refutatio was being 
written, monarchianism and psilanthropism were both live options for protecting the uniqueness of God. 
104 Wolfgang A. Bienert, “Sabellius und Sabellianismus als historisches Problem,” in Logos: 
Festschrift für Luise Abramowski (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1993), 124–39. Bienert is drawing from Adolf 
von Harnack, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, vol. 1 (Freiburg: Mohr, 1886), 674. Bienert later reiterates 
his position: “Vor diesem Hintergrund wird der Name Sabellius schließlich zur Chiffre für einen in Rom zu 
Beginn des 3. Jahrhunderts verurteilten Modalismus im Sinne des Patripassianismus, von dem sich auch 
Kallist abzugrenzen versucht” (“Wer war Sabellius?” Studia patristica 40 [Leuven: Peeters, 2006], 364). 
105 Bienert, “Sabellius und Sabellianismus als historisches Problem,” 130. Bienert suggests that 
Methodius of Olympus is the earliest author to place Sabellius outside of Rome, but his argument seems to 
be a bit of a stretch. His contention is not based on any geographical epithet in Methodius, but rather on the 
fact that Methodius accuses Sabellius of teaching that the Father suffers. See Methodius of Olympus, 





Caesarea, for example, identifies Sabellius as having been from Libya.106 The Refutatio 
and Novatian, our earliest witnesses to Sabellius, suggest that Sabellius was active in 
Rome during the beginning of the third century. Since later authors seem to have little 
firsthand knowledge of Sabellius’ teaching, there is little reason to doubt that Sabellius 
was present in Rome in the early third century. 
One might think that Ephiphanius’ section on Sabellius in the Panarion would 
shed valuable light on the teaching of Sabellius. Sadly, it does not. Lienhard notes that 
Hübner has convincingly demonstrated that Epiphanius’ primary source for his section on 
Sabellius is the Contra Sabellianos of Pseudo-Athanasius.107 Lienhard then goes on to 
note that “the ‘Sabellius’ of this work is actually Marcellus.”108 The Contra Sabellianos 
actually reproduces the theology of Marcellus under the name of Sabellius.109 Althrough 
Epiphanius heavily employed a source that wrongly attributed Marcellan teaching to 
Sabellius, that teaching still bears some resemblance to the fundamental tenets of the 
monarchianism of the beginning of the third century. Near the beginning of his 
discussion, Epiphanius tells us that the Sabellians taught that the Father and the Son and 
                                                 
106 Bienert, “Sabellius und Sabellianismus als historisches Problem,” 136. See, for example, Basil 
of Caesarea, Epistle 9.2. 
107 Joseph T. Lienhard, “Basil of Caesarea, Marcellus of Ancyra, and ‘Sabellius,’” Church History 
58, no. 2 (1989): 166. Lienhard cites Reinhard M Hübner, “Die Hauptquelle des Epiphanius (Panarion, haer 
65) über Paulus von Samosata: Ps-Athanasius, Contra Sabellianos,” Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte 90, 
no. 2–3 (1979): 201–20. See also Andrew Radde-Gallwitz’s discussion on this text, at least part of which 
he thinks sheds light on Sabellius’ actual teaching: “The Holy Spirit as Agent, Not Activity: Origen’s 
Argument with Modalism and Its Afterlife in Didymus, Eunomius, and Gregory of Nazianzus,” Vigiliae 
Christianae 65, no. 3 (2011): 233–5. 
108 Lienhard, “Basil of Caesarea, Marcellus of Ancyra, and ‘Sabellius,’” 166. 





the Spirit are the same—one ὑπόστασις with three names.110 He next recounts that the 
Sabellians used a dossier of biblical texts from both the Old and New Testaments.111 As 
in the earliest accounts of monarchianism, this dossier of texts begins with those that 
assert that there is only one God. Also included in this dossier are key texts from John’s 
Gospel that feature prominently in third-century accounts of monarchianism. As in 
Tertullian’s account of monarchianism, Epiphanius suggests that Sabellius and his 
followers preyed on the simple people in the church: 
Then, when they encounter simple or innocent persons who do not understand the 
sacred scriptures clearly, they give them this first scare: 'What are we to say, 
gentlemen? Have we one God or three gods?' But when someone who is devout 
but does not fully understand the truth hears this, he is disturbed and assents to 
their error at once, and comes to deny the existence of the Son and the Holy 
Spirit.112 
 
It seems, therefore, that there is little in Epiphanius’ account that is of use for clarifying 
details about the life and teaching of Sabellius. We must be wary of anything in 
Epiphanius that reflects a substantial change from the earlier sources, as it likely reflects 
the teaching of Marcellus more than the teaching of Sabellius. The elements in 
Epiphanius’ account that comport well with the the third-century accounts of 
                                                 
110 Epiphanius, Panarion 62.1. Given the paucity of references to Sabellius that are reliable at the 
requisite level of detail, it is difficult to know if Sabellius actually used terms like ὑπόστασις to denote the 
oneness of God. 
111 Epiphanius, Panarion 62.2. 
112 Epiphanius, Panarion 62.2. Translation from Epiphanius, The Panarion of Epiphanius of 
Salamis, trans. Frank Williams, Nag Hammadi and Manichaean Studies 36 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1987), 122. 
The clear Trinitarian focus of this passage is indicative that it postdates the earliest phases of the 
monarchian controversy. Recall that the debates of the early stage of the monarchian controversy were 





monarchianism tell us little more than that some key features of monarchianism survived 
until at least 377, when Epiphanius most likely completed the Panarion.113 
 It turns out, then, that the attestation to Sabellius that postdates the third century is 
of little use for reproducing the details of Sabellius’ life and teaching. First, we do not 
even have a detailed explication of his teachings from contemporary sources. Second, 
shortly after his lifetime, his name became a watchword used by the opponents of 
monarchianism and its continued influence. When his name became used as a general 
cypher for monarchianism, as Bienert suggests, there was little hope that any later author 
would add nuance to accounts of his teaching. 
Novatian Continued 
While the Refutatio focuses on the political relations between Callistus and 
Sabellius to the exclusion of any of Sabellius’ specific doctrines, Novatian cursorily 
makes mention of Sabellius’ teaching without going into the details of his life. What 
exactly was it about Sabellius that warranted him being the only “heretic” mentioned by 
name in Novatian’s De Trinitate? Certainly it was not merely the erroneous doctrine that 
Novatian attributed to him. As I noted in the quotations above, Novatian twice accused 
Sabellius of teaching that Christ is the Father. There is nothing spectacular or novel about 
this teaching that Novatian ascribes to Sabellius. By the time of Novatian’s writing, such 
statements identifying the Father and the Son were commonplace, little more than 
garden-variety monarchianism in the middle of the third century. Since there is nothing 
                                                 
113 For the dating of the Panarion, see Frances M. Young and Andrew Teal, From Nicaea to 






especially noteworthy about the teaching that Novatian attributes to Sabellius, there must 
be something else that makes him notable. The most likely reason Novatian mentions 
Sabellius by name is that he had become the most public and influential monarchian in 
Rome by Novatian’s day. Sabellius deserved to be mentioned by name not because his 
teaching was any worse than that of other monarchians but because Novatian wished to 
attack the leader of the monarchian cause in Rome.114 
Father and Son 
 As in the earlier accounts of monarchianism, Novatian portrays his monarchian 
opponents as still claiming that the same [one] was both Father and Son. He writes, 
They want to show that Christ is God the Father by the very fact that He is 
declared to be not only Man but also God. They express themselves in this 
manner: Scripture teaches that there is one God. But Christ is God. Therefore, say 
the heretics, if the Father and Christ are the one God, Christ will be called the 
Father. In this syllogism they are proved to be in error, not knowing Christ, but 
rather favoring the mere sound of a name. For they want Him not to be the 
Second Person after the Father, but the Father Himself.115 
 
This passage highlights one of the idiosyncrasies of Novatian’s depiction of 
monarchianism: their identification of the Father and the Son appears to flow only in one 
                                                 
114 DeSimone claims that Novatian is concerned with Sabellius because he “came to Rome and 
introduced a second, more refined form of Monarchainism called Modalist Monarchianism” (The Treatise 
of Novatian, 74, italics in original). DeSimone’s use of “modalist Monarchianism” here, as opposed to 
“crass Monarchianism” is not standard usage of the term; and it does not add any clarity to the discussions. 
As I argued above, it is difficult to see anything distinctive about Sabellius’ teaching in De Trin. Uríbarri 
Bilbao suggested that Novatian was directly addressing the theology of Sabellius in De Trin. and that this is 
one of the reasons Novatian does not use the term monarchia (Monarquía y Trinidad, 429). As I note 
elsewhere, I do not find Uríbarri’s views convincing in this case. 
115 Novatian, De Trinitate 26.1-2 (trans. FC 67:90): hoc ipso patrem deum uolentes ostendere 
christum esse, dum non homo tantum asseritur, sed et deus promitur. Sic enim inquiunt: si unus esse deus 
promitur, christus autem deus, ergo, inquiunt, si pater et christus est unus deus, christus pater dicetur. In 
quo errare probantur christum non noscentes, sed sonum nominis approbantes; nolunt enim illum 





direction. Almost every time Novatian rehearses his opponents’ position, he records that 
they say that Christ is the Father, never that the Father is the Christ. This tendency is 
elucidated by other, clearer passages. The following passage is especially helpful:  
The Scriptures so clearly teach that Christ is also God that many heretics, deeply 
moved by the reality and the grandeur of His divinity, stressed His glories to such 
an extent that they did not hesitate to declare (or at least were of the opinion) that 
He was not the Son, but God the Father Himself. Though this opinion of theirs is 
contrary to the truth of the Scriptures, it is, nevertheless, a weighty and excellent 
argument for the divinity of Christ. He is so indisputably God—that is, as Son of 
God, born of God—that many heretics, as we have said, took Him to be God in 
such a manner that they thought that He must be called the Father, not the Son.116 
 
Novatian reiterates his point in this passage when he says, “Hence, though they read in 
Scripture that He is the Son, they think that He is the Father because they readily perceive 
that the Son is God.”117 For Novatian’s monarchian opponents, the Father is God; and 
divinity appears to reside exclusively with the Father.118 For them, any admission that the 
Son is God necessarily entails that he is the Father.119 Since the monarchians, unlike the 
psilanthropists, had no reservations about affirming the divinity of Christ, they did not 
hesitate to identify Christ with the Father. 
                                                 
116 Novatian, De Trinitate 23.2-3 (trans. FC 67:84): Nam usque adeo hunc manifestum est in 
scripturis et deum tradi, ut plerique haereticorum diuinitatis ipsius magnitudine et ueritate commoti, ultra 
modum extendentes honores eius, ausi sint non filium, sed ipsum deum patrem promere uel putare. Quod 
etsi contra scripturarum ueritatem est, tamen diuinitatis christi argumentum grande atque praecipuum est, 
qui usque adeo deus, sed qua filius dei natus ex deo, ut plerique illum, ut diximus, haeretici ita deum 
acceperint, ut non filium, sed patrem pronuntiandum putarent. 
117 Novatian, De Trinitate 23.4 (trans. FC 67:84): ad hoc illos manifesta christi diuinitate cogente 
ut, quem filium legerent, quia deum animaduerterent, patrem putarent. Novatian repeatedly claims that his 
opponents argued that Christ was the Father himself throughout the remainder of ch. 23. 
118 This teaching in itself is not necessarily troubling. Recall that for many first- and second-
century authors the one God is said to be the Father. 
119 This is an interesting similarity to Origen’s schema in ComJn 2.13ff. There, Origen argues that 
the Father is αὐτόθεος. In the context, Origen’s unique construction seems to mean that the Father is 
properly God. Origen also held that the Son was divine, but only by participation in the divinity of the 
Father. Both Origen and Novatian’s monarchian opponents agreed that divinity is preeminently (or in the 





 Novatian also depicts his opponents as expressing the identity of Christ and the 
Father with syllogistic reasoning.120 Novatian repeats a condensed version of this same 
reasoning later in the treatise, writing, “Now the heretics who say that Jesus Christ is the 
Father argue as follows: If God is one and Christ is God, then Christ is the Father, 
because God is one.”121 The frequency with which Novatian addresses the monarchian 
contention that the Son was the Father shows how central he thought this claim was to 
monarchian theology. Such an emphasis prompts Novatian to devote substantial energy 
to showing that the Father and Son are not the same.122 
Sabellius receives brief mention in the Refutatio, but we learn very little about 
what he actually taught.123 As noted above, Sabellius is the only opponent whom 
Novatian mentions by name in De Trinitate.124 Novatian briefly discusses his teaching, 
but this discussion does not reveal too much distinctive about his theology. It is evident, 
however, that one of Novatian’s chief problems with him is that he claims that Christ is 
the Father. Novatian writes, “Thus the sacrilegious heresy of Sabellius, as we said, takes 
                                                 
120 Novatian, De Trinitate 26.1-2. 
121 Novatian, De Trinitate 30.4 (trans. FC 67:105): “Et quidem illi qui iesum christum patrem 
dicunt ista praetendunt: si unus deus, christus autem deus, pater est christus, quia unus deus.” Whatever 
distortions Novatian might make to his opponents’ positions, his depiction of their syllogistic reasoning is 
not intended to present their positions as devoid of scriptural backing. He writes, “In fact, the heretics who 
say that Jesus Christ is Himself God the Father, as well as those who would have him to be only a man, 
have drawn from Scripture the elements and the reasons for their error and perversity.” De Trinitate 30.3 
(trans. FC 67:105): Tam enim illi qui iesum christum ipsum deum patrem dicunt quam etiam illi qui 
hominem illum tantummodo esse uoluerunt, erroris sui et peruersitatis origines et causas inde rapuerunt. 
122 See, for example, De Trinitate 26.21, where Novatian claims that the Son cannot be the Father 
because the Son is obedient to the Father. 
123 Refutatio 9.11-12. 





concrete form because of these men who believe that Christ is not the Son but the 
Father.”125 Later, he states again that Sabellius “says that Christ is the Father.”126  
Toward the end of the treatise, Novatian claims to have disarmed his opponent, 
saying, “Now that he has been deprived of those two passages, he is like a man who has 
had his two eyes gouged out; he is completely overcome by the blindness of his own 
doctrine.”127 In this comment, Novatian is referring to John 14:9ff and John 10:30. As I 
noted in the discussion of Adversus Praxean and Contra Noetum, these passages were 
two of the favorite scriptural warrants of the monarchians.128 In his treatment of John 
10:30, Novatian makes a very familiar argument: 
For if Christ were the Father, as the heretics think, He should have said: 'I, the 
Father, am one [unus].' But when He says 'I' and then introduces the Father, by 
saying 'I and the Father,' He thereby distinguishes and separates the individuality 
of His own Person, viz. that of the Son, from the authority of the Father, not only 
as regards the mere sound of the name [Son] but also in regard to the order of 
power in the divine economy.129 
 
Novatian makes a grammatical point here that is almost exactly the same as the move 
Hippolytus makes in Contra Noetum. Hippolytus states there,  
                                                 
125 Novatian, De Trinitate 12.7 (trans. FC 67:51): Et iam per istos, ut diximus, sabelliana haeresis 
sacrilega corporatur, siquidem christus non filius, sed pater creditur. 
126 Novatian, De Trinitate 12.9 (trans. FC 67:52): Si patrem, quid dubitant cum sabellii temeritate 
misceri, qui christum patrem dicit? 
127 Novatian, De Trinitate 28.30 (trans. FC 67:99): quandoquidem duobus istis locis quibusdam 
effossis luminibus orbatus totus sit in doctrinae suae caecitate superatus. 
128 It is hardly surprising that neither of these passages occurs in the Refutatio. To be sure, it has 
been well documented that this work distorted the positions of its opponents in order to make them fit its 
genealogy of heresy. In order to show that its opponents’ views derived from the teaching of Heraclitus, it 
represented the views of its opponents without any reference to scripture. All of the other witnesses to the 
monarchian positions show, however, that scriptural exegesis was essential to the monarchian contentions. 
129 Novatian, De Trinitate 27.2 (trans. FC 67:92-3): Si enim erat, ut haeretici putant, pater 
christus, oportuit dicere 'ego pater unus sum'. At cum ego dicit, deinde patrem infert dicendo ego et pater, 
proprietatem personae suae, id est filii, a paterna auctoritate discernit atque distinguit, non tantummodo de 





And if he were to say, “He himself said: ‘I and the Father are one,’” let him apply 
his mind to the matter and learn that he did not say “I and the Father am one”, but 
“are one”. “We are” is not said with reference to one, but with reference to two. 
He revealed two persons, but a single power.130 
 
Both of these passages are clear examples of the grammatical exegesis that became the 
common defense against the monarchian interpretation of these passages.131 Novatian 
thought that these passages were so important to the monarchians that he was able to 
claim that he had defeated them once he had successfully refuted the monarchian 
interpretation. 
Visible and Invisible 
Further along in the De Trinitate, Novatian addresses another of the major 
emphases of monarchianism: the visibility and invisibility of God. As I highlighted in my 
examination of the earlier texts, questions of visibility and invisibility were major pieces 
of the monarchian contention that there is only one God. Novatian sets the problem up by 
juxtaposing texts that claim God appeared to Abraham with Ex. 33:20, which states that 
none shall see God and live.132 For Novatian, God was seen in the biblical theophanies; 
but to uphold the invisibility of the Father, he argues, “Accordingly, this can only mean 
that it was not the Father, who never has been seen, that was seen, but the Son, who is 
wont both to descend and to be seen, for the simple reason that He has descended. In fact, 
                                                 
130 Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 7.1 (trans. Butterworth, 60). 
131 Again, see Mark DelCogliano, “The Interpretation of John 10:30 in the Third Century: 
Antimonarchian Polemics and the Rise of Grammatical Reading Techniques,” Journal of Theological 
Interpretation 6, no. 1 (2012): 117–38. 





He is ‘the image of the invisible God.’”133 Novatian’s argument here seems to be directed 
against something like the monarchian contention that when the Father wishes to be seen, 
he is visible; and when the Father wishes to remain unseen, he is invisible.134 
Commenting on the Sermon on the Mount, Novatian takes up the theme of 
visibility and invisibility again: 
When Christ Himself is seen and touched by the crowd and yet promises and 
declares that he who is clean of heart shall see God, He proves by this very fact 
that He, who was then present, was not the Father because He promised, while 
actually present to their gaze, that whoever was clean of heart would see the 
Father.135 
 
The monarchians consistently maintained that the one God is sometimes visible and other 
times invisible. Novatian’s position above functions as a ready-made rebuttal of the 
position we see in the Refutatio: God appeared as Son but told those who were able to 
receive it that he was also the Father.136 Novatian, on the other hand, takes the passage he 
interprets here to be a clear demonstration that there is a distinction between the Father 
and the Son, and that it is the Son who is now seen. Throughout the treatise, Novatian 
                                                 
133 Novatian, De Trinitate 18.2-3 (trans. FC 67:67): Ex quo intellegi potest quod non pater uisus 
sit, qui numquam uisus est, sed filius, qui et descendere solitus est et uideri, quia descenderit. Imago est 
enim inuisibilis dei. Note the discussion of Novatian’s exegesis here and elsewhere to uphold the 
invisibility of the Father at Adhémar d’Alès, Novatien, étude sur la théologie romaine au milieu du IIIe 
siècle, Études de théologie historique (Paris: Beauchesne, 1924), 90–1. When Novatian himself is speaking, 
he tends to refer to the Son, whereas he has his monarchian opponents speak of Christ. This fact might be 
significant, but Novatian does not draw attention to this difference. 
134 See, for example, the treatment of the theme of visibility and invisibility in Contra Noetum 2 
and Adversus Praxean 14. 
135 Novatian, De Trinitate 28.28 (trans. FC 67:99): Quando autem dum contingitur ipse christus et 
uidetur, repromittit tamen et dicit quoniam qui mundo fuerit corde deum uidebit, hoc ipso probat se non 
esse, qui tunc praesens cum uideretur repromittebat quod patrem uisurus esset quisquis mundo corde 
fuisset. 





asserts that gazing upon the visible Son is preparation for the presumably eschatological 
vision of the Father, which will come after purification.137 
 Because a group of Novatian’s opponents argued that the Son and the Father were 
the same, he goes to great lengths to demonstrate that they are distinct. Although the 
central aim of this section is to add detail to our account of monarchianism by means of 
Novatian’s depiction of his opponents, a brief examination of his responses to them is 
useful. In the following discussion, Novatian’s concern to explain another theophany 
shows that the proper interpretation of these theophanies was one of the most contested 
points between the monarchians and their opponents.  
 Novatian’s assertion that the Son is both God and angel is one of the more 
interesting moves that he makes in order to prove the distinction between the Father and 
the Son. Novatian’s discussion of the Son as an angel follows directly upon the heels of 
his examination of the Old Testament theophanies. Novatian sets up the problem by 
analyzing Gen. 31:11-13, where an angel says to Jacob, “I am the God who appeared to 
you in the place of God.”138 This passage merits Novatian’s attention precisely because 
he has just argued that the Father was not seen in the theophanies. Novatian needed to 
                                                 
137 See, for example, De Trinitate 28.4, 14, 25. Novatian does not clarify what exactly this vision 
of the Father will be like. He also does not spend too much time trying to explain how the Father is 
invisible but will later be seen by the pure in heart. The image of God plays an important part in this 
discussion: “The Lord, therefore, would never have used all these arguments, especially after having 
already given so many that clearly bear witness that He is not the Father but the Son, if He had been 
mindful that He was the Father or wished that He be considered the Father. His sole purpose in these words 
was to make it clear to us that every man should henceforth account it to be the same thing to see the image 
of God the Father through the Son, as if he had seen the Father. Every man, by believing in the Son, 
exercises himself in the contemplation of the image, that he may advance and grow even to the perfect 
contemplation of God the almighty Father, after he has grown accustomed to see the divinity in the Image” 
(De Trinitate 28.25 [trans. FC 67:98]). D’Alès comments about the vision of the Father, “seul le Fils, image 
du Dieu invisible, a été vu, parce que seul il est descendu. Par lui la fragilité humaine se fortifie peu à peu 
et s’accoutume par degrés à voir enfin le Père” (Novatien, 90). 
138 Novatian, De Trinitate 19.2 (trans. FC 67:73). See also Justin’s assertions that the Son was also 





explain how the Father remained invisible when this angel, claiming to be God, was seen 
by Jacob. In order to maintain the invisibility of God, Novatian argues that we must 
preserve a distinction between “Him who is called simply God and Him who is declared 
to be not simply God, but an angel as well.”139 He continues and states that while the 
Father is simply God, the Son is both God and angel, thus using the interpretation of 
theophanies as a means of distinguishing Father and Son.140  
Suffered and Died 
 Although there are signs in Adversus Praxean and the Refutatio that some 
monarchians were moving away from asserting that the Father suffered, Novatian’s 
testimony demonstrates that by the middle of the third century, he thought it still 
worthwhile to oppose the monarchian assertion that the Father suffered, or at least that 
accusing people of having made such an assertion was an effective polemical tool. He 
writes, “Well then, say the heretics, if Christ is not only Man but also God, and Scripture 
says that Christ died for us and rose again, surely Scripture is teaching us to believe that 
God died.”141 In his attempts to refute this teaching, he states it again in a much simpler 
form: “If scripture had declared that Christ was only God and there was no association of 
                                                 
139 Novatian, De Trinitate 19.3 (trans. FC 67.73): distinctio sit inter eum qui tantummodo deus 
dicitur et inter eum qui non deus simpliciter, sed et angelus pronuntiatur. 
140 Novatian, De Trinitate 19.4. Novatian also argues this in De Trinitate 18.22. 
141 Novatian, De Trinitate 25.1 (trans. FC 67:88): Ergo, inquiunt, si christus non homo est tantum, 
sed et deus, christum autem refert scriptura mortuum pro nobis et resuscitatum, iam docet nos scriptura 





human frailty traceable in him, then their twisted syllogism would have had some force 
here: 'If Christ is God, and Christ died, then God died.’”142  
Novatian constantly reiterates that Christ is both human and divine, which allows 
him to affirm that Christ suffered and to avoid affirming that the Father suffered. If 
Novatian can be trusted in the passage above, the monarchians used syllogistic logic to 
claim bluntly that the Father suffered.143 Novatian later claims that the psilanthropists 
used the sufferings and human frailties of Christ to prove that he was only human. They 
could have used syllogistic reasoning similar to what Novatian outlines above: God does 
not suffer; Christ suffered; therefore, Christ is not God.144 In order to counter 
psilanthropist claims that Christ was only human, Novatian points out that the miracles he 
performed demonstrate that he was also divine. By his insistence that Christ was both 
divine and human, Novatian sought to meaningfully say that Christ suffered and at the 
same time to avoid having to predicate suffering of God.145 
Scholarly Theories Reconsidered 
Monarchian theology came from Asia Minor to Rome at the end of the second 
and beginning of the third century. It quickly gained a following in Rome among both the 
                                                 
142 Novatian, De Trinitate: 25.3 (trans. FC 67:88): Si enim scriptura proponeret christum 
tantummodo deum et nulla in illo fragilitatis humanae sociatio esset permixta, merito illorum hic aliquid 
ualuisset sermo contortus: ‘si christus deus, christus autem mortuus, ergo mortuus est deus’. 
143 It is difficult to determine here if Novatian’s opponents were this direct about the death of the 
Father or if this is a polemical amplification of something he thought followed from other monarchian 
premises. 
144 Novatian, De Trinitate 11.3-4. 
145 Novatian likewise wants to protect God from the charge of being changeable: "He never 
changes or transforms Himself into other forms, lest through change he should appear to be also mortal" 





leaders, such as Callistus, and other members of the community. As far as the extant 
witnesses indicate, Rome became the epicenter of monarchian theology, but 
monarchianism elicited rebuttals from theologians from Asia Minor (Hippolytus, the 
author of Contra Noetum), North Africa (Tertullian), Alexandria (Origen),146 and Rome 
(the author of the Refutatio and Novatian). By all accounts, monarchianism was a 
theological force to be reckoned with in the early-third-century church. 
Early Third Century Orthodoxy? 
Despite its notable influence in the early-third-century church, it is difficult to 
sustain claims that monarchianism was the majority position in the church, or something 
like an early-third-century orthodoxy. Reinhard Hübner is the most recent proponent of 
this theory, and he suggests that monarchianism was the overwhelming majority position 
in Christianity until the middle of the third century.147 Hübner’s theory is built upon a 
number of suppositions, the most problematic of which requires a revisionist reading of 
virtually all second-century theology and a revisionist chronology of some major figures. 
Although he dismisses Contra Noetum as a product of the fourth century, Hübner 
claims that Noetus antedated a number of major figures in the second century and that 
                                                 
146 Although I have not included Origen in any of the analysis up to this point, the final two 
chapters are devoted to demonstrating his interaction with, and rejection of, monarchianism. 
147 See, for example, his introductory remarks to his collection of essays on monarchianism, Der 
Paradox Eine: Antignostischer Monarchianismus im zweiten Jahrhundert (Leiden: Brill, 1999), vii. See 
also Daniel H. Williams’ interaction with Hübner’s theories: “Monarchianism and Photinus of Sirmium as 






these figures, including Ignatius, Irenaeus, and Melito, drew on his theology.148 Because 
he does not consider Contra Noetum a reliable attestation of Noetus’ thought, Hübner 
bases his portrait of Noetus’ theology almost exclusively on the accounts contained in the 
Refutatio. He spends substantial time examining the antithetical statements about God 
contained in the Refutatio’s account of Noetus. These, he claims, were excerpted from an 
anti-Gnostic rule of faith or paschal homily of Noetus.149 Hübner then surveys other 
second-century authors who use such antithetical statements about God before 
concluding that all of these authors must have been drawing on Noetus’ allegedly earlier 
theology.150 
Unfortunately, the connection Hübner draws between Noetus and the other 
second-century authors is tenuous. The main point of contact Hübner alleges is 
antithetical statements about God.151 Whenever he sees these sorts of statements in 
second-century writers, he concludes that they are drawing on Noetus. If, in fact, the 
antithetical statements are authentically Noetian and not the distortions of the author of 
the Refutatio, Hübner’s theory does not necessarily follow. Noetus could just as easily 
                                                 
148 For Hübner’s dismissal of Contra Noetum as a product of the fourth century, see his “Melito 
und Noët,” 6–9. 
149 Hübner, “Die antignostische Glaubensregel des Noët von Smyrna,” in Der Paradox Eine, 39–
94. 
150 Hübner concludes that the Ignatian epistles are late, most likely between 165-175. See his, “Die 
Ignatianen und Noët von Smyrna,” in Der Paradox Eine, 203–4. Hübner also claims that Ignatius’ 
statements are rendered more intelligible if they are considered as responses to Gnosticism (ibid., 194). He 
is well aware of the bold nature of his revision, and he explicitly argues that Ignatius should no longer be 
considered an “Apostolic Father” but rather an Apologist (ibid., 204). 
151 Further difficulty arises because Hübner draws on the Refutatio to establish that such antitheses 
were one of the distinguishing characteristics of Noetus’ theology. Although he is aware of the polemical 
distortions in the Refutatio, he brushes them aside too easily. Another reason he dismisses Contra Noetum 
as an unreliable witness to Noetus’ thought is that it does not contain these sorts of statements (Hübner, 





have been speaking about God in a manner common to second-century writers from Asia 
Minor. There is no evidence that demands (or even suggests) that Noetus was the source 
on which other second-century theologians drew for such antitheses. 
Hübner never explains why one of the most distinctive elements of Noetus’ 
theology, the explicit identification of the Father and Son and concomitant denial of any 
distinction between them, is absent from all of these authors who allegedly rely on 
Noetus. Second-century writers were concerned with maintaining that there was only one 
God, and they often left the precise relationship between the Father and Son unexplored. 
Even though they did not carefully define the distinction between the Father and Son, 
they did not overtly identify the Father with the Son as did Noetus. Recall the Refutatio’s 
summary of Noetus’ teaching in one of the passages Hübner deems trustworthy: “For in 
this manner he thinks to establish the sovereignty (μοναρχίαν) of God, alleging that 
Father and Son, so called, are one and the same, not one individual produced from a 
different one, but himself from himself; and that he is styled by name Father and Son, 
according to vicissitude of times.”152 
All of the extant accounts of monarchianism that I have studied thus far have 
shown that the explicit identification of the Father and Son was at the core of monarchian 
theology. The absence of such strong statements about the Father and Son being identical 
in second-century texts is an insurmountable obstacle for Hübner’s theory. Were Noetus 
as influential as Hübner contends, one would surely find this central aspect of his 
teaching mirrored in those writers who allegedly relied on him. It is more probable that 
                                                 
152 Refutatio 9.10.11 (trans. ANF 5:128 with modifications): οὕτως γοῦν δοκεῖ μοναρχίαν 
συνιστᾶν, ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φάσκων ὑπάρχειν πατέρα καὶ υἱόν, γινόμενον οὐχ ἕτερον ἐξ ἑτέρου, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸν 





Noetus’ antithetical statements about God were drawing on traditional ways of speaking 
about God in Asia Minor.153 He added to this traditional phraseology the monarchian 
postulate, that the Father and the Son are one and the same. 
Once Hübner’s assertions in favor of an early date for Noetus have been 
problematized, his theories about monarchianism as the overwhelming majority position 
until the mid-third century lose their firm basis. There is evidence that monarchianism 
gained a strong following in Rome at the beginning of the third century. However, there 
is scarcely enough information to determine the extent to which monarchianism was 
adopted in other regions. Monarchianism was a conscious reaction to the varieties of 
Christian theology (like that of Justin) that were perceived as destroying the uniqueness 
of God. Although authors like Melito and Ignatius do not seem concerned to sharply 
distinguish the Father and Son, we see nothing in them like the conscious, reactive 
assertion that the Father and Son are “one and the same.” Pace Hübner, monarchianism 
cannot be found in nearly all second-century authors. In fact, there is little evidence for 
the conscious identification of the Father and Son before the beginning of the third 
century. 
An Exegetically-Based Theology? 
 All of the extant witnesses to monarchianism show that monarchian theology was 
thoroughly exegetical. Even though the author of the Refutatio tried to expunge all 
references to scripture in his accounts of monarchianism, scriptural exegesis was so 
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thoroughly entwined with this theology that he was unsuccessful.154 The monarchians 
relied on classic proclamations of monotheism from Deutero-Isaiah, Genesis, and Exodus 
to establish their fundamental commitment to protecting the uniqueness of God.155 
 Decker claims that the biblical exegesis attributed to the Noetians in Contra 
Noetum is a distorting insertion of Hippolytus.156 His argument, however, is belied by the 
other witnesses to monarchianism from the early third century. The biblical exegesis 
Hippolytus attributes to his opponents addresses the same topics as versions of 
monarchian exegesis reported by the anti-monarchians (especially Old Testament 
theophanies), and it uses some of the same passages, such as John 10:30 and John 14:8-
10. In his source-critical reconstruction of monarchianism, Decker has discarded what 
appears to be authentic content in an attempt to find the core of monarchianism.157 
East vs. West? 
 Michael Decker has also argued that monarchian theology and the responses to it 
are symptomatic of a divide between East and West in early Christianity. He contends 
that theologians from Asia Minor emphasized the unity of God in response to the 
                                                 
154 See, for example, the quotation of John 14:11 in Refutatio 9.12.17-18. Note also that Hübner 
has shown some suggestive verbal parallels to Baruch 3:36-38 in Refutatio 9.10.11. 
155 For a dense cluster of these passages, see Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 2.1-3. 
156 Decker, “Die Monarchianer,” 156–7. 
157 Note that my rejection of Decker’s claim is supported by Heine, who writes concerning the bias 
of the author of the Refutatio, “The selection itself of what to include and what to omit may reflect his bias. 
This is most obvious in the omission of the scriptural texts from which Callistus drew his views to make it 
appear that his doctrine was not derived from Scripture. That the modalists made abundant and effective 
use of Scripture is evident from (a) the account of Noetus’ teachings in CN …, (b) Hippolytus’ own remark 
about how Callistus supported his doctrine of the nature of the Church from Scripture (Ref. 9.12.22-23), 
and (c) the lengthy scriptural debates in which Tertullian and Origen engage against them” (Heine, “The 





theology of the Gnostics.158 Although he does not call Irenaeus an outright monarchian, 
he notes that Irenaeus’ theology has a number of similarities with the monarchians and is 
a good example of the theology of Asia Minor. Decker further characterizes theology 
from Asia Minor as being almost exclusively concerned with the action of God in 
salvation history, economic theology.159 Rome serves as the epicenter of Western 
theology in Decker’s narration. When the monarchians came to Rome from Asia Minor, 
he argues, they found theologians engaged in speculation about differentiation within the 
Godhead and accused them of being ditheists.160 Rather than focusing on the unity of 
God in the economy of salvation, Decker avers, Roman theologians were preoccupied 
with ontological questions about the Godhead.161 
 Decker’s geographical theory has a number of problems. In the first place, if there 
was such a large difference between the theologies of the East and West, how did Asian 
monarchian theology gain such a large following in Rome? Had the divide between East 
and West been as strong as Decker contends, monarchian theology would have gained no 
following in Rome. The primary sources paint a picture of a theology that found ready 
acceptance from both leaders and the “simple” Christians in Rome. In the second place, 
Contra Noetum, perhaps the earliest of the anti-monarchian treatises, was probably 
written in Asia Minor.162 This probability complicates Decker’s picture and suggests that 
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159 Ibid., 204. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid., 204–5, 208. 
162 See Manlio Simonetti, “Aggiornamento Su Ippolito,” in Nuove ricerche su Ippolito, Studia 





there was within the theology of Asia Minor the type of diversity that Decker wants to 
split between East and West: both monarchian and anti-monarchian theologies arose in 
Asia Minor. 
Was Monarchianism the Privileging of Jewish Theology? 
 Several scholars have suggested that monarchianism is best understood as a 
privileging of Jewish theology and a Jewish understanding of monotheism. Uríbarri 
Bilbao, for example, understands monarchianism as a “Judaizing tendency” and an 
“attempt to maintain the monotheism inherited from the Jewish tradition.”163 More 
recently, Daniel Boyarin has pushed the alleged relationship between Judaism and 
monarchianism even further. He argues that monarchianism’s defeat was Judaism being 
cast out of Christianity.164 For Boyarin, the expulsion of monarchianism was one of the 
main ways that borders between Judaism and Christianity were “inscribed” and 
solidified. 
 Much of Boyarin’s narration presupposes his understanding of Christianity and 
Judaism as an undifferentiated mass of “Judaeo-Christianity” in the second century.165 
Such a characterization is difficult to sustain in the monarchian controversy—if only on 
                                                 
Cerrato, Hippolytus between East and West: The Commentaries and the Provenance of the Corpus, Oxford 
Theological Monographs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 116–23. 
163 Uríbarri Bilbao, Monarquía y Trinidad, 502. See also his list of four reasons he thinks 
Monarchianism is a return or defense of Jewish monotheism at p. 499. 
164 Daniel Boyarin, “Two Powers in Heaven: Or, the Making of a Heresy,” in The Idea of Biblical 
Interpretation, ed. Hindy Najman and Judith H. Newman (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 331–70; idem, Border 
Lines: The Partition of Judaeo-Christianity, Divinations (Philadelphia, Pa: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2004); idem, “Justin Martyr Invents Judaism,” Church History 70, no. 3 (2001): 427–61. 
165 See Boyarin’s discussion of “Judaeo-Christianity” and his argument for its usefulness as a 





the basis of which texts were cited as authoritative. Both monarchian and anti-
monarchian writers cited texts from the New Testament as authoritative, and both 
considered Jesus to be divine. Neither of these practices would have been acceptable for 
second-century Jews who did not believe that Jesus was the Messiah. Boyarin’s theory 
also seems to presuppose some type of connection between monarchianism and rabbinic 
Judaism, but he never explains how such contact between Asian monarchians and early, 
Palestinian rabbis occurred. Furthermore, there are no clear textual or exegetical linkages 
between monarchianism and rabbinic Judaism.166 
 Uríbarri Bilbao’s suggestion that monarchianism represents a Judaizing tendency 
within early Christianity is never elaborated. He merely claims that it is the defense of 
monotheism inherited from Judaism. His statements suggest a monolithic conception of 
monotheism within first- and second-century Judaism, but such characterizations of 
Jewish monotheism have been problematized by scholars since at least the late 1980s.167 
                                                 
166 For a further discussion and deconstruction of Boyarin’s theory, see my forthcoming article in 
Vigiliae Christianae, “Monarchianism and Two Powers: Jewish and Christian Monotheism at the 
Beginning of the Third Century.” 
167 See especially the work of Hurtado, Bauckham, Stuckenbruck, and Fossum, a full discussion of 
which is beyond the scope of this dissertation. For the major works of Jarl Fossum on these issues, see: Jarl 
E. Fossum, “Jewish-Christian Christology and Jewish Mysticism,” Vigiliae Christianae 37, no. 3 (1983): 
260–87; Jarl E. Fossum, The Name of God and the Angel of the Lord: Samaritan and Jewish Concepts of 
Intermediation and the Origin of Gnosticism, Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen Zum Neuen Testament 36 
(Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1985); Jarl E. Fossum, “The New Religionsgeschichtliche Schule: The Quest for 
Jewish Christology,” Society of Biblical Literature Seminar Papers 30 (1991): 638–46; Jarl E. Fossum, The 
Image of the Invisible God: Essays on the Influence of Jewish Mysticism on Early Christology, Novum 
Testamentum et Orbis Antiquus 30 (Freiburg; Göttingen: Universitätsverlag; Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1995). See also Carey C. Newman, Gladys S. Lewis, and James R. Davila, eds., The Jewish Roots of 
Christological Monotheism: Papers from the St. Andrews Conference on the Historical Origins of the 
Worship of Jesus, Supplements to the Journal for the Study of Judaism 63 (Leiden: Brill, 1999). See, 
among many others, Larry W. Hurtado, “What Do We Mean by ‘First-Century Jewish Monotheism,’” 
Society of Biblical Literature Seminar Papers, no. 32 (1993): 348–68; Loren T. Stuckenbruck, Angel 
Veneration and Christology: A Study in Early Judaism and in the Christology of the Apocalypse of John, 
Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen Zum Neuen Testament 70 (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1995); Richard 
Bauckham, God Crucified: Monotheism and Christology in the New Testament, Didsbury Lectures 1996 





Tertullian does call the Praxean theology “Jewish,” but that fact proves only that 
Tertullian found the accusation of “Judaism” to be effective in anti-monarchian 
polemics.168 Whether monarchian theology was underwritten by a specific stream of 
Jewish theology is an open question, but sweeping categorizations of monarchianism as 
“Jewish” or “Judaizing” are methodologically problematic and do little to advance our 
understanding of monarchianism.169 
The Development of Monarchianism and Geographical Schools 
 Noting the differences in monarchian texts with regard to patripassianism, some 
scholars have suggested that there was a development within monarchianism. Heine, for 
example, argues that the early, Asian school of monarchianism readily accepted 
patripassian conclusions while the later, Roman school rejected patripassianism.170 The 
move away from patripassianism in the Refutatio and parts of Adversus Praxean suggests 
that there was diversity regarding the acceptance of patripassianism within 
monarchianism. In the latest text, Novatian’s De Trinitate, we see unabashed statements 
of patripassianism.171 
                                                 
168 See Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 31.1, where Tertullian writes, “Moreover this matter is of 
Jewish faith, so to believe in one God as to refuse to count in with him the Son, and after the Son the Spirit” 
(trans. Evans, 179). 
169 The monotheism of early-third-century Christians was, of course, originally inherited from 
Judaism. Christian worship of Jesus as divine, however, caused it to develop in ways different from its 
Jewish roots. 
170 Heine, “The Christology of Callistus,” 89. 





 Unfortunately, we do not have enough extant data to determine the cause of the 
variations regarding patripassianism in presentations of monarchianism by its opponents. 
To determine if the acceptance of patripassianism was a persistent, particularly Asian 
phenomenon, we would need a later Asian source to show that the acceptance of 
patripassianism survived in Asian monarchianism. To prove that the rejection of 
patripassianism by some monarchians was a peculiarly Roman phenomenon, we would 
either need to show that Novatian’s testimony is incorrect or have other Roman sources 
that corroborated the portrait of Callistus in the Refutatio. As it stands, perhaps the most 
we can say is that there was variation within monarchianism, especially with regard to 
patripassianism. Whether this variation was geographically or chronologically 
characterized requires more data than we have. 
Summary of Monarchianism 
 Monarchianism was a powerful theological movement that began in the late 
second century and continued well past the middle of the third. Although it seems to have 
originated in Asia Minor, it quickly gained influence in Rome. It was an important 
enough theological movement to merit rebuttals from several theologians in the third 
century. These anti-monarchian treatises give us our only glimpse into monarchian 
theology, and their polemical portrait leaves us with a meager amount of data from which 
to reconstruct that theology. Despite this lack of data, the few scholars who have treated 
monarchianism in any depth have advanced a number of broad theories. 
 As my appraisal of these theories has shown above, I consider many of them to be 





there is no witness in the primary texts. Once these theories and narratives are stripped 
away, however, we are still able to ascertain a stable core of monarchian theology, which 
then allows us to determine what parts of monarchianism might have been variable. The 
establishment of this stable core of monarchianism is crucial for understanding the role 
monarchianism played in theological development and polemics in the early third 
century. 
 The most foundational tenet of monarchian theology, and the one that remains 
stable across all witnesses, is the strong affirmation that there is only one God. At the 
beginning of the third century, such claims were common. Both the monarchians and 
their opponents claimed to believe in only one God. The distinctive thing about the 
monarchian commitment to belief in only one God was that it interpreted the oneness of 
God in a manner that rejected the position held by their opponents, namely, that Jesus and 
the father were distinct realities and both God. The monarchians supported their 
understanding of the oneness of God with references to classic biblical affirmations of 
monotheism, like Isaiah 44:6. 
 The second core component of monarchian theology was the unwavering 
confession that Jesus was divine. The acceptance of the divinity of Jesus demarcated 
them from the psilanthropists, who also sought to preserve the oneness of God by 
denying that Jesus was God. Because the monarchians had an interpretation of 
monotheism that did not allow for two distinct realities to be God, they argued that the 
Father and Son were one and the same. In their monotheistic reasoning, if the Father was 
God, and the Son was God, then they were necessarily the same. Any argument affirming 





monarchians. Using this same logic, the monarchians focused on biblical theophanies and 
argued that one and the same God was both invisible and visible. This approach was a 
stark rejection of the way someone like Justin interpreted the Old Testament theophanies. 
 Despite the stable core of teachings just outlined, there was variety within 
monarchianism. Even from the limited attestation that we have, we know that 
monarchians after Noetus had mixed feelings about arguing that the Father suffered. 
Patripassianism can be seen as a necessary byproduct of the assertion that the Father and 
the Son are one and the same, and the anti-monarchian writers did not hesitate to point 
out this entailment. For reasons unknown to us, however, some monarchians rejected this 
conclusion and sought to preserve the impassibility of the Father. 
 As I demonstrate in the remaining chapters, the struggle against monarchianism 
catalyzed development in the language theologians used to speak about the distinction 
between the Father and Son. If only for this reason, the monarchians deserve a more 
prominent place in narrations of Trinitarian theology in the early third century than they 
now have. The monarchians, though, were more than a foil for the development of 
“proto-orthodox” theology. Their distinctive theology represents an earnest attempt to 









CHAPTER FOUR: MONARCHIANISM, ORIGEN’S COMMENTARY ON 
JOHN, AND WISDOM CHRISTOLOGY1 
Reading Origen in Situ: Origen and Monarchianism 
 Many modern accounts of Origen’s Trinitarian theology present him as moving 
along this or that trajectory toward the Nicene debates. The focus on Origen’s legacy in 
the Nicene debates brings with it questions that are foreign to the period in which Origen 
actually wrote, such as one of the main sorts of questions scholars like to ask regarding 
Origen: Did he teach that the Father and the Son were equal (with regard to divinity, 
power, substance, etc)? The work of Bruns and Ramelli is a good example of this 
tendency.2 Origen’s surroundings thus are only a blur receding into the distance. My 
approach to Origen in these final two chapters is an attempt to slow him down, an attempt 
to arrest his motion toward Nicaea so that his immediate, contemporary surroundings can 
come into sharper focus. A densely contextual reading is necessary to achieve this sharp 
focus. I undertake this reading by making three choices.  
First, I attempt to isolate as much as possible one part of his polemical context in 
my examination of Origen: the monarchian controversy that spanned the first half of the 
third century.3 The spate of anti-monarchian texts produced at the beginning of the third 
                                                 
1 Portions of this chapter are forthcoming in the Greek Orthodox Theological Review, in an article 
entitled, “Wisdom Christology and Monarchianism in Origen’s Commentary on John.” 
2 Christoph Bruns, Trinität und Kosmos: zur Gotteslehre des Origenes, Adamantiana 3 (Münster: 
Aschendorff Verlag, 2013); Ilaria Ramelli, “Origen’s Anti-Subordinationism and Its Heritage in the Nicene 
and Cappadocian Line,” Vigiliae Christianae 65, no. 1 (2011): 21–49. 
3 As will become clear, it is not possible to completely isolate this controversy by considering 
Origen’s thought only with reference to it. Origen did not write any exclusively anti-monarchian works like 
Contra Noetum or Adversus Praxean. His Dialogue with Heraclides is the closest he comes to doing so, but 





century demonstrates that monarchianism was perceived to be a serious threat by some 
notable theologians at the beginning of the third century.4 The interplay between the 
monarchian controversy and the development of Origen’s thought has not received its 
due attention from scholars.5 One of the ways I bring monarchianism into focus is by 
reading Origen alongside other anti-monarchian writers from the early third century.6 As 
I noted above, mine is a conscious decision to read Origen with his contemporaries rather 
than with his heirs in the Nicene debates. 
Second, I focus my analysis almost exclusively on ComJn 1-2, books which 
Origen composed during the height of the monarchian controversy. These opening books 
of ComJn survive in well-preserved Greek.7 This fact is important because even the 
transmission and preservation of Origen’s works bears the mark of concern about 
                                                 
his patron, Ambrose, as a response to the Valentinian Heracleon’s commentary on the Gospel of John. 
Origen interacts with monarchian ideas in books 1-2 of ComJn, but the Valentinian polemical context is 
never too far out of view. 
4 As the preceding reconstruction of monarchianism shows, these theologians included 
Hippolytus, Tertullian, the author of the Refutatio omnium haeresium, and Novatian. I should note here that 
there is a substantial difference between the passages of Origen I examine and those of the other anti-
monarchian writers. Origen was not writing an anti-monarchian treatise. He addresses monarchian theology 
within the context of a larger biblical commentary and so does not give a detailed account of many of the 
monarchian positions we saw in the other works. 
5 There are a few notable exceptions to this trend: Antonio Orbe, “Orígenes y los monarquianos,” 
Gregorianum 72, no. 1 (1991): 39–72; Gabino Uríbarri Bilbao, Monarquía y Trinidad: El concepto 
teológico “monarchia” en la controversia “monarquiana,” Publicaciones de la Universidad Pontificia 
Comillas Madrid, Serie I: Estudios 62 (Madrid: UPCO, 1996); Ronald E. Heine, “The Christology of 
Callistus,” Journal of Theological Studies 49 (1998): 56–91. As I noted in the introduction, Christoph 
Bruns makes a nod in this direction but never follows through on considering the full impact of 
monarchianism (or modalism, as he calls it) on Origen’s thought. See Bruns, Trinität und Kosmos. Bilbao’s 
account focuses on Origen’s interaction with monarchianism in the Dialogue with Heraclides, but he does 
not give too much attention to ComJn 1-2. 
6 In the last chapter, I read Origen alongside Tertullian and Novatian. 
7 By “well-preserved Greek,” I mean to highlight the fact that after the first two books of ComJn, 
the surviving text becomes very fragmentary. Compared to the later books of ComJn, there are relatively 





Origen’s relationship to post-Nicene orthodoxy.8 The fact that these books are extant in a 
mostly complete Greek text, untouched by the editorial hand of Rufinus, makes them 
particularly valuable for reconstructing Origen’s thought.9 Further motivating my choice 
to use these two books is the fact that I accept an early dating for their composition, 
beginning around 217 C. E. This dating means that these two books were composed in 
the middle of the monarchian controversy, with Contra Noetum (ca. 200-210) and 
Adversus Praxean (ca. 213) antedating them and the Refutatio (ca. 225-235) and De 
Trinitate (ca. 240-250) postdating them. This dating of the text, coupled with Origen’s 
probable contact with monarchianism during his trip to Rome, suggests that the anti-
monarchian polemical context is important for interpreting works he composed while still 
in Alexandria.10 
Third, I explore one key theme in Origen’s theology that, I argue, was formed 
through contact and conflict with monarchianism: the distinction of the Father and Son.11 
                                                 
8 I discuss this matter at length in my section on the reliability of the Trinitarian sections in 
Rufinus’ translations of Origen’s works in my final chapter. I conclude that, especially with regard to 
Trinitarian matters, Rufinus’ translation renders Origen inoffensive to post-Nicene Latin readers. 
9 Origen’s De principiis is his most well-known work; and for this reason, many scholars privilege 
it in their accounts of Origen’s Trinitarian theology. See, for example, how extensively Henri Crouzel relies 
on it: Origen, trans. A. S. Worrall (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1989), 181–204. Charles Kannengiesser 
argues that the structure of De principiis itself shows the Trinitarian focus of the work: “Divine Trinity and 
the Structure of Peri Archon,” in Origen of Alexandria: His World and His Legacy, ed. Charles 
Kannengiesser and William Lawrence Petersen, Christianity and Judaism in Antiquity 1 (Notre Dame, Ind.: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 231–49. As I argue at length in my later section on Rufinus the 
translator, Rufinus’ translation of De principiis distorts Origen’s Trinitarian theology to make it conform to 
post-Nicene orthodoxy. Therefore, I use De principiis only when it agrees with what we see in the ComJn. 
Also motivating my decision regarding De principiis is the fact that it is something of an outlier with regard 
to genre. The vast majority of Origen’s extant works are biblical commentaries, and it is only fitting to start 
with one of his earliest to begin an exploration of his Trinitarian theology. 
10 I discuss the dating of the text and Origen’s Roman travels in detail in the sections below. 
11 The narrowing of the scope of this project to the relationship between the Father and Son in 
Origen’s early works is meant to suggest neither that Origen had no substantial Pneumatology, as scholars 
like Harnack argue, nor that Origen’s later works are of no importance. See Adolf von Harnack, History of 
Dogma, trans. Neil Buchanan, vol. 3 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1907), 358. The length of my 





One of the most distinctive characteristics of monarchianism was its identification of the 
Father and the Son, the claim that they are “one and the same.”12 In the face of this 
identification of Father and Son, a careful articulation of their distinction was a pressing 
matter for anti-monarchian theologians at the beginning of the third century.13 This 
imperative to distinguish the Father and Son was further complicated by the fact that 
early third-century theologians felt the need to avoid the kind of division of the Godhead 
they perceived in the Valentinian Pleroma.14 They needed to determine how to speak of 
distinction without implying polytheistic separation. 
My examination of the distinction of the Father and Son in Origen’s early works 
consists of two dense examinations of passages from his ComJn.15 Before these studies, I 
discuss the dating of ComJn, its Alexandrian milieu, and the anti-Valentinian context set 
                                                 
oeuvre study of Origen’s Trinitarian theology in the present work. I hope that my focused study on 
Origen’s early works here might serve as a good Ausgangspunkt for such a fuller study in the future. 
12 For this claim, see especially Refutatio omnium haeresium 9.10.11-2 and Tertullian, Adversus 
Praxean 2.3: maxime haec quae se existimat meram veritatem possidere dum unicum deum non alias putat 
credendum quam si ipsum eundemque et patrem et filium et spiritum sanctum dicat. 
13 The anti-monarchian theologians thought the distinction of the Father and Son was a pressing 
matter for a number of reasons. As we see in Contra Noetum 2.4, 3.1, 4.2, and 9.3, Hippolytus thought that 
the distinction of the Father and Son was required by a proper reading of scripture. Hippolytus was also 
concerned to stress that the Father did not suffer. See Contra Noetum 1.7, 8.3. Also motivating the anti- 
monarchian theologians was the fact that the regula fidei or veritatis spoke of one God and three 
(somethings), Father, Son, and Spirit. As will become clear in my discussion of Origen, he was concerned 
to protect the individuality (ἰδιότης) of the Son. Note also that Novatian’s De Trinitate is really more of an 
exposition and defense of the regula vertitatis than a treatise on the Trinity. 
14 This dual concern with monarchianism and Valentinianism is very evident in Adversus Praxean 
3. There, Tertullian presents the monarchians and Valentinians as two poles on the spectrum of error 
regarding the relationship between the Father and Son. Note also that prior to its discussion of 
monarchianism, the Refutatio omnium haeresium has already surveyed a number of different Gnostic 
systems. At the beginning of the third-century, Gnosticism was still very much a live issue for Christian 
theologians. I have elsewhere treated the question of whether there was any relationship, antagonistic or 
otherwise, between monarchianism and Gnosticism. See my conference paper “Isaiah 44-45 and 
Competing Conceptions of Monotheism in the 2nd and 3rd Centuries,” presented at the Oxford 
International Patristics Conference, August 11, 2015. This essay is under review at Studia Patristica. 
15 My analysis here does not seek to be exhaustive. In each case, I focus on one major passage and 





by the request of his patron, Ambrose. In the first study, I analyze the ways in which 
monarchianism influenced Origen’s interpretation of ἀρχή and λόγος in the opening 
verses of John’s Gospel. I argue that Origen used the term ἀρχή to develop a Wisdom 
Christology that responded to the difficulties created by stoicized monarchian 
understandings of Logos. In the second study, I take up the question of Origen’s 
subordinationism in relation to other anti-monarchian writers in the first half of the third 
century. I conclude that Origen, like his contemporaries, intentionally deployed a 
subordinationist model of the relationship between the Father and Son in order to 
safeguard the distinction of the Father and the Son.16 
Dating the Commentary on John 
Although scholars agree that Origen began his ComJn while he was still in 
Alexandria, they do not agree about precisely when this work was written. Dating ComJn 
is not made easier by the fact that “there are no cross-references between the 
Commentary on John and the other Alexandrian writings.”17 This lack of references to his 
other Alexandrian works problematizes any attempts to determine where ComJn fits in 
the sequence of Origen’s work; and thus, we cannot feel secure in any judgments 
regarding the relation of dependence between ComJn and Origen’s other writiings. The 
one thing we can be relatively certain about regarding Origen’s literary activity in 
                                                 
16 Thus I continue to use the term “subordinationist;” but my usage seeks to disentangle it from the 
negative evaluative freight of post-Nicene orthodoxy. 
17 Ronald E. Heine, Origen: Scholarship in the Service of the Church, Christian Theology in 





Alexandria is that it came to a close in 231-232. Eusebius tells us that Origen left 
Alexandria during the tenth year of the reign of Alexander Severus.18 
Despite the lack of any explicit dating by Origen or cross-references to other 
works, a few pieces of data can at least help us to narrow down the timeframe in which 
ComJn was most likely composed. Origen notes at the beginning of book six of ComJn 
that the previous five books had been composed in Alexandria.19 Origen also makes two 
references at the beginning of book one that give us some hints for dating the work. First, 
he speaks of the fittingness of starting a commentary on the firstfruits of the Gospels 
immediately following a physical (κατὰ τὸ σῶμα) separation.20 Origen then elaborates 
and speaks of his return to Alexandria.21 While these statements seem to hint at some 
concrete events relative to which we can date the work, they are not as helpful as one 
would hope. Indeed, Origen made multiple trips while  that he lived in Alexandria. 
Unless we can determine to which of Origen’s trips he is referring here, these references 
are not truly helpful in clarifying the date of the work. 
                                                 
18 Eusebius, EH 6.26. 
19 Origen, ComJn 6.1-12. Eusebius also recounts thi fact  in EH 6.23.1-24.2.  
20 Origen, ComJn 1.12 (Greek from Origen, Commentaire sur Saint Jean, ed. Cécile Blanc, vol. 1 
(livres I - V), Sources chrétiennes 120 (Paris: Cerf, 1966), 64). 
21 Origen, ComJn 1.13. In ComJn 1.12-3, he writes, “What more excellent activity oghtut there be 
after our physical separation from one another, than the careful examination of the gospel? For, indeed, one 
might dare say that the gospel is the firstfruits of all the scriptures. What other firstfruits of our activities 
ought there to have been, then, since we have come home to Alexandria, than that devoted to the firstfruits 
of the Scriptures?” (ποίαν ἐχρῆν εἶναι μετὰ τὸ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα κεχωρίσθαι ἡμᾶς ἀλλήλων διαφέρουσαν ἢ τὴν 
περὶ εὐαγγελίου ἐξέτασιν; Καὶ γὰρ τολμητέον εἰπεῖν πασῶν τῶν γραφῶν εἶναι ἀπαρχὴν τὸ εὐαγγέλιον. 
Ἀπαρχὴν οὖν πράξεων, ἐξ οὗ τῇ Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ ἐπιδεδημήκαμεν, τίνα ἄλλην ἢ τὴν εἰς τὴν ἀπαρχὴν τῶν 
γραφῶν ἐχρῆν γεγονέναι;). Translation from Origen, Commentary on the Gospel according to John, trans. 
Ronald E. Heine, Fathers of the Church 80 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 





To which physical separation and journey is Origen referring in ComJn 1.13? 
There are two possibilities for identifying the absence that preceded Origen’s work on 
ComJn. Both of these possibilities hinge on interpretations of Eusebius’ rather laconic, 
enigmatic, and imprecise description of “no small warfare breaking out in the city” (οὐ 
σμικροῦ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν ἀναρριπισθέντος πολέμου).22 Nautin identifies this “warfare” 
with Origen’s conflict with his bishop, Demetrius  La ‘guerre’ qui l'a contraint à quitter 
Alexandrie n'était probablement rien d'autre que cette hostilité qui s'était déclarée contre 
lui dans l'entourage de l'évêque23 Eusebius recounts amicable relations between Origen 
and Demetrius earlier in Origen’s career, even claiming that Demetrius installed Origen 
alone as the head of the catechetical school in Alexandria.24 Nautin’s interpretation of the 
“warfare” would push Origen’s work on ComJn toward the end of his Alexandrian period 
when his relationship with Demetrius seems to have deteriorated.25 From this assumption, 
Nautin gives the following dating proposal: 229 – De Prin. composed; 230 – Origen 
takes a trip to Palestine; 231 – Origen composes books 1 – 4 of ComJn; winter 231/232 – 
Origen departs to Antioch and composes book 5 of ComJn.26 Nautin’s dating, which 
                                                 
22 Eusebius, EH 6.19.16 (Greek and trans. from Eusebius, EH: Books 6-10, ed. J. E. L. Oulton, 
Loeb Classical Library 265 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1932), 62–3.). 
23 Pierre Nautin, Origène: Sa vie et son œuvre, Christianisme antique 1 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1977), 
366. 
24 Eusebius, EH 6.3.8. 
25 At least one factor in the deterioration of Origen’s relationship with Demetrius was his 
ordination, not under the auspices of Demetrius, by the bishops of Caesarea and Jerusalem (see Eusebius, 
EH 6.8.4). In Nautin’s dating schema, this event would give us an early time at which conflict between 
Origen and Demetrius was increasing. Even still, we cannot date Origen’s ordination with any precision 
and are no closer to a date for the workefore. In his relatively recent treatment of Origen, John Behr follSo 
ae ows Nautin’s dating. His work was produced well before Heine’s reassessment, and Behr does not 
mention Preuschen’s earlier suggestions. See John Behr, The Way to Nicaea, The Formation of Christian 
Theology 1 (Crestwood, N.Y: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2001), 167. 





pushes ComJn to the very end of Origen’s time in Alexandria, means that all of Origen’s 
other Alexandrian works were composed earlier than ComJn.27 
The alternative understanding of Eusebius’ statement is given by Heine and 
Preuschen. Because Heine sums up Preuschen’s work so well, I treat Heine’s argument as 
representative of this view.28 Heine finds it quite unlikely that Eusebius’ statement about 
warfare breaking out in the city would refer to the disagreement between Origen and 
Demetrius. If Eusebius were describing the disagreement between Origen and Demetrius, 
he would be suggesting that the whole city was embroiled in the controversy, which is 
highly unlikely.29 Instead, Heine understands Eusebius’ statement to be referring to 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 366–7. Nautin’s dating was a substantial revision of the paradigm that had prevailed 
before him. Indeed, he is well aware that his proposal is overturning the argument of Preuschen. He notes 
that (unnamed) scholars had taken Origen’s reference to ComJn as the first fruits of  his works since the 
return to Alexandria as meaning that this was the the first of Origen’s literary efforts. 
28 For Preuschen’s argument, see Origen, Origenes Werke: Der Johanneskommentar, ed. Erwin 
Preuschen, vol. 4, Griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte 10 (Leipzig: J.C. 
Hinrichs, 1903), lxxvi-lxxxi. Heine’s views on the dating of books 1-2 of ComJn have shifted during his 
career. In his introduction to ComJn in 1989, Heine follows Nautin’s proposal and dates the work as 
follows: “This would place the composition of the first four books in Alexandria in A.D. 230-231, and part, 
at least, of Book 5 in Antioch in A.D. 231-232” (“Introduction,” in Commentary on the Gospel according 
to John, Fathers of the Church 80 [Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America Press, 1989], 4]. 
Although he does not explicitly revise his dating of ComJn, Heine argues in 1993 that Origen was 
responding to monarchianism at the beginning of ComJn, a key point in his later reappraisal of the dating 
(“Stoic Logic as Handmaid to Exegesis and Theology in Origen’s Commentary on the Gospel of John,” 
Journal of Theological Studies 44, no. 1 [1993]: 92–100). In his 1998 article, Heine suggests, “The first 
two books [of ComJn] were written soon after Origen returned from Rome, and are largely structured by 
the modalist question” (“The Christology of Callistus,” 58). This statement appears to mark the point where 
Heine’s views on the dating of the work definitively shifted to an early date, following Preuschen. 
29 Heine finds Nautin’s suggestion implausible on linguistic grounds, among others. See Heine, 
Origen, 87 n. 20, where he writes, “There are two points in Eusebius’ account which I think point to 
Caracalla’s massacre. First is Eusebius’ statement that this warfare broke out ‘in the city’ (kata tēn polin). 
This suggests something larger than a dispute between the bishop and a teacher. The other is the verb 
Eusebius chooses to designate Origen’s departure—hupexerchesthai. The usual meaning of this word is a 
secret, unnoticed departure (see, for example, Josephus, Antiquities 14.16). I can see no reason for Origen’s 
departure to have been secretive had he been leaving because of Demetrius’ animosity towards him. But if 
it refers to his departure at the time when Caracalla’s army was slaughtering the inhabitants of Alexandria 





Origen’s stealthy departure from Alexandria to escape Caracalla’s massacre in 215.30 
This understanding of Eusebius’ statement makes his claim that warfare broke out in the 
city much more intelligible than a skirmish between a bishop and a theologian. The 
upshot of this dating is that the date of composition of the first books of ComJn is moved 
back to sometime around 217, soon after Caracalla had left the city and Origen had time 
to return.31 Heine notes the full import of this dating: 
This way of reading the texts also makes the Commentary on John the first of 
Origen’s Biblical commentaries. Origen would have been in his early thirties 
when he began work on the commentary. He begins his literary career by trying to 
sort out the thorny Christological issues centered largely on the Gospel of John 
which divided the late second-and early third-century church.32 
 
The two dating proposals that deal with the majority of the evidence at length, then, give 
us very different conclusions.33 Nautin’s scheme places ComJn after Origen’s other 
Alexandrian works, while that of Preuschen and Heine puts the composition at the very 
beginning of Origen’s literary endeavors. There are various other suggestions for the 
dating of ComJn, but Nautin and Heine/Preuschen contain the fullest discussions.34 I find 
                                                 
30 Heine, Origen, 87. On pp. 87-88, Heine gives a detailed explanation of Caracalla’s massacre. 
Caracalla seems to have erected statues portraying himself as Alexander the Great, some of which might 
have been destroyed in a riot in Alexandria. Upon arrival, Caracalla was incensed at the destruction of the 
statues and began a massacre that lasted for some time.  
31 Heine, Origen, 88. 
32 Ibid., 89. 
33 Neither of these dominant dating schemes, however, damages my thesis that Origen’s 
distinction of the Father and Son was motivated by his contact with monarchianism. Even the late dating of 
ComJn 1-2 still places it in the middle of the monarchian controversy and puts it before Novatian’s De 
Trinitate. 
34 In his 1994 article, John Anthony McGuckin dates the first books of ComJn to 230/231: 
“Structural Design and Apologetic Intent in Origen’s Commentary on John,” in Origeniana Sexta 
(Louvain: Leuven University Press, 1995), 444 n.9. Later, he changes his position and dates them to 
between 226 and 229: John Anthony McGuckin, ed., The Westminster Handbook to Origen, 1st ed, The 
Westminster Handbooks to Christian Theology (Louisville, Ky: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004), 29. 
Johannes Quasten dates books 1-4 to between 226 and 229: Patrology (Utrecht: Spectrum, 1950), 2.49. 
Hans Georg Thümmel dates the work to the late 220s or by 230: Thümmel, ed., Origenes’ 





Heine and Preuschen’s argument convincing, especially its treatment of the “warfare” 
Eusebius mentions. 
 
The Alexandrian Milieu of the Commentary on John 
While Origen’s De prin. draws the attention of a number of scholars, we would do 
well to remember that his exposition of the Christian faith in this work was not typical of 
the mode in which he theologized. Indeed, Heine notes that apart from De Prin., Contra 
Celsum, and a few other works, “Origen did his theology by writing commentaries on the 
canonical scriptures of the Church in the manner that his contemporaries who were 
Aristotelian or Platonic philosophers did their philosophy by writing commentaries on the 
works of earlier philosophers.”35 In Eusebius’ list of the works Origen composed in 
Alexandria, the majority are biblical commentaries.36 
If the biblical commentary was Origen’s preferred theological medium, he gave 
the Gospel of John pride of place among all the other scriptures. By doing so, he was 
conforming to the pattern that prevailed in Alexandria in the late second and early third 
centuries.37 Eusebius attributes the following opinion to Origen’s predecessor, Clement: 
                                                 
Siebeck, 2011), 4. Marguérite Harl notes that Eusebius’ statement is “très vague” and asserts that books 1-2 
of ComJn were written either contemporaneously with, or just before, De Prin.: Marguerite Harl, Origène 
et la fonction révélatrice du Verbe incarné, Patristica Sorbonensia 2 (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1958), 121. 
35 Heine, Origen, 83.  
36 Eusebius, EH (EH) 6.24.1-3 (LCL 265:71-3). Eusebius lists the following works: Commentary 
on the Gospel of John, Commentary on Genesis, Commentary on Psalms 1-25, Commentary on 
Lamentations, De Principiis, On the Resurrection, and Stromateis. Eusebius also indicates that Origen 
began work on the Hexapla while still in Alexandria: EH 6.16. 
37 The privileging of John’s Gospel was by no means confined to Alexandria. See, for example, 





“But that John, last of all, conscious that the outward facts had been set forth in the 
Gospels, was urged on by his disciples, and, divinely moved by the Spirit, composed a 
spiritual Gospel.”38 Origen himself states, “We might dare say, then, that the Gospels are 
the firstfruits of all the Scriptures, but that the firstfruits of the Gospels is that according 
to John, whose meaning no one may understand who has not leaned on Jesus' breast nor 
received Mary from Jesus to be his mother also.”39 Heine notes that Origen does not 
allegorize anything contained in the first five verses of John’s Gospel.40 This restraint on 
Origen’s part is somewhat surprising, especially given his fondness for allegorizing. 
What leads him to restraint here? It is likely that he shared the opinion of Clement that 
John’s was a spiritual Gospel, that it soared above the rudimentary foundations laid by 
the synoptics. If John’s Gospel already led people to contemplate the spiritual—the very 
goal of allegory, there was no need to allegorize.41 
Ambrose and the Anti-Valentinian Context 
 Origen produced the ComJn at the request of his patron Ambrose, whom he 
addresses at multiple points in the Commentary.42 Although Origen does not refer to 
Ambrose by name, he speaks of someone urging him to examine the Gospel of John.43 
                                                 
38 Eusebius, EH 6.14.7 (trans. LCL 265:49). 
39 Origen, ComJn 1.23 (trans. FC 80:38). See also ComJn 1.21. 
40 Heine, “Introduction,” 21. 
41 Although not related, I suspect that something similar to this is happening in Basil’s refusal to 
allegorize in his Hexaemeral Homilies. 
42 For references to Ambrose, see: Origen, ComJn 1.9, 2.1, 6.6, 13.1, 20.1, 28.6, 32.2. 
43 Origen, ComJn 1.21: “But I think that John’s Gospel, which you have enjoined us to examine to 
the best of our ability, is the firstfruits of the Gospels. It speaks of him whose descent is traced, and begins 





Eusebius tells us that Ambrose supplied Origen with multiple stenographers and copyists, 
a luxury he would not have enjoyed without his patron.44 Eusebius also writes the 
following about Ambrose: “At this time also Ambrose, who held the views of the heresy 
of Valentinus, was refuted by the truth as presented by Origen, and, as if his mind were 
illuminated by light, gave his adhesion to the true doctrine as taught by the Church.”45 
Jerome, however, suggests that Ambrose was a follower of Marcion before being 
converted by Origen.46 Heine argues that Eusebius was correct and that, as an 
Alexandrian, it is more likely that Ambrose would have been a follower of Valentinus 
than of Marcion.47 
 Sinec Ambrose had only recently converted from Valentinianism, it is no surprise 
that he commissioned Origen to write a commentary on the Gospel of John.48 It is likely 
that in addition to supplying Origen with stenographers and copyists, Ambrose provided 
Origen with a copy of Heracleon’s Valentinian commentary on the Gospel of John.49 The 
                                                 
κατὰ δύναμιν ἐρευνῆσαι, τὸ κατὰ Ἰωάννην, τὸν γενεαλογούμενον εἰπὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀγενεαλογήτου 
ἀρχόμενον). Translation from FC 80:121; Greek from SC 120:68. 
44 Eusebius, EH 6.23.1-2 (LCL 265:69). See also Jerome, De viris illustribus 61.3. 
45 Eusebius, EH 6.18.1 (trans. LCL 265:55). 
46 Jerome, De viris illustribus 56.1. “ambrosius, primum marcionites, dein ab origene correctus, 
ecclesiae diaconus et confessionis dominicae gloria insignis fuit.” Latin from Jerome and Gennadius, 
Hieronymus: liber De viris inlustribus; Gennadius: liber De viris inlustribus., ed. Ernest Cushing 
Richardson, Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur 14 (Leipzig: J.C. 
Hinrichs, 1896), 34. Jerome repeats this claim that Ambrose was a follower of Marcion in De viris 
illustribus 61.3. 
47 Heine, “Introduction,” 6 n. 22. 
48 Eusebius, EH 6.18.1 (LCL 265:55); Heine, Origen, 95.  






Gospel of John was a favorite gospel of Valentinians.50 Irenaeus’ record of the teaching 
of Ptolemaeus the Valentinian focuses on the opening verses of John’s Gospel.51 In 
Irenaeus’ account, Ptolemaeus focused on many of the same Christological titles that 
Origen dwells on at length in the opening books of ComJn.52 
 Although the refutation of Heracleon’s Valentinian commentary on the Gospel of 
John is ostensibly the motivation for Origen’s composition of ComJn, there are only two 
references to Heracleon’s commentary in the first two books of ComJn. The first 
reference to Heracleon does not occur until about halfway through book two of ComJn.53 
Heine argues that despite the scant references to Heracleon in books 1-2 of ComJn, 
Origen is still addressing Valentinian views.54 Αs Irenaeus’ account of Ptolemaus’ 
teaching shows, the interpretation of ἀρχή was a critical part of the Valentinian 
                                                 
50 Elaine H. Pagels, The Johannine Gospel in Gnostic Exegesis: Heracleon’s Commentary on 
John, Society of Biblical Literature Monograph Series 17 (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1973), 16–7. T. E. 
Pollard suggests that one reason there is little explicit quotation of the Gospel by proto-orthodox Christians 
before the end of the second century is that the Gospel was used heavily by Gnostics. See his Johannine 
Christology and the Early Church, Society for New Testament Studies; Monograph Series 13 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1970), 24–5. 
51 Irenaeus, Adversus haereses 1.8.5. I use the term “Valentinian” here, as elsewhere, fully aware 
that it is perhaps an oversimplification. To be sure, the fragments we have that are thought to accurately 
reflect the thought of Valentinus himself lack many of the features of later “Valentinians.” Thus, we ought 
not assume that all who are called “Valentinians” are representative of the thought of Valentinus. See 
Heine, Origen, 53–4. See also the thorough treatment of Valentinianism and all of the attendant 
complexities in Einar Thomassen, The Spiritual Seed: The Church of the Valentinians, Nag Hammadi and 
Manichaean Studies 60 (Leiden: Brill, 2006). 
52 Among those Irenaeus discusses in Adversus haereses 1.8.5 are the following: beginning, life, 
logos, truth, God.  
53 Origen, ComJn 2.100-4. Here Origen is refuting Heracleon’s interpretation of John 1:3: “All 
things were made through him.” Shortly afterward, Origen refutes Heracleon’s interpretation of John 1:4: 
“What was made in him was life.” For an examination of all of Heracleon’s fragments in ComJn, see 
Heracleon, The Fragments of Heracleon: Newly Edited from the Mss. with an Introduction and Notes, ed. 
Alan England Brooke, 1st Gorgias Press ed, Texts and Studies: Contributions to Biblical and Patristic 
Literature, 1, no. 4 (Piscataway, N.J.: Gorgias Press, 2004). Note, however, that Brooke’s numbering of the 
text does not match that of Blanc and Thümmel, since his text was produced well before the newer critical 
editions. 





understanding of the Ogdoad.55 Origen’s fixation on determining the proper meaning of 
ἀρχή in book one of ComJn is most likely intended to guard against Valentinian 
interpretations.56 However, Origen’s discussions of ἀρχή also have utility for anti-
monarchian polemic. 
Monarchianism and Book 1 of the Commentary on John 
 At multiple points in ComJn, Origen bemoans the fact that many people have 
unduly fixated on the title Logos for Christ. He wishes that they would consider it as one 
title among many. He states, 
But let us consider more carefully what the Word is which is in the beginning. I 
frequently marvel when I consider the things said about the Christ by some who 
wish to believe in him. Why in the world, when countless names are applied to 
the Savior, do they pass by most of them in silence? Even if they should perhaps 
remember them, they do not interpret them in their proper sense, but say that these 
name him figuratively. On the other hand, they stop in the case of the title “Word” 
alone, as if they say that the Christ of God is “Word” alone; and they do not 
investigate, consistent with the rest of the names, the meaning of what is indicated 
by the term “Word.”57 
 
After surveying the many titles ascribed to Christ, he further specifies what troubles him 
about his opponents’ fixation on the title Logos: 
                                                 
55 Irenaeus, Adversus haereses 1.8.5. So also Heine, Origen, 94–5. 
56 For a good example, see ComJn 1.111-8, where Origen’s discussion is concentrated on terms 
important for Valentinian pleromatology: arche, logos, sophia, and demiourgos. While the Valentinians 
took all of these terms to represent different Aeons, Origen collapses all of them together and unifies them 
in the Son. This move is almost assuredly motivated by his opposition to the Valentinian exegesis of the 
prologue to the Gospel of John. 
57 Origen, ComJn 1.125 (trans. FC 80:59-60): Ἴδωμεν δ’ ἐπιμελέστερον τίς ὁ ἐν αὐτῇ λόγος.   
Θαυμάζειν μοι πολλάκις ἐπέρχεται σκοποῦντι τὰ ὑπό τινων πιστεύειν εἰς τὸν Χριστὸν βουλομένων 
λεγόμενα περὶ αὐτοῦ, τί δήποτε δυσεξαριθμήτων ὀνομάτων τασσομένων ἐπὶ τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν τὰ μὲν 
πλεῖστα παρασιωπῶσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἴ ποτε μνήμη αὐτῶν γένοιτο, μεταλαμβάνουσιν οὐ κυρίως ἀλλὰ 
τροπικῶς ταῦτα αὐτὸν ὀνομάζεσθαι, ἐπὶ δὲ μόνης τῆς λόγος προσηγορίας ἱστάμενοι οἱονεὶ «λόγον» μόνον 
φασὶν εἶναι τὸν Χριστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ οὐχὶ ἀκολούθως τοῖς λοιποῖς τῶν ὀνομαζομένων ἐρευνῶσι τοῦ 





It is worthwhile to consider those who disregard so many names and treat this one 
as special. And again they look for an explanation in the case of the other names, 
if someone brings them to their attention, but in the case of this one they believe 
they have a clear answer to what the Son of God is, when he is named Word. This 
is especially obvious since they continually use this verse, ‘My heart uttered a 
good word,’ (Ps. 44:2 LXX) as though they think the Son of God is an expression 
of the Father occurring in syllables. And in accordance with this view, if we 
inquire of them carefully, they do not give him ὑπόστασιν, neither do they make 
clear his οὐσίαν. I do not yet mean that it is this or that, but in what manner he has 
οὐσίαν. For it is impossible for anyone to understand a proclaimed word to be a 
son. Let them declare to us that God the Word is such a word, having life in 
himself, and either is not separated from the Father and, in accordance with this 
position, does not subsist (μὴ ὑφεστάναι) nor is he a son, or is both separated and 
invested with ousia.58 
 
Scholars have suggested multiple possibilities for Origen’s opponents in this passage. 
Often drawing on a passage from Irenaeus, Adversus haereses 2.28.5, some have argued 
that Origen is addressing Valentinian positions here.59 Others have suggested that Origen 
                                                 
58 Origen, ComJn 1.151-2 (trans. FC 80:64-5 with modifications). Καὶ ἔστιν ἄξιον ἐπιστῆσαι τοῖς 
τὰ τοσαῦτα τῶν ὀνομαζομένων παραπεμπομένοις καὶ τούτῳ ὡς ἐξαιρέτῳ χρωμένοις καὶ πάλιν ἐπ’ ἐκείνοις 
μὲν διήγησιν ζητοῦσιν, εἴ τις αὐτοῖς προσάγοι αὐτά, ἐπὶ δὲ τούτῳ ὡς σαφὲς προσιεμένοις τὸ τί ποτέ ἐστιν ὁ 
υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος ὀνομαζόμενος, καὶ μάλιστα ἐπεὶ συνεχῶς χρῶνται τῷ· «Ἐξηρεύξατο ἡ καρδία μου 
λόγον ἀγαθόν», οἰόμενοι προφορὰν πατρικὴν οἱονεὶ ἐν συλλαβαῖς κειμένην εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ 
κατὰ τοῦτο ὑπόστασιν αὐτῷ, εἰ ἀκριβῶς αὐτῶν πυνθανοίμεθα, οὐ διδόασιν οὐδὲ οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ 
σαφηνίζουσιν, οὐδέπω φαμὲν τοιάνδε ἢ τοιάνδε, ἀλλ’ ὅπως ποτὲ οὐσίαν. (152.)  Λόγον γὰρ 
ἀπαγγελλόμενον υἱὸν εἶναι νοῆσαι καὶ τῷ τυχόντι ἐστὶν ἀμήχανον. Καὶ λόγον τοιοῦτον καθ’ αὑτὸν ζῶντα 
καὶ ἤτοι οὐ κεχωρισμένον τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο τῷ μὴ ὑφεστάναι οὐδὲ υἱὸν τυγχάνοντα ἢ καὶ 
κεχωρισμένον καὶ οὐσιωμένον ἀπαγγελλέτωσαν ἡμῖν θεὸν λόγον. Greek from SC 120:134-6. 
59 See Ilaria Ramelli, “Origen, Greek Philosophy, and the Birth of the Trinitarian Meaning of 
Hypostasis,” Harvard Theological Review 105, no. 3 (2012): 313–4; Christoph Bruns, Trinität und 
Kosmos, 62–3; Cécile Blanc in Origen, Commentaire sur Saint Jean, 1 (livres I - V):136. Blanc suggests 
that Irenaeus’ report in Adversus haereses 2.28.5 elucidates Origen’s passage. Irenaeus writes, “But ye 
pretend to set forth His generation from the Father, and ye transfer the production of the word of men 
which takes place by means of a tongue to the Word of God, and thus are righteously exposed by your own 
selves as knowing neither things human nor divine” (Vos autem generationem eius ex patre divinantes et 
verbi hominum per linguam factam prolationem transferentes in verbum Dei, iuste detegimini a vobis ipsis 
quod neque humana neque divina noveritis). Trans. ANF 1.400-1; Latin from Irenaeus, Contre les hérésies: 
Livre II, ed. Adelin Rousseau and Louis Doutreleau, vol. 2, Sources chrétiennes 294 (Paris: Cerf, 1982), 
282. Ronald Heine has recently supported this view and shown how Ptolemaus appears to have focused on 
the term logos, according to Irenaeus’ report in Adversus haereses 1.8.5. He argues that this focus would 
make sense of Origen’s comments in ComJn 1.125. See Heine, Origen, 94–6. Elsewhere, however, Heine 
notes that the interpretation of Psalm 44:2 was a point of disagreement between the “Logos theologians” 





is addressing a monarchian reading of Psalm 44:2 (LXX).60  Ronald Heine writes, “The 
difference between the Logos theologians and the modalists lay in the definition of the 
Logos as either substantial or insubstantial, and this difference was debated exegetically, 
as both Tertullian and Origen show, in relation to Ps. 44:2.”61 The latter group of scholars 
often notes that Origen appears to be addressing both the position of the monarchians and 
the teaching of someone like Tertullian.62 Part of the difficulty of determining the identity 
of Origen’s opponents in this passage is that Origen’s interpretation takes place within a 
crowded polemical landscape. We know that the monarchians relied heavily on passages 
from the Gospel of John, especially John 10:30 and 14:8-10.63 At the beginning of the 
Dialogue with Heraclides, Heraclides quotes John 1:1-3 as a statement of his belief, thus 
demonstrating that the Johannine prologue could also be a focal point for someone who 
                                                 
60 Antonio Orbe, in agreement with Eugenio Corsini, shows the parallels between Origen’s 
opponents and monarchian exegesis before suggesting that Origen also “has his sights set on a domestic 
exegesis, like that of Tertullian.” See Orbe, “Orígenes y los Monarquianos,” 54–6; Origen, Commento al 
Vangelo di Giovanni, ed. and trans. Eugenio Corsini, Classici della filosofia 3 (Torino: Unione tipografico-
editrice torinese, 1968), 160–1, n. 45. Thümmel notes the similarity to monarchianism: Origenes’ 
Johanneskommentar, Buch I-V, 221–2. In his earlier article, Heine, following Orbe, argues that Origen 
appears to be addressing the positions of both the monarchians and someone like Tertullian in this passage 
(“The Christology of Callistus,” 65–6). Perhaps the various solutions are not mutually exclusive. On the 
one hand, Tertullian’s attribution of a similar interpretation of Ps. 44:2 to the monarchians in Adversus 
Praxean is the closest parallel to Origen’s passage that we have. Therefore, it is probable that Origen was 
addressing the monarchians in this passage. On the other hand, the resonances with the passages from 
Adversus haereses describing Valentinianism are evocative and should not be dismissed. 
61 Heine, “The Christology of Callistus,” 64. 
62 The part of the “domestic exegesis” of someone like Tertullian that Origen would find 
troublesome is that it can be considered a two-stage Logos theology. For example, Tertullian speaks of the 
“perfect nativity of the Word” (nativitas perfecta sermonis dum ex Deo procedit) occurring when God says 
“Fiat lux” in Gen. 1:3. See, Adversus Praxean 7.1 (Tertulliani Opera: Pars II, ed. A Kroymann and Ernest 
Evans, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina 2 [Turnholt: Brepols, 1954], 1165). Tertullian’s exegesis would 
be problematic for Origen because he wants to stress that the Son has always been alongside the Father. See 
De prin. 1.2.2; ComJn 10.246. Behr draws attention to Origen’s insistence that the Son has always been 
with the Father: (The Way to Nicaea, 185, 193). 
63 See Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 4.7, 7.1, and 7.4-5; Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 20.1; 





subscribed to monarchian views.64 We also know that the Johannine prologue was a focal 
point of Valentinian theology.65 Even more, the Gospel of John was important for 
theologians like Origen and Tertullian, who worked to refute both Valentinianism and 
monarchianism.66 In short, the Gospel of John was central to the theology of many of the 
major Christians groups at the beginning of the third century.67 In what follows, I focus 
on one side of the polemical context (anti-monarchian) of books 1-2 of Origen’s ComJn, 
which focus on the opening verses of John’s Gospel.68 
After the passage quoted above, Origen repeats that these opponents interpret the 
title Logos literally although they understand many of the other titles of Christ 
figuratively.69 Later, after another lengthy excursus on the names of Christ, Origen again 
punctuates his discussion by countering the claims of his opponents, saying,  
We have said all these things wishing to show the random and unexamined 
procedure followed by many interpreters. Although so many names are applied to 
Christ, they stop with the term ‘Word’ alone, and do not investigate why ‘the Son 
of God’ has been recorded to be the Word, God, who was in the beginning with 
the Father, through whom all things came into being.70 
 
                                                 
64 Origen, Dialogue with Heraclides 1. 
65 As demonstrated, for example, in Irenaeus, Adversus Haereses 1.8.5.  
66 See, for example, Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 20-5. In these chapters, Tertullian relies heavily 
on the Gospel of John to articulate his position against that of the Praxeans. 
67 T. E. Pollard writes, “I believe that it was St John’s Gospel, with its Logos-concept in the 
Prologue and its emphasis on the Father-Son relationship, that raised in a most acute way the problems 
which led the church to formulate her doctrines of the trinity and of the person of Christ” (Johannine 
Christology and the Early Church, xi). 
68 I leave aside the discussion of Origen’s anti-Valentinian motive here in order to keep this 
chapter focused and concise. 
69 Origen, ComJn 1.154. 
70 Origen, ComJn 1.266 (trans. FC 80:88): Ταῦτα δὲ ἡμῖν πάντα εἴρηται τὸ τῶν πολλῶν 
ἀποκληρωτικὸν καὶ ἀβασάνιστον ἐλέγξαι βουλομένοις, ὅτι τοσούτων ὀνομάτων εἰς αὐτὸν ἀναφερομένων 
ἵστανται ἐπὶ μόνης τῆς «λόγος» ὀνομασίας, οὐκ ἐξετάζοντες, τί δήποτε λόγος εἶναι θεὸς ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸς τὸν 





Again, the problem is that is opponents privilege the title Logos and do not consider the 
reason the Son is called Logos. 
 At the end of book one of ComJn, Origen returns to interpretation of Ps. 44:2 and 
says that his opponents cite it frequently as if they understood it.71 Origen does not give 
us more detail about his opponents’ interpretation of this verse, only complaining that 
they interpret literally the word mentioned in it as an expression occurring in syllables.72 
Tertullian, however, discusses Ps. 44:2 at multiple points in Adversus Praxean. He 
himself uses this verse to describe the generation of the Son and summarizes his 
opponents’ position: “For what, you will say, is a word except voice and oral sound and 
(as the grammarians’ tradition has it) smitten air intelligible in the hearing, for the rest an 
empty something, void and incorporal?”73 Later, when Tertullian takes up this psalm 
again, he clarifies the monarchian position: 
Just as I allege as spoken by God, My heart hath disgorged a good Word, against 
this do you object that God somewhere said, My heart hath disgorged myself as a 
good word, so that he himself may be both he who disgorged and what he 
disgorged, himself both he who brought forth and he who was brought forth, if he 
himself is Word and God.74 
 
                                                 
71 Origen, ComJn 1.280. 
72 Again, see ComJn 1.151 for those who interpret Logos as an “expression of God occurring in 
syllables” (trans. FC 80:64). 
73 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 7.6 (trans. Evans, 137-8): Quid est enim, dices, sermo, nisi uox et 
sonus oris et, sicut grammatici tradunt, aer offensus intellegibilis auditu, ceterum uacuum nescio quid et 
inane et incorporale? Latin from CCSL 2:1166.  
74 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 11.2 (trans. Evans, 143): Sicut ego profero dictum a Deo: 
Eructauit cor meum sermonem optimum, haec tu contra opponas alicubi dixisse Deum: ‘Eructauit me cor 
meum sermonem optimum’, ut ipse sit qui et eructauit et quod eructauit et ipse qui protulerit et qui prolatus 





Heine ably treats these passages in his article on Callistus’ Christology, detailing the 
philosophical underpinnings of monarchian teaching on the Logos as it relates to Psalm 
44:2:75   
If we view the statement in Ps. 44:2 from a Stoic standpoint, then the exegetical 
argument of the modalists becomes clear. The Stoics distinguished between λόγος 
ἐνδιάθετος (reason) and λόγος προφόρικος (speech). Ps. 44:2 is clearly about the 
latter…. Consequently when the term Logos was used of Christ in the sense of 
λόγος προφόρικος it could only refer to a spoken word (φωνή, vox or sonus oris) 
from a Stoic standpoint. And this is precisely what Tertullian and Origen accuse 
the modalists of saying in their exegesis of Ps. 44:2.76 
  
It is most likely to this interpretation of Psalm 44:2 that Origen is referring when he 
speaks of those who think the Son is an expression of the Father occurring in syllables. 
Heine notes that the Stoic understanding of Logos used by the monarchians was 
unpalatable to Origen, Tertullian, and the author of the Refutatio because it treated Logos 
as a category of speech, not a category of ontology.77 Tertullian complains that his 
opponents’ understanding of the word makes it “void and incorporeal” (inane et 
incorporale) and counters that what proceeds from substance must have substance.78  
                                                 
75 Heine also notes that the foregrounding of the Logos concept in Callistus’ theology is probably 
the work of the author of the Refutatio. Heine argues that spirit was probably a more important concept for 
Callistus’ theology. See “The Christology of Callistus,” 64. 
76 Ibid., 66. Note, however, that Mark J. Edwards does not think this distinction was as much of a 
Stoic commonplace as some posit: “Clement of Alexandria and His Doctrine of the Logos,” Vigiliae 
Christianae 54, no. 2 (2000): 161–2. 
77 Heine, “The Christology of Callistus,” 66. 
78 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 7.6. Note also that Tertullian’s materialist understanding of God 
as spirit is probably influencing his critique here. See René Braun, Deus christianorum: Recherches sur le 
vocabulaire doctrinal de Tertullien, 2nd ed., Collection des Études augustiniennes 70 (Paris: Études 





Origen’s characterization of his opponents’ error fits well with Tertullian’s 
testimony. Recall that in the passage I quoted above, Origen wrote that his opponents 
interpreted Psalm 44:2 
as though they think the Son of God is an expression of the Father occurring in 
syllables. And in accordance with this view, if we inquire of them carefully, they 
do not give him ὑπόστασιν, neither do they make clear his οὐσίαν. I do not yet 
mean that it is this or that, but in what manner he has οὐσίαν. For it is impossible 
for anyone to understand a proclaimed word to be a son. Let them declare to us 
that God the Word is such a word, having life in himself, and either is not 
separated from the Father and, in accordance with this position, does not subsist 
(μὴ ὑφεστάναι) nor is he a son, or is both separated and invested with ousia.79 
 
Origen criticizes his opponents for denying ousia to the prophora, which is here the 
Logos.80 This criticism is very similar to Tertullian’s complaint that his opponents 
understand the Word as something “void and incorporeal.”81 The Stoicized Logos 
theology of their opponents allowed them to interpret the Logos as something without a 
distinct existence or substance. 
This background for the interpretation of Psalm 44:2 elucidates why Origen and 
Tertullian are concerned with it. When substance is denied to the Logos, it is much easier 
to claim that the Logos is not distinct from the Father. An indistinct Logos easily allows 
for the assertion that the Father and the Son are “one and the same.”82 This fact is 
                                                 
79 Origen, ComJn 1.151-2 (trans. FC 80:64-5 with modifications). οἰόμενοι προφορὰν πατρικὴν 
οἱονεὶ ἐν συλλαβαῖς κειμένην εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ὑπόστασιν αὐτῷ, εἰ ἀκριβῶς αὐτῶν 
πυνθανοίμεθα, οὐ διδόασιν οὐδὲ οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ σαφηνίζουσιν, οὐδέπω φαμὲν τοιάνδε ἢ τοιάνδε, ἀλλ’ ὅπως 
ποτὲ οὐσίαν. (152.)  Λόγον γὰρ ἀπαγγελλόμενον υἱὸν εἶναι νοῆσαι καὶ τῷ τυχόντι ἐστὶν ἀμήχανον. Καὶ 
λόγον τοιοῦτον καθ’ αὑτὸν ζῶντα καὶ ἤτοι οὐ κεχωρισμένον τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο τῷ μὴ ὑφεστάναι 
οὐδὲ υἱὸν τυγχάνοντα ἢ καὶ κεχωρισμένον καὶ οὐσιωμένον ἀπαγγελλέτωσαν ἡμῖν θεὸν λόγον. Greek from 
SC 120:134-6. 
80 As I note later, Origen appears to be guarding against just the sort of tendency in his discussion 
of wisdom in De principiis 1.2.2. 
81 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 7.6 
82 For the monarchian contention that the Father and Son are one and the same, see especially 





especially clear when Tertullian taunts his opponents to change the wording of the Pslam 
so that they have a passage that supports their position: “My heart hath disgorged myself 
as a good word.”83 Tertullian’s opponents do not allow for any distinction between the 
one speaking and the thing being spoken; they are one and the same. Origen appears to be 
addressing a similar problem when he writes, “Let them declare to us that God the Word 
is such a word, having life in himself, and either is not separated from the Father and, in 
accordance with this position, does not subsist (μὴ ὑφεστάναι) nor is he a son, or is both 
separated and invested with ousia.”84 For Origen, if the Logos is not separated (οὐ 
κεχωρισμένον) or distinct from the Father, he does not subsist (μὴ ὑφεστάναι) and, 
therefore, cannot be a son. Conversely, if the Logos is separate from the Father, he has 
ousia (οὐσιωμένον).85 The problem is that in the monarchian exegesis, the προφοράν is 
merely syllables and is denied ὑπόστασιν or οὐσίαν; the Son does not have distinct 
existence alongside the Father. 
                                                 
meram veritatem possidere dum unicum deum non alias putat credendum quam si ipsum eundemque et 
Patrem et Filium et Spiritum dicat (CCSL 2:1161). 
83 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 11.2 (italics mine). Note the subtle shift between the Latin text of 
the Psalm, Eructavit cor meum sermonem optimum and the modified version Tertullian puts on the lips of 
his opponents, Eructavit me cor meum sermonem optimum. (Latin from CCSL 2:1171). 
84 Origen, ComJn 1.152 (trans. FC 80:64-5 with modifications): Καὶ λόγον τοιοῦτον καθ’ αὑτὸν 
ζῶντα καὶ ἤτοι οὐ κεχωρισμένον τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο τῷ μὴ ὑφεστάναι οὐδὲ υἱὸν τυγχάνοντα ἢ καὶ 
κεχωρισμένον καὶ οὐσιωμένον ἀπαγγελλέτωσαν ἡμῖν θεὸν λόγον. Greek from SC 120:136-8. 
85 Origen gives us a rough summary of his opponents’ interpretation of Psalm 44:2, but he does 
not elaborate on their teaching. From Contra Noetum and Adversus Praxean, however, we know that the 
monarchians denied that there was any distinction between the Father and the Son. Consider the saying 
Hippolytus attributes to the Noetians: “You see, brethren, how rash and reckless a doctrine they introduced 
in saying quite shamelessly, ‘The Father is himself Christ; he is himself the Son; he himself was born, he 
himself suffered, he himself raised himself up!’” See Contra Noetum 3.2 (trans. Hippolytus, Contra 
Noetum, ed. Robert Butterworth, Heythrop Monographs 2 (London: Heythrop College [University of 





 Origen returns to this Psalm repeatedly in the first book of his commentary on the 
Gospel of John because it was an integral piece of the monarchian contention that the 
Word was, in fact, not an existent distinct from the Father. Furthermore, one of the 
reasons Origen downplays the significance of Word as a title for Christ in book one of 
ComJn is this prominent exegetical trend of his monarchian opponents.86 Thus, Origen 
spends so much time discussing every title of Christ but Logos in his commentary on the 
opening verse of John’s gospel, which is the locus classicus for Logos Christology. As is 
clear elsewhere, Origen was certainly not averse to developing a Logos Christology, but 
he deemphasized it in this instance to counter the monarchian usage of the term.  Origen, 
of course, does not completely pass up this opportunity to speak about the Word.  In book 
two of ComJn, he argues that all rational creatures are rational insofar as they participate 
in the Logos. See especially the section on participation starting in 2.16. He is not willing 
to relinquish such an important Christological title to his opponents, but he can develop 
an alternative to combat what he views as their mistaken interpretation of Logos. 
                                                 
86 As I noted above in my summary of scholarship, the Valentinian usage of Logos surely 
contributed to Origen’s de-emphasis of it as well. A few scholars have noticed the importance of Wisdom 
as a Christological title in Origen, but they do not consider the function of Wisdom as a response to 
monarchianism. See A. H. B. Logan, “Origen and Alexandrian Wisdom Christology,” in Origeniana 
Tertia: The Third International Colloquium for Origen Studies, University of Manchester, September 7th-
11th, 1981, ed. Richard Hanson and Henri Crouzel (Roma: Edizioni dell’Ateneo, 1985), 123–29; W. 
Ullmann, “Die Sophia-Lehre des Origenes im 1 Buch seines Johanneskommentars,” Studia Patristica 16.2 
(Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1985), 271–78; Miyako Demura, “Origen on Sophia in Contra Celsum: The 
Double Understandings of the Wisdom of Solomon 7:27,” in Origeniana Quinta: Papers of the 5th 
International Origen Congress, Boston College, 14-18 August 1989 (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 
1992), 174–78; Michel Fédou, La sagesse et le monde: Essai sur la christologie d’Origène, Collection 
“Jésus et Jésus-Christ” 64 (Paris: Desclée, 1995). Behr writes that in books 1-2 of ComJn, Origen pays the 
most attention “to the designation of Jesus as the ‘Word,’ for, as mentioned earlier, Origen is particularly 
concerned about those who refrain from investigating 'the meaning of what is indicated by the term 
"Word,"' so that they do not have to affirm the independent subsistence of the Son (ComJn. 1.125, 151).” 
See Behr, The Way to Nicaea, 182. As I argue in what follows, despite the few passages where Origen 






Where we would expect to find lengthy meditations on Christ as Logos, we see 
Origen suggest that Wisdom is perhaps the most proper name for the Son. When Origen 
does discuss the Son as Logos in book one of ComJn, he locates Logos in Wisdom. He 
states, “And if we should carefully consider all the concepts applied to him, he is the 
beginning only insofar as he is wisdom. He is not even the beginning insofar as he is the 
Word, since ‘the Word’ was ‘in the beginning,’ so that someone might say boldly that 
wisdom is older than all the concepts in the names of the firstborn of creation.”87  
Origen’s de-emphasis of Logos is not confined to ComJn. In his discussion of 
Christ in De Prin. 1.2, Origen begins with a discussion of the names of applied to Christ. 
Instead of Logos, Origen focuses on Christ as Wisdom.88 He then quickly adds, “Let no 
one think, however, that when we give him the name ‘wisdom of God’ we mean anything 
without substance (aliquid insubstantivum).”89 It appears that Origen made this comment 
to guard against the same problem he saw in the monarchian exegesis of Psalm 44:2 that 
he addressed in ComJn, namely, that they denied the Son substantiality and distinction 
from the Father. Origen discusses Christ as Logos in De Prin. only after he has 
considered him as Wisdom. Although Origen locates Logos within Wisdom in book 1 of 
                                                 
87 Origen, ComJn 1.118 (trans. FC 80:58): Καὶ ἐὰν ἐπιμελῶς ἐξετάζωμεν αὐτοῦ πάσας τὰς 
ἐπινοίας, μόνον κατὰ τὸ εἶναι σοφία ἀρχή ἐστιν, οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι λόγος ἀρχὴ τυγχάνων, εἴγε «ὁ λόγος ἐν 
ἀρχῇ» ἦν· ὡς εἰπεῖν ἄν τινα τεθαρρηκότως <ὡς> πρεσβύτερον πάντων τῶν ἐπινοουμένων ταῖς ὀνομασίαις 
τοῦ πρωτοτόκου πάσης κτίσεώς ἐστιν ἡ σοφία. Greek from SC 120:120. In the sections preceding this one, 
Origen discusses the role of Wisdom in creation. He also discusses the relationship between Logos and 
Wisdom, although his discussion is not terribly clear. 
88 Origen, De Prin. 1.2. 
89 Origen, De Prin. 1.2.2 (trans. Butterworth, 15 with modifications): “Nemo tamen putet aliquid 
nos insubstantiuum dicere, cum eum dei sapientiam nominamus.” Latin from Origen, Traité des principes, 
ed. Henri Crouzel and Manlio Simonetti, vol. 1, Sources chrétiennes 252 (Paris: Cerf, 1978), 112. 
Butterworth translates aliquid insubstantivum as “anything without hypostatic existence.”  This translation, 





ComJn, he viewed both Wisdom and Logos as proper titles for the Son, titles that would 
have been appropriate even if humans had not fallen.90 
In both ComJn and De Prin., Origen interprets ἀρχή in John 1:1 as a reference to 
the ἀρχή in Proverbs 8:22ff, where Wisdom is said to have been with God before 
creation. By means of Pr. 8:22, which itself echoes the opening words of Genesis in the 
LXX, Origen explicitly links Wisdom with demiurgic functions, even claiming that 
Wisdom contains within herself all of the forms of what would be created.91 In De Prin., 
he asks if any pious person could consider the Father to have ever existed without 
Wisdom by his side.92 Later in book one of ComJn, Origen stresses that the Wisdom of 
God “is above all creation” (τὴν ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν κτίσιν σοφἰαν τοῦ θεοῦ).93 Thus, not only 
has Origen argued that Wisdom is not something insubstantial, he has also argued that 
Wisdom has been alongside of, and distinct from, the Father from the beginning, that the 
Father has never been without Wisdom.94 
At the beginning of book two, Origen addresses views that are surely monarchian. 
He writes,  
                                                 
90 Origen, ComJn 1.124. Origen’s point here is that, in the absence of the fall, Christ would not 
have needed to be “physician” or “shepherd.” In the absence of the fall, however, Christ would have still 
been Wisdom and Word. 
91 Origen, ComJn 1.111ff; De Prin. 1.2.3. 
92 Origen, De Prin. 1.2.2. 
93 Origen, ComJn 1.244-6 (Greek from SC 120:180). 
94 Note that Tertullian does something very similar to this in his reading of Proverbs 8:22 in 
Adversus Praxean 6. There, he speaks of Wisdom being “established as a second person (secundam 
personam).” For both Tertullian and Origen, the description of Wisdom as being with God in creation 
provides ample grounds to assert that there was another (person, being, thing?) with God at creation. As I 
noted above, however, Origen probably disagreed with the fact that Tertullian thought that the Word only 
achieved a perfect nativity when God spoke the first words in creation. The way Origen speaks of Wisdom 
as alongside the Father prior to creation serves as a good refutation of Tertullian’s position that the Word 





Many people who wish to be pious are troubled because they are afraid that they 
may proclaim two Gods (δύο ἀναγορεῦσαι θεοὺς) and, for this reason, they fall 
into false and impious beliefs.  They either deny that the individual nature 
(ἰδιότητα) of the Son is other than that of the Father by confessing him to be God 
whom they refer to as ‘Son’ in name at least, or they deny the divinity of the Son 
and make his individual nature (ἰδιότητα) and essence as an individual (τὴν 
οὐσἰαν κατὰ περιγραφήν) to be different from the Father.95 
  
In this passage, he uses two terms, ἰδιότης and περιγραφή, to describe the individuality of 
the Son.96 Without overtly directing it at monarchians, Origen had earlier used περιγραφή 
to speak about the individuality of the Son.97 He begins, “In addition, to signify that the 
Word has his own individuality, that is to say, lives according to himself….”98 He goes 
on and writes about the “Logos... having ὑπόστασιν ‘in the beginning,’ in Wisdom.”99 
Even when Origen is focusing on the title Logos, he employs Wisdom as the basis for 
articulating the distinct ὑπόστασις or ἰδίαν περιγραφὴν of the Son. 
I have argued that Origen’s turn to Wisdom Christology as a means of 
establishing the individual identity of the Son was due to his rejection of monarchianism 
in Rome. The monarchians identified the Father and the Son, and their Stoicized 
                                                 
95 Origen, ComJn 2.16 (trans. FC 80:98): Καὶ τὸ πολλοὺς φιλοθέους εἶναι εὐχομένους ταράσσον, 
εὐλαβουμένους δύο ἀναγορεῦσαι θεοὺς καὶ παρὰ τοῦτο περι πίπτοντας ψευδέσι καὶ ἀσεβέσι δόγμασιν, ἤτοι 
ἀρνουμένους ἰδιότητα υἱοῦ ἑτέραν παρὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ὁμολογοῦντας θεὸν εἶναι τὸν μέχρι ὀνόματος παρ’ 
αὐτοῖς «υἱὸν» προσαγορευόμενον, ἢ ἀρνουμένους τὴν θεότητα τοῦ υἱοῦ τιθέντας δὲ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἰδιότητα καὶ 
τὴν οὐσίαν κατὰ περιγραφὴν τυγχάνουσαν ἑτέραν τοῦ πατρός. Greek from SC 120:220-2. I examine this 
passage at length in the next chapter. 
96 For a good discussion of the use of περιγραφή by Origen and others, see Matthew R. Crawford, 
“The Triumph of Pro-Nicene Theology over Anti-Monarchian Exegesis: Cyril of Alexandria and Theodore 
of Heraclea on John 14:10-11,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 21, no. 4 (2013): 549–55. Note also my 
discussion of this term in the section on Clement of Alexandria in chapter one. Clement also used 
περιγραφή to speak of the distinction of the Logos from the Father. 
97 Origen, ComJn 1.291-2. 
98 Origen, ComJn 1.291 (trans. FC 80:94): Καὶ ἔτι εἰς τὸ παραδέξασθαι τὸν λόγον ἰδίαν 
περιγραφὴν ἔχοντα, οἷον τυγχάνοντα ζῆν καθ’ ἑαυτόν. Greek from SC 120:206. 





understanding of the Logos helped support this identification.100 Their understanding of 
the Logos as a prophora from the Father allowed them to deny that the Logos had any 
individual existence of his own. He was merely struck air or sound. This understanding of 
Logos meant that the monarchians did not have to consider the Logos as another existing 
alongside the Father.  
Accordingly, Origen de-emphasized Logos Christology and developed Wisdom 
Christology in counterpoint to his monarchian opponents. The turn to Wisdom 
Christology shaped his Christology in two important ways. First, Origen de-emphasized 
Logos as the pre-eminent title of Christ in response to the controversy that the 
monarchian interpretation of the term had caused. Second, he emphasized Wisdom in his 
understanding of the Son to counteract the monarchian position: he argued that the Son, 
as Wisdom, had an individual existence distinct from the Father from the beginning.101 
He then described the Logos as in the beginning (ἐν ἀρχή), which he identifies with 
Wisdom, thus communicating to the Logos the distinct individual existence he had 
ascribed to Wisdom. His use of Wisdom Christology was also able to counteract what he 
most likely viewed as a problem in non-Stoicized Logos theologies of someone like 
Tertullian. Tertullian argued that the Logos received “perfect nativity” when God spoke 
the first words in creation, but for Origen, such an understanding of the Logos coming to 
fully or perfectly exist at a point in time was problematic. He used the concept of 
Wisdom to argue that the Son preceded creation and indeed was always alongside the 
                                                 
100 Again, see specifically ComJn 151-2 for Origen’s discussion of the reading of Psalm 44:2 that 
denies ousia to the Logos. 
101 As I have noted above, Origen uses a number of different terms to establish this distinct 





Father.102 In this way, his Wisdom Christology accomplished something that a de-
Stoicized Logos theology might not have been able to.  
                                                 
102 See especially, De prin. 1.2.2. See also passages like ComJn 10.246, where Origen argues that 
for a father to be father, he must always have a son. As John Behr astutely notes, Origen was on the early 
end of those who held that the relationship between the Father and Son is constitutive of the core of their 





CHAPTER FIVE: ORIGEN THE SUBORDINATIONIST; 
SUBORDINATION AS A MEANS OF DISTINGUISHING THE FATHER 
AND SON 
Introduction: Anti-Monarchian Subordination in the Early Third Century 
Throughout this dissertation I have surveyed various ways of speaking about the 
relationship between the Father and Son. In the first chapter, I introduced a heuristic to 
evaluate the ways authors spoke about the distinction between the Father and Son, 
ranging from “soft” distinction to “hard” distinction. On one end of the spectrum were 
those authors who distinguished the Father and Son mainly through the consistent use of 
names and titles.1 Others were more attentive to distinguishing the Father and Son but left 
the precise manners of their unity and distinction ambiguous. For example, Clement of 
Alexandria spoke of the Son as distinct from the Father by means of περιγραφή; and 
Athenagoras spoke of distinction within the Godhead by means of τάξις.2 On the far end 
of the spectrum was Justin, who argued that the Father and Son were distinct because 
they were ἕτερος ἐν ἀριθμῷ.3 Even more dramatic is the θεὸς ἕτερος that Justin claims to 
find in the Old Testament.4 
                                                 
1 Many of the so-called apostolic Fathers fall into this category. See my discussion of “soft 
distinction” in the first chapter. For example, Clement of Rome consistently uses the title δεσπότης to refer 
to the Father and the title κύριος to refer to the Son. 
2 For Clement’s use of περιγραφή, see especially my discussion of Exc. 19 in chapter one. For 
Athenagoras’ use of τάξις language, see Legatio 10.5, where he writes, “τὴν ἐν τῇ τάξει διαίρεσιν.” 
3 For one of the places Justin makes this claim, see Dialogue with Trypho 128.4. 





At the beginning of the third century, the monarchians claimed that the Father and 
Son were “one and the same.”5 With this claim, they denied that there was any distinction 
between the Father and Son. For the anti-monarchian writers who opposed them, finding 
proper means to distinguish the Father and Son was of paramount importance. Like 
earlier authors, they used the language of alterity and claimed that the Son was “other” 
(alius or ἕτερος) than the Father.6 Following the tradition of authors who antedated the 
monarchian controversy, like Athenagoras, they also spoke of distinction by using the 
language of order or τάξις.7 They used various other terms such as περιγραφή, ἰδιότης, 
ὑπόστασις, οὐσία, and ὑποκείμενον to describe how the Father and Son had existences 
differentiated from each other. At the beginning of the third century, however, these 
terms did not yet have fixed, univocal meanings. The anti-monarchian writers used these 
terms and others to argue for the distinction of the Father and the Son; but they had to 
offer further explanation to clarify how they were using them. 
 In this chapter, I demonstrate that the intentional subordination of the Son was a 
common strategy that anti-monarchian writers used to distinguish the Father and Son 
during the first half of the third century. By situating their terms for distinction within a 
subordinationist framework, they were able to clarify how the Father and Son were not 
“one and the same.” The term subordination is often used by scholars with the negative 
                                                 
5 See Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 2.3 and Refutatio 9.10.11-2 for prime examples of this claim. 
Tertullian writes: maxime haec quae se existimat meram ueritatem possidere, dum unicum deum non alias 
putat credendum quam si ipsum eundemque et Patrem et Filium et Spiritum dicat. The Refutatio records the 
following language: οὕτως γοῦν δοκεῖ μοναρχίαν συνιστᾶν, ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ φάσκων ὑπάρχειν πατέρα καὶ 
υἱόν. 
6 For examples, see Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 11.4; Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 11.1, among 
others. 
7 See especially Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 2.3-4, where Tertullian uses gradus in a manner 





evaluative judgment that whatever is deemed subordinationist was a failure to live up to 
the standards of Nicaea.8 I reject this usage as anachronistic when discussing third-
century texts and authors and argue, to the contrary, that the subordinationist schemata 
employed by the authors considered in this chapter were intentionally used to distinguish 
the Father and Son.9 Although subordinationism comes to be viewed as heretical in the 
post-Nicene period, it was an accepted anti-monarchian strategy among some prominent 
early third-century authors. 
 By treating subordination in the context of anti-monarchian polemics, I hope to 
avoid anachronistic evaluative judgments. Thus, I examine three instances of anti-
monarchian subordination in the early third century. First, I examine subordinationist 
passages from Tertullian and Novatian, whose works were separated by roughly thirty 
years.10 Next, I evaluate a key passage from the beginning of book 2 of Origen’s 
Commentary on John, which was composed in the years between Adversus Praxean and 
De Trinitate. In order to justify my focus on this passage, I preface it with an appraisal of 
                                                 
8 Simonetti notes that scholars often view the subordinationism of a pre-Nicene theologian as 
something of an embarrassment. He then notes that it is only an embarrassment if we expect the pre-Nicene 
theologians to have espoused post-Nicene orthodoxy avant la lettre. Manlio Simonetti, “Note sulla teologia 
trinitaria di Origene,” Vetera Christianorum 8 (1971): 274. It is precisely this sort of embarrassment that 
drives Christoph Bruns’ preoccupation with determining whether Origen’s subordinationism was 
ontological, in his Trinität und Kosmos: zur Gotteslehre des Origenes, Adamantiana 3 (Münster: 
Aschendorff Verlag, 2013). 
9 Geoffrey D. Dunn rightly notes the importance of reading texts within their contemporary 
contexts, although he has not completely escaped the post-Nicene freight attached to pronouncements of 
subordinationism. He writes, “The need to read Novatian free from later developments in trinitarian 
theology is important and for this reason Novatian's work deserves a re-reading. A good historical 
theologian seeks not to evaluate early theological writings from a later perspective or to use them to prove 
points in other debates, but to understand them as products of their own environment and to understand 
them within that environment” (“The Diversity and Unity of God in Novatian’s De Trinitate,” Ephemerides 
Theologicae Lovanienses 78, no. 4 (2002): 389–90). 





the value of Rufinus’ translations of Origen’s work.11 Finally, I conclude that 
subordinationist renderings of the Son’s relationship to the Father were a key feature in 
anti-monarchian polemics and that Origen’s subordinationist scheme in ComJn 2.13-32 is 
best understood within this context.12 
Tertullian 
 Scholars have puzzled over what to make of Tertullian’s Trinitarian theology in 
Adversus Praxean. On the one hand, he responds to the monarchian accusations that he 
separates the Father from the Son by arguing that the Father, Son, and Spirit all share one 
substance.13 On the other hand, some passages in the work strike scholars as undeniably 
“subordinationist.” Eric Osborn has captured the scholarly ambivalence toward 
Tertullian’s Trinitarian theology well: “Criticism of Tertullian's doctrine of the trinity has 
measured him against later formulations and either applauded or bewailed his 
achievement. To many he seems to have anticipated Nicaea and later developments, to 
others he has succumbed to extreme subordinationism.”14 Raniero Cantalamessa judges 
                                                 
11 Specifically, I discuss why I have chosen to privilege ComJn over De Principiis, which appears 
to provide a more compact and orderly account of Origen’s Trinitarian theology. 
12 Adolf von Harnack rightly observes, “While Adoptianism apparently played a very small part in 
the development of the Logos Christology in the church, the Christological theses of Tertullian and the rest 
were completely dependent on the opposition to the Modalists.  This reveals itself especially in the strict 
subordination of the Son to the Father.  It was only by such a subordination that it was possible to repel the 
charge, made by opponents, of teaching that there were two Gods” (History of Dogma, trans. Neil 
Buchanan, vol. 3 [Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1907], 70).  
13 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 2.3-4. 
14 Eric Osborn, Tertullian, First Theologian of the West (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), 133. He then qualifies this scenario on the same page, “A first reading of Against Praxeas suggests 
that Tertullian has not avoided a division of the divine substance, and more exact scrutiny indicates that he 





certain aspects of Tertullian’s theology to be subordinationist, writing, “The Christ of 
Tertullian is God in the same way as the Father, but not to the same extent.”15 Similarly, 
Adhémar d’Alès concludes that in Tertullian’s theology, “The divinity of the Father is 
communicated by degrees to the Son and the Holy Spirit, without detriment to the 
monarchy.”16 His final judgement is that “the subordinationist flavor of some of the 
passages is undeniable.”17  
 In Tertullian’s Trinitarian vocabulary in Adversus Praxean, there are some words 
that he consistently uses to denote unity and some that he uses consistently to denote 
distinction. The following passage, where Tertullain focuses on monarchianism among 
other heresies, gives a clear example of these terms: 
and in particular this one [Monarchainism] which supposes itself to possess truth 
unadulterated while it thinks it impossible to believe in one God unless it says that both 
Father and Son and Holy Spirit are one and the same: as though the one <God> were not 
all <these things> in this way also that they are all of the one, namely by unity of 
substance, while none the less is guarded the mystery of that economy which disposes the 
unity into trinity, setting forth Father and Son and Spirit as three, three however not in 
quality but in sequence, not in substance but in aspect, not in power but in <its> 
manifestation, yet of one substance and one quality and one power, seeing it is one God 
from whom those sequences and aspects and manifestations are reckoned out in the name 
of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. How they admit of plurality without division 
the discussion will show as it proceeds.18 
                                                 
15 Raniero Cantalamessa, La cristologia di Tertulliano, Paradosis 18 (Fribourg, Switzerland: 
Edizioni universitarie Friburgo, 1962), 27: Il Cristo di Tertulliano è Dio allo stesso modo del Padre, ma 
non nella stessa misura.  
16 Adhémar d’Alès, La théologie de Tertullien, Bibliothèque de théologie historique (Paris: 
Beauchesne, 1905), 73. 
17 Ibid., 101. 
18 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 2.3-4 (trans. Evans, 132; Latin CCSL 2.2, 1161). maxime haec 
quae se existimat meram ueritatem possidere, dum unicum Deum non alias putat credendum quam si ipsum 
eundemque et Patrem et Filium et Spiritum dicat. Quasi non sic quoque unus sit omnia dum ex uno omnia 
per substantiae scilicet unitatem et nihilominus custodiatur oikonomiae sacramentum, quae unitatem in 
trinitatem disponit, tres dirigens Patrem et Filium et Spiritum, tres autem non statu sed gradu, nec 
substantia sed forma, nec potestate sed specie, unius autem substantiae et unius status et unius potestatis 
quia unus Deus ex quo et gradus isti et formae et species in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti 






In this passage, Tertullian uses substantia, status, and postestas to indicate of what there 
is one among Father, Son, and Spirit.19 He distinguishes these latter three by using the 
terms gradus, forma, and species.20 Of note here is gradus, which implies a gradation of 
the three Trinitarian persons.21 In his discussion of gradus in Tertullian, Rankin writes, 
“Here we have the suggestion of a hierarchy in the Godhead, which Tertullian is prepared 
to accept with the attendant risk of suggesting a notion of subordinationism, for he will 
do everything he possible [sic] can to avoid the greater dangers of modalism.”22 
Elsewhere, Tertullian speaks of an order within the Godhead without the use of gradus: 
how should God be thought, in the Son and in the Holy Spirit occupying second 
and third place, while they are to such a degree conjoint of the Father's substance, 
                                                 
19 Moingt highlights that Tertullian uses substantia as a unifying term in Adversus Praxean, but he 
cautions against reading too much into Tertullian’s usage. He suggests that in Adversus Praxean, Tertullian 
means something like generic unity when he speaks of unity of substance, not something like numerical 
unity of substance. He further notes that we should not expect Tertullian to have anticpated the 
philosophical difficulty introduced by Arius. See Joseph Moingt, Théologie trinitaire de Tertullien, vol. 2, 
Théologie 69 (Paris: Aubier, 1966), 395. 
20 Species is not as important for my argument as gradus, but note Moingt’s lengthy discussion of 
Tertullian’s use of the species: ibid., 2:433–47. 
21 For a detailed discussion of substantia, status, and gradus in Tertullian, see René Braun, Deus 
Christianorum: recherches sur le vocabulaire doctrinal de Tertullien, 2nd ed., Collection des études 
augustiniennes 70 (Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1977), 176–207. Note also Moingt’s detailed discussion of 
gradus: Moingt, Théologie trinitaire de Tertullien, 2:447–78. Moingt notes that from the perspective of 
God’s interaction with the world, Tertullian’s use of gradus can seem to imply that the Son is posterior and 
inferior to the Father. Moingt, however, wants to avoid these conclusions (463). These very notions that 
Moingt finds uncomfortable, however, are precisely the ones that help Tertullian distinguish the Father and 
Son. 
22 David Rankin, “Tertullian’s Vocabulary of the Divine ‘Individuals’ in Adversus Praxean,” 
Sacris Erudiri 40 (2001): 20. Later, Rankin writes, “In employing gradus to distinguish the Persons 
Tertullian comes perilously close—indeed some might suggest that he cannot avoid it—to a form of 
subordinationism. Yet, used in conjunction with terms such as conserti and connexus, and understood 
against the backdrop of the oikonomia, Tertullian is prepared to take this risk in order to expose and oppose 
the greater danger of Praxeas' modalism” (45). Rankin’s analysis here exemplifies the typical scholarly 
attitude toward pre-Nicene subordinationism. For Rankin, subordinationism is something to be avoided 
almost at all costs; it is perilous and risky. Tertullian, however, does not appear to share this modern 
aversion to subordinationist understandings of the Son’s relationship to the Father. Even as he describes it 
as perilous, Rankin can recognize that it was commonplace in pre-Nicene theology: “Subordination is, 
however, not an unusual feature of Tertullian's concept of the Trinity, as it was not for anyone prior to 





to experience a division and a dispersion such as he does not experience in the 
plurality of those angels, alien as they are from the Father's substance?23 
 
This sentence again highlights how Tertullian can at the same time claim unity of 
substance for the Trinitarian persons and distinction by order or place, a distinction that 
neither divides nor disperses them. The assignment of second or third place to the Son 
and Spirit does not necessarily imply subordination, but other instances where Tertullian 
uses a taxis to distinguish the Trinitarian persons lead to the conclusion that the Son and 
Spirit are somehow less than the Father. Just before the quotation above, Tertullain 
describes the Son’s place in the monarchy by invoking the language of participation. He 
writes of the Monarchy, “it is not ipso facto divided, does not cease to be a monarchy, if 
the son also is assumed as partner [particeps] in it, but it continues to belong in first 
instance to him by whom it is passed on to the son: and so long as it is his, that continues 
to be a monarchy which is jointly held by two who are so closely united.”24  
 Tertullian’s understanding of the unity of God and monarchy is further elucidated 
by his description of what would destroy monarchy: 
Overthrow of monarchy you should understand as <taking place> when there is 
superimposed another kingship of its own character and its own quality, and 
consequently hostile, when another god is introduced to oppose the Creator, as 
with Marcion, or many gods according to people like Valentinus and Prodicus: 
                                                 
23 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 3.5 (trans. Evans, 133; Latin CCSL 2.2, 1162): Quale est ut Deus 
diuisionem et dispersionem pati uideatur in Filio et in Spiritu sancto, secundum et tertium sortitis locum, 
tam consortibus substantiae Patris quas non patitur in tot angelorum numero et quidem tam <alienorum> 
a substatia Patris? 
24 Adversus Praxean 3.3 (trans. Evans, 133): si vero et filius fuerit ei cuius monarchia sit, non 
statim dividi eam et monarchiam esse desinere si particeps eius adsumatur et filius, sed proinde illius esse 
principaliter a quo communicatur in filium, et dum illius est proinde monarchiam esse quae a duobus tam 
unitis continetur. Joseph Moingt argues that Tertullian’s use of a schema of participation does not imply 
subordination, that the divine power is not degraded. See Joseph Moingt, “Le problème du Dieu unique 
chez Tertullien,” Revue des sciences religieuses 44, no. 4 (1970): 355–356. See also idem, Théologie 
trinitaire de Tertullien, 2:395. As I argue in the following discussion of Origen’s use of participation, 





then is it for the overthrow of the monarchy when it is for the destruction of the 
creator.25 
 
This passage demonstrates how Tertullian understands the economy to work. There is but 
one monarch who administers the economy through those who share in his rule.26 A 
monarchy can, by definition, only have one monarch; and the Marcionite dualism 
destroys this arrangement. In the systems of both Marcion and Valentinus, other deities 
are often opposed to the rule of the supreme deity. Tertullian’s monarchical economy has 
the Father at the top with the Son and Spirit in the second and third places, respectively. 
Both the Son and the Spirit work in accord with the will of the Father, thus working from 
within the monarchy instead of opposing it. 
 Tertullian next argues for the distinction of the Father and the Son in a discussion 
of the visibility of the Son.27 He writes,  
It will follow that we must understand the Father as invisible because of the 
fulness of his majesty, but must acknowledge the Son as visible because of the 
enumeration of his derivation, just as we may not look upon the sun in respect of 
the total of its substance which is in the sky, though we can with our eyes bear its 
beam because of the moderation of the assignment which from thence reaches out 
to the earth.28 
 
                                                 
25 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 3.6 (trans. Evans, 133; Latin CCSL 2.2, 1162): Euersio enim 
monarchiae illa est tibi intellegenda cum alia dominatio suae condicionis et proprii status ac per hoc 
aemula superducitur, cum alius deus infertur aduersus creatorem cum Marcione, cum plures, secundum 
Valentinos et Prodicos: tunc in monarchiae euersionem cum in creatoris destructionem. 
26 Note again, that in Adversus Praxean 3.3, quoted on the previous page, Tertullian describes the 
Son’s place in the monarchy by using the language of participation. 
27 Recall from the earlier chapters on monarchianism that the question of God’s visibility was one 
of the chief areas of disagreement between the monarchians and their opponents. The monarchians argued 
that the same God was both visible and invisible, while their opponents consistently argued that the Father 
was invisible and the Son was visible. 
28 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 14.3 (trans. Evans, 149; Latin CCSL 2.2, 1176): consequens erit 
ut inuisibilem patrem intellegamus pro plenitudine maiestatis, visibilem vero filium agnoscamus pro 
modulo deriuationis, sicut nec solem nobis contemplari licet, quantum ad ipsam substantiae summam quae 





Here, Tertullian claims that the Son is visible because his majesty is derivative. The 
Father possesses properly the fullness of majesty, while the Son has majesty in virtue of 
the modulus of its derivation from the Father.29 The fact that the Son derivately has what 
is properly the Father’s allows for Tertullian to distinguish between them. The degree to 
which each possesses majesty determines whether that person is visible. Tertullian here 
uses the sun/ray image that is important elsewhere in Adversus Praxean for maintaining 
both the unity and distinction of Father and Son.30 The key point for Tertullian is that the 
Father possesses something (in this case, majesty) in its fullness, and the Son only 
possesses it in part. Were the Son the same as the Father, he too would have the fullness 
of majesty. 
 In Adversus Praxean, Tertullian’s insistence that the Son is not the same as the 
Father because the Son is less than the Father is most clearly stated in chapter nine, where 
he combats the monarchian identification of the Father and Son: 
Remember at every point that I have professed this rule, by which I testify that 
Father and Son and Spirit are unseparated from one another, and in that case you 
will recognise what I say and in what sense I say it. For look now, I say that the 
Father is one, and the Son another, and the Spirit another (every unlearned or self-
willed person takes this statement in bad part, as though it proclaimed diversity 
and because of diversity threatened a separation of Father and Son and Spirit: but 
I am bound to make it, so long as they maintain that Father and Son and Spirit are 
identical, favouring the monarchy at the expense of the economy), not however 
that the Son is other than the Father by diversity, but by distribution, not by 
division but by distinction, because the Father is not identical with the Son, they 
even being by measure one and another. For the Father is the whole substance, 
while the Son is an outflow and portion of the whole, as he himself professes, 
                                                 
29 Evan’s translation here is idiosyncratic, and he blunts the force of what Tertullian says. 
“Enumeration” is not a standard definition for modulus, which normally means something like a “measure” 
or “small measure.” Tertullian is intentionally contrasting modulus with plenitudo. The Father’s majesty 
cannot be measured; and thus, he is invisible. Because of the derivation of the Son’s majesty and 
subsequent lack of plenitude, the Son is visible.  






Because my Father is greater than I: and by him, it is sung in the psalm, he has 
also been made less, a little on this side of the angels. So also the Father is other 
than the Son as being greater than the Son, as he who begets is other than he who 
is begotten, as he who sends is other than he who is sent, as he who makes is other 
than he through whom a thing is made. It suits my case also that when our Lord 
used this word regarding the person of the Paraclete, he signified not division but 
ordinance: for he says, I will pray the Father and he will send you another 
advocate, the Spirit of truth. Thus <he calls> the Paraclete other than himself, as 
we say the Son is other than the Father, so as to display the third sequence in the 
Paraclete as we the second in the Son, and so to preserve the economy. Is not the 
very fact that they are spoken of as Father and Son <a statement that they are> 
one thing beside another? Surely all facts will correspond with their designations, 
and diversity of designation can by no means be confused, since neither can < the 
diversity> of the things of which they are the designations. "Is" is "is", and "not" 
is "not": for what is more than this is on the side of evil.31 
 
This passage encapsulates many of the key features of Tertullian’s polemic against the 
monarchians. His first task is to reiterate that he does not teach that the Father, Son, and 
Spirit are separated, divided, or diverse, lest he be accused of the error of the 
Valentinians.32 Such clarification, however, does not cause him to abandon the language 
of alterity to describe the Father, Son, and Spirit: Ecce enim dico alium esse Patrem et 
                                                 
31 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 9.1-4 (trans. Evans, 140-1 with my modifications; Latin, CCSL 
2.2, 1168-9): Hanc me regulam professum qua inseparatos ab alterutro patrem et filium et spiritum testor, 
tene ubique et ita quid quomodo dicatur agnosces. Ecce enim dico alium esse Patrem et alium Filium et 
alium Spiritum – male accepit idiotes quisque aut perversus hoc dictum, quasi diuersitatem sonet et ex 
diuersitate separationem protendat Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti. Necessitate autem hoc dico cum 
eundem Patrem et Filium et Spiritum contendunt, aduersus oikonomiam monarchiae adulantes – non 
tamen diuersitate alium Filium a Patre sed distributione, nec diuisione alium sed distinctione, quia non sit 
idem Pater et Filius, uel modulo alias ab alio. Pater enim tota substantia est, Filius uero, deriuatio totius et 
portio sicut ipse profitetur: Quia Pater maior me est. A quo et minoratus canitur in psalmo: Modico quid 
citra angelos. Sic et Pater alias a Filio, dum Filio maior, dum alias qui generat, alius qui generatur, dum 
alius qui mittit, alius qui mittitur, dum alius qui facit, alius per quem fit. Bene quod et Dominus usus hoc 
uerbo in persona Paracleti non diuisionem significauit sed dispositionem: Rogabo enim, inquit, Patrem et 
alium advocatum mittet uobis, Spiritum ueritatis. Sic alium a se Paracletum, quomodo et nos a Patre alium 
Filium, ut tertium gradum ostenderet in Paracleto, sicut nos secundum in Filio, propter oikonomiae 
obseruationem. Ipsum, quod Pater et Filius dicuntur, nonne aliud ab alio est? Utique enim omnia quod 
uocantur, hoc erunt, et quod erunt, hoc uocabuntur, et permiscere se diuersitas uocabulorum non potest 
omnino, quia nec rerum quarum erunt uocabula. Est, est, non, non; nam quod amplius est, hoc a malo est. 
32 This dual polemical context of monarchianism and Valentinianism suggests that monarchianism 
was at least in part a reaction against Gnosticism. Tertullian is likely guarding against these Gnostic views 
because the monarchians accused him of teaching the separation of the Father and the Son in the manner of 
some Gnostics. Note also Moingt’s discussion of how Valentinian theology might have shaped Tertullian’s 





alium Filium et alium Spiritum….33 This language, of course, harkens back to that used 
by Justin in the Dialogue with Trypho. Such assertions of the alterity of Father, Son, and 
Spirit would have undoubtedly been repugnant to the monarchians; it might have been 
this sort of language that provoked the monarchians in the first place. Tertullian is well 
aware of the harsh ring of the language of alterity, and he quickly moves to rule out 
certain ways of interpreting his use of alius. The three divine persons are other non tamen 
diuersitate alium Filium a Patre sed distributione, nec diuisione alium sed 
distinction….34  
 Thus far in the passage, Tertullian has tried to secure the distinction of the persons 
of the Trinity, but he has not yet used anything potentially subordinationist to accomplish 
this goal. His next bevy of reasons that the Father and Son are not one and the same, 
however, relies on his assumption that there is gradation within the Godhead. He writes, 
“For the Father is the whole substance, while the Son is an outflow and portion of the 
whole” (Pater enim tota substantia est Filius uero, deriuatio totius et portio).35 Ernest 
Evans writes concerning this passage, 
The unity depends on this, that the Father is the whole substance, pater tota 
substatia est, while the Son is derivatio totius et portio (§9). It is tempting here, 
and in §26 (portio totius quae cessura erat in filii nomen) to claim that portio 
does not mean part but inheritance, and that totius is a descriptive, not a partitive, 
genitive; but it seems from Novatian…that in the third century portio was 
regularly used for pars, and in fact in the present passage Tertullian admits a 
                                                 
33 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 9.1. 
34 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 9.1. 
35 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 9.2. Kevin B. McCruden notes that such notions of the Father 
containing the fullness of the divinity imply that the Logos is a lesser divinity than the Father. See his 






certain minoration of the Son (not only in the incarnation but) in his divine 
being.36 
  
Evans later tries to downplay the implications of this passage, arguing, “And it would 
appear likely that while the suggestion of minoration was forced upon him by 
controversy, the safeguarding of equality was a requirement of the received tradition.”37 
Andrew McGowan likewise notes that this passage is potentially subordinationist but 
then seeks to soften the severity of that judgment. He writes, “The ‘Father is the whole 
substance’ (pater enim tota substantia est, 9.2), which suggests a quite different 
understanding of God's fatherhood, and potentially a subordinationist one; but this is 
primarily a claim for unity of divine substance.”38  
Evans is concerned to protect Tertullian from what he views to be the damning 
charge of subordinationism, but his statement begs the question about whether or not the 
equality of the Father and Son was yet a part of the “received tradition.”39 Tertullian here 
uses straightforwardly subordinationist language as an intentional means of 
                                                 
36 Tertullian, Tertullian’s Treatise against Praxeas, ed. Ernest Evans (London: S.P.C.K., 1948), 
44. 
37 Ibid., 247. 
38 Andrew Brian McGowan, “God in Early Latin Theology: Tertullian and the Trinity,” in Andrew 
Brian McGowan, Brian Daley, and Timothy J. Gaden, eds., God in Early Christian Thought: Essays in 
Memory of Lloyd G. Patterson, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 94 (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 66. It is not 
clear that recourse to “unity of divine substance” successfully mitigates the charge of subordinationism. 
Substance and status unify the divine persons for Tertullian; but his point is that they can be possessed in 
differing, and, therefore, differentiating, degrees. It is not clear that emphasizing “unity of substance” is 
Tertullian’s primary goal here. Indeed, he needs to emphazie both unity and distinction equally in order to 
achieve his double goal here. 
39 Furthermore, Evans does not define what he means by “received tradition.” Evans seems to 
assume that the equality of the Father and Son was generally accepted at the beginning of the third century 
and that it was Tertullian’s duty to protect this tradition. As I hope to have demonstrated in the preceding 
reconstruction of the monarchian controversy, however, few theologians were yet concerned with the 
equality of the Father and Son at the beginning of the third century. More pressing for them was the 
question of whether the Father and Son were “one and the same.” Only after that question was answered 





distinguishing the Father and the Son. He clearly argues, without blinking, that the Son 
cannot be the Father because the Father is greater than the Son. One cannot be greater 
than oneself. 
Tertullian then bolsters his argument with the exegesis of John 14:28 and Psalm 
8:5/Hebrews 2:7.40 He quotes John 14:28 as scriptural warrant for his assertion that the 
Father is greater than the Son (Sic et Pater alias a Filio, dum Filio maior).41 Evans 
observes that Tertullian cites Psalm 8/Hebrews 2 elsewhere to refer to the incarnation. He 
then states, “The present passage therefore stands alone in regarding the minoration as the 
subordination of the Son to the Father within the Godhead.”42 Adversus Praxean 9.1-4 is 
a clear and focused example of Tertullian using subordinationist imagery and exegesis as 
a means of distinguishing the Father, Son, and Spirit. The intentional subordination of the 
Son to the Father was one of Tertullian’s anti-monarchian means of distinguishing the 
Father and Son. 
Novatian 
Questions about the nature of Novatian’s subordinationism have arrested the 
attention of scholars for some time. Daniel Lloyd has recently offered a valuable 
summary of scholarly positions regarding Novatian’s subordinationism, suggesting three 
                                                 
40 Tertullian’s quotation of Psalm 8:5/Hebrews 2:7 presents a variant reading not attested in any of 
the main text-types of the Vetus Latina. See Hermann Josef Frede, ed., Epistulae ad Thessalonicenses, 
Timotheum, Titum, Philemonem, Hebraeos, Vetus Latina 25 (Freiburg/Breisgau: Herder, 1975), 1127–31. 
41 Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 9.2. 
42 Tertullian, Against Praxeas, 248. Evans wants to protect Tertullian from his later critics, but his 
statement needs much more nuance. As I have argued above, there are numerous passages within Adversus 





main groupings of scholarship: 1) those who view Novatian’s subordination of the Son as 
ontological; 2) those who view Novatian as teaching a subordination of rank or authority, 
but, nevertheless, holding that he taught that the Father and Son were equal in divinity; 
and 3) those who believe “that Novatian never resolves the theological tension between 
his suggestions of equality and inequality.”43 In the first group, d’Alès had no doubt that 
Novatian’s subordinationism was ontological.44 James Leonard Papandrea’s work is the 
most prominent in the second group, although his attempts to rescue Novatian often feel 
strained.45 DeSimone’s scholarship represents those who felt that Novatian had 
significant unresolved theological tension.46  
Russel J. DeSimone writes that “[Novatian] strives to place in bold relief the 
posteriority of the Son, insofar as his origin is concerned, so that he can better defend the 
personal distinction of the Father and the Son. He has been charged with 
subordinationism. Novatian, however, did not make use of explicit formulas to formally 
defend subordinationism.”47 DeSimone argues that “Novatian, however, in his efforts to 
                                                 
43 Daniel Lloyd, “Ontological Subordination in Novatian of Rome’s Theology of the Son” (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Marquette University, 2012), 9–13. 
44 See especially, his, Novatien, étude sur la théologie romaine au milieu du IIIe siècle, Études de 
théologie historique (Paris: Beauchesne, 1924), 120–34. 
45 See his two major works: The Trinitarian Theology of Novatian of Rome: A Study in Third-
Century Orthodoxy (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen, 2008); Novatian of Rome and the Culmination of Pre-
Nicene Orthodoxy, Princeton Theological Monograph Series 175 (Eugene, Or.: Pickwick, 2012). 
46 See his The Treatise of Novatian, the Roman Presbyter on the Trinity. A Study of the Text and 
the Doctrine, Studia Ephemeridis Augustinianum 4 (Roma: Institutum patristicum Augustinianum, 1970); 
idem, “Introduction,” in The Trinity, The Spectacles, Jewish Foods, In Praise of Purity, Letters, The 
Fathers of the Church 67 (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1974), 13–19; idem, “Again 
the Kenosis of Phil. 2,6-11,” Augustinianum 32, no. 1 (1992): 91–104. 
47 DeSimone, “Introduction,” 19. Earlier (p. 17), Simone had argued that Novatian’s 
subordinationism is a product of his reliance on the theology of Tertullian. As the above discussion 
indicated, I think Tertullian’s subordination pervades more of his thought than just his conception of the 





posit a real distinction in the Trinity against the Sabellians, ran ashore on the dangerous 
shoals of subordinationism (mitigated form).”48 DeSimone correctly perceives that 
Novatian’s subordinationism was a response against his monarchian, or Sabellian, 
opponents.49 He nevertheless exhibits the attitude, prevalent among modern scholars, that 
subordinationism was a danger that would have best been escaped by pre-Nicene 
theologians.50 DeSimone ultimately judges Novatian’s subordinationism to be the product 
of some sort of theological incompetence, although Lloyd has heavily critiqued him on 
this point.51  
Geoffrey Dunn has more recently suggested that appraisals of Novatian’s 
theology as ontological subordination perhaps expect too much from him. Referring to J. 
N. D. Kelly’s classic, Early Christian Doctrines, Dunn writes,  
Kelly argues that the only way Novatian maintained a belief in the oneness of 
God and a distinction of persons in the Trinity was through a subordination of Son 
to Father. As we have noted above, there is certainly a subordination of dignity or 
function between Son and Father, but one should be a little hesitant to conclude 
from this that Novatian envisaged a subordination of natures or being; he simply 
seemed to have avoided anything that esoteric.52 
                                                 
48 DeSimone, The Treatise of Novatian, 90–1. 
49 Geoffrey Dunn also notes that “Novatian was writing in reaction against those who over-
emphasised the oneness of God.” See his “The Diversity and Unity of God in Novatian’s De Trinitate,” 
386. See also his specific mention of monarchianism at p. 390. 
50 Thus, he writes that Novatian “did not avoid the pitfall of subordinationism” (DeSimone, The 
Treatise of Novatian, 78). At p. 169, he uses similar language: “He has avoided the dreaded pit of ditheism 
only to fall headlong into that of subordinationism.” 
51 Consider the following statement at ibid., 181: “Hence, Novatian's deviations are due to 
doctrinal impotence rather than obstinate, heretical intent. Although it is evident from critical scrutiny that 
many of Novatian's statements are truly tainted with subordinationism, he did not make use of explicit 
formulas to formally defend subordinationism. Finally, we must bear in mind that the subordinationism of 
certain Ante-Nicene writers was simply an erroneous theory of private theologians and does not touch the 
faith of the Church.” Contra DeSimone, I argue that subordinationism was one of the most prominent 
means some early third-century theologians used to distinguish the Father from the Son against 
monarchianism. 
52 “The Diversity and Unity of God in Novatian’s De Trinitate,” 400. Dunn here has the following 
statement from Kelly in his sights: “Thus, for all his emphatic assertion of the Son's distinct subsistence as 






Such a judgment that Novatian avoided anything as “esoteric” as speaking about the 
subordination of being or nature betrays some assumptions about Novatian that Lloyd 
sought to correct. Dunn rightly notes that Novatian “was commenting on and explaining 
the rule of truth (regula veritatis) as preserved in the early Roman church’s baptismal 
symbol of faith.”53 Dunn’s observation comes with the concomitant judgment that “it 
could well be a work designed more for catechetical instruction than for theological 
investigation.”54 This judgment about De Trinitate implies that it is perhaps simplistic 
and unconcerned with esoteric things such as being or nature.55 Lloyd, however, has 
argued precisely the opposite. He demonstrates that in this treatise, Novatian employs the 
technical language of Middle Platonism to buttress his theology.56 
 I find Lloyd’s arguments about ontological subordination in De Trinitate 
compelling, but my primary interest in Novatian here is not whether his subordination of 
                                                 
or alternatively by making Him a passing moment in the divine life of the Father. His doctrine of the Holy 
Spirit is, for his date, rudimentary” (J. N. D Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 5th, rev. ed. [London: A & C 
Black, 1977], 126). 
53 Dunn, “The Diversity and Unity of God in Novatian’s De Trinitate,” 390. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Note Lloyd’s similar reading of Dunn at Lloyd, “Ontological Subordination,” 14. Dunn’s 
implication that Novatian was philosophically unsophisticated is continued in his image of Novatian as 
unable to keep from running aground in his attempt to articulate his theology: “Sailing between the Scylla 
and Charybdis of Adoptionism and Modalism, Novatian could not avoid the perils of subordinationism, 
although they seem to be perils about which he was largely unaware and which would only be recognised 
in the following generations” (“The Diversity and Unity of God in Novatian’s De Trinitate,” 409). Dunn’s 
statement here demonstrates the unnuanced way in which many scholars speak of subordinationism. On the 
one hand, Dunn refers to subordinationism as a peril. On the other hand, Dunn suggests that Novatian 
would not have been aware that it was perilous because it was only recognized as such by later generations. 
But subordinationism can only be viewed as perilous when it is viewed through the lens of later theological 
developments. For early third-century anti-monarchian authors, it was a tool to be employed intentionally 
to secure the distinction of Father and Son against the monarchians, as I hope to show in this chapter. 
56 See especially his first two chapters on Novatian’s conception of the Father in relation to 





the Son is ontological. My interest is in the purpose of Novatian’s subordination of the 
Son. The following passages from De Trinitate that clearly depict subordination will aid 
in determining the function of Novatian’s subordination. Commenting on John 16:14, 
Novatian writes,  
If [the Paraclete] received from Christ the things which He will make known, then 
surely Christ is greater than the Paraclete, since the Paraclete would not receive 
from Christ unless He were less than Christ. Now, the fact that the Paraclete is 
less than Christ proves that Christ is also God, from whom he received what He 
makes known. This, then, is a great testimony to Christ's divinity, inasmuch as the 
Paraclete, having been found to be less than Christ, takes from Him what He gives 
to others. If Christ were only man, Christ would receive from the Paraclete what 
He should say; the Paraclete would not receive from Christ what he should make 
known.57 
 
The subordination of the Paraclete to Christ is the main focus of this passage, and 
Novatian highlights this subordination in order to reiterate the divinity of Christ. For 
Novatian, the subordination of the Paraclete to the Son is not an accident he could have 
avoided if he had been more careful or astute. It is a strategy he employs in order to make 
an intentional theological claim about the divinity of the Son. Novatian here is dealing 
with the views of psilanthropists, but the logic he employs to establish the Son’s divinity 
recurs in his treatment of positions that are explicitly monarchian. 
                                                 
57 Novatian, De Trinitate 16.3 (trans. FC 67:62; Latin CCSL 4:40): Sed si a christo accepit quae 
nuntiet, maior ergo iam paracleto christus est, quoniam nec paracletus a christo acciperet, nisi minor 
christo esset. Minor autem christo paracletus christum etiam deum esse hoc ipso probat, a quo accepit 
quae nuntiat, ut testimonium christi diuinitatis grande sit, dum minor christo paracletus repertus ab illo 
sumit quae ceteris tradit. Quandoquidem si homo tantummodo christus, a paracleto christus acciperet quae 
diceret, non a christo paracletus acciperet quae nuntiaret. Dunn notes regarding this passage, “Such an 
economic treatment of the Spirit still leaves Novatian open to charges of subordinationism, particularly in 
the light of his comment in chapter 16 about the relationship between Son and Spirit that: '… maior ergo 
iam paracleto Christus est, quoniam nec paracletus a Christo acciperet, nisi minor Christo esset” (“The 





 In a passage commenting on Philippians 2:6-11, Novatian again demonstrates 
subordinationist tendencies.58 He writes, 
Therefore, though 'He was in the form of God, He did not think it robbery to be 
equal to God.' For though He was ever mindful that He was God of God the 
Father, He never compared or ranked Himself with God the Father, knowing that 
He is of His Father; and this very thing (that He is) He had, because the Father 
had given it to Him. Hence not only before He took upon Himself the flesh but 
even after He had taken a body, and again, after His Resurrection, He rendered 
and still renders perfect obedience to His Father in all things. Consequently, this 
proves that He never regarded His divinity as a means of unlawfully arrogating to 
Himself equality with God the Father.59 
 
Novatian first argues that Christ was God because he was ex deo patre. He then qualifies 
this statement by clarifying that the Son did not compare himself to the Father. 
Novatian’s reasoning for this point is illuminating. The Son does not compare himself to 
the Father because the Father has given to the Son what the Son has. Although Papandrea 
claims that Novatian’s interpretation of this passage is “tantamount to asserting that [the 
                                                 
58 Novatian’s interpretation of Philippians 2:6-11 features prominently in DeSimone’s work. 
Although DeSimone had earlier judged Novatian’s interpretation of this passage to be subordinationist, he 
later changed his position in his 1992 article. For his earlier position, see The Treatise of Novatian, 108–13. 
In his later article, he writes, “Novatian’s teaching, therefore, is not ‘frankly heretical’, as Prat thought, nor 
is it a question of a diminished, inferior god of the Neoplatonics, nor the heretical crass subordinationism of 
the Arians. It is the elaboration of Ante-Nicene Trinitarian language” (“Again the Kenosis of Phil. 2,6-11,” 
100). Note also Lloyd’s discussion at “Ontological Subordination,” 281–4. Papandrea claims that Phil. 2:6-
11 is the “most important New Testament passage for Novatian….” He then claims that “forma can be 
synonymous with substantia for Novatian, so that to say that Christ was in forma dei, is tantamount to 
asserting that He is consubstantial (ὁμοούσιος) with the Father” (The Trinitarian Theology of Novatian of 
Rome, 268–9). To make such a judgment, Papandrea has to ignore a mass of contrary evidence. 
59 Novatian, De Trinitate 22.5-6 (trans. FC 67:82; Latin CCSL 4:55). Hic ergo quamuis esset in 
forma dei, non est rapinam arbitratus aequalem se deo esse. Quamuis enim se ex deo patre deum esse 
meminisset, numquam se deo patri aut comparauit aut contulit, memor se esse ex suo patre et hoc ipsum, 
quod est, habere se, quia pater dedisset. Inde denique et ante carnis assumptionem, sed et post 
assumptionem corporis, post ipsam praeterea resurrectionem omnem patri in omnibus rebus oboedientiam 
praestitit pariter ac praestat. Ex quo probatur numquam arbitratum illum esse rapinam quandam 
diuinitatem, ut aequaret se patri deo. DeSimone’s earlier position views chapter 22 as one of the most 
egregious examples of Novatian’s subordinationism: “The note of subordinationism in Novatian, however, 
is not found so much in his exegesis of the theophanies (chs. 17, 18, 19, 20)—where he follows the safe 
and sure tradition of previous Ante-Nicene writers—as in his unique and unprecedented exegesis of 
Philippians 2:6-11, contained in chapter 22 of his treatise. The distinctive mark of subordinationism is 





Son] is consubstantial (ὁμοούσιος) with the Father,” a reading of this passage in light of 
Novatian’s earlier remarks about the Paraclete suggests a more nuanced assessment is 
needed.60 Recall that Novatian had earlier argued that the Paraclete is inferior to the Son 
because it receives from the Son.61 Novatian’s reasoning in the earlier passage yields a 
clear conclusion when applied to his exegesis of Philippians 2:6-11. If reception of 
something makes the recipient inferior to the giver, the Son must be inferior to the Father 
because he receives from the Father. This line of thinking elucidates Novatian’s 
conclusion that “this proves that He never regarded His divinity as a means of unlawfully 
arrogating to Himself equality with God the Father.”62 Pace Papandrea, the Son can 
possess divinity from the Father without being equal to the Father in divinity. 
 In his interpretation of Philippians 2:6-11, Novatian stresses that the Son has 
always been obedient to the Father. This obedience to the Father is partially a result of 
the fact that the Son is inferior to the Father. A statement later in De Trinitate makes it 
clear that the Son’s obedience to the Father had polemical utility for Novatian. He argues, 
“What could make it more evident that He is not the Father but the Son than the fact that 
He is set before us as obedient to God the Father? If we were to believe otherwise—that 
he is the Father—then we would have to say that Christ is subject to another God the 
                                                 
60 Again, see Papandrea, The Trinitarian Theology of Novatian of Rome, 269. The introduction of 
ὁμοούσιος brings with it the connotations of its legacy in the Nicene and post-Nicene debates, where it was 
used to emphasize the equality of the Father and Son. Whatever Novatian thinks about shared substance 
between the Father and Son, it is clear that he is stressing their inequality here. 
61 Novatian, De Trinitate 16.3. 





Father.”63 Immediately preceding this sentence, Novatian focuses on the power that the 
Son has over all things. Recalling the subordinationist framework of reception discussed 
above, Novatian speaks of the Son’s power as delivered and granted to the Son by the 
Father.64 The Son’s obedience to and reception of power from the Father shows that he is 
not himself the Father. Novatian expounds the Son’s obedience to the Father within his 
subordinationist framework of reception and deploys it to argue against the monarchian 
contention that the Father and the Son are the same, that the Father is the Son and the Son 
is the Father. Here, obedience and subordination secure the distinction between the Father 
and the Son.65 
 Novatian continues to multiply reasons that the Son is inferior to the Father. He 
writes,  
On the other hand, the Father also precedes Him; for as the Father, He must of 
necessity be prior, because He who knows no origin must of necessity precede 
Him who has an origin. At the same time the Son must be less than (minor) the 
Father, for he knows that He is in the Father, having an origin, since he is born.66 
 
Scholars have focused on this passage in their discussions of whether Novatian taught the 
eternal generation of the Son, but those questions are beyond the scope of my argument 
                                                 
63 Novatian, De Trinitate 26.21 (trans. FC 67:92; Latin CCSL 4:63): Quid enim tam euidens potest 
esse, hunc non patrem esse, sed filium, quam quod oboediens patri deo proponitur, ne si pater esse 
credatur, alteri iam deo patri christus subiectus esse dicatur? 
64 Novatian, De Trinitate 26.20: “…potestatem, sed qua traditam, sed qua concessam, sed qua a 
Patre proprio sibi indultam.” 
65 Manlio Simonetti also observes that Novatian’s subordination of the Son serves to distinguish 
him from the Father (“Il problema dell’unità di Dio a Roma da Clemente a Dionigi,” Rivista di storia e 
letteratura religiosa 22, no. 3 [1986]: 462). 
66 Novatian, De Trinitate 31.3 (trans. FC 67:108; Latin CCSL 4:75): quia et pater illum etiam 
praecedit, quod necesse est prior sit qua pater sit, quoniam antecedat necesse est eum qui habet originem 





here.67 What is important for my argument is that we have here another clear example of 
Novatian’s contention that the Son is less than the Father. Note that in this passage, 
Novatian claims that the Son is inferior to the Father because he comes from the Father. 
This lines up with his argument about Phil. 2 in De Trinitate 22.5-6 
Having surveyed some of the passages where Novatian implies or overtly claims 
that the Son is less than the Father, let us now consider the function of Novatian’s 
subordinationism.68 In chapter 27 of De Trinitate, Novatian engages with monarchian 
interpretations of John 10:30, first using a grammatical argument to refute their reading 
of the verse.69 After this argument, Novatian cites John 10:36, where Jesus asks, “Do you 
say of Him whom the Father has made holy and sent into this world, ‘You blaspheme,’ 
because I said, ‘I am the Son of God’?”70 Novatian comments: 
Furthermore, He declares that He has been made holy by His Father. Since, then, 
He receives sanctification from the Father, He is less than the Father. Because He 
is less than the Father, He is consequently <not the Father>, but the Son. For if He 
had been the Father, He would have given, not received sanctification. By openly 
acknowledging that He receives sanctification from the Father, He proves, by the 
very fact that He receives sanctification from the Father, that He is less than the 
Father; consequently He has already demonstrated that He is the Son, not the 
Father.71 
                                                 
67 See Lloyd’s discussion of this passage and its interpretation at “Ontological Subordination,” 
262–70. 
68 Of particular note for establishing his subordinationism are De Trinitate 22.5-6, 26.20-21, and 
30.3. The subordinationist import of these passages is especially clear when they are read through the lens 
of Novatian’s comments about the Holy Spirit in De Trinitate 16.3. 
69 On this argument, see Mark DelCogliano, “The Interpretation of John 10:30 in the Third 
Century: Antimonarchian Polemics and the Rise of Grammatical Reading Techniques,” Journal of 
Theological Interpretation 6, no. 1 (2012): 117–38. 
70 Novatian, De Trinitate 27.10 (trans. FC 67:94). 
71 Novatian, De Trinitate 27.12 (trans. FC 67:94; Latin CCSL 4:65): Et sanctificatum se a suo 
Patre esse proponit. Dum ergo accipit sanctificationem a patre, minor patre est; minor autem patre 
consequenter <non pater> est, sed filius. Pater enim si fuisset, sanctificationem dedisset, non accepisset. 
Et nunc autem profitendo se accepisse sanctificationem a patre, hoc ipso quo patre se minorem accipiendo 






This passage demonstrates the polemical function of subordination within Novatian’s 
thought. Note again that Novatian argues that the Son’s reception (here, of sanctification) 
from the Father makes him less than the Father. The next step in his reading of the 
passage is crucial for my argument. Because the Son is less than the Father, he is not the 
Father but the Son. For Novatian, the subordination of the Son to the Father is neither an 
accidental by-product of an anti-psilanthropist proof of Christ’s divnity nor the product of 
an inferior theological mind. It is purposefully deployed to refute the monarchian 
identification of the Father and Son.72 As for Tertullian, the subordination of the Son to 
the Father was a crucial piece in Novatian’s anti-monarchian polemic. 
Subordination and Distinction: Origen’s Schema of Participation 
 In this final section, I analyze a core passage from the second book of Origen’s 
Commentary on John. In this passage, Origen seeks to guard against monarchian 
theology by employing a framework of participation which, I argue, is subordinationist. I 
supplement my analysis with others passages from Origen’s corpus, but I do not attempt 
to be exhaustive. I consider the passage from ComJn 2.13-32 to be one of the most 
important passages for determining Origen’s views on the relationship between the 
                                                 
72 Commenting on De Trinitate 22.2-3, Dunn writes, “That there is the suggestion of 
subordinationism here is undeniable, but it was more by accident or oversight than by design. Establishing 
the divinity of Christ was Novatian's concern, and questions of the relationship between Father and Son 
beyond establishing that the Son was of God were more of a distraction” (“The Diversity and Unity of God 
in Novatian’s De Trinitate,” 398). Novatian’s comments in De Trinitate 27.12 and elsewhere make 
problematic Dunn’s claim that Novatian’s subordinationism in his interpretation of Philippians 2:6-11 was 
an accident or the result of oversight. In the earlier passage, Novatian uses the same logic that he employs 





Father and Son in his Alexandrian works.73 Before examining this passage, however, I 
must make a few observations about Rufinus as a translator of Origen. 
Two Origens: Rufinus’ Translation of De principiis  
 In my examination of Origen’s articulation of the distinction between the Father 
and Son in his Alexandrian works, I use his statements in De principiis only with great 
caution. Such a methodological decision, however, is not followed in several recent 
reconstructions of Origen’s Trinitarian theology. The recent works of Christopher Beeley 
and Illaria Ramelli are good examples of this trend. Christopher Beeley’s recent 
discussion of Origen’s Christology notes the importance of Origen’s ComJn for a 
reconstruction of his authentic thought, but Beeley relies heavily on statements from De 
principiis without serious discussion of the reliability of Rufinus’ translation.74  
In her recent article alleging anti-subordinationism in Origen, Ilaria Ramelli notes 
that she offers a “painstaking analysis of [Origen’s] works (always with attention to their 
reliability in relation to Greek original, translations, and fragments).”75 After this 
statement of methodology, Ramelli starts her article with a series of quotations from 
Latin translations of Origen, notably De principiis and the Commentary on Romans. 
                                                 
73 Henri Crouzel notes that this passage has caused a good bit of controversy, but then he tries to 
explain away its obvious implications. See his Origen, trans. A. S. Worrall (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 
1989), 181. 
74 See: Christopher A. Beeley, The Unity of Christ: Continuity and Conflict in Patristic Tradition 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 9–11, 21–7. The closest Beeley comes to engaging the question 
of the reliability of Rufinus’ translation of De principiis is in n. 41 on pp. 319-20. Here, defending Rufinus’ 
translation, he argues that Jerome’s critique of Rufinus’ translation “clearly reflects Jerome’s own biases 
and tells us little about Origen’s text.” Beeley considers Rufinus’ translations to represent accurately 
Origen’s thought on Trinitarian matters. 
75 Ilaria Ramelli, “Origen’s Anti-Subordinationism and Its Heritage in the Nicene and 





Regarding Comm. in Rom. 7.12.146-147 (7.11.10 in SC 543), she notes that the text 
claims that “Christ has nothing and nobody over him, not even the Father.”76 The 
translators of the Sources chrétiennes edition note the following about the passage 
Ramelli quoted: “On peut légitimement penser que cette dernière formule porte la marque 
de Rufin, soucieux de défendre l'orthodoxie d'Origène. Mais le développement qui 
précède n’en traduit pas moins la pensée de l'Alexandrin, et montre que celui-ci ne peut 
être accusé d'avoir ouvert la voie à l’arianisme.”77 Ramelli has introduced the quotation 
from Rufinus’ translation as authoritatively representing Origen’s thought; but in her 
article, she does not interact with those scholars who suggest that it is clearly a Rufinian 
modification or interpolation.  
Furthermore, Ramelli’s decision to label Origen an “anti-subordinationist” begs a 
fundamental question that she does not answer: Was anyone being accused of 
subordinationism in the early third century? As my argument should make clear, my 
answer is a resounding “no.” The subordination of the Son to the Father was a tool used 
intentionally by Tertullian, Novatian, and Origen against the monarchians. None of these 
authors was yet labeled a subordinationist because such theologies had not yet taken on 
the negative evaluative judgment they were later given in the post-Nicene era. This, of 
course, is not to say that the theologies of Tertullian, Novatian, and Origen were 
unopposed in the third century. As I make clear, the monarchians opposed their theology; 
but they opposed it because they thought it was tantamount ditheism, not because it 
subordinated the Father to the Son. In the third century, the subordination of the Father to 
                                                 
76 Ibid., 25. 
77 Origen, Commentaire sur l’Épître aux Romains, ed. Caroline P. Hammond Bammel, trans. Luc 





the Son was a common anti-monarchian strategy that was rejected by the monarchians as 
entailing ditheism. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that Tertullian, Novatian, 
and Origen do not defend themselves against charges of subordinationism, only against 
charges of ditheism or polytheism. 
My hesitance about the use of De principiis as a source for Origen’s Trinitarian 
theology stems from my conviction that Rufinus’ translations are fundamentally 
unreliable with regard to Origen’s Trinitarian theology. Numerous other scholars have 
also noted this same unreliability.78 The following survey of Rufinus’ translation 
methodology demonstrates why his translations of Trinitarian material are of dubious 
value.79 After this discussion of his methodology, I will offer a concrete example of how 
his methodological assumptions affect his translation practice. 
                                                 
78 Paul Koetschau notes that “Rufinus has adapted Origen’s doctrine of the Trinity to his orthodox 
commitments either by omission or emendation.” See  Koetschau, ed., Origenes Werke: Fünfter Band; De 
Principiis (ΠΕΡΙ ΑΡΧΩΝ), GCS 22 (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1913), cxxx. Basil Studer discusses Trinitarian 
issues in the translation of De principiis at length in his “Zur Frage der dogmatischen Terminologie in der 
lateinischen Uebersetzung von Origenes’ De Principiis,” in Épektasis: Mélanges patristiques offerts au 
cardinal Jean Daniélou, ed. Jacques Fontaine and Charles Kannengiesser (Paris: Beauchesne, 1972), 403-
14. Regarding Rufinus’ translations, Ronald E. Heine notes that “one may say that, on the whole, the 
substance can be regarded as representing Origen’s thought. The major exception to this statement is 
theological statements regarding the Trinity and the resurrection of the body. Whenever statements on these 
subjects agree with the doctrines of the fourth-century Church they should be regarded with suspicion.” See 
his “Introduction,” in Homilies on Genesis and Exodus, ed. Ronald E. Heine, Fathers of the Church 71 
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1982), 38. Catherine M. Chin specifically 
discusses Origen’s subordinationism with regard to Rufinus’ translation practices. See her “Rufinus of 
Aquileia and Alexandrian Afterlives: Translation as Origenism,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 18, no. 
4 (2010): 628–34. 
79 Charles Kannengiesser warns that we must not spend so much time worrying about Rufinus’ 
translations that we fail to grasp the thought of Origen himself in his “Écriture et théologie trinitaire 
d’Origène,” in Origeniana sexta: Origéne et la Bible, ed. Gilles Dorival and Alain Le Boulluec, 
Bibliotheca Ephemeridum theologicarum Lovaniensium 118 (Leuven: Leuven University Press; Peeters, 
1995), 352: “Évitons que les arbres de Rufin traducteur ne nous cachent la forêt d'Origène auteur.” 
Kannengiesser, of course, has a point; but so too do those who question the reliability of Rufinus’ 
translations. Perhaps the best way to ensure that we do not lose sight of Origen’s thought is to consider the 
texts that survive in Greek as foundational, and only after a thorough examination of those texts, move on 





Rufinus’ working assumptions for translating Origen are first expressed in his 
translation of Pamphilius’ Apology for Origen and his addendum of On the Falsification 
of the Books of Origen (henceforth De adulteratione). He explicitly discusses his 
methodological principles in De adulteratione, so it is the logical place to begin this 
discussion.80 Rufinus begins by noting that there are in Origen’s works things that do not 
agree with the rule of truth (ueritatis regula). There are also contradictions in Origen’s 
writings, but Rufinus is confident that both sorts of problems cannot be the product of 
someone as wise and well-educated as Origen.81 Such contradictory and problematic 
statements are found in Origen’s writings, argues Rufinus, because “heretics” modified 
them and inserted their own heretical opinions, as is their wont.82 Rufinus claims that 
such insertions were made in Origen’s work, even in his own lifetime; and then Rufinus 
reproduces one of Origen’s letters, wherein Origen himself complains of the falsification 
of his works.83 Rufinus finally reaches the following conclusion:  
If anything is found in his works that is not consonant with the Catholic faith, we 
suspect that it has been inserted by heretics, and regard it as alien both to his 
understanding and to our faith. Even if we are deceived about this, we incur, as I 
think, no danger from such an error. For we ourselves, through God’s help, 
                                                 
80 Rufinus’ work on Pamphilius’ Apology, De adulteratione, and De Principiis was completed 
from 397 to 398 at the request of a certain Macarius, whom Rufinus mentions in his preface to the 
translation of Pamphilius’ Apology. For the dating of these works and the circumstances of their 
production, see Francis X. Murphy, Rufinus of Aquileia (345-411): His Life and Works, Studies in 
Medieval History 6 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1945), 82–110; C. P. 
Bammel, “Last Ten Years of Rufinus’ Life and the Date of His Move South from Aquileia,” Journal of 
Theological Studies 28, no. 2 (1977): 386. 
81 Rufinus, De adulteratione 1. 
82 Rufinus, De adulteratione 2. Rufinus cites a number of examples of such misfortunes happening 
to the works of other authors, including Clement of Rome, Dionysius of Alexandria, Cyprian, Hilary of 
Poitiers. 





continue unharmed by avoiding that which we regard as suspect and of which we 
disapprove.84 
 
Rufinus’ conclusions about the presence of heretical interpolations in Origen’s writings 
motivate his approach to translating those same texts.85 
Because Rufinus assumes that Origen’s works contain interpolations, he does not 
hesitate to correct anything he deems to be contradictory or unorthodox. In the preface to 
his translation of De Prin., he speaks of following the practices of a previous translator of 
Origen, presumably Jerome:86  
[I]n my translation I would follow as far as possible the rule observed by my 
predecessors and especially by the distinguished man whom I mentioned above. 
For he, when translating into Latin more than seventy treatises of Origen, called 
homilies, and also a number of his other Commentaries on St. Paul’s epistles, both 
of which are known to contain in the original a good many statements likely to 
cause offence, so smoothed over and emended these in his translation, that a Latin 
reader would find in them nothing out of harmony with our faith. His example, 
therefore, I am following to the best of my ability; if not with an equal degree of 
eloquence, at least observing the same rules and taking care not to reproduce such 
passages from the books of Origen as are found to be inconsistent with and 
contrary to his true teaching.87 
                                                 
84 Rufinus, De adulteratione 16 (trans. Thomas P. Scheck, Apology for Origen, The Fathers of the 
Church 120 (Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America Press, 2010), 136–7): Si quid autem 
inuentum fuerit in his quod cum fide catholica non consonant, hoc et ab haereticis suspicamur insertum et 
tam ab illius sensu quam a nostra fide ducimus alienum. In quo etiam si fallimur, nihil, ut opinor, periculi 
huiuscemodi errore incurrimus. Nam et ipsi Deo iuuante permanemus inlaesi uitando ea quae suspecta 
habemus et inprobamus. Latin from Pamphilus, Eusebius, and Rufinus, Pamphile et Eusèbe de Césarée 
Apologie pour Origène ; suivi de Rufin d’Aquilée Sur la falsification des livres d’Origène, ed. René 
Amacker and Eric Junod, Sources chrétiennes 464 (Paris: Cerf, 2002), 320–2. 
85 Catherine Chin helpfully catalogues some of Rufinus’ basic assumptions about the texts he is 
working with: “first, the instability of texts given the mechanics of late ancient book production; second, 
the presumption of authorial consistency, so that the same author cannot be both orthodox and heretical; 
and third, the more general notion that textual corruption necessarily occurs over time, and that it is the task 
of later readers to restore a text to its original condition” (“Rufinus of Aquileia and Alexandrian 
Afterlives,” 636–7). 
86 Above, Rufinus speaks of this person translating some of Origen’s Homilies on the Song of 
Songs, and the editors of the SC edition of De prin. identify this translator as Jerome. See Origen, Traité 
des principes, ed. Henri Crouzel and Manlio Simonetti, vol. 1, Sources chrétiennes 252 (Paris: Cerf, 1978), 
69. 
87 Rufinus, Preface to De principiis 2 (trans. Origen, On First Principles: Being Koetschau’s Text 
of the De Principiis, ed. Paul Koetschau, trans. G. W. Butterworth (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1973), 






As Rufinus’ discussion makes clear, Origen’s “true teaching” will emerge as something 
that will be in accord with what Rufinus takes to be the correct faith of his Latin readers, 
especially regarding Trinitarian theology. He goes on to make a specific remark about his 
treatment of Trinitarian passages: 
Wherever, therefore, I have found in his books anything contrary to the reverent 
statements made by him about the Trinity in other places, I have either omitted it 
as a corrupt and interpolated passage, or reproduced it in a form that agrees with 
the doctrine which I have often found him affirming elsewhere…. But I have said 
nothing of my own, simply giving back to him his own statements found in other 
places.88 
 
Rufinus himself admits that he is especially cognizant of problematic passages regarding 
Trinitarian theology in Origen’s corpus.  
Rufinus states that he will correct Origen’s Trinitarian thought so that it is in 
accord with what Origen says elsewhere. Although one might suspect that Rufinus is 
dissimulating when he claims only to be reproducing Origen’s true thought, he is not 
                                                 
cuius superius fecimus mentionem. Qui cum ultra septuaginta libellos Origenis, quos homileticos 
appellauit, aliquantos etiam de tomis in apostolum scriptis transtulisset in latinum, in quibus cum aliquanta 
offendicula inueniantur in graeco, ita elimauit omnia interpretando atque purgauit, ut nihil illis quod a fide 
nostra discrepet latinus lector inueniat. Hunc ergo etiam nos, licet non eloquentiae uiribus, disciplinae 
tamen regulis in quantum possumus sequimur, obseruantes scilicet ne ea, quae in libris Origenis a se ipso 
discrepantia inueniuntur atque contraria, proferamus. Latin from SC 252:70. 
88 Rufinus, Preface to De Principiis 3 (trans. Butterworth, lxiii.). Sicubi ergo nos in libris eius 
aliquid contra id inuenimus, quod ab ipso in ceteris locis pie de trinitate fuerat definitum, uelet 
adulteratum hoc et alienum aut praetermisimus aut secundum eam regulam protulimus, quam ab ipso 
frequenter inuenimus adfirmatam…. Nihil tamen nostrum diximus, sed licet in aliis locis dicta, sua tamen 
sibi reddidiums. Latin from SC 252:72. At the end of this passage, Rufinus wishes to diminish his role as a 
translator. He claims that he is not saying anything of his own; he is merely reproducing an undefiled 
Origen for his Latin readers. Note that shortly before this passage, Rufinus offers a thinly veiled critique of 
Pope Damasus’ translation of Origen for introducing too much of his own voice: “I can see, however, that 
he derives most pleasure from the works of his own pen. He pursues a task that promises greater fame, that 
of being a ‘father of the word’ and not a mere translator” (Sed ille, ut uideo, in stilo proprio placens rem 
maioris gloriae sequitur, ut pater uerbi sit potius quam interpres). Rufinus, Preface to De Principiis, 1 
(trans. Butterworth, lxii; Latin from SC 252:68). Catherine Chin notes that Rufinus privileged the role of 
translator more than that of author in his attempt to produce a Latin Christian library (“Rufinus of Aquileia 





necessarily being disingenuous. Shortly after his translation of the Apology and De 
principiis, Rufinus translated the Dialogue of Adamantius on the Orthodox Faith.89 
Although Buchheit claimed that Rufinus was aware that the work was not actually by 
Origen, Bammel argues that such a cynical interpretation is not necessary.90 Whether or 
not Rufinus was aware that it was not an authentic work of Origen, Murphy suggests that 
“Rufinus, on discovering the complete orthodoxy of the contents, naturally seized upon it 
as a justification of his contention that the errors found in the other works of Origen were 
interpolations.”91 Rufinus’ belief that the Dialogue was genuinely a work of Origen 
allowed him to justify using it as the touchstone for his correction of the alleged 
interpolations in Origen’s works; it gave him a more fully orthodox version of Origen 
from which to work.92 
Test Case: De principiis 1.2.13 
 In order to make more concrete observations about Rufinus’ translations, I now 
examine his translation of De principiis 1.2.13, a passage for which we have both 
                                                 
89 The critical edition of this text can be found in Adamantius, Der Dialog des Adamantius: ΠΕΡΙ 
ΤΗΣ ΕΙΣ ΘΕΟΝ ΟΡΘΗΣ ΠΙΣΤΕΩΣ, ed. Willem Hendrik van de Sande Bakhuyzen, Griechischen 
christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte 4 (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1901). For an English translation, 
see Robert A Pretty, ed. and trans., Adamantius: Dialogue on the True Faith in God, Gnostica 1 (Leuven: 
Peeters, 1997). Bammel places Rufinus’ translation of this work ca. 398-399 (“Last Ten Years,” 428). If 
Bammel’s chronology is correct, it is unclear whether Rufinus had already had contact with the Dialogue 
when he was translating De principiis. Rufinus translated the Dialogue with Adamantius from Greek 
sources at the request of a certain “Paul”, and Murphy suggests that Rufinus chose this work because he 
was already familiar with it (Rufinus of Aquileia, 123–125). 
90 Bammel, “Last Ten Years,” 390–391; V. Buchheit, “Rufinus von Aquileja als Fälscher des 
Adamantiosdialogs,” Byzantinische Zeitschrift 51, no. 2 (1958): 314–28. 
91 Murphy, Rufinus of Aquileia, 125. 
92 See Thomas P. Scheck’s brief discussion of the Trinitarian orthodoxy of the Dialogue, in his 
Thomas P. Scheck, “Introduction,” in Apology for Origen, The Fathers of the Church 120 (Washington, 





external attestation and internal parallels within Origen’s other works. The choice of this 
passage is particularly apropos because of the ways it elucidates ComJn 2.13-32, which I 
will discuss after the present section. Rufinus’ Latin translation reads as follows: 
There remains the inquiry, what is the ‘image of his goodness’? Here, I think, we 
do well to adopt the same line of reasoning which we used above in regard to the 
image formed in a mirror. The original goodness is undoubtedly the Father; and 
from this is born the Son, who is in every respect an image of the Father, and who 
may also without any doubt be properly called an ‘image of his goodness’. For 
there is no other second goodness existing in the Son, besides that which is in the 
Father. So the Saviour himself rightly says in the Gospel that ‘none is good save 
one, God the Father’, the purpose of this statement being to make it understood 
that the Son is not of some other ‘goodness’, but of that alone which is in the 
Father; whose image he is rightly called, because he neither springs from any 
other source than from original goodness itself,—for if that were so, there would 
seem to be a different goodness in the Son from that which is in the Father—nor 
has the goodness that is in him any dissimilarity or divergence from that of the 
Father. Accordingly we ought not to imagine that there is some kind of 
blasphemy, as it were, in saying that ‘none is good save one, God the Father’, as if 
these words were to be taken as a denial that either Christ or the Holy Spirit is 
good; but, as we said before, the original goodness must be believed to reside in 
God the Father, and from him both the Son and the Holy Spirit undoubtedly draw 
into themselves the nature of that goodness existing in the fount from which the 
one is born and the other proceeds. If then there are any other things called good 
in the scriptures, such as an angel, or a man, or a slave, or a treasure, or a good 
heart or a good tree, all these are so called by an inexact use of the word, since the 
goodness contained in them is accidental and not essential.93 
 
                                                 
93 Origen, De principiis 1.2.13 (trans. Butterworth, 27-8). Superest quid sit imago bonitatis eius 
inquirere, in quo eadem, ut opinor, intellegi conuenit, quae supererius de imagine ea, quae per speculum 
deformatur, expressimus. Principalis namque bonitas sine dubio pater est; ex qua filius natus, qui per 
omnia imago est patris, procul dubio etiam bonitatis eius conuenienter imago dicetur. Non enim alia aliqua 
secunda bonitas existit in filio praeter eam, quae est in patre. Vnde et recte ipse saluator in euangelio dicit 
quoniam nemo bonus nisi unus deus pater, quo scilicet per hoc intellegatur filius non esse alterius 
bonitatis, sed illius solius, quae in patre est; cuius recte imago appellatur quia neque aliunde est nisi ex 
ipsa principali bonitate, ne altera bonitas quam ea quae in patre est uideatur in filio, neque aliqua 
dissimilitudo aut distantia bonitatis in filio est. Propter quod non debet uelut blasphemiae aliquod genus 
putari in eo quod dictum est quia nemo bonus nisi unus deus pater, ut propterea putetur uel Christus uel 
spiritus sanctus negari quod bonus sit; sed, ut superius diximus, principalis bonitas in deo patre sentienda 
est, ex quo uel filius natus uel spiritus sanctus procedens sine dubio bonitatis eius naturam in se refert, 
quae est in eo fonte, de quo uel natus est filius uel procedit spiritus sanctus. Iam uero si qua alia bona in 
scripturis dicuntur, uel angelus uel homo uel seruus uel thesaurus uel cor bonum uel arbor bona, haec 






Compare the above passage from Rufinus’ Latin to the following Greek fragment from 
Justinian:94  
In the same way, therefore, I consider that in the case of the Saviour it would be 
right to say that he is an image of God’s goodness, but not goodness itself. And 
perhaps also the Son while being good, is yet not good purely and simply. And 
just as he is the image of the invisible God, and in virtue of this is himself God, 
and yet is not he of whom Christ himself says ‘that they may know thee, the only 
true God’; so he is the image of the goodness, and yet not, as the Father is, good 
in a precisely similar way.95 
 
Crouzel and Simonetti observe that the fragment from Justinian appears to be authentic, 
and the contents are not scandalous when viewed within the wider sweep of Origen’s 
thought.96 We also possess a comment from Jerome that appears to be discussing the 
same passage in De principiis. Jerome writes, “God the Father almighty he [Origen] calls 
good, and of perfect goodness. The Son is not good, but is a kind of breath and image of 
                                                 
94 As a general rule, Justinian’s fragments should be viewed with suspicion because of his overt 
bias against Origen. In this case, as I discuss below, there are other texts from Origen’s corpus that 
corroborate what Justinian records in the fragment. 
95 Justinian, Epistula ad Mennam (trans. Butterworth, 27 with my modifications). Οὕτω τοίνυν 
ἡγοῦμαι καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ σωτῆρος καλῶς ἂν λεχθήσεσθαι ὅτι εἰκὼν ἀγαθότητος θεοῦ ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ 
αὐτοαγαθόν. καὶ τάχα καὶ ὁ υἱὸς ἀγαθός, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς ἁπλῶς ἀγαθός, καὶ ὥσπερ εἰκών ἐστι τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ 
ἀοράτου καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο θεός, ἀλλ’ οὐ περὶ οὖ λέγει αὐτὸς ὁ Χριστὸς ἵνα γινώσκωσί σε τὸν μόνον 
ἀληθινὸν θεόν, οὕτως εἰκὼν τῆς ἀγαθότητος, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς ὁ πατὴρ ἀπαραλλάκτως ἀγαθός. Greek from 
Justinian, Scritti teologici ed ecclesiastici di Giustiniano, ed. Mario Amelotti and Livia Migliardi Zingale, 
Legum Iustiniani imperatoris vocabularium 3 (Milano: A. Giuffrè, 1977), 110. This text, with a few 
insignificant exceptions is the same as that printed by Koetschau in his edition of De principiis. See his 
Origenes Werke: Fünfter Band; De  Principiis (ΠΕΡΙ ΑΡΧΩΝ), 47. Note also ComJn, 6.295 (trans. Origen, 
Commentary on the Gospel according to John, trans. Ronald E. Heine, Fathers of the Church 80 
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1989), 248.FC 80:248). “… for the Father is 
good, and the savior is an image of his goodness” (ὁ μὲν γὰρ πατὴρ ἀγαθός, ὁ δὲ σωτὴρ εἰκὼν τῆς 
ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ). Greek from Origen, Commentaire sur saint Jean, ed. Cécile Blanc, vol. 2: Livres VI et 
X, Sources chrétiennes 157 (Paris: Cerf, 1970), 352. 
96 Origen, Traité des principes, ed. Henri Crouzel and Manlio Simonetti, vol. 2, Sources 
chrétiennes 253 (Paris: Cerf, 1978), 54. “Le passage de Justinian peut être authentique et raccourci par 
Rufin pour être compris de ses lecteurs latins. Il n'est guère scandaleux si on le replace dans la conception 
d'Origène, car il traduit uniquement un subordinatianisme d'origine.” Later they note that Justinian and 
Jerome warped Origen’s thought by downplaying the unity of goodness between Father and Son (55). 
Görgemanns and Karpp also note that Rufinus seems to have suppressed some of the elements in Origen’s 
thought, which they think are present in the Justinian fragment. See Origen, Vier Bücher von den 
Prinzipien, ed. Herwig Görgemanns and Heinrich Karpp, 2nd ed., Texte zur Forschung 24 (Darmstadt: 





goodness, so that he is not called good absolutely, but with an addition, such as the good 
shepherd, etc.”97 
In addition to these exterior witnesses from Justinian and Jerome, we possess 
other passages from Origen where he speaks about the goodness of the Son in relation to 
the Father. In ComJn 13, Origen brings up the issue of the goodness of the Son, this time 
placing it in a fuller discussion of the relationship between the Father and Son:  
But we are obedient to the Savior who says, 'The Father who sent me is greater 
than I,' and who for this reason, did not permit himself to accept the title 'good' 
when it was offered to him, although it was perfectly legitimate and true. Instead, 
he graciously offered it up to the Father, and rebuked the one who wished to 
praise the Son excessively. This is why we say the Savior and the Holy Spirit 
transcend all created beings, not by comparison, but by their exceeding 
preeminence. The Father exceeds the Savior as much (or even more) as the Savior 
himself and the Holy Spirit exceed the rest. And by 'the rest' I do not mean 
ordinary beings, for how great is the praise ascribed to him who transcends 
thrones, dominions, principalities, powers, and every name that is named not only 
in this world but also in that which is to come? And in addition to these [what 
must we] say also of holy angels, spirits, and just souls? (152) But although the 
Savior transcends in his essence, rank, power, divinity (for the Word is living), 
and wisdom, beings that are so great and of such antiquity, nevertheless, he is not 
comparable with the Father in any way. (153) For he is an image of the goodness 
and brightness, not of God, but of God's glory and of his eternal light; and he is a 
vapor, not of the Father, but of his power; and he is a pure emanation of God's 
almighty glory, and an unspotted mirror of his activity.98 
                                                 
97 Jerome, Epistula ad Avitum 2 (trans. Butterworth, 27, n. 3). deum patrem omnipotentem appellat 
bonum et perfectae bonitatis, filium non esse bonum sed auram quondam et imaginem bonitatis, ut non 
dicatur absolute bonus, sed cum additamento ‘pastor bonus’ et cetera. Latin from Jerome, Sancti Eusebii 
Hieronymi Epistulae, ed. Isidorus Hilberg, vol. 3 (epistulae CXXI - CLIV), Corpus scriptorum 
ecclesiasticorum latinorum 56 (Vindobonae; Lipsiae: Tempsky; Freytag, 1918), 97. 
98 Origen, ComJn 13.151-3 (trans. FC 89:100). Ἀλλ’ ἡμεῖς πειθόμενοι τῷ σωτῆρι λέγοντι· «Ὁ 
πατὴρ ὁ πέμψας με μείζων μού ἐστιν» καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μὴ ἐνεγκόντι μηδὲ τὴν «ἀγαθὸς» προσηγορίαν τὴν 
κυρίαν καὶ ἀληθῆ καὶ τελείαν παραδέξασθαι αὐτῷ προσφερομένην, ἀλλὰ ἀναφέροντι <αὐ>τὴν εὐχαρίστως 
τῷ πατρὶ μετ’ ἐπιτιμήσεως πρὸς τὸν βουλόμενον ὑπερδοξάζειν τὸν υἱόν, πάντων μὲν τῶν γενητῶν 
ὑπερέχειν οὐ συγκρίσει ἀλλ’ ὑπερβαλλούσῃ ὑπεροχῇ φαμὲν τὸν σωτῆρα καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον, 
ὑπερεχόμενον τοσοῦτον ἢ καὶ πλέον ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρός, ὅσῳ ὑπερέχει αὐτὸς καὶ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα τῶν λοιπῶν, 
οὐ τῶν τυχόντων ὄντων. Ὅση γὰρ δοξολογία τοῦ ὑπερέχοντος θρόνων, κυριοτήτων, ἀρχῶν, ἐξουσιῶν, καὶ 
παντὸς ὀνόματος ὀνομαζομένου οὐ μόνον ἐν τῷ αἰῶνι τούτῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι, πρὸς τούτοις καὶ 
ἁγίων ἀγγέλων καὶ πνευμάτων καὶ ψυχῶν δικαίων, <τί δεῖ> καὶ λέγειν; (152.) Ἀλλ’ ὅμως τῶν τοσούτων καὶ 
τηλικούτων ὑπερέχων οὐσίᾳ καὶ πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει καὶ θειότητι—ἔμψυχος γάρ ἐστι λόγος—καὶ σοφίᾳ, 
οὐ συγκρίνεται κατ’ οὐδὲν τῷ πατρί. (153.) Εἰκὼν γάρ ἐστιν τῆς ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀπαύγασμα οὐ τοῦ 
θεοῦ ἀλλὰ τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀϊδίου φωτὸς αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἀτμὶς οὐ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀλλὰ τῆς δυνάμεως 






Compare this passage to a similar discussion in ComMatt, where Origen writes, 
The Saviour is the image of the invisible God, and in the same way, he is the 
image of God’s goodness. Whenever the word ‘good’ is applied to a lesser being, 
it has another meaning. Considered in relation to the Father, the Son is the image 
of the Father’s goodness; considered in relation to other beings, he is to them 
what the Father’s goodness is to him. And it can even be said that the analogy 
between God’s goodness and the goodness of the Saviour, who is the image of 
God’s goodness, is closer than the analogy between the Saviour and a good man, 
and good deed or a good tree. The fact that he is the image of God’s goodness sets 
the Saviour higher above the lesser beings than the fact of being good sets God 
above the Saviour.99 
 
Hermann Josef Vogt discusses both ComJn 13.151-3 and ComMatt 15.10 and concludes 
that these passages are not fundamentally at odds with later post-Nicene theology. He 
acknowledges that the passage from ComJn appears to be written in opposition to a 
Gnostic conception of homoousios, although he does not expand on this suggestion. He 
concludes that the passage in ComJn is not at odds with Nicaea because it is addressing 
the incarnate Son, not the pre-existent Logos. This, conclusion, however, is not clearly 
faithful to the text. Origen’s hierarchical schema in which the Son is an intermediary 
                                                 
ἐνεργείας αὐτοῦ. Greek from Origen, Commentaire sur saint Jean, ed. Cécile Blanc, vol. 3 (livres XIII), 
Sources chrétiennes 222 (Paris: Cerf, 1975), 112–4. 
99 Origen, ComMatt 15.10 (trans. Jean Daniélou, Origen, trans. Walter Mitchell (New York: Sheed 
and Ward, 1955), 255): Καὶ ὁ σωτὴρ δὲ ὡς ἔστιν «εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου», οὕτως καὶ «τῆς 
ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ εἰκών»· καὶ <ἐπὶ> παντὸς δὲ τοῦ ὑποδεεστέρου, ᾧ ἐφαρμόζεται ἡ «ἀγαθὸς» φωνή, ἄλλο 
σημαινόμενον ἔχει τὸ ἐφ’ αὑτοῦ λεγόμενον, εἴπερ ὡς μὲν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα «εἰκών» ἐστιν «ἀγαθότητος», ὡς 
δὲ πρὸς τὰ λοιπὰ ὅπερ ἡ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀγαθότης πρὸς αὐτόν. ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἔστι τινὰ ἀναλογίαν προσεχῆ ἰδεῖν 
ἐπὶ τῆς ἀγαθότητος τοῦ θεοῦ πρὸς τὸν σωτῆρα ὄντα εἰκόνα «τῆς ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ», ἤπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ σωτῆρος 
πρὸς ἀγαθὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἔργον καὶ ἀγαθὸν δένδρον. πλείων γὰρ ἡ ὑπεροχὴ πρὸς τὰ ὑποδεέστερα 
ἀγαθὰ ἐν τῷ σωτῆρι, καθό ἐστιν «εἰκὼν τῆς ἀγαθότητος» αὐτοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἤπερ ἡ ὑπεροχὴ τοῦ θεοῦ ὄντος 
ἀγαθοῦ πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα σωτῆρα. Greek from Origen, Origenes Werke: Origenes Matthäuserklärung, ed. 
Erich Klostermann, vol. 10, Griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte 40 (Leipzig: 
Hinrichs, 1935), 375–6. See also Crouzel’s brief discussion of these two passages: Henri Crouzel, Origène 





seems to be fundamentally at odds with later Nicene doctrine.100 Regarding the passage 
from ComJn 13, Jean Daniélou writes,  
Origen’s position can be gathered from this without a shadow of a doubt. If the 
Son and the Spirit transcend all λογικοί, they are themselves transcended to a still 
greater extent by the Father. They thus form an intermediate category, which 
though much nearer to the Father than to the rest of creation, is still separate from 
him because their essence, power and other attributes are different from his.101 
 
Daniélou emphasizes one of the most prominent characteristics of Origen’s theology: that 
of some sort of hierarchy of beings. This hierarchy is evident in the passages on goodness 
from ComJn and ComMatt. In each, the Son is placed lower in the hierarchy than the 
Father, from whom he receives goodness.  
 A comparison of Rufinus’ translation with these external attestations of his source 
and parallels within Origen’s works makes Rufinus’ editorial hand evident in his version 
of De principiis 1.2.13. Notably absent from Rufinus’ translation of Origen’s discussion 
of the goodness of Father and Son is any notion of the sort of hierarchy that is present in 
Origen’s comments on goodness in ComJn 13 and ComMatt 15. The absence of this 
hierarchy, I argue, is the product of the sort of concern Rufinus expressed in his preface 
to the translation. Although the degree of the Father’s superiority to the Son seems to 
have been variable in Origen’s articulation of this hierarchy, the superiority itself is a 
stable element, often expressed with the verb ὐπερέχω and its variants. In Origen’s 
depictions of this hierarchy, the verb ὑπερέχω suggests that something on a higher level 
                                                 
100 See Hermann Josef Vogt, Origenes als Exeget, ed. Wilhelm Geerlings (Paderborn: Ferdinand 
Schöningh, 1999), 196–7. 
101 Daniélou, Origen, 254–255. Daniélou’s statement here seems to contradict itself and the text he 
is commenting on, but he is anticipating a tension in Origen’s thought that he is about to introduce. Just 
following this quotation, he quotes ComMatt 15.10, where Origen states that the Son is closer to the Father 
in the hierarchy of beings than to other creatures. His comment conflates the two passages. Nevertheless, 





“rises above” those on a lower level; and this would seem to imply that there is some sort 
of distance that separates them. Thus, when Rufinus denies that there is any distantia 
between the goodness of the Father and the Son, it is probable that he is denying the 
implications of the hierarchical framework in which Origen elsewhere discusses 
goodness. 
 At the end of the passage in Rufinus’ translation, Origen appears to make a hard 
divide between the Father, Son, Spirit, and created beings. He writes, “If then there are 
any other things called good in the scriptures, such as an angel, or a man, or a slave, or a 
treasure, or a good heart or a good tree, all these are so called by an inexact use of the 
word, since the goodness contained in them is accidental and not essential.”102 Goodness 
in created beings is accidental, writes Rufinus’ Origen. The implication of this statement 
is that the goodness in the Son and Spirit is essential, even though it is drawn from the 
Father as source. This section in Rufinus’ translation again seems to expunge the 
hierarchical structure of Origen’s thought in which Son and Spirit functioned as 
intermediaries. Rufinus positions Son and Spirit firmly alongside the Father, while the 
passages from ComJn and ComMatt place them in positions in the middle, sometimes 
closer to the Father, sometimes closer to creatures. 
The fragments of Justinian and Jerome both suggest that there was a dissimilarity, 
between the goodness in the Father and the Son. In Justinian’s fragment, the Son εἰκὼν 
ἀγαθότητος θεοῦ ἐστιν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ αὐτοαγαθόν.103 The Son may still be good, but he is not 
                                                 
102 Origen, De principiis 1.2.13 (trans. Butterworth, 28). Iam uero si qua alia bona in scripturis 
dicuntur, uel angelus uel homo uel seruus uel thesaurus uel cor bonum uel arbor bona, haec omnia abusiue 
dicuntur, accidentem, non substantialem in se continentia bonitatem. Latin from SC 252:142. 





goodness itself. The presence of αὐτοαγαθόν in Justinian’s fragment is especially 
noteworthy because a similar term, αὐτόθεος, appears in ComJn 2.17. There, Origen uses 
αὐτόθεος to refer to the Father and then states that all other things that are said to be θεός 
(among which Origen includes the Son) are made θεός by participation in divinity of 
αὐτόθεος. Divinity properly belongs to the Father, and other things are divine only 
insofar as they participate in the divinity of the Father. If we were to use the terms of 
Rufinus at the end of De principiis 1.2.13 to describe the theology of ComJn 2.17, we 
would say that the Father has divinity essentially and all else (including the Son) has it 
accidentally. This, however, does not align with what Rufinus’ translation says with 
regard to goodness. In his translation, goodness appears to be contained in Father, Son, 
and Spirit essentially. Compare Justinian’s use to that of Numenius: 
 For if the Second (Divinity) is good, not from itself but from the First, how then 
would it be possible that he (the First) is not good, if the latter derives his 
goodness from participation with the (other, the First), especially as the Second 
participates in him (the First) specially because he is Good? So Plato taught the 
sharply observant (auditor) by his statement, ‘That the Good is One.’ That this is 
so, Plato has expressed in different ways; for in the Timaeus (10) he used the 
popular manner of expression, and said that he was ‘good;’ but in his Republic 
(vii.14), he speaks of the ‘Idea of the Good.’ Thus the Good would also be the 
Idea of the Creator, because he appears to us good through participation in the 
First and Only. Just as one says, that men are formed according to the idea of 
Man, and cattle after the Idea of Cattle, and the horses, after the Idea of a Horse, 
so it is also probably with the Creator; for if the latter is good only because of his 
participation in the goodness of the First Good, then would the First Mind, as the 
Good-in-itself, be its Idea (or model). 104 
                                                 
104 Numenius, Fragments 19-20 (trans. Numenius, The Neoplatonic Writings of Numenius, trans. 
Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie, Great Works of Philosophy Series, vol. 4 (Lawrence, Kans.: Selene Books, 1987), 
34–6; Greek from Numenius, Fragments, ed. Édouard des Places, Collection des universités de France 
(Paris: Les Belles lettres, 1973), 59–60): Εἰ γὰρ ἀγαθός ἐστιν ὁ δεύτερος οὐ παρ’ ἑαυτοῦ, παρὰ δὲ τοῦ 
πρώτου, πῶς οἷόν τε ὑφ’ οὗ μετουσίας ἐστὶν οὗτος ἀγαθός, μὴ ἀγαθὸν <εἶναι>, ἄλλως τε κἂν τύχῃ αὐτοῦ 
ὡς ἀγαθοῦ μεταλαχὼν ὁ δεύτερος; οὕτω τοι ὁ Πλάτων ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ τῷ ὀξὺ βλέποντι ἀπέδωκε τὸ 
ἀγαθὸν ὅτι ἐστὶν ἕν.Ταῦτα δ’ οὕτως ἔχοντα ἔθηκεν ὁ Πλάτων ἄλλῃ καὶ ἄλλῃ χωρίσας· ἰδίᾳ μὲν γὰρ τὸν 
κυκλικὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ ἐγράψατο ἐν Τιμαίῳ εἰπών· ‘Ἀγαθὸς ἦν’· ἐν δὲ τῇ Πολιτείᾳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶπεν 
‘ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν’, ὡς δὴ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ ἰδέαν οὖσαν τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὅστις πέφανται ἡμῖν ἀγαθὸς μετουσίᾳ τοῦ 






That Numenius uses αὐτοαγαθός to distinguish between the First and Second is 
particularly elucidating. It gives us a probable context within which to interpret Origen’s 
use of αὐτο-X language.105 For Numenius, the Second does not possess goodness on its 
own but rather through participation (μετουσία). He supplements this notion by using 
μεταλαγχάνω, which means something like possessing something because a share of it 
has been allotted by another. In the fragments where Numenius uses ἀυτοαγαθός, two 
things are clear: (1) there is a hierarchy with the principal possessor (the First) of an 
attribute (αὐτο-X) at the top; and (2) that the Second possesses the attribute through 
reception of a share of what the principal possessor has. Although the Second is good, he 
does not possess goodness properly speaking, which is the sole prerogative of the First, ὁ 
αὐτοαγαθός. 
 The fact that Origen elsewhere uses αὐτο-X language to distinguish Father and 
Son (ComJn 2.17), coupled with the fact that we see a similar usage of it in Numenius, 
suggests that its appearance in Justinian’s fragment is authentic. Furthermore, Justinian’s 
fragment interprets the fact that the Son is not αὐτοαγαθός as suggesting that there is 
some sort of dissimilarity between the goodness of the Son and the goodness of the 
Father. The son is an image of the goodness of the Father, “but not as the Father, good in 
                                                 
τῆς βοός, ἵπποι δ’ ὑπὸ τῆς ἵππου ἰδέας, οὕτως καὶ εἰκότως ὁ δημιουργὸς εἴπερ ἐστὶ μετουσίᾳ τοῦ πρώτου 
ἀγαθοῦ ἀγαθός, <ἀγαθοῦ> ἰδέα ἂν εἴη ὁ πρῶτος νοῦς, ὢν αὐτοάγαθον. 
105 Note here that both Origen and his predecessor and teacher Clement were familiar with the 
work of Numenius and occasionally cited it favorably. See Clement Strom. 1.22.150; Origen, Contra 
Celsum 4.51. Both Clement and Origen mention Numenius shortly after discussing Aristobulus. For a 
thorough discussion of this fragment of Numenius and Origen’s thought, see Gerhard Gruber, ΖΩΗ: Wesen, 
Stufen und Mitteilung des wahren Lebens bei Origenes, Münchener theologische Studien, 2, Systematische 





a precisely similar way” (ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς ὁ πατὴρ ἀπαραλλάκτως ἀγαθός).106 If we combine 
Justinian’s fragment, interpreted through the lens of Numenius, with Origen’s other 
discussions of goodness, we are left with a stable schema. Origen consistently spoke 
about the goodness of the Father and Son by using some form of hierarchy. The Father, 
the proper possessor of goodness (ὁ αὐτοαγαθός), sat atop this hierarchy. The Son 
possessed the same goodness as the Father, but through reception and therefore to a 
diminished degree.107 Thus, as in the passages from ComJn 13 and ComMatt 15, the Son 
was located somewhere in the hierarchy below the Father but above creatures.   
Rufinus’ translation of De prin. 1.2.13, which discusses the issue of the goodness 
of the Father and Son, contains vestiges of Origen’s hierarchical teaching, which implied 
that there is some sort of dissimilarity or space between the Father and Son. The Son has 
goodness, but not in the same way as the Father. Rufinus’ Origen denies that there is any 
dissimilitudo or distantia between the goodness of the Father and Son. In ComJn 13.151-
153, preserved in Greek, Origen argues that the Son “is not comparable to the Father in 
any way” (οὐ συγκρίνεται κατ’ οὐδὲν τῷ πατρί). Immediately after this statement, Origen 
writes that the Son is an image of God’s goodness. When Rufinus’ translation of De 
principiis 1.2.13 is put alongside this passage from ComJn 13 and Justinian’s fragment, 
one is left with the distinct impression that the denial of dissimilitudo or distantia is 
Rufinus’ attempt to correct the distance or dissimilarity within Origen’s hierarchical 
                                                 
106 Justinian, Epistula ad Mennam. 
107 Thus, Rufinus has not completely distorted Origen’s thought. In all extant attestation, the 
Father is the source of goodness. Rufinus preserves this feature of Origen’s thought. Furthermore, Rufinus 
also attests to the fact that Origen thought that the Father and Son had the same goodness. This, too, seems 
to be authentically Origenian, although he would want to stress that they had it in a dissimilar manner; and 





theology. Origen’s assertion that the Father transcends the Son and that the Son is the 
image of God’s goodness, but not the goodness itself, would surely have been considered 
unorthodox by Rufinus as he was translating De principiis at the close of the fourth 
century. All of the external evidence suggests that Rufinus was aware of the occurrence 
of passages he considered unorthodox in the text of Origen he had before him. As 
Görgemanns and Karpp note, he seems to have suppressed the problematic elements of 
Origen’s thought in this passage.108 
 This examination of Rufinus’ translation of De principiis 1.2.13 has demonstrated 
the ways in which Rufinus’ editorial principles led him to modify Origen’s texts. The 
fragment of Justinian and similar passages elsewhere in Origen’s corpus suggest that 
Origen would have emphasized the transcendence of the Father over the Son in De 
principiis 1.2.13. Rufinus, in accordance with his assumptions about interpolations in De 
adulteratione and stated procedure in the Preface, has likely removed those 
characteristically Origenian elements that would have troubled his readers at the dawn of 
the fifth century. He has stripped Origen’s theology of all but vestiges its characteristic 
hierarchical structure. 
Commentary on John 2.13-32 
 Because of Rufinus’ tendencies with regard Origen’s Trinitarian theology, I do 
not mine passages from De principiis in this final vignette on Origen’s articulation of the 
distinction between the Father and Son. Instead, I focus on ComJn 2.13-32, a passage that 
                                                 





survives in a Greek untouched by the editorial hand of Rufinus. This passage is one of the 
most important texts for understanding Origen’s distinction of the Father and Son in his 
early works,109 and it is all the more valuable because we can be fairly certain that 
Origen’s opponents here are monarchians.110 My goal in this final vignette is not to offer 
a complete reconstruction of Origen’s early Trinitarian thought but to demonstrate that 
Origen, like Tertullian and Novatian, used a schema of subordination to safeguard the 
distinction of the Father and Son against his monarchian opponents. Because the passage 
I am considering is so long, I break it up into smaller sections and discuss them in 
succession. 
 At the beginning of this section, Origen examines the use of the definite article in 
the opening verse of the Gospel of John. His deliberation on this topic forms the 
foundation for his subsequent discussion: 
(13) John has used the articles in one place and omitted them in another very 
precisely, and not as though he did not understand the precision of the Greek 
language. In the case of the Word, he adds the article 'the,' but in the case of the 
noun 'God,' he inserts it in one place and omits it in another. (14) For he adds the 
article when the noun 'God' stands for the uncreated cause of the universe, but he 
omits it when the Word is referred to as 'God.' And as 'the God' and 'God' differ in 
these places, so, perhaps, 'the Word and 'Word' differ. (15) For as the God who is 
over all is 'the God' and not simply 'God,' so the source of reason in each rational 
                                                 
109 Jean Danielou notes that “this passage expresses the very heart of Origen’s vision of the 
Godhead.” See his Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture, trans. John Austin Baker, History of Early 
Christian Doctrine before the Council of Nicaea 2 (London: Longman & Todd, 1973), 382. 
110 For the identification of Origen’s opponents here as monarchians or modalists, see Daniélou, 
Origen, 253; Cécile Blanc, “Avant-Propos,” in Commentaire sur saint Jean, Sources chrétiennes 120 
(Paris: Cerf, 1966), 14; Daniélou, Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture, 375–6; Jean-Noël Aletti, 
“D’une écriture à l’autre: Analyse structurale d’un passage d’Origène--Commentaire sur Jean, livre 2:13-
21,” Recherches de science religieuse 61, no. 1 (1973): 27; Antonio Orbe, “Orígenes y los Monarquianos,” 
Gregorianum 72, no. 1 (1991): 42; Norbert Brox, “«Gott»: Mit und ohne Artikel: Origenes über Joh 1, 1,” 
Biblische Notizen, no. 66 (1993): 32; Kannengiesser, “Écriture et théologie trinitaire d’Origène,” 359–61; 
Ronald E. Heine, Origen: Scholarship in the Service of the Church, Christian Theology in Context 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 97–99; Bruns, Trinität und Kosmos, 50–2. Gabino Uríbarri 
Bilbao notes the dual polemical context of monarchianism and adoptianism. See his Monarquía y Trinidad: 
El concepto teológico “monarchia” en la controversia “monarquiana,” Publicaciones de la Universidad 





being is 'the Word.' That reason which is in each rational being would not 
properly have the same designation as the first reason, and said to be 'the 
Word.'111 
 
Origen’s comments on the use of the definite article here have a notable parallel in Philo, 
whose thoughts help to reveal the full import of Origen’s passage. Philo comments on 
Genesis 31:13, 
“I am the God who appeared to thee in the place of God” (Gen. xxxi. 13). Surely 
it is a good cause for boasting for a soul, that God deigns to show Himself to and 
converse with it. And do not fail to mark the language used, but carefully inquire 
whether there are two Gods; for we read “I am the God that appeared to thee,” not 
“in my place” but “in the place of God,” as though it were another’s. What, then, 
are we to say? He that is truly God is One, but those that are improperly so called 
are more than one. Accordingly the holy word in the present instance has 
indicated Him Who is truly God by means of the articles saying “I am the God,” 
while it omits the article when mentioning him who is improperly so called, 
saying “Who appeared to thee in the place” not “of the God,” but simply “of 
God.”112 
 
                                                 
111 Origen, ComJn 2.13-5 (trans. FC 80:98). Πάνυ δὲ παρατετηρημένως καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἑλληνικὴν 
ἀκριβολογίαν οὐκ ἐπιστάμενος ὁ Ἰωάννης ὅπου μὲν τοῖς ἄρθροις ἐχρήσατο ὅπου δὲ ταῦτα ἀπεσιώπησεν, 
ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ λόγου προστιθεὶς τὸ «ὁ», ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς θεὸς προσηγορίας ὅπου μὲν τιθεὶς ὅπου δὲ αἴρων. (14.) 
Τίθησιν μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἄρθρον, ὅτε ἡ «θεὸς» ὀνομασία ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀγενήτου τάσσεται τῶν ὅλων αἰτίου, σιωπᾷ δὲ 
αὐτό, ὅτε ὁ λόγος «θεὸς» ὀνομάζεται. Ὡς δὲ διαφέρει κατὰ τούτους τοὺς τόπους «ὁ θεὸς» καὶ «θεός», 
οὕτως μήποτε διαφέρῃ «ὁ λόγος» καὶ «λόγος». (15.) Ὃν τρόπον γὰρ ὁ ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεὸς «ὁ θεὸς» καὶ οὐχ 
ἁπλῶς «θεός», οὕτως ἡ πηγὴ τοῦ ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν λογικῶν λόγου «ὁ λόγος», τοῦ ἐν ἑκάστῳ λόγου οὐκ ἂν 
κυρίως ὁμοίως τῷ πρώτῳ ὀνομασθέντος καὶ λεχθέντος «ὁ λόγος». Greek from SC 120:214-6. Aletti, 
“D’une écriture à l’autre,” offers a very close reading of the grammar of this passage, noting subtle shifts in 
Origen’s schema throughout the passage. 
112 Philo, De somniis 2.228-9 (Greek and trans. with my modifications from Philo, Philo: On 
Flight and Finding; On the Change of Names; On Dreams, trans. F. H. Colson and Whitaker, vol. 5, Loeb 
Classical Library 275 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934), 416–9): ‘ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ θεὸς ὁ ὀφθείς σοι 
ἐν τόπῳ θεοῦ.’ πάγκαλόν γε αὔχημα ψυχῇ, τὸ ἀξιοῦν θεὸν ἐπιφαίνεσθαι καὶ ἐνομιλεῖν αὐτῇ. μὴ παρέλθῃς δὲ 
τὸ εἰρημένον, ἀλλὰ ἀκριβῶς ἐξέτασον, εἰ τῷ ὄντι δύο εἰσὶ θεοί· λέγεται γὰρ ὅτι ‘ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ θεὸς ὁ ὀφθείς σοι,’ 
οὐκ ἐν τόπῳ ἐμῷ, ἀλλ᾿ ‘ἐν τόπῳ θεοῦ,’ ὡς ἂν ἑτέρου. τί οὖν χρὴ λέγειν; ὁ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ θεὸς εἷς ἐστιν, οἱ δ᾿ ἐν 
καταχρήσει λεγόμενοι πλείους. διὸ καὶ ὁ ἱερὸς λόγος ἐν τῷ παρόντι τὸν μὲν ἀληθείᾳ διὰ τοῦ ἄρθρου 
μεμήνυκεν εἰπών· ‘ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ θεός,’ τὸν δ᾿ ἐν καταχρήσει χωρὶς ἄρθρου φάσκων· ‘ὁ ὀφθείς σοι ἐν τόπῳ,’ οὐ 





Both Philo and Origen argue that the article before the noun θεός distinguishes between 
the God and other gods.113 For Origen, ὁ θεός refers to the “uncreated cause of the 
universe” (τοῦ ἀγενήτου τἀσσεται τῶν ὅλων αἰτίου).114 For Philo, the use of the article 
designates the one who is truly God (ἀληθείᾳ θεός). For both, the article represents the 
uniqueness of the one to whom it is applied.115 Thus far, Origen has set up a means for 
distinguishing God and Word, but he has not traced its full implications. 
 In the next section, however, the reason for his attention to the articles as a means 
of distinction becomes clear. He continues, 
(16) Many people who wish to be pious are troubled because they are afraid that 
they may proclaim two Gods and, for this reason, they fall into false and impious 
beliefs. They either deny that the individual nature of the Son is other than that of 
the Father (ἰδιότητα υἱοῦ ἑτέραν παρὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς) by confessing him to be 
God whom they refer to as 'Son' in name at least, or they deny the divinity 
(θεότητα) of the Son and make his individual nature and essence as an individual 
(ἰδιότητα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν κατὰ περιγραφὴν) to be different from the Father.116 
 
Origen has here described the key features of the monarchian controversy.117 The first 
thing to notice is that those whom Origen is addressing are concerned to keep from 
                                                 
113 Alan F. Segal’s discusses this passage from Philo, although he does not remark on any possible 
connections with Origen: Two Powers in Heaven: Early Rabbinic Reports about Christianity and 
Gnosticism, Studies in Judaism in Late Antiquity 25 (Leiden: Brill, 1977), 260–6. 
114 Aletti suggests that in the series of expressions in 2.13-5, the phrases that have the article are 
perhaps commenting on πηγή in 2.15. The articular nouns in the passage represent the source for any others 
that possess the quality (“D’une écriture à l’autre,” 29–30). 
115 See also Hans Georg Thümmel’s brief discussion of this matter, in which he notes the common 
aim of Origen and Philo to protect the claim that there is only one God: Thümmel, ed., Origenes’ 
Johanneskommentar, Buch I-V, Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum 63 (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2011), 243. 
116 Origen, ComJn 2.16 (trans. FC 80:98): Καὶ τὸ πολλοὺς φιλοθέους εἶναι εὐχομένους ταράσσον, 
εὐλαβουμένους δύο ἀναγορεῦσαι θεοὺς καὶ παρὰ τοῦτο περιπίπτοντας ψευδέσι καὶ ἀσεβέσι δόγμασιν, ἤτοι 
ἀρνουμένους ἰδιότητα υἱοῦ ἑτέραν παρὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ὁμολογοῦντας θεὸν εἶναι τὸν μέχρι ὀνόματος παρ’ 
αὐτοῖς «υἱὸν» προσαγορευόμενον, ἢ ἀρνουμένους τὴν θεότητα τοῦ υἱοῦ τιθέντας δὲ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἰδιότητα καὶ 
τὴν οὐσίαν κατὰ περιγραφὴν τυγχάνουσαν ἑτέραν τοῦ πατρός. Greek from SC 120:220-2. 
117 Brox draws attention to the monarchian context of this passage and highlights that Origen’s 





becoming ditheists, from “proclaiming two gods.” The monarchians were especially 
troubled by anything they perceived to be ditheism, and ditheism was the damning label 
they attached to the theology of their opponents.118 
 In their quest to avoid ditheism, Origen argues that his opponents often fall into 
two main errors: 1) “they deny that the individual nature of the Son is other than that of 
the Father” (ἰδιότητα υἱοῦ ἑτέραν παρὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς); 2) “they deny the divinity 
(θεότητα) of the Son and make his individual nature and essence as an individual 
(ἰδιότητα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν κατὰ περιγραφὴν) to be different from the Father.”119 Although 
Origen does not reproduce the exact terminology, this first “false and impious dogma” 
aligns well with the main contention of the monarchians—that the Father and Son are 
“one and the same.”120 The second “false and impious dogma” also appears to be a 
paraphrase, but it aligns well with psilanthropism.121 In this error, Origen’s opponents 
                                                 
calls the Father alone ‘true God’ shows that he wants to account for biblical monotheism” (Trinität und 
Kosmos, 51). 
118 The charge of ditheism is made explicitly by Callistus, when he says, “δίθεοί ἐστε.” See 
Refutatio omnium haeresium 9.12.16. For the critical edition, see Miroslav Marcovich, ed., Refutatio 
omnium haeresium, Patristische Texte und Studien 25 (New York; Berlin: W. De Gruyter, 1986). See also 
Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 3.1. Although we do not see the accusation of ditheism itself in Contra 
Noetum, Hippolytus and the “elders” he mentions seem to be reacting to the charge of ditheism in multiple 
places. See Hippolytus, Contra Noetum 1.7, 11.1, 14.2-3. 
119 Thümmel uses Harnack’s terminology and notes that the two errors are modalistic and 
dynamistic [monarchianism]. See Thümmel, Origenes’ Johanneskommentar, Buch I-V, 243. Orbe notes 
that both errors stem from “the same fundamental premise: the absolute oneness of God (substantial and 
personal)” (“Orígenes y los Monarquianos,” 42). 
120 It appears as though Origen has paraphrased their positions and used one of his own key terms, 
ἰδιότητα. However, his claim that they denied that the Son is “other” (ἑτέραν) than the Father accords well 
with the extant testimony to monarchianism. As I suggested in the earlier chapters, early statements (like 
those in Justin’s Dialogue) that the Son was “other” than the Father were a probable motivation for the 
monarchian positions.  
121 Many scholars use “adoptianism” to refer to the position Origen describes here, but I think 
“psilanthropism” is a more apposite term. Origen says nothing here of the adoption of the Son or his 





argue for the alterity of the Son; but they do so only because they have already denied his 
divinity. In their view, if they had admitted that the Son was divine, also admitting that 
the Son was other than the Father would have been tantamount to dividing the Godhead, 
to professing ditheism. 
 Origen’s choice of vocabulary in ComJn 2.16 is noteworthy. He uses both 
ἰδιότητα and περιγραφήν to refer to the individuality of the Son, as distinguished from the 
Father. The term ἰδιότης does not appear in discussion of the Godhead in Contra Noetum 
or the Refutatio omnium haeresium, the two earliest attestations to monarchianism extant 
in Greek.122 Likewise, neither of those works contains a use of περιγράφω that 
approximates that of Origen’s use of περιγραφής here or in ComJn 1.291-2.123 He does 
not use ὑπόστασις at all in 2.13-20, where he is so concerned to articulate the distinction 
between the Father and Son.124 
 Perhaps even more interesting is the manner in which Origen uses the term οὐσία 
in ComJn 2.16. Recall that the first error of Origen’s opponents was that they denied that 
the ἰδιότης of the Son was other than that of the Father, that they collapsed any 
distinction between the unique individualities of Father and the Son. The second error 
                                                 
122 As I argue here, Origen’s ComJn also attests to monarchianism; but Contra Noetum and the 
Refutatio focus on this doctrine much more than does Origen. The term ἰδιότης does appear once in 
Refutatio 7.20.4, but this is in the context of a discussion of the theology of Basilides. According to this 
passage, Basilides appears to use the term to talk about the particular characteristics of things designated by 
names; but he is not discussing the Godhead. 
123 The term is used once in the Refutatio, but it is used to describe the process of writing the tenth 
book. Again, see Matthew R. Crawford’s discussion of περιγραφή in his “The Triumph of Pro-Nicene 
Theology over Anti-Monarchian Exegesis: Cyril of Alexandria and Theodore of Heraclea on John 14:10-
11,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 21, no. 4 (2013): 549–55. 
124 With this observation, I do not mean to suggest that ὑπόστασις was not an important term for 
Origen’s formulation of the distinction between the Father and Son. I call attention to its absence here only 
to suggest that it was only one of a cluster of terms Origen used to describe the individuality or distinction 





was that the Son’s ἰδιότης and οὐσία κατὰ περιγραφήν were preserved only because the 
divinity of the Son was rejected. Origen’s problem with the latter error appears to have 
been the denial of divinity to the Son. Ηe is unconcerned with the fact that his opponents 
held that the οὐσία of the Son according to περιγραφήν was said to be ἑτέρα τοῦ πατρός. 
Origen seems comfortable with οὐσία being used to distinguish the Father and Son.125 He 
does not even flinch at the suggestion that the οὐσία of the Son is ἑτέρα τοῦ πατρός. 
 His lack of concern with the way οὐσία is used here is reflected in the fact that the 
term does not appear anymore in this section. That Origen has no problem with οὐσία 
being used as part of an expression of the Father-Son distinction here is further confirmed 
by a passage later in book 2 of ComJn. Origen writes,  
Now since the Savior here is 'light' in general, and in the catholic epistle of the 
same John, God is said to be light, one thinks it is confirmed from that source too 
that the Father is not distinct from the Son in essence. But another who has 
observed more accurately and speaks more soundly will say that the light which 
shines in the darkness and is not overcome by it, and the light in which there is no 
darkness at all are not the same.126 
 
Origen’s problem with the position in this passage is that it claims that the Father is not 
separate or distinct from the Son in οὐσία. It is clear that Origen would readily approve 
the opposite, namely, that the Father and Son are distinct in οὐσία, as acceptable doctrine. 
Origen, in fact, makes exactly this move in De oratione: “For if, as is demonstrated by 
other arguments, the Son is a being and subject distinct from the Father, it follows that 
                                                 
125 Compare Origen’s usage here with that of Clement of Alexandria in Excerpta ex Theodoto 19, 
which I discuss in chapter 1. There, Clement uses περιγραφήν to talk about the distinction of the Son (or 
Logos), but he maintains that the Father and Son are not distinguished by οὐσία as Origen appears to allow 
here. 
126 Origen, ComJn 2.149 (trans. FC 80:134; Greek SC 120:304-6): Ἐπεὶ δὲ «φῶς» ἁπαξαπλῶς 
ἐνταῦθα μὲν ὁ σωτήρ, ἐν δὲ τῇ καθολικῇ τοῦ αὐτοῦ Ἰωάννου ἐπιστολῇ λέγεται ὁ θεὸς εἶναι φῶς, ὁ μέν τις 
οἴεται καὶ ἐντεῦθεν κατασκευάζεσθαι τῇ οὐσίᾳ μὴ διεστηκέναι τοῦ υἱοῦ τὸν πατέρα· ὁ δέ τις ἀκριβέστερον 
τηρήσας, ὁ καὶ ὑγιέστερον λέγων, φήσει οὐ ταὐτὸν εἶναι τὸ φαῖνον ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ φῶς καὶ μὴ 





prayer should be addressed to the Son and not to the Father, or to both, or to the Father 
alone.”127  
Simonetti supports this conclusion and observes that in addition to ὑπόστασις and 
ὑποκείμενον, Origen also uses οὐσία to distinguish the Father and Son.128 Ilaria Ramelli 
claims that ComJn 2.149 supports her contention that Origen taught that the Father and 
Son “are the same in their essence or οὐσία....”129 Ramelli, however, has misread the 
passage. Origen puts the claim that the Father and Son (using light imagery) are not 
separated in οὐσίᾳ on the lips of those whom he is opposing. He clearly signifies this fact 
by introducing the statement with “someone thinks” (ὁ μέν τις οἴεται). Origen explicitly 
states that he prefers the opposite stance, that the Father and the Son are not the same. 
Ramelli goes on to assert that Origen here teaches that the Father and Son “are two 
different individuals, having different individual substances or ὑποστάσεις.”130 Apart 
from the fact that this assertion is built on a faulty premise concerning Origen’s use of 
οὐσία in the passage, Ramelli’s argument cannot stand. Ramelli wants to introduce a fine 
distinction between οὐσία and ὑπόστασις in this passage, but the term ὑπόστασις does not 
occur here or in the immediately surrounding context (it occurs again in 2.156, but not in 
                                                 
127 Origen, De oratione 15.1: “εἰ γὰρ ἕτερος, ὡς ἐν ἄλλοις δείκνυται, κατ’ οὐσίαν καὶ ὑποκείμενόν 
ἐστιν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ πατρὸς, ἤτοι προσευκτέον τῷ υἱῷ καὶ οὐ τῷ πατρὶ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ἢ τῷ πατρὶ μόνῳ.” Greek 
from Origen, Origenes Werke: Buch V-VIII Gegen Celsus; Die Schrift vom Gebet, ed. Paul Koetschau, vol. 
2, Griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte 3 (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1899), 334. 
128 See Simonetti, “Note sulla teologia trinitaria di Origene,” 273–4. 
129 See her “Origen, Greek Philosophy, and the Birth of the Trinitarian Meaning of Hypostasis,” 
Harvard Theological Review 105, no. 03 (2012): 304. 
130 Ibid. Ramelli displays the same sort of tendency in her treatment of the Dialogue with 
Heraclides. She notes that the term ὑπόστασις is not present but then argues that the meaning is clear: 
“Although the key term ὑπόστασις does not pop up here – probably for the sake of simplicity and the lack 
of a philosophical context – Origen’s conception of the two distinct hypostases in one and the same divine 





connection with the relationship between the Father and Son). Origen might have 
catalyzed the development of these two key terms, but they had certainly not achieved 
any sort of stability when he was composing the first books of ComJn. 
Origen’s choice of vocabulary in this one small section which is extant in Greek is 
in particular contrast with Ramelli’s thesis that Origen had a stable, advanced, and 
technical usage of οὐσία and ὑπόστασις that laid the foundation for the Nicene 
formulation. See, for example, her typical statement: “Origen himself had already 
maintained both things: that the Father, the Son, and the Spirit have the same οὐσία but 
are three different ὑποστάσεις…. As I set out to argue, Origen's thought represented a 
novel and fundamental theorization with respect to the communality of οὐσία and the 
individuality of ὑποστάσεις, conceived as individual substances, in the Trinity.”131 
 After explaining the errors of those trying to avoid ditheism, Origen returns to his 
exegesis of John 1:1 in order to provide a solution to the problem the monarchians raised: 
(17) Their problem can be resolved in this way. We must say to them that at one 
time God, with the article, is very God (αὐτόθεος), wherefore also the Savior says 
in his prayer to the Father, ‘That they may know you the only true God.’ On the 
other hand, everything besides the very God, which is made God by participation 
in his divinity (πᾶν δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὸ αὐτόθεος μετοχῇ τῆς ἐκείνου θεότητος 
θεοποιούμενον), would be more properly not said to be ‘the God,’ but ‘God.’ To 
be sure, his ‘firstborn of every creature,’ inasmuch as he was the first to be with 
God and has drawn divinity into himself (ἅτε πρῶτος τῷ πρὸς τὸν θεὸν εἶναι 
σπάσας τῆς θεότητος εἰς ἑαυτόν), is more honored than the other gods beside him 
(of whom God is God as it is said, ‘The God of gods, the Lord has spoken, and he 
has called the earth’). It was by his ministry that they became gods, for he drew 
from God (ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀρυσά<μενος>) that they might be deified, sharing 
ungrudgingly also with them according to his goodness. (18) The God, therefore, 
is the true God. The others are gods formed according to him as images of the 
prototype. But again, the archetypal image of the many images is the Word with 
the God, who was ‘in the beginning.’ By being ‘with the God’ he always 
continues to be ‘God.’ But he would not have this if he were not with God, and he 
                                                 






would not remain God if he did not continue in unceasing contemplation of the 
depth of the Father (οὐκ ἂν δ’ αὐτὸ ἐσχηκὼς εἰ μὴ πρὸς θεὸν ἦν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν 
μείνας θεός, εἰ μὴ παρέμενε τῇ ἀδιαλείπτῳ θέᾳ τοῦ πατρικοῦ βάθους).132 
 
Origen begins by noting that God with the article, ὁ θεός, is “very God” (αὐτόθεος).133 
By quoting Jesus’ prayer from John 17:3, Origen clarifies that the Father is αὐτόθεος, or 
the only true God (ἀληθινὸν θεόν).134 The designation of the Father as αὐτόθεος allows 
Origen to distinguish the Father from all of the other theoi.135 
                                                 
132 Origen, ComJn 2.17-8 (trans. FC 80:98-9): ἐντεῦθεν λύεσθαι δύναται. (17.) Λεκτέον γὰρ 
αὐτοῖς, ὅτι τότε μὲν αὐτόθεος ὁ θεός ἐστι, διόπερ καὶ ὁ σωτήρ φησιν ἐν τῇ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα εὐχῇ· «Ἵνα 
γινώσκωσι σὲ τὸν μόνον ἀληθινὸν θεόν»· πᾶν δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὸ αὐτόθεος μετοχῇ τῆς ἐκείνου θεότητος 
θεοποιούμενον οὐχ «ὁ θεὸς» ἀλλὰ «θεὸς» κυριώτερον ἂν λέγοιτο, οὗ πάντως «ὁ πρωτότοκος πάσης 
κτίσεως», ἅτε πρῶτος τῷ πρὸς τὸν θεὸν εἶναι σπάσας τῆς θεότητος εἰς ἑαυτόν, ἐστὶ τιμιώτερος, τοῖς λοιποῖς 
παρ’ αὐτὸν θεοῖς—ὧν ὁ θεὸς θεός ἐστι κατὰ τὸ λεγόμενον· «Θεὸς θεῶν κύριος ἐλάλησε, καὶ ἐκάλεσε τὴν 
γῆν»—διακονήσας τὸ γενέσθαι θεοῖς, ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀρυσά<μενος> εἰς τὸ θεοποιηθῆναι αὐτούς, ἀφθόνως 
κἀκείνοις κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ χρηστότητα μεταδιδούς. (18.) Ἀληθινὸς οὖν θεὸς ὁ θεός, οἱ δὲ κατ’ ἐκεῖνον 
μορφούμενοι θεοὶ ὡς εἰκόνες πρωτοτύπου· ἀλλὰ πάλιν τῶν πλειόνων εἰκόνων ἡ ἀρχέτυπος εἰκὼν ὁ πρὸς 
τὸν θεόν ἐστι λόγος, ὃς «ἐν ἀρχῇ» ἦν, τῷ εἶναι «πρὸς τὸν θεὸν» ἀεὶ μένων «θεός», οὐκ ἂν δ’ αὐτὸ ἐσχηκὼς 
εἰ μὴ πρὸς θεὸν ἦν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν μείνας θεός, εἰ μὴ παρέμενε τῇ ἀδιαλείπτῳ θέᾳ τοῦ πατρικοῦ βάθους. Greek 
from SC 120:216-8. 
133 Compare Origen’s usage of αὐτόθεος here to Tertullian’s usage of ipsum deum: “And so that 
they should not think they ought to stone him on the ground that he had wished himself to be taken for God 
himself, that is, the Father, because he had said, I and the Father are one, by way of showing that he is 
God, the Son of God, not by way of <showing> that he is God himself….” Tertullian, Adversus Praxean 
22.12 (trans. Evans, 164; Latin CCSL 2.2:1191): et ne putarent ideo se illum lapidare debere, quasi se 
Deum ipsum, id est Patrem, uoluisset intellegi quia dixerat: Ego et Pater unum sumus, qua Filium Dei 
Deum ostendens, non qua ipsum Deum…. Tertullian here argues that the Father is ipsum Deum, while the 
Son is only Deum. Tertullian’s usage here serves the same purpose as Origen’s distinction between 
αὐτόθεος and θεός. Note also the similarity in Origen’s usage here to that of Numenius in fragments 19-20 
(des Places) discussed above. In both cases the αὐτο- prefix is used to distinguish the source from the 
recipient. Note also John Whittaker’s discussions of αὐτο- prefixes used in contexts of self-generation. See 
his “The Historical Background of Proclus’ Doctrine of the ΑΥΘΥΠΟΣΤΑΤΑ,” in De Jamblique à 
Proclus: Neuf exposés suivis de discussions, ed. Bent Dalsgaard Larsen, Entretiens sur l’Antiquité classique 
21 (Vandœuvres-Genève: Fondation Hardt, 1975), 193–237; idem, “Self-Generating Principles in Second-
Century Gnostic Systems,” in The Rediscovery of Gnosticism: The School of Valentinus, ed. Bentley 
Layton, vol. 1, Studies in the History of Religions: Supplements to Numen 41 (Leiden: Brill, 1980), 176–
93. Origen never uses the sort of self-generation language that Whittaker discusses, but his use of the αὐτο- 
prefixes is similar to that of Numenius. 
134 The ἀληθινὸν θεόν language from John 17:3 is similar to that used by Philo. Philo separated the 
highest God from the others by using “true God” language as well: ὁ μὲν ἀληθείᾳ θεὸς εἷς ἐστιν (Philo, De 
somniis, 229). Note also Philo’s discussion of the God and God in the following sections. This passage in 
Philo provides a parallel to Origen’s usage. 
135 Recall my earlier discussion of the αὐτο-X language in Numenius and the fragment of Origen 





 Unlike the psilanthropists, Origen was not willing to secure the distinction of the 
Father and Son by denying the divinity of the Son. In order to argue that the Son was 
divine while still distinct from the Father, Origen invoked the framework of 
participation.136 Within this framework, all other divine beings (the theoi) are divine only 
insofar as they participate in the divinity of the αὐτόθεος.137 Origen then makes explicit 
that this notion of deity by participation includes the “firstborn of every creature.” He has 
“drawn divinity into himself” (σπάσας τῆς θεότητος εἰς ἑαυτόν).138 The implications of 
this statement are clear: divinity (θεότης) properly belongs to the Father, and a share of it 
comes to the Son from outside himself, that is, from the Father who is divinity itself. 
David Balás observes that “as in the Platonic tradition, in Origen's works, too, 
participation expresses the relationship of a lower degree within the hierarchy of beings 
to the higher.”139 The Son is divine, but only because he participates in the divinity of the 
                                                 
136 David L. Balás has argued convincingly that the concept of participation is fundamental for any 
analysis of Origen’s thought. See his “The Idea of Participation in the Structure of Origen’s Thought. 
Christian Transposition of a Theme of the Platonic Tradition,” in Origeniana: Premier colloque 
international des études origéniennes, Montserrat, 18-21 Septembre 1973, ed. Henri Crouzel, Gennaro 
Lomiento, and Josep Rius-Camps, Quaderni di “Vetera Christianorum” 12 (Bari: Istituto di letteratura 
cristiana antica, Università di Bari, 1975), 257. René Cadiou also highlights the foundational role of the 
concept of participation in Origen’s thought. See his Origen, His Life at Alexandria, trans. John A. 
Southwell (St. Louis, Mo.: Herder, 1944), 136. Note also the comment of Corsini, cited by Balás: “Il 
subordinazionismo, in particolare, sembra essere il frutto di quello che è, sostanzialmente, il nucleo 
metafisico fondamentale della speculazione origeniana: l’idea di partecipazione.” Origen, Commento al 
Vangelo di Giovanni, ed. and trans. Eugenio Corsini, Classici della filosofia 3 (Torino: Unione tipografico-
editrice torinese, 1968), 41. 
137 Both Philo and Origen note that only one is properly called God, although they do not use the 
same vocabulary to do this. 
138 He uses two verbs, σπάω and ἀρύω, to speak of the Son “drawing” divinity into himself. 
139 Balás, “The Idea of Participation,” 261. Balás’ argument in this article is abbreviated because it 
is in a short conference paper. He offers a fuller discussion of the philosophical background of the idea of 
participation in the first chapter of his Metousia Theou: Man’s Participation in God’s Perfections 
according to Saint Gregory of Nyssa, Studia Anselmiana Philosophica Theologica 55 (Rome: I. B. C. 
Libreria Herder, 1966). There, he notes, “The idea of participation acquired true philosophical importance 
for the first time with Plato, who introduced the term μέθεξις primarily to express the relationship of the 
many individual and sensible instances to the one ‘idea’ or ‘form’” (2). At p. 4 of the same work, he also 





Father or draws it into himself.140 His participation in the divnity of the Father necessarily 
entails him receiving or drawing it from the Father into himself. Only one is αὐτόθεος, 
and it is not the Son. Origen’s use of αὐτό- language to establish distinction between the 
Father and Son is even more intriguing when considered alongside monarchian 
theological expressions. Consider Origen’s usage in response to the following passage 
from Contra Noetum: “You see, brethren, how rash and reckless a doctrine they 
introduced in saying quite shamelessly, 'The Father is himself Christ; he is himself the 
Son; he himself was born, he himself suffered, he himself raised himself up!”141 
Nevertheless, it is not inappropriate to call the Son θεός as long as he is distinguished 
from αὐτόθεος. 
 When ComJn 2.13-32 is viewed alongside other passages where Origen employs 
a hierarchical scheme (such as ComJn 13.151-3 and ComMatt 15.10 discussed above), it 
becomes clear that Origen has classed the Son below the Father in terms of divinity.142 
                                                 
of participation naturally [came] to express not only the relationship between the intelligible and sensible 
worlds, but also more generally the relation of any lower to any higher degree of reality.”  
140 Jules Lebreton argues that this passage is a good example of the sort of hierarchy with unequal 
degrees of divinity that he thinks is characteristic of Alexandrian theology. J. Lebreton, “Le désaccord de la 
foi populaire et de la théologie savante dans l’Église chrétienne du IIIe siècle (suite et fin),” Revue 
d’histoire ecclésiastique 20, no. 1 (1924): 15–6. He further notes that this sort of divine hierarchy shows 
“l’influence des spéculations philosophiques” (17). Lebreton locates the sources of this hierarchical 
tendency in what he considers to be an Alexandrian emphasis on the transcendence of God (16). Although I 
think Lebreton is correct in his assertion that (at least some) Alexandrian theologians had a hierarchical 
understanding of the Godhead, his assessment is part of a somewhat inexact characterization of different 
theologies. For example, Lebreton speaks of early theologians who only considered the persons of the 
Trinity “dans leurs relations avec le dogme du salut.” That is, he wants to paint a picture of early 
theologians who were not influenced by philosophy. 
141 Hippolytus, Contra Noetum, 3.2 (Greek and trans. Hippolytus, Contra Noetum, ed. Robert 
Butterworth, Heythrop Monographs 2 (London: Heythrop College [University of London], 1977), 48: 
ὁρᾶτε, ἀδελφοί, πῶς προαλὲς καὶ τολμηρὸν δόγμα παρεισήνεγκαν ἀναισχύντως λέγοντες, Αὐτός ἐστι 
Χριστὸς ὁ Πατήρ, αὐτὸς Υἱός, αὐτὸς ἐγεννήθη, αὐτὸς ἔπαθεν, αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἤγειρεν! The Noetians used 
αὐτός frequently to identify the Father and the Son, but Origen’s usage turns it to the opposite purpose. 
142 It is difficult to find the proper word to describe Origen’s view of the relationship between the 
Father and Son in ComJn 2.13-32. He does not express this relationship with a single word that can easily 





He places the Son among the other theoi, who also receive divinity through participation 
in the Father. Origen is aware that his classification of the Son with the other theoi might 
be troubling for some, and he quickly moves to reassert the preeminence of the Son. The 
Son, he writes, “is more honored than the other gods beside him” (ἐστὶ τιμιώτερος, τοῖς 
λοιποῖς παρ’ αὐτὸν θεοῖς). Although the other theoi receive divinity by participation like 
the Son, they only receive it through the mediation of the Son. “It was by his ministry 
that they became gods, for he drew from God (ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀρυσά<μενος>) that they 
might be deified, sharing ungrudgingly also with them according to his goodness.”143 In 
this schema, then, the Son participates directly in the divinity of the Father; and the other 
theoi participate indirectly through the Son. For this reason, the Son outranks them even 
though he, too, receives divinity. Origen further stresses the mediatorial function of the 
Son as he argues that the Son is the archetypal image upon whom the other images are 
based. 
 There are some interesting similarities here with the work of Novatian. Recall that 
Novatian had argued that the Spirit is inferior to the Son because the Spirit receives from 
the Son. He also applied the same logic to the Son’s relationship to the Father. Origen’s 
schema of participation implies the same sort of relationship between the source and 
receiver, although he never expresses it as bluntly as Novatian. I argue that he is less 
                                                 
we could say that the Son is “downstream” from the Father when it comes to divinity. Such a description, 
while somewhat awkward, has the virtue of emphasizing, as does Origen, that the Son receives divinity 
from a source. He is not himself the source of divinity. 
143 Note the striking structural similarity between Origen’s scheme here and that in ComMatt 15, 
where he writes, “Considered in relation to the Father, the Son is the image of the Father’s goodness; 
considered in relation to other beings, he is to them what the Father’s goodness is to him” (translation from 
Daniélou, Origen, trans. Mitchell, 255). In each passage, the Father is the ultimate source (be it of divinity 





blunt and explicit than Novatian here because other notions are doing the work of 
describing the relationship between the Father and Son. First, Origen uses his exegesis of 
the definite article in John 1:1 to establish that the Son receives divinity from the Father. 
Second, this exegesis occurs within a typically Origenian hierarchical structure that 
presupposes the inferiority of things that are “downstream” from the source. He did not 
need to explicitly say that the Son was inferior to the Father because the whole 
framework in which he was discussing the Son (or Logos here) presupposed it. 
 Origen ends this section in a manner that suggests how firmly he situates the Son 
within the participatory framework. He writes of the Son, “By being 'with the God' he 
always continues to be 'God.' But he would not have this if he were not with God, and he 
would not remain God if he did not continue in unceasing contemplation of the depth of 
the Father” (οὐκ ἂν δ’ αὐτὸ ἐσχηκὼς εἰ μὴ πρὸς θεὸν ἦν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν μείνας θεός, εἰ μὴ 
παρέμενε τῇ ἀδιαλείπτῳ θέᾳ τοῦ πατρικοῦ βάθους). Here the logic of participation is 
made clear: one possesses that in which one participates only so long as one continues in 
participation. Because divinity is received by the Son from a source outside of himself, 
argues Origen, he would cease to be God if he stopped being with the only true God, who 
is the Father. The “being-with” of John 1:1 (πρὸς τὸν θεόν) Origen thus interprets within 
his framework of participation.144 Furthermore, divinity can be possessed in degrees 
                                                 
144 In light of the participated nature of the Son’s divinity, I think Crouzel misses the mark when 
he writes: “Bien que le Fils et l’Esprit aient reçu tout ce qu’ils ont du Père, origine de la divinité et de 
l’univers, ils le possèdent comme leur bien propre et parfaitement, sans possibilité de croissance ou de 
diminution” (Although the Son and the Spirit have received all that they are from the Father, who is the 
origin of the deity and of the universe, they possess it as their own and perfectly, without the possibility of 
increase or decrease). See his, Origène (Paris; Namur: Lethielleux; Culture et vérité, 1985), 237 (trans. 
Origen, 181). Origen does seem to think that the Son will always remain God, but Crouzel does not specify 
what he means whe he says “they possess it as their own and perfectly.” In the passage I am considering, 
Origen stresses the opposite: the Father is αὐτόθεος καὶ ἀληθινὸς θεὸς, not the Son. If Origen maintained, 
as Crouzel contends, that the Son and Spirit possessed as their own and perfectly what they received, we 





depending on how perfectly one participates.145 The Son is more honored than the other 
theoi because of the supremely exemplary nature of his participation.146 
 Origen is aware that even though he has safeguarded the uniqueness of the Father 
by calling him αὐτόθεος, some will still suspect that he has failed to maintain the 
traditional monotheistic assertion that there is only one God. He continues, 
(19) Some, however, have probably taken offense at what we said when we 
described the Father as the true God but, in addition to the true God (ἀληθινοῦ 
θεοῦ), said many gods have come into existence by participation in the God (θεῶν 
πλειόνων τῇ μετοχῇ τοῦ θεοῦ γινομένων). These people might fear that the glory 
of the one who transcends all creation is put on a level with the others who 
happen to have the title 'god.' Because of this we must set for this explanation in 
addition to the difference which has already been explained in relation to which 
                                                 
There is a tension in Origen’s thought that Crouzel side-steps too easily. On the one hand the Son always 
remains God (ἀεὶ μένων «θεός») because he is “πρὸς τὸν θεὸν” and has been since the beginning. On the 
other hand, everything except ὁ αὐτόθεος is made God (θεοποιούμενον) by participation through reception. 
The tension lies in the fact that Origen seems to be bending philosophy’s schema so that he can account for 
the Christian faith. Normally, a trait that is possessed by participation can be lost; but Origen claims that 
this is not the case with regard to Jesus’ possession of divinity by participation. 
145 Balás describes Origen’s use of participation well: “Common to all applications seems to be 
that it expresses a relationship of a 'lower level' of being, which possesses a certain perfection in a derived, 
dependent manner to a 'higher level' of being, which possesses the same perfection fully, and is the source 
of it for others.” See Balás, “The Idea of Participation,” 270. Balás later suggests that within the Trinity, 
“though the aspects of receiving and of personal communion are fully present, the character of an 
accidental, losable, decreasing or growing possession is explicitly excluded by Origen, as is also the notion 
of a temporal beginning.” (271) Balás’ argument here is unconvincing. He seems eager to avoid what he 
thinks are the negative side effects of participation within the Trinity. He produces as evidence for his 
claim ComJn 2.124, where Origen claims that rational beings to not possess blessedness as an inseparable 
attribute (ἀχώριστον συμβεβηκὸς τὴν μακαριότητα). This passage, however, is not directly addressing the 
members of the Trinity. Even more, a passage like ComJn 2.76 seems to problematize his claim. There, 
Origen writes, “The Holy Spirit seems to have need of the Son ministering to his hypostasis, not only for it 
to exist, but also for it to be wise, and rational, and just, and whatever other thing we ought to understand it 
to be by participation in the aspects of Christ which we mentioned previously” (trans. FC 80:114): “οὗ 
χρῄζειν ἔοικε τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα διακονοῦντος αὐτοῦ τῇ ὑποστάσει, οὐ μόνον εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ σοφὸν 
εἶναι καὶ λογικὸν καὶ δίκαιον καὶ πᾶν ὁτιποτοῦν χρὴ αὐτὸ νοεῖν τυγχάνειν κατὰ μετοχὴν τῶν προειρημένων 
ἡμῖν Χριστοῦ ἐπινοιῶν” (Greek from SC 120:256). If the Holy Spirit has to participate in the Son even to 
exist, it is difficult to see how Balás can support his claim that what is received in the Trinity is not 
accidental—at least in the case of the Holy Spirit. 
146 Joseph Trigg expresses the full import of this passage well: “Origen, although he insisted on 
Christ's divinity and utter difference from all lesser beings, was unwilling to ascribe to the Son the same 
dignity he ascribed to the Father. The son as a mediating hypostasis is inferior to the Father and represents 
a lower stage in the cosmological scale. Only the Father, Origen said, is truly God; the Son is God only by 
participation in the Father. He found in the opening verse of the Gospel of John a grammatical construction 
that confirmed his evaluation of the Son's lesser divinity.” See Joseph Wilson Trigg, Origen: The Bible and 





we declared that God the Word is the minister of deity (θεότητος) to all the other 
Gods. (20) The reason which is in each rational being has the same position in 
relation to the Word which is in the beginning with God, which is God the Word, 
which God the Word has with God. For as the Father is very God and true God 
(ὡς γὰρ αὐτόθεος καὶ ἀληθινὸς θεὸς ὁ πατὴρ) in relation to the image and images 
of the image (wherefore also men are said to be 'according to the image,' not 
'images'), so is the very Word (ὁ αὐτόλογος) in relation to the reason in each one. 
For both hold the place of a source; the Father, that of divinity, the Son, that of 
reason (Ἀμφότερα γὰρ πηγῆς ἔχει χώραν, ὁ μὲν πατὴρ θεότητος, ὁ δὲ υἱὸς 
λόγου).147 
 
The potential fear that Origen describes is precisely the sort of thing that would have 
troubled the monarchians. The application of the title “God” to more than one being 
opens one to the monarchian critique of ditheism or polytheism. Origen’s emphasis on 
the title “God” here signals that the application of this title was problematic for the 
monarchians unless the Son was identified with the Father. Origen reiterates that even 
though they are called theoi, they are not placed in the same position as the true God with 
regard to divinity, for the true God transcends all else.148 The other theoi are downstream 
from the source (πηγή), as it were; and they are one step further removed from the source 
                                                 
147 Origen, ComJn 2.19-20 (FC 80:99-100). (19.) Ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ εἰκὸς προσκόψειν τινὰς τοῖς 
εἰρημένοις, ἑνὸς μὲν ἀληθινοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀπαγγελλομένου παρὰ δὲ τὸν ἀληθινὸν θεὸν θεῶν 
πλειόνων τῇ μετοχῇ τοῦ θεοῦ γινομένων, εὐλαβουμένους τὴν τοῦ πᾶσαν κτίσιν ὑπερέχοντος δόξαν 
ἐξισῶσαι τοῖς λοιποῖς τῆς «θεὸς» προσηγορίας τυγχάνουσι, πρὸς τῇ ἀποδεδομένῃ διαφορᾷ, καθ’ ἣν 
ἐφάσκομεν πᾶσι τοῖς λοιποῖς θεοῖς διάκονον εἶναι τῆς θεότητος τὸν θεὸν λόγον, καὶ ταύτην παραστατέον. 
(20.)Ὁ γὰρ ἐν ἑκάστῳ λόγος τῶν λογικῶν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἔχει πρὸς τὸν ἐν ἀρχῇ λόγον πρὸς τὸν θεὸν 
ὄντα λόγον θεόν, ὃν ὁ θεὸς λόγος πρὸς τὸν θεόν· ὡς γὰρ αὐτόθεος καὶ ἀληθινὸς θεὸς ὁ πατὴρ πρὸς εἰκόνα 
καὶ εἰκόνας τῆς εἰκόνος, —διὸ καὶ «κατ’ εἰκόνα» λέγονται εἶναι οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὐκ «εἰκόνες»—οὕτως ὁ 
αὐτόλογος πρὸς τὸν ἐν ἑκάστῳ λόγον. Ἀμφότερα γὰρ πηγῆς ἔχει χώραν, ὁ μὲν πατὴρ θεότητος, ὁ δὲ υἱὸς 
λόγου. Greek from SC 120:218-20. 
148 Origen discusses differing degrees of participation in De Prin. 4.4.9.  Creatures which 
participate in the same thing are said to share in the same nature as each other, even though they can 
possess the participated thing in different degrees. Origen writes, “Everyone who shares in anything is 
undoubtedly of one substance and one nature with him who shares in the same thing” (trans. Butterworth, 
325-326; Latin from GCS 22:361): Omnis, qui participat alicuius, cum eo, qui eiusdem rei particeps est, 
sine dubio unius substantiae est uniusque naturae. Origen does not here spell out what this might mean for 
the Son’s participation in the Father’s divinity, perhaps because of Rufinian modifications; but Origen 
seems to have been able to speak about things being of the same nature while possessing something more 
or less fully. See also Crouzel’s discussion of this passage from De Prin.: Henri Crouzel, Théologie de 





because divinity is mediated to them by the Word, who is the minister of deity (διάκονον 
τῆς θεότητος). 
 After explaining the participatory schema with regard to divinity, Origen turns his 
attention to the way in which rational creatures participate in the Logos. In the same way 
that the Father is the source of divinity, so too the Word (ὁ λόγος, ὁ αὐτόλογος) is the 
source of reason in all rational creatures.149 Origen goes on to speak of degrees of 
participation in the Logos, noting that there can be “words of the second or third rank 
next to the Word who is before all things.”150 Just as there is a hierarchy of reason in 
those who participate in the Logos, so too there must be a hierarchy of those theoi who 
have divinity through participation in the Father. The graded nature of this participatory 
framework of logos is reflected in the graded nature of the participatory framework of 
divinity, since Origen himself says the two frameworks are similar.151 Origen places the 
                                                 
149 Aletti draws attention to a subtle shift in Origen’s terminology here. On the one hand, those 
beings which participate in the divinity of the Father are called theoi. On the other hand, those beings 
which participate in the reason of the Word are called logikoi, not logoi (“D’une écriture à l’autre,” 32). 
Commenting on ComJn 2.20, Aletti notes that “Origen insists not on the subordination of the Word, but on 
the fact that he is, like the Father, source” (Origène insiste non sur la subordination du Verbe, mais sur le 
fait qu’il est comme le Père, source). See ibid., 44. Aletti then concedes in a footnote that there is in this 
passage a “subordination quant à l’origine.” Even after this concession, however, Aletti argues that nothing 
indicates that this is a “subordination substantielle.” While Aletti’s observation that nothing in this section 
suggests substantial subordination is technically correct, his comment reveals the imposition of foreign 
concerns on this passage, namely, the heightened polemical importance of questions regarding divine 
substance in the Nicene and post-Nicene contexts. Substance is of little interest to Origen in this passage; 
his main concerns are with divinity, reason, and the sources of each. Aletti appears concerned to rescue 
Origen from the charge of teaching the substantial or ontological subordination of the Son. Even if he is 
successful in this task, though, Origen can still be said to be teaching a subordination of divinity in the Son. 
Surely this is just as problematic from a post-Nicene perspective as teaching that the Son is ontologically 
subordinate to the Father. Aletti’s tendency here is mirrored in the recent work of Bruns, which I discussed 
earlier. See especially Trinität und Kosmos, 22–3. It seems as though both Aletti and Bruns think that if 
they can prove that Origen did not teach the ontological subordination of the Son, they have proven that his 
theology is consonant with that of Nicaea. As this chapter has indicated, however, I find such approaches to 
be anachronistic. 
150 Origen, ComJn 2.23 (trans. FC 80:100): λόγων δευτέρων ἢ τρίτων παρὰ τὸν πρὸ πάντων. 
Greek from SC 120:222. 
151 Harnack also notes that Origen’s notion of source implies a gradation within the Trinity: “But, 





Son below the Father in the hierarchy of divine beings; yet he is still above all of the 
other theoi. The Son, being reason itself (ὁ αὐτόλογος), sits atop the hierarchy of the 
logikoi. Although the Son must receive divinity from another, he himself is the source of 
all reason. 
 After what he says might be seen as a digression, Origen sums up the force of his 
preceding argument: 
There was “the God” and “God,” then “gods” in two senses. “God the Word” 
transcends the higher order of these gods, himself being transcended by “the God” 
of the universe. And again, there was “the Word,” and perhaps also “Word,” 
comparable to “the God” and “God,” and “the words” in two senses.152 
 
Origen’s discussion of the Father and Son here is similar to those passages discussed 
above where he speaks of the goodness of the Father and Son. In both ComJn 13 and 
ComMatt 15, Origen introduced a hierarchical framework wherein the Father transcended 
the Son and the Son transcended the rest of creatures. He does the same here, even using 
the same key term (ὑπερέχω) to describe this transcendence. Later, in a passage where he 
is considering the Son as “light,” Origen makes a similar argument in even stronger 
terms, writing, “Now to the extent that God, the Father of truth, is more than, and greater 
than, the truth and, being the Father of wisdom, is greater than and surpasses wisdom, to 
this extent he transcends being ‘true light.’”153 Not only has Origen here used his 
                                                 
τῆς θεότητος) and principle of the other two hypostases, the Trinity is in truth no homogeneous one, but 
one which, in accordance with a ‘subtle emanation idea’, has degrees within it” (History of Dogma, trans. 
Neil Buchanan, vol. 2 [Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1907], 358). 
152 Origen, ComJn 2.32 (trans. FC 80:102; Greek SC 120:230-232): Ἦν γὰρ «ὁ θεὸς» καὶ «θεός», 
εἶτα «θεοὶ» διχῶς, ὧν τοῦ κρείττονος τάγματος ὑπερέχει ὁ «θεὸς λόγος» ὑπερεχόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ τῶν ὅλων 
«θεοῦ». Καὶ πάλιν ἦν «ὁ λόγος», τάχα δὲ καὶ «λόγος», ὁμοίως τῷ «ὁ θεὸς» καὶ «θεός», καὶ «οἱ λόγοι» 
διχῶς. 
153 Origen, ComJn 2.151 (trans. FC 80:134; Greek SC 120:310): ᾧ δὲ λόγῳ ὁ πατὴρ τῆς ἀληθείας 
θεὸς πλείων ἐστὶ καὶ μείζων ἢ ἀλήθεια καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ὢν σοφίας κρείττων ἐστὶ καὶ διαφέρων ἢ σοφία, τούτῳ 





characteristic term ὑπερέχω, he has also used the terms “more” (πλείων), “greater” 
(μείζων), and “better” (κρείττων) to describe the Father’s transcendence of the Son. This 
passage comes shortly after Origen brings up a problem:  
Now since the Savior here [Jn 1:4] is “light” in general, and in the catholic epistle 
of the same John, God is said to be light [1 Jn 1:5], one thinks it is confirmed 
from that source too that the Father is not distinct from the Son in essence. But 
another who has observed more accurately and speaks more soundly will say that 
the light which shines in the darkness and is not overcome by it, and the light in 
which there is no darkness at all are not the same.154 
 
It is probable that the position Origen takes issue with in this passage is some form of 
monarchianism. If Origen is addressing monarchians here, he would seem to be opposing 
those who deny that the Father and Son are distinct in οὐσία. In the accounts of 
monarchianism I considered in part one, proponents of monarchianism do not often use 
technical language like οὐσία.155 A bit later, Origen argues that because the Father is the 
Father of Wisdom, he is “greater than and surpasses wisdom.”156 The verb Origen uses 
for “surpass” (διαφέρω) here carries the implication of differing from something else 
because it excels the other thing. If this is the sense Origen intends for the verb here, it 
clarifies his argument. Because the Father transcends and surpasses the Son, they cannot 
be the same. Origen’s hierarchical understanding of the universe, with its concomitant 
                                                 
154 Origen, ComJn 2.149 (trans. FC 80:134; Greek SC 120:308-10): Ἐπεὶ δὲ «φῶς» ἁπαξαπλῶς 
ἐνταῦθα μὲν ὁ σωτήρ, ἐν δὲ τῇ καθολικῇ τοῦ αὐτοῦ Ἰωάννου ἐπιστολῇ λέγεται ὁ θεὸς εἶναι φῶς, ὁ μέν τις 
οἴεται καὶ ἐντεῦθεν κατασκευάζεσθαι τῇ οὐσίᾳ μὴ διεστηκέναι τοῦ υἱοῦ τὸν πατέρα· ὁ δέ τις ἀκριβέστερον 
τηρήσας, ὁ καὶ ὑγιέστερον λέγων, φήσει οὐ ταὐτὸν εἶναι τὸ φαῖνον ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ φῶς καὶ μὴ 
καταλαμβανόμενον ὑπ’ αὐτῆς, καὶ τὸ φῶς ἐν ᾧ οὐδαμῶς ἐστι σκοτία. 
155 They prefer to say things like the Father and Son are “one and the same” (ἑν καὶ ὁ αὐτός), but 
they do not specify one and the same “what.” If this usage of οὐσία is an insertion of Origen, it does not 
necessarily help us to understand the intricacies of the position he was opposing. As I noted above, his 
usage of οὐσία is not fixed and consistent. 
156 Origen, ComJn 2.151 (trans. FC 80:134; Greek SC 120:310): ὁ πατὴρ ὢν σοφίας κρείττων ἐστὶ 





subordinationism, pervades all of his thought; but he utilizes it in this anti-monarchian 
context to prove that the Father and Son are not the same.  
 As the preceding analysis has demonstrated, Origen expressed a subordination of 
the Son to the Father in ComJn 2.13-32. The question of whether this is an ontological 
subordination is a red herring. Origen focuses on divinity and reason in this passage, not 
on ousia and hypostasis. The subordination of the Son to the Father with regard to 
divinity is not an oversight or mistake, nor is it a corner into which Origen is backed or a 
shoal he fails to avoid despite his best efforts. Origen intentionally employs the 
framework of participation, with its concomitant subordinationism, in order to refute 
monarchian assertions that the Father and Son are one and the same. His distinction 
between ὁ θεός and θεός and ὁ αὐτόθεος and θεοί allows him to affirm that the Son is 
God (θεός, but not ὁ θεός) without the implication that he is the same as the Father. 
Origen, like Tertullian and Novatian, argued that the derivative or received nature of the 
Son’s divinity distinguished him from the Father, who alone properly and fully possessed 
divinity. With regard to divinity, the Son was downstream from the Father, the source 







This dissertation rests on the methodological assumption that to understand 
Origen’s Trinitarian theology properly, it is necessary to offer a detailed reading of that 
theology within its contemporary context in the early third century.1 Any attempt to 
understand his theology requires a consciousness of the theological debates of Origen’s 
time. Furthermore, the more detail we can provide about the theological positions Origen 
opposed or sought to correct, the better.2 
Based on these methodological commitments, this dissertation has focused on a 
small part of the vast corpus of Origen’s work: ComJn 1-2. In an evocative passage from 
these two books, ComJn 2.13-32, Origen gives an account of the relationships among the 
Father, Son, and the rest of creation that functions as a corrective to what he views as a 
pious but misguided theology: monarchianism. A methodologically sound reading of this 
passage requires as detailed an account of monarchianism as we can provide. Prior to my 
work in this dissertation, however, such a focused attempt to understand monarchian 
theology did not yet exist in English-language literature.3 
The first part of this dissertation was an attempt to provide a thorough and 
fulsome account of monarchianism as a theological movement. There are no surviving 
works of monarchian theology from the early third century, so any reconstruction relies 
                                                 
1 This dissertation is not, then, interested in the Nachleben of Origen’s thought in the Nicene and 
post-Nicene debate, as important and interesting as it may be.  
2 Recall my note from the introduction that this dissertation is a long-form version of what Michel 
R. Barnes calls a “dense reading,” a term I define there. 
3 Furthermore, the examinations of monarchianism that did exist were not focused on 





on second-hand and often hostile witnesses to this understudied theological movement. 
Using the available sources, I offered an account of monarchianism that demonstrates 
that it had a stable core of theological commitments and development during the brief 
period of time I study. The monarchians shared with other streams of Christianity two 
non-negotiable theological commitments: (1) there is only one God; and (2) Jesus (or the 
Son) is God. The tension produced by these two commitments led the monarchians to 
what I consider their characteristic conclusion that the Father and Son are “one and the 
same.”4 With this assertion that the Father and the Son were the same, the monarchians 
opposed distinction between the Father and the Son, which they viewed as imperiling the 
uniqueness of God. 
 Monarchianism was popular at the beginning of the third century, probably 
because of its unabashed affirmation that Jesus was God and its staunch commitment to 
defending the uniqueness of God. Despite its popularity, monarchianism did not go 
unchallenged. Soon some notable theologians produced anti-monarchian treatises. Part 
two of this dissertation considered Origen alongside those other theologians who wrote 
against the monarchians. Origen likely wrote books one and two of ComJn at the height 
of the monarchian controversy, shortly after returning to Alexandria from Rome, the 
epicenter of the monarchian controversy. 
My reexamination of ComJn 1-2 alongside other anti-monarchian writers and 
against the backdrop of monarchian theology brings into stark relief some of the key 
features of Origen’s Trinitarian theology. Both Origen and his contemporary anti-
                                                 
4 In the surviving accounts that we have, the monarchians do not make this statement more 





monarchian counterparts shared the two core theological commitments of the 
monarchians; they too wanted to affirm both that there is only one God and that Jesus is 
God. They could not, however, accept the conclusion that this meant that the Father and 
the Son were “one and the same.” Therefore, they had to articulate theologies in such a 
way that allowed them to affirm that Jesus is God, that there is only one God, and that the 
Father and Son are in some meaningful way distinct.5 
This is precisely what Origen attempts to do in ComJn 1-2. In ComJn 1, he 
develops and emphasizes a Wisdom Christology so that he can argue that the Son, as 
Wisdom, was a distinct agent or actor alongside the Father “from the beginning.”6 Where 
one would expect him to devote all of his attention to the occurrence of Logos in John 
1:1, we instead see him turn his focus to Wisdom as an important title for the Son. 
Furthermore, Origen’s emphasis on the Son as Wisdom allows him to use scriptural texts 
like Proverbs 8:22 to argue that the Son was alongside the Father prior to creation.7  
In the passage I consider at the greatest length, ComJn 2.13-32, Origen’s response 
to the monarchian claims is even clearer, especially since he signals that he is responding 
to their theology in 2.16. In this passage, Origen argues that the Father is “the God” and 
                                                 
5 See my brief summary of the key terms and means they used to describe the distinction of the 
Father and Son at the beginning of chapter five. Another way to define “distinct” in the context of the anti-
monarchian writers is “not one and the same.” Although these authors never use a phrase this unsubtle, this 
is what they need to prove. The anti-monarchian theologians must walk a tightrope and affirm that the 
Father and Son are one without allowing that they are “one and the same.” For this reason, they cast about 
for various ways to distinguish the Father and Son without completely separating them. 
6 I say “agent or actor” here because I do not think that Origen’s vocabulary for speaking of 
different individuals had stabilized this early in his career. 
7 As I argued in chapter four, the existence of the Son prior to creation is important for two 
reasons: (1) it places another alongside the Father prior to creation; (2) this other (the Son or Logos or 
Wisdom) has existence “from the beginning” or eternally. See, for example, De prin. 1.2.2 and ComJn, 2.9. 
The “two stage” Logos theologies would have been problematic for Origen because they denied the 





that the Son is “God” by participation. He uses several devices to argue that the Father is 
truly God or “God himself.” This emphasis allows him to demonstrate that he, too, 
believes that there is only one God. By claiming that the Son is God by participation, 
Origen is also able to affirm that the Son is God without claiming that they constitute a 
coordinated pair of two Gods. The framework of participation that Origen employs to 
make this argument leads him to claim that the Father transcends the Son, that the Father 
is greater than the Son. In their anti-monarchian writings, Tertullian and Novatian made 
similar arguments. Both argued that although the Son was God, he was somehow less 
than the Father. This allows them to say that the Son is not “the same as the Father,” for 
something cannot be less than itself. Instead of emphasizing that the Son is less than the 
Father, Origen focuses on the transcendence of the Father over the Son. Origen’s 
argument varies slightly from that of Novatian and Tertullian, but the result is the same. 
What is greater than something else cannot be the same as that which it is greater than. 
Because of their contention that the Son is less than the Father, the theologies of 
Tertullian, Origen, and Novatian have been labelled as “subordinationist” by scholars at 
different points.8  Scholars who label these theologies as “subordinationist” often imply 
or explicitly state that they are deficient. This negative evaluative judgment of early third-
century “subordinationism” is based on an anachronistic imposition of post-Nicene 
definitions of Trinitarian orthodoxy onto these earlier authors. For Origen, as also for 
Tertullian and Novatian,9 a subordinationist understanding of the Father and Son enabled 
                                                 
8 Of course, the question of Origen’s subordinationism is hotly debated; and some scholars, such 
as Ramelli, would disagree with my assessment. 
9 Regarding Novatian’s subordinationism, I agree with the broad conclusions of Daniel Lloyd’s 
dissertation on Novatian’s subordinationism. See his “Ontological Subordination in Novatian of Rome’s 





a cogent response to the appeal of monarchianism.10 Origen’s subordinationism allowed 
him to argue that there is only one God, that the Son is God, and that the Son is not the 
same as the Father. This dissertation enables an appreciation of the theological force and 
function of Origen’s subordinationism by demonstrating how he intentionally utilized it 
to combat monarchian teaching.  
 
  
                                                 
10 I am not the first to argue that pre-Nicene subordinationism was not aberrant. Wolfgang Marcus 
argued this position in his Der Subordinatianismus als historiologisches Phänomen: Ein Beitrag zu unserer 
Kenntnis von der Entstehung der altchristlichen “Theologie” und Kultur unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung der Begriffe Oikonomia und Theologia (München: M. Hueber, 1963). While Marcus 
seeks to normalize pre-Nicene subordinationism, his account is directed at determining whether this pre-
Nicene subordinationism should be considered some sort of “proto-Arianism.” His account is more 
historically sensitive than most, but it is still drawn into the orbit of Nicene and post-Nicene debates. Daniel 
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